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COMPARATIVE DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW: A CRITICAL
EVALUATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS
Abstract
This study1 addresses the key information technology issues of the age and
its unintended consequences. The issues include social control by
businesses, governments, and information age Star Chambers. The study
focuses on a comparative analysis of data protection, data security, and
information privacy (DPSIP) laws, regulations, and practices in five countries.
The countries include Australia, Canada, South Africa, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The study addresses relevant international legal
standards and justifications. This multidisciplinary analysis includes a
systems thinking approach from a legal, business, governmental, policy,
political theory, psychosocial, and psychological perspective. The study
implements a comparative law and sociolegal research strategy. Historic,
linguistic, and statistical strategies are applied. The study concludes with a
next step proposal, based on the research, for the international community,
the five countries in the study, and specifically, South Africa as it has yet to
enact a sound DPSIP approach.
Key words: Australia data protection, Canada data protection, comparative
law privacy or data protection, data protection, data security, information
privacy, information privacy laws, information technology, International data
protection legal standards, social control ,sociolegal information privacy,
South Africa data protection, United Kingdom, data protection, United States
information protection.
1 The analysis and research is current to 30 June 2013.
vAcknowledgements
No thesis could ever be completed without the criticism, encouragement,
patience, and wisdom of the project supervisor [Chair in the US]. This author
was blessed with working with the supervisor of this project, Professor
Anneliese Roos of the School of Law and the University of South Africa. At
the very beginning of the author’s connection with the Law School, he met
and worked with Professor Tana Pistorius, who was a beacon of light and
direction in the unknown. The published works and actions of Professor J.
Neethling is also acknowledged. All of the above were a source of inspiration
for the project that helped the author translate the various standards and
expectations differences between South Africa (SA) and United States (US)
academic standards in researching and writing about the law.
A special acknowledgement is noted for Professor Ian Lloyd who, at the time
was affiliated with the School of Law at the University of Strathclyde in
Glasgow Scotland. He was the author’s Dissertation Chair and teacher. For
a decade he was also the director of the graduate law program where the
author was a teaching tutor. The friendship has continued.
An acknowledgement is noted for a former teacher, Professor Michael Geist
at the School of Law at the University of Ottawa in CA. His analysis and
writings were an inspiration. A note of thanks is also noted for the life and
works of the Honorable Justice Michael Kirby in AU. Both ofr these scholars
represent countries where the author has lived and worked
An acknowledgement is noted for the author’s past teachers of law at the
Schools of Law at Harvard, New York University, Stanford, and Oxford Law
Schools. The list of teachers includes Professors Yochai Bernker, William
Fisher III, Lawrence Lessig, Charles Nesson, and Jonathan Zittrain,
An acknowledgement is also noted for the major professors and mentors
engaged in the author’s undergraduate education at Weber State. The
analysis could not have been accomplished without the mentors in the Ph.D
vi
program. M.B.A., and M.S.W. programs at the University of Southern
California. The business administration mentor was Larry E. Greiner, D.B.A.
Psychology mentors included Campbell Perry, Ph.D., Donald Schrader,
Ph.D., and Martin Orne, M.D., Ph.. The social work mentors included Barbara
Solomon, D.S.W., Carl Shafer, D.S.W., and Herman Borenzweig, D.S.W. A
special acknowledgement to Linda.
vii
Privacy: An Observation Cartoon
Non-exclusive use of this cartoon granted to Ray William London, Ph.D. as
part of his LL.D. thesis by the artist for a fee.
viii
Table of Contents
Title Page i
Author’s Declaration ii
Approval Page iii
Abstract iv
Acknowledgements v
Privacy: An Observation Cartoon vii
Table of Contents viii
Abbreviations and Acronyms x
List of Figures xv
List of Tables xvi
Table of Cases xviii
Table of Regulations and Statutes xxxvii
Table of International Conventions, Declarations and Treaties xliv
Table of Governmental Documents li
Detailed Outline lxx
Chapter One: Data Protection and Security Law: The Problem 1
Chapter Two: Data Protection and Security Law: Sociolegal Issues 38
Chapter Three: Data Protection and Security Law: International Legal
Standards
135
Chapter Four: Data Protection and Security Law: Australian Legal
Standards
207
Chapter Five: Data Protection and Security Law: Canadian Legal
Standards
262
Chapter Six: Data Protection and Security Law: South African Legal
Standards
330
Chapter Seven: Data Protection and Security Law: United Kingdom
Legal Standards
376
Chapter Eight: Data Protection and Security Law: United States of
America Legal Standards
433
Chapter Nine: Data Protection and Security Law: Comparative
Evaluation
529
ix
Chapter Ten: Data Protection and Security Law: Gold Standard
Proposal
561
Appendix A International Declarations 600
Bibliography 602
xAbbreviations and Acronyms
ACLU American Civil Liberties Union (US)
ADMA Australian Direct Marketing Association (AU)
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution
ADVISE Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and
Semantic Enhancement
ALRC Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC)
ALWD Association of Legal Writing Directors Citation Manual (3rd
ed.).
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency (US)
AU Australia - Commonwealth of Australia
B2B Business to Business
B2C Business to Consumer
BCR Binding Corporate Rules
BT British Telecom (UK)
CA Canada - Government of Canada
CA-ASA The CA Anti-Spam Act (CA)
CAD Canadian Dollars
CEAA Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CA)
CEPA Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CA)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CM Comparative Model of Legal Support of DPSIP Models
COPPA Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (US)
CORBA Common Object Request Broker Architecture
CPO Chief Privacy Officer
CSA Canadian Standard Association (CA)
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Administration
(US)
DEA Drug Enforcement Agency (US)
DHS Department of Homeland Security (US)
DNC Do Not Call Registry (US)
DOC Department of Commerce (US)
xi
DOT Department of Transportation (US)
DPA Data Protection Act (UK)
DPA-EU Data Protection Authority (EU)
DPSIP Data Protection, Security, and Information Privacy
ECHR European Court of Human Rights.
EEA European Economic Area
ECPA Electronic Communications Privacy Act (US)
EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor (EU)
EHR Electronic Health Records
EMR Electronic Medial Records
EPC Electronic Product Code
EPIC Electronic Privacy Information Center
EU European Union
FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act (US)
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)
FCC Federal Communications Commission (US)
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (US)
FERPA Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (US)
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (US)
FTC Federal Trade Commission (US)
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GB Great Britain - England, Scotland, and Wales
GAO Government Accountability Office (US)
GLBA Gramm-Leach-Bililey Act (US)
GPS Global Positioning Systems
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (US)
HITECH Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health
HP Hewlett Packard
HPPs Health Privacy Principles (AU, NSW)
HRA Human Rights Act (UK)
HUAC House Un-American Activities Committee (US)
ICO Information Commissioner’s Office (UK)
IDL Interface Definition Language
xii
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IIOP Inter-ORB Protocol
IP Intellectual Property
InP Internet Protocol
IPPs Information Privacy Principles (AU)
IRS Internal Revenue Service (US)
ISP Internet Service Providers
IT Information Technology
KDD Knowledge Discovery in Databases
MPAA Motion Picture Association of America (US)
NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (US)
NAI National Advertising Network (US)
NCLB National Civil Liberties Bureau (CA)
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act (US)
NFC Near Field Communications
NGO Non-Governmental Organizations
NPP National Privacy Principles (AU)
NSA National Security Agency (US)
NSF National Science Foundation (US)
NSW New South Wales (AU)
NT Northern Territory (AU)
OAS Organization of American States (Western Hemisphere)
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development
OMB Office of Management and Budget (US)
OMG Object Management Group
OTA Office of Technology Assessment (US)
PbD Privacy by Design
PCPA Pest Control Products Act (CA)
PCC Privacy Commissioner of Canada (CA)
PDE Personal Data Ecosystem
PDV Personal Data Vault
PET Privacy Enhancing Technologies
xiii
PIA Privacy Impact Assessment
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PIPEDA Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document
Act (CA)
PM Personalized Medicine
POIP Protection of Personal Information (SA)
Qld Queensland (AU)
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police (CA)
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (UK)
SA Republic of South Africa
SA-AU South Australia (AU)
SALRC South African Law Reform Commission (SA)
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission (US)
SLAPPS Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (CA)
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SQL Structured Query Language
SSL Secure Socket Layer Encryption
SSN Social Security Number (US)
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications
TAPAC Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee (US)
Tas Tasmania (AU)
TIDE Terrorist Identities’ Datamart Environment (US)
TSR Telemarketing Sales Rule (US)
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain (England, Scotland, and
Wales) and Northern Ireland.
UN United Nations
UPPs Uniform Privacy Principles (AU)
US United States of America
USA-Patriot Act Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Obstruct Terrorism Act
(US)
xiv
USD United States Dollar
VA Veterans Administration (US)
Vic Victoria (AU)
W3C World Wide Web Consortium
WA Western Australia (AU)
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
xv
List of Figures
Figure # Title Page
1.1 Source of the Breaches 10
1.2 State of Privacy Map 12
1.3 Continuum of DPSIP Approaches 32
2.0 Impact Assessment Decision Making Model 91
9.0 Sociolegal Analysis 536
9.1 International DPSIP Textual Analysis 552
9.2 Data Protection Terms 553
9.3 Term Relationships 554
9.4 Privacy Definitions 555
9.5 Operational Definitions 556
9.6 Exclusions 557
xvi
List of Tables
Table # Title Page
2.0 PII Ownership 101
3.0 Resolutions 155
4.0 Comparison of Australian and United States
Supreme Court
219
4.1 Comparative Model of Australian Legal Support of
DPSIP Models
255
5.0 Comparison of Canadian and United States
Supreme Court
280
5.1 Complaints Received and Closed between January
1, 2007 and December 31, 2009
310
5.2 Privacy Concerns 315
5.3 Comparative Model of Canadian Legal Support of
DPSIP Models
324
6.0 Comparison of South African and United States
Supreme Court
346
6.1 Security Concerns 368
6.2 Comparative Model of South African Legal Support
of DPSIP Models
370
7.0 Comparison of United Kingdom and United States
Supreme Court
387
7.1 Concern with Regard to Organizations using
Personal Information
414
7.2 Comparative Model of United Kingdom Legal
Support of DPSIP Models
427
8.0 United States Supreme Court 463
8.1 State Constitutional Declarations 483
8.2 Fair Information Practices 490
8.3 Self-regulation Arguments 497
8.4 Poll Meta Analysis Data 504
8.5 Harris Poll 506
xvii
8.6 Concerns 507
8.7 Consumer Concerns 507
8.8 Expectation of Privacy Supreme Court Cases 510
8.9 Comparative Model of United States Legal Support
of DPSIP Models
522
9.0 Comparative Technology and Regulatory Data 537
xviii
Table of Authorities
Table of Cases
Australia (AU)
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, (2001)
HCA 63; 208 CLR 199; 185 ALR 1; 76 ALJR 1, (15 November 2001)
(AU).
Australian Style Pty Ltd v .au Domain Administration Limited, VSC 422, (25
September 2009) (Vic SC-AU).
Beauchamp v Department of Education (General), VCAT 1653, (2006) (Vic-
AU).
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, 176 CLR 1 at 38, (1992) (AU).
Director General, Department of Education and Training v MT (GD),
NSWADTAP 77, (23 December 2005) (NSW-AU).
Director General, Department of Education and Training v MT, NSWCA 270
(2006) (NSW-AU).
Dodd v Department of Education and Training, VCAT 2207, (21 October
2005) (Vic-AU).
Dietrich v The Queen, 177 CLR 292 at 305, (1992) (AU).
GA & Ors v Department of Education and Training and NSW Police (GD),
NSWADTAP 18, (25 May 2004) (NSW-AU).
Gilleer v Procipets, VSC 113, (2004) (Vic AU).
GQ v NSW Department of Education and Training (No 2) NSWADT 319,
(2008) (NSW-AU).
Grosse v Purvis, QDC 151, (2003) (Qld AU).
HW v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2), NSWADT 73, (2004) (NSW-
AU).
Jane Doe v ABC, VCC 281, (2007) (Vic AU).
JD v Director General, NSW Department of Health (No 2) NSWADT 256,
(2007) (NSW-AU).
JD v NSW Medical Board, NSWADT 247, (3 November 2005) (NSW-AU).
KJ v Wentworth Area Health Service, NSWADT 84, (3 May 2004) (NSW-AU).
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 189 CLR 520., (1997) (AU).
xix
Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199. (AU)
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh, 183 CLR 273 at 286-6,
(1995) (AU).
MT v Director General, NSW Department of Education & Training, NSWADT
194, (3 September 2004) (NSW-AU).
NRMA v John Fairfax, NSWSC 563, (2002) (NSW AU).
OD v Department of Education and Training, NSWADT 161, (2005) (NSW-
AU).
ON v Marrickville Council, NSWADT 274, (2 December 2005) (NSW-AU).
OQ v Commissioner of Police, NSWADT 240, (2005) (NSW-AU).
PN v Department of Education and Training, NSWADT 122, (2006) (NSW-
AU).
SW v Forests NSW, NSWADT 74, (2006) (NSW-AU).
Vice-Chancellor Macquarie University v FM, NSWCA 192, (2005) (NSW-AU).
Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor, HCA 45; ( 1937)
58 CLR 479, (26 August 1937 ) (AU).
Canada (CA)
A-G Canada v A-G Quebec, 2 D.L.R. 81 (JCPC), (1932) (CA).
Aubry v. Editions Vice-Versa Inc, 1 S.C.R. 591, (1998) (CA).
B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Minister of Health Services), 2005
CarswellBC 672, 2005 BCSC 446, 27 Admin. L.R. (4th) 125, 129
C.R.R. (2d) 301, (25 March 2005) (CA-BCSC).
Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship &
Immigration), 2002 CarswellNat 1476, 2002 FCA 270, 291 N.R. 236,
228 F.T.R. 319 (note), [2003] 1 F.C. 219, 21 C.P.R. (4th) 30, 1 Admin.
L.R. (4th) 270, (21 June 2002) (CA).
Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), [2003]
B.C.J. No. 1344, 14 B.C.L.R. (4th) 359, [2003] 9 W.W.R. 242, 2003
BCSC 862, 2003 CarswellBC 1394 (B.C. S.C.), (5 June 2003) (CA).
Canada Post Corp. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works) (1995), [1995] F.C.J.
No. 241, 60 C.P.R. (3d) 441, 91 F.T.R. 320 (note), (sub nom. Societe
canadienne des postes v. Canada) [1995] 2 F.C. 110, 179 N.R. 350, 30
Admin. L.R. (2d) 242, 1995 CarswellNat 688, 1995 CarswellNat 652
xx
(Fed. C.A.), (10 February 1995) (CA).
Canadian AIDS Society v. Ontario (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 1720, 25 O.R.
(3d) 388 (Ont. Gen. Div.); affirmed Canadian AIDS Society v. Ontario
(1996), [1996] O.J. No. 4184, 39 C.R.R. (2d) 236, 31 O.R. (3d) 798,
1996 CarswellOnt 4604 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused Canadian
AIDS Society v. Ontario (1997), [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 33, (sub nom.
Canadian Aids Society v. Ontario) 107 O.A.C. 80 (note), 216 N.R. 159
(note), 43 C.R.R. (2d) 188 (note) (S.C.C.), (1997) (CA).
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v Northwest Territories (Minister of Finance),
2006 CarswellNWT 41, 2006 NWTSC 33 (N.W.T. S.C.). (6 July 2006)
(CA).
Community Charge Registration Officer of Runnymede Borough Council v.
Data Protection Registrar, Case DA/90 24/49/3 (1990) (CA).
Dickie v. Nova Scotia (Department of Health) (1999), (sub nom. Dickie v.
Nova Scotia (Minister of Health)), 538 A.P.R. 333, 176 N.S.R. (2d) 333,
173 D.L.R. (4th) 656, [1999] N.S.J. No. 116, 1999 CarswellNS 97 (N.S.
C.A.), (4 February 1999) (CA).
Dr. Jeffrey Wyndowe (Psychiatric Assessment Services Inc.) v. X., Federal
Court of Appeal File No. A–551–06, (2008) (CA).
Englander v. Telus Communications, Inc., 2004 FCA 387 (Federal Court of
Appeal 2004) (CA).
Finlay v. Minister of Finance of Canada, 2 S.C.R. 607, (1986) (CA).
Hung v. Gardiner (2002), 2002 CarswellBC 1953, 2002 BCSC 1234, [2002]
B.C.J. No. 1918, 45 Admin. L.R. (3d) 243 (B.C. S.C.); additional
reasons at Hung v. Gardiner (2003), 2003 CarswellBC 509, 2003
BCSC 285, [2003] B.C.J. No. 499 (B.C. S.C.); affirmed Hung v.
Gardiner (2003), [2003] B.C.J. No. 1048, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 298, 32
C.P.C. (5th) 1, 302 W.A.C. 4, 184 B.C.A.C. 4, 1 Admin. L.R. (4th) 152,
227 D.L.R. (4th) 282, 2003 CarswellBC 1060, 2003 BCCA 257 (B.C.
C.A.),(21 August 2002) (CA).
Hunter v Southam, 2 S.C.R. 145, (1984) (CA).
Hunter v. Southam Inc, 2 S.C.R. 145, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 41 C.R. (3d) 97,
(1984) (CA).
xxi
Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, (18 January 2012) (CA).
Keating v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (2001), 2001 CarswellNS 206,
2001 NSSC 85, [2001] N.S.J. No. 227, 606 A.P.R. 290, 194 N.S.R.
(2d) 290, 42 Admin. L.R. (3d) 66 (N.S. S.C.) (CA).
Lycka v Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner), 2009 CarswellAlta
588, 2009 ABQB 245 (Alta. Q. B.) (CA - Alberta).
MacNeill v. Prince Edward Island (Information & Privacy Commissioner)
(2004), 22 Admin. L.R. (4th) 144, 2004 PESCTD 69, 2004 CarswellPEI
88, [2004] P.E.I.J. No. 86, 719 A.P.R. 231, 242 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 231
(P.E.I. T.D.), (23 November 2004) (CA).
Marcoux v. Bouchard, 204 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [S.C.C.], (2001) (CA).
Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borowski, 2 S.C.R. 575, (1981) (CA).
Montana Band of Indians v. Canada (Minister of Indian & Northern Affairs)
(1988), 1988 CarswellNat 723, 26 C.P.R. (3d) 68, [1989] 1 F.C. 143, 51
D.L.R. (4th) 306, [1988] 5 W.W.R. 151, 31 Admin. L.R. 241, 18 F.T.R.
15, 59 Alta. L.R. (2d) 353, [1988] 4 C.N.L.R. 69, 1988 CarswellNat
1202 (Fed. T.D.), (15 April 1988) (CA).
Nichols v. Young O.J. No. 4367, (Ontario Court of Appeal) (2003) (CA).
Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, 2 S.C.R. 265, (1976) (CA).
R v. Whiteley, Court Of Appeal, Hearing-Dates: (22 January, 4 February
1991) (CA).
R. v Harris (2006), [2006] O.J. No. 1321, 2006 CarswellOnt 2015, 2006 ONCJ
106 (Ont. C.J.); reversed R. v. Harris (2007), 87 O.R. (3d) 214, [2007]
O.J. No. 3185, 49 C.R. (6th) 220, 51 M.V.R. (5th) 172, 2007
CarswellOnt 5279, 2007 ONCA 574, 163 C.R.R. (2d) 176, 225 C.C.C.
(3d) 193, 228 O.A.C. 241 (Ont. C.A.), (24 August 2007) (CA).
R. v Mills, 1999 CarswellAlta 1055, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 248 N.R. 101, 28
C.R. (5th) 207, [2000] 2 W.W.R. 180, 244 A.R. 201, 209 W.A.C. 201,
75 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, 180 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 69 C.R.R. (2d) 1, [1999] 3
S.C.R. 668, 1999 CarswellAlta 1056, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, (19
January 1999) (CA).
R. v O'Connor, 1995 CarswellBC 1098, [1996] 2 W.W.R. 153, [1995] 4 S.C.R.
411, 44 C.R. (4th) 1, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 235, 191 N.R.
1, 68 B.C.A.C. 1, 112 W.A.C. 1, 33 C.R.R. (2d) 1, (14 December 1995)
xxii
(CA).
R. v. Dyment, 2 S.C.R. 417 at 427-428, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 503, 66 C.R. (3d)
348, (1988) (CA).
R. v. Drybones, S.C.R. 282, 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473, 3 C.C.C. 355, 10 C.R.N.S.
334, 71 W.W.R. 161, (1970) (CA).
R. v. E. (M.) (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 2482, 2006 ONCJ 146, [2006] O.J. No.
1657 (Ont. C.J.), (8 March 2006) (CA).
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., (1986) 2 S.C.R. 713 at 779, (1986) (CA).
R. v. Plant, 3 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.), (1993) (CA).
R. v. Stewart, (1988). Stewart v. The Queen. (1988) 1 S.C.R. 963 (1988)
(CA).
R. v. Wise, 1992 CarswellOnt 71, 11 C.R. (4th) 253, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 70
C.C.C. (3d) 193, 133 N.R. 161, 8 C.R.R. (2d) 53, 51 O.A.C. 351, (27
February 1992) (CA).
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney-General) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342
(SC.C.), (1993) (CA).
Rousseau v. Wyndowe A-551-06, 2008 FCA 39, (2008) 2 F.C.R. D-12, (1
February 2008) (CA).
Ruby v Canada (Solicitor General) 2000 CarswellNat 1106, 256 N.R. 278, 184
F.T.R. 159 (note), 6 C.P.R. (4th) 289, [2000] 3 F.C. 589, 2000
CarswellNat 3423, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 675, 3 F.C. 589, 2000 F.C.J. No.
779, 42 Admin. L.R. (3d) 214) (CA).
Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, 1 S.C.R. 1038 (1989) (CA).
Somwar v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd., (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 172
(2006), 263 D.L.R. (4th) 752, (2006) (CA).
Stubicar v Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner, 2008 CarswellAlta
1625, 2008 ABCA 357 (Alta. C.A.) (CA - Alberta).
Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, 1 S. C.R. 138, (1975) (CA).
X. v. Accusearch Inc., dba Abika.com et al., Federal Court File No. T–2228–
05, (2007) (CA).
X. v. Telus Communications Inc., Federal Court of Appeal File No. A–639–05,
(2007) (CA).
xxiii
European Union (EU)
Amann v. Switzerland, ECHR 27798/95, (2000) (EU).
Case of Copland v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 62617/00 (3 April
2007) (ECHR 2007) (EU).
Chavenee Jullien v. France, Appl 14461/88, 71 DR 141, (1991) (EU).
European Court of Human Rights, Case of I v. Finland (Application no.
20511/03). (2008, July 17,), at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=3&portal=hbkm&actio
n=html&highlight=Finland%20%7C%20data%20%7C%20security%20
%7C%20privacy&sessionid=12271808&skin=hudoc-en (accessed 30
July 2011). (EU)
Gaskin v. United Kingdom 10454/83 [1989] European Court of Human Rights
13 (7 July 1989) (EU).
Hatton v. United Kingdom, E.C.H.R. 565, (2002) 34 EHRR 1, (2001) (EU).
Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, 9 EHRR 433, (1987) (EU).
Niemietz v. Germany, E.C.H.R. 12/16/1992, (1992) (EU).
P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, E.C.H.R., 9/25/2001, (2001) (EU).
Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España
SAU, Case C-275/06, (2008) (EU).
Rotaru v. Romania ECHR 28341/95; 8 BHRC 449, (2000) (EU).
The Rachel Affaire. Trib. pr. inst. de la Seine, 1858 D.P. III 62, (1858)
(Sweden).
Republic of South Africa (SA)
Bernstein v Bester, 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (SA).
C v Minister of Correctional Services, 1996 (4) SA 292 (T) (SA).
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal
Studies Intervening), 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (SA).
Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) ) (SA).
Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (T) (SA).
Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd, 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) (SA).
Gosschalk v Rossouw, 1966 (2) SA 476, 492 (C) (SA).
Grutter v Lombard, 2007 (4) SA 89 (SCA ) (SA).
Hendy v. Oomkens abd Shallies, 1924 T.P.D. 165, (1924) (SA).
xxiv
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Ply) Ltd 2001 1 SA 545 (CC ) (SA).
Janit v Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd, 1995 (4) SA 293 (A)
(SA).
Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A) (SA).
Jeffreys v Boosey, (4) HLC 815 862, (1854) (SA).
Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers LTD 1957 (3) SA 461 (W) (SA).
La Grange v Schoeman, 1980 (1) SA 885 (E) (SA).
Madallie & Schieff v. Roux, 1920 20 S.C. 438 (SA).
Mhlongo v Bailey, 1958 (1) SA 370 (C) (SA).
Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa, 1998 (4) SA 1127
(CC) (SA).
Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd v Janit, 1994 (3) SA 56 (W)(SA).
National Media v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) (SA).
O’Keefe v. Argus Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (CPD) (SA).
Protea Technology v Wainer, [1997] 3 All SA 594 (W) 608; 1997 9 BCLR
1225 (W) 1241) (SA).
Rhodesian Printing and Publishing v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590 (R) (SA).
S v A, 1971 (2) SA 293 (T) (SA).
S v Bailey, 1981 (4) SA 187 (N) (SA).
S v. Jordan (6) SA 642 (CC), [2002] (11) B.C.L.R. 1117; 2002 (6) SA 642)
(SA).
Van Tonder v. Alexander, 1906 E.D.L.D. 186 (SA).
Waring & Gillow Ltd v Sherborne, 1904 TS 340 (SA).
United Kingdom (UK)
Alan Lord v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, EWHC 2073,
(1 September 2003) (UK).
Ash & Anor v. McKennitt & Ors, [2006] EWCA Civ 1714 (14 December 2006)
[2007] 3 WLR 194, [2007] EMLR 4, [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB
73, [2006] EMLR 178, (2006) (UK).
Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22 (6 May 2004) [2004] UKHRR 648,
[2004] 2 AC 457, [2004] EMLR 15, [2004] UKHL 22, 16 BHRC 500,
[2004] 2 WLR 1232, [2004] HRLR 24, [2004] 2 All ER 995, (2004)
xxv
(UK).
Community Charge Registration Officer of Runnymede Borough Council v
Data Protection Registrar (Case Da/90 24/49/3) (UK).
Community Charge Registration Officer of South Northamptonshire District
Council v Data Protection Registrar (Case Da/90 24/49/4) (UK).
Community Charge Registration Officer of Harrow Borough Council v Data
Protection Registrar (Case Da/90 24/49/5)) (UK).
Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others, [1993] AC
534, [1993] 1 All ER 1011, [1993] 2 WLR 449, 91 LGR 179 House of
Lords, (1993) (UK).
Douglas & Ors v. Hello! Ltd & Ors, [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch) (11 April 2003)
[2003] 3 All ER 996, [2003] EMLR 31, [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), (2003)
(UK).
Durant v. Financial Services Authority, EWCA Civ 1746, (2003) (UK).
Entick v. Carrington, 1558-1774. All E.R. Rep. 45, (1765) (UK).
Equifax Europe Limited v The Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection
Tribunal (DA/90 25/49/7) (UK).
Gaskin v. United Kingdom, July 7,1989, Series A, No 160, (1998) (UK).
Grant v. Allen (1987 S.C.C.R): Grant v. Procurator Fiscal, High Court of
Justiciary, Hearing-Dates: 5 June, (1987) (UK).
Heydon’s Case 76 Eng. Rep. 637, (1584) (UK).
Hm Advocate v. Wilson High Court of Justiciary, SCCR 420, (1983) (UK).
Infolink Limited v The Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection Tribunal
(DA/90 25/49/6) (UK).
Infolink Limited v. The Data Protection Registrar, (DA/90 25/49/6)) (UK).
Innovations (mail order) Limited v Data Protection Registrar, case da/92
31/49/1) UKIT DA92_31491 (29 September, (1992) (UK).
Johnson v. Medical Defense Union, EWCA Civ 262, (28 March 2007) (UK).
Kaye v. Robertson, FSR 62, (1991) (UK).
Linguaphone Institute Limited v Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection
Tribunal (Case DA/94 31/49/1)) (UK).
London Street Tramways v London County Council, [1898] AC 375, (1898)
(UK).
Marcel v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ch. 225 at 240, (1992) (UK).
xxvi
Midlands Electricity PLC v. The Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection
Registrar (DA/ 99) (UK).
Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379, (1769) (UK).
Morison v. Moat, 68 Eng. Rep. 492, 9 HARE 241, (1851) (UK).
Murray v. Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, (7 May 2008) (UK).
Norman Baker v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKHRR 1275,
(2001) (UK).
Oxford v. Moss Queen's Bench Divisional Court, 68 Cr App Rep 183., (1978)
(UK).
Peter Hitchens v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKHRR 1275,
(10 December 2001) (UK).
Pitman Training Ltd. v. Nominet UK Ch. 1997-F-No, 1984 (High Court. of
Justice May 22, 1997) (UK).
Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 324, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (1741) (UK).
Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 H & Tw 1; 2 De G & SM 293; (1849) 1 Mac & G 25;
[1849] EWHC Ch J20, (1849) (UK).
R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte Equal Opportunities
Commission, 2 WLR 409, (1994) (UK).
R. v. Gold, 2 ALL ER 186 (Court of Appeal), (1988) (UK).
Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No 2) [1991]
1 AC 603, (1991) (UK).
Regina v. Brown, 1 ALL ER 545 at 555-556, (24 July 1997) (UK).
Regina v. Jacqueline Mary Rooney, EWCA Criminal 1841 (12 July 2006)
(UK).
Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd., 65 R.P.C.
203, (1948) (UK).
Slater v. Baker & Stapelton, 95 English Reporter 860 (K. B.), (1767) (UK).
Sykes v. Sykes, 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (1824) (UK).
The Community Charge Registration Officer of Rhondda Borough Council v
Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection Tribunal (Case DA/90
25/49/2)) (UK).
Tony Gosling v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKHRR 1275,
(10 December 2001) (UK).
X v. British Broadcasting Corporation & Anor, [2005] ScotCS CSOH_80 (22
xxvii
June 2005) (UK).
United States (US)
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 1180, 40 S. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173
616, 30 (Holmes, J., dissenting), (1919 ) (US).
ACLU v. Gonzales, No. 04-2614 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6. (2007),(US) at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/nsldecision.pdf (accessed 15 June
2011). (US)
ACLU v. Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L117, (2000) (US).
American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, (1950) (US).
American Friends Service Committee, et al. v City and County of Denver,
United States District Court, District of Colorado, Civil Action No. 02-N-
0740 (CBS), (2002) (US).
Arizona Retail Systems v. The Software Link, Inc, F. Supp.831 759 (D. Ariz.)
(1993) (US).
Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185, (1995) (US).
Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Department of Health, 558 A.2d 1363 (N.J. 1989).)
(US).
Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburg, 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa.
1981); rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 933 (1982) (US).
Beacon Journal Publishing v. Akron, 70 Ohio St. 3d 605, (1994) (US).
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600, (1975) (US).
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (US).
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, (1886) (US).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969) (US).
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 625-26, (1951) (US).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (US).
Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1981) (US).
Buckley v. Valeo, (No. 75-436) No. 75-36, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 519 F.2d
821, affirmed in part and reversed in part; No. 75-437, 401 F.Supp.
1235, affirmed, (1976) (US).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, (1961) (US).
Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 936 F2d 1151 (11th Cir.
xxviii
1991) (US).
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, (1986) (US).
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30,
(1988) (US).
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (US).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (US).
Chevron v. NRDC, 467 US 837, (1984) (US).
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, (1971) (US).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, (1971) (US).
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, (1961)
(US).
Comp Examiner Agency, Inc., dba 25th Century Internet Publishers, v. JURIS,
INC., a Tennessee corporation, Defendant, No. 96-0213-WMB (CTx),
(1996) (US).
Cox v. Riley, 83 Cr. App. R. 54 d, Queen's Bench Divisional Court, Hearing-
Dates: 12 March, (1986) (US).
Dallas v. Staglin, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 1595, (1989) (US).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, (1993) (US).
Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157, (1972) (US).
Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1992) (US).
Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, (1976) (US).
Dickerson v. Raphael, 222 Mich. App. 185 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (US).
Dietemann v. Time, 449 F. 2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1971) (US).
Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006) (US).
Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d
226, (1986) (US).
Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Kodak Cycle Company, 15 R.P.C.
105, (1898) (US).
ECPA, Andersen Consulting LLP v. OUP and Bickel & Brewer, No. 97 C
5501, 1998 WL 30703 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1998) (US).
Edgar v. Mite Corporation, 457 U.S. 624, 631, (1982) (US).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349, (1972)
(US).
Erickson v. Erickson, 246 Conn. 359, 716 A.2D 92 (Conn. 1998) (US).
xxix
Erven Warnink v. Townend, FSR 397, Lord Diplock, (1979) (US).
Federal Trade Commission v. Audiotex Communication, Inc. (2003), at
http://www.Loundy.com/E-LAW_Links.html (accessed 20 May 2011).
Federal Trade Commission v. Zuccarini, No. CIV.A.01-CV4854, 2002 WL
1378421 at *2 (E.D. Pa Apr 9, 2002) (slip op.) (US).
Felsher v. University of Evansville, 755 N.E. 2d 589 (Ind. 2001) (US).
Florida Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524, (1989) (US).
Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100, 111 (1841) (US).
Frohwert v. United States, , 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (US).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir, (1923) (US).
Gibson v Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 548,
(1963) (US).
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 138, (1942) (US).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 1 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510,
(1965) (US).
Handschu v. Special Services Division (NYPD), S.D.N.Y., Index No. 71 Civ.
2203 (CSH) (direct). 605 F.Supp. 1384 (D.C.N.Y. 1985). affirmd, 787
F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986) (US).
Hasbro, Inc., Plaintiff, v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., et al.,
Defendants, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626, (1996) (US).
Henke v. United States Department of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1461 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (quoting Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403, 1408 n.10 (D.C. Cir.
1984). (1996) (US).
Herrera v. Collins, 506 US 390, (1993) (US).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (US).
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, (1987) (US).
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935) (US).
Hunt v. Bradshaw, 88 S.E. 2d 762 (N.C. 1955) (US).
Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360, 366-368, (1918) (US).
In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10580 (D.
Minn., (2004) (US).
In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (US).
In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 7817, 746 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review, (2002) (US).
xxx
Intercon v. Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions, 10 US Number 98-6428, (2000)
(US).
Interstellar Starship Services Limited v. Epix, Inc., Civil No. 97-107-FR. Nov.
20, (1997) (US).
J. E. M. AG. Supply v Pioneer Hi-Bred International, 534 U.S. 124, 141-142.
(1974) (US).
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197 (Stewart J., concurring), (1964) (US).
Junger v. Daley, 2000 FED App. (6th Cir. 2000) (US).
Juno On-Line Services, L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp 684 (N.D. Illl.
1997) (US).
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002) (US).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, (1967)
(US).
Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University, 327 N.W.2d 783, (1982) (US).
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 447 (1957) (US).
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, (1983) (US).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94, (2001)
(US).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 123 S.Ct 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508,
(2003) (US).
Liebling, Jeff, dba The “Lectric Law Library” v. Interlaw Limited, et. al. , U. S.
District Court of Nevada [Case # N-96-107 DWH] (February 15, 1996)
(US).
Lloyd & Henninger v. Marshall, 526 F.Supp. 485, 487 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (US).
Lopez v. United States 373 U.S. 471, (1963) (US).
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 862 (D. Mass., January
24, 2000) (US).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, (1967) (US).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 644, (1961) (US).
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, (1803) (US).
Mc Donald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91, (1917) (US).
McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 514 U.S. 334, (1995)
(US).
McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp 215 (D.D.C., (1998) (US).
xxxi
Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026
(2d Cir. 1989) (US).
Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, (1931) (US).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973),
rehearing denied 414 U.S. 881, 94 S.Ct. 26, 38, L.Ed.2d 128 (1973)
(US).
Minnis v. Department of Agriculture, 737 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1984) cert. denied
471 U.S. 1053, (1985) (US).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, (1966) (US).
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (2001) (US).
MTV Networks v. Curry, (867 F.Supp. 202 S.D.N.Y.) (US).
Multnomah County Medical Society v. Scott, 825 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir., (1987)
(US).
Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation, 434 F. 3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006) (US).
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488,
(1958) (US).
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-433 (1963) (US).
Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d 671 (Kan. 1960) (US).
National Archives and Records Administration v. Allan J. Favish, et al., 124 S.
Ct. 1570, (2004) (US).
National Association of Retired Federal Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (US).
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Federal
Communications Commission, United States of America, Qwest
Communications International Inc. and Verizon. (2009, February 13), at
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200902/07-1312-
1164901.pdf (accessed 2 April 2011). (US)
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Federal
Communications Commission, United States of America, Qwest
Communications International Inc. and Verizon. (2009, February 13), at
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200902/07-1312-
1164901.pdf (accessed 13 February 2011). (US)
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 83
(1964) (US).
xxxii
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, (1977) (US).
Norwood v Harrison 413 U.S. 455, (1973) (US).
Nutrition Physiology Corp. v. Enviros Ltd., N.D. Texas, No. 5:99-CV-0107-C,
3/9/00.) (US).
Oklahoma Press Publishing Company v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494,
90 L.Ed. 614, (1946) (US).
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 S. Ct. 564. 66 ALR 376, 72 L.Ed. 944,
(1928) (US).
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341, (1966) (US).
Panavision v. Network Solutions, 41 U.S.P.Q. 2d [BNA] 1310 [C.D. Cal.
Entered Dec. 2, 1996]) (US).
Paramount Motor Works, Inc v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. C 06-2703 1997
U.S. Dist. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, ) (US).
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, (1976) (US).
Paulsen v. Gundersen, 260 N.W. 448 (Wis. 1935) (US).
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company, 122 Ga. 190; 50 S.E. 68;
1905 Ga. LEXIS 156, (1905) (US).
Peck v. the United Kingdom, (application no. 44647/98), (2003) (EU).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (US).
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S.
37, 45, (1983) (US).
Pittsburgh Press Company v, Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rights, 413
U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973), rehearing denied 414
U.S. 881, 94 S.Ct. 30, 38 L.Ed.2d 128 (1973) (US).
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 142 L. Ed. 2d 71:
67 U.S.L.W., 3231 (1998) (US).
Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 41 F.Supp 2d 1130, D. Or. 1999) (US).
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 [N.D.
Cal.] (1997) (US).
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96, (1972) (US).
Pratt v. Davis 118 Ill. App. 161, (1905) (US).
ProCD Inc. v Zeidenberg. 86 F. 2d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). (US), at
http://floridalawfirm.com/procdinc.html (accessed 11 November 2011).
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (Marshall, J., concurring), (1974)
xxxiii
(US).
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467, (1952) (US).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, (1992) (US).
Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 331 (1886) (US).
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, (1980) (US).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, (1973) (US).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (US).
Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2201,
2213 (June 4, 2007) (US).
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170,
(1957) (US).
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394 -
417, (1886) (US).
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (US).
Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714 (9th Cir.), (1988) (US).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 63 L.Ed. 470, 473, 39 S. Ct. 247
(1919) (US).
Schloendorff v The Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, (1914) (US).
Schuyler v. Curtis et al., 15 N.Y.S. 787, (1891) (US).
Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, (1979) (US).
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, (1960) (US).
Shirley v. Time, Inc., 45 Ohio App. 2d 69, 341 NE2d 337 (Ohio App. 1975)
(US).
Sierra Club v. United State Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988)
(US).
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734,
(1961) (US).
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 569, (1974) (US).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed2d 220, (1979) (US).
Smyth v. Pillsbury Company, 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (US).
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, (1966) (US).
Spitzer vs. Network Associates D/B/A Mcafee 758 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2003) (US).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542, (1969)
(US).
xxxiv
Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology and The Software Link,
Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 3d Circuit, (1991) (US).
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432
(W.D. Tex. 1993), aff'd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (US).
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, (1960) (US).
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, (1976) (US).
Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, 724 F2d 1010, (1984) (US).
Tbornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (US).
TCE, 1996 – The Comp Examiner Agency, Inc. d/b/a 25th Century Internet
Publishers v. Juris, Inc., U.S. District Court, Central District of
California, 96 CV 0213-WMB [CTx] April 23, 1966) (US).
Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86, S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453, (1966) (US).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968) (US).
The Federal Trade Commission v. James J. Rapp, Regana L. Rapp, d/b/a/
Touch Tone Information, Inc., (Civil Action No. 99-WM-783) (2000)
(US).
Theodore v. Ellis, 141 La. 709, 75 So. 655, 660, (1917) (US).
TicketMaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. , Computer & Online Industry Litigation
Report, 24,144 (April. 28, 1997) (US).
Time Inc v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383, (1967) (US).
Truck Equipment Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corporation, 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861, (1976) (US).
Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission, 114 S.
Ct. 2445-2459 (1994) (US).
U. S. Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 114 S.Ct.
1006, (1994) (US).
U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, (1989) (US).
U.S. v. Czubinski, 106 F3d 1069 (1st Cir.), (1997) (US).
U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Corporation, 532 U.S. 483, 494, (2001)
(US).
U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, affirmed. May
xxxv
22) (US).
United States Department of Justice v. Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of
the Press, 489 US 749, 109 S. Ct. 1468, (1989) (US).
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945)) (US).
United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1976) (US).
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (US).
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (US).
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530, (1984)
(US).
United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2nd 1103 (D. Kan., (2000) (US).
United States v. Miami University, 91 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1147 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(US).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71, (1976)
(US).
United States v. New York Telephone Company, 434 U.S. 159, 98 S.Ct. 364,
54 L.Ed.2d 376, (1977) (US).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, (1968) (US).
United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001) (US).
United States v. Steel Company, 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (US).
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32
L.Ed.2d 752, (1972) (US).
US West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10 Cir. 1999) (US).
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54, 62 S. Ct. 920, 921, 86 L.Ed. 1262,
(1942) (US).
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.), (1988) (US).
Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 1997) (US).
Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone. Company 110 F.3d 174 (1st Cir.
1997) (US).
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Incorporated,
425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346, (1976) (US).
Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(US).
Wall v Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943) (US).
xxxvi
Waynick v. Reardon, 72 S.E.2d 4 (N.C. 1952) (US).
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (US).
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, (1977) (US).
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055, (1834) (US).
Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, (1949) (US).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77, (1927) (US).
Wickard v. Filburn 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (US).
Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1983).) (US).
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (US).
Wojciechowski v. Coryell, 217 S.W. 638, 644 (Mo.App, (1920) (US).
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, (1977) (US).
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. 436 U.S. 457, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525,
(1978) (US).
xxxvii
Table of Authorities
Table of Regulations and Statutes
Australia (AU)
Australia Act 1986 Chapter 2 (1986) (AU, UK).
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) amend. No. 43
of 2006 (2006) (AU).
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp), 63 & 64 Victoria, c
12 (Imp.) (1900) (AU).
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act as amended. (2003), at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/general/constitution/par5cha1.htm
(accessed 7 January 2011).
Constitution Act 1902, Act 32 of 1902. (NSW) (1902), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca1902188/
(accessed 16 February 2011).
Constitution of Queensland 2001, Act No. 80 of 2001. (2001), at
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/2001/01AC080.pdf
(accessed 16 February 2011).
Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 (Qld) (1986) (AU).
Criminal Records Act of 1991 (NSW). (1991), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/cra1991167/
(accessed 7 January 2011).
Criminal Records spent Convictions) Act 1992 (NT). (1992), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/crca368/ (accessed 8
January 2011).
Health Records Act (HRA) 2001 (Vic) amend. No. 2 of 2001 (2001) (AU).
Health Records and Information Privacy Act of 2002 (NSW). (2002), at
http://www.informationcommissioner.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/privacynsw/ll_
pnsw.nsf/pages/PNSW_03_hripact (accessed 1 January 2011).
Human Rights Act 2004. (Act) (2004, amended 2010), at
http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/2004-5/current/pdf/2004-5.pdf
(accessed 27 July 2011).
Information Act 2002 amend 2009 (NT). (2002), at
xxxviii
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/ia144.txt (accessed 8
January 2011).
Information Privacy Act of 2000 (Vic-AU) amend. No. 98 of 2000 (2000) (AU).
Information Privacy Act of 2009 (Qld). (2009), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/qld/consol_act/ipa2009231.txt/cgi-
bin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/qld/consol_act/ipa2009231.txt
(accessed 9 January 2011).
Listening and Surveillance Devices Act (SA AU). (1972), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_act/lasda1972326/index.ht
ml (accessed 12 February 2011).
Listening Devices Act of 1991 (Tas AU). (1997), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/tas/consol_act/lda1991181/
(accessed 11 February 2011).
National Consumer Credit Protection Act. (2009), at
http://www.treasury.gov.au/consumercredit/content/legislation.asp The
actual code is at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/151D9CCD
D6F2FAC1CA25768E001B64CC?OpenDocument (accessed 26 July
2011).
Privacy Act of 1988 (Cwlth) amend. Act No. 119 of 1988, Act No. 102 of 2009
(1988) (AU).
Privacy and Personal Data Protection Act 1998 (NSW). (1998), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/papipa1998464/
(accessed 7 January 2011).
Privacy Committee Act of 1975 (NSW). (1975), at
http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/PrivLRes/1995/3/51_2_1.html
(accessed 7 January 2011).
Queensland, Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld). (2002), at
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/I/InvasOfPrivA
71.pdf (accessed 9 January 2011).
South Australia, Constitution Act 1934. (1934), at
http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/CONSTITUTION%20ACT%20
1934/CURRENT/1934.2151.UN.PDF (accessed 16 February 2011).
Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA) (1988) (AU).
xxxix
Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) amend. Act No. 21/1999 (1999) (AU).
Surveillance Devices Act of 1998 (WA AU). (1998), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/sda1998210/
(accessed 12 February 2011).
Surveillance Devices Act of 2007 (NT AU). (2007), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/sda2007210/
(accessed 12 February 2011).
Canada (CA)
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) amend. c. 15.31 (1999) (CA).
Certain Personality Rights amend. Civil Code of Quebec, Chapter III: Respect
of Reputation and Privacy, 35-41, (S.Q. 1991, c.64) (1991) (CA).
Civil Code of Quebec amend. 1991, c. 64, a. 35; 2002, c. 19, s. 2. (1991)
(CA).
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) amend. S.C. 1992, c. 37 (1992) (CA).
Ontario Health Care Consent Act amend. c. 10, Sched. R, s. 14 (1996) (CA).
Personal Health Information Act. SNL2008. c. P-7.01. (2010), at
http://www.assembly.nl.ca/legislation/sr/statutes/p07-01.htm
(accessed 17 July 2011). (SJNL CA).
Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004. S.O. 2004, c. 3. (2010), at
http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_04p03_e.htm
(accessed 17 July 2011).
Pest Control Products Act (PCPA) amend. S.C. 2002, c. 28 (2002) (CA).
Privacy Act ( R.S., 1985, c. P-21 ). (1985), at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/P-21/
(accessed 6 July 2011).
Right to Information Act Chapter R-10.3. (1978), (NB CA) at
http://www.gnb.ca/0062/PDF-acts/r-10-3.pdf (accessed 8 July 2011).
Statutes of Canada 2010; Chapter 23: Anti-Spam amend. Third Session,
Fortieth Parliament, 59 Elizabeth II, 2010 (2010) (CA).
Republic of South Africa (SA)
xl
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. (SA).
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (SA).
Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (SA).
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (SA).
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (SA).
Open Democracy Bill B 67-98 of 1999 (SA).
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (SA).
Protection of Information Bill 6 of 2010 (SA).
Protection of Personal Information Bill 9 of 2009 (SA).
Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of
Communication-related Information Act 70 of 2002 (SA).
United Kingdom (UK)
British Race Relations Act of 1965 amend. ch. 73 § 6(1), as amended in 1976
and 1986 (1986) (UK).
Data Protection Act of 1998 amend. Chapter 29 (1998) (UK).
European Communities Act 1972 (c. 68) (1972) (UK).
Fox’s Libel Act, 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792) (UK).
Government of Wales Act 2006 Chapter 32 (2006) (UK).
Justices of the Peace Act amend. (Eng.). 34 Edw. 3, c. 1. (1361) (UK).
Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 asp 11 (2000) (UK).
Scotland Act 1998 Chapter 46 (1998) (UK).
The Consumer Protection Act 1987 (Commencement No. 1) Order 1987
(1987) (UK).
United States (US)
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 amend. 68 Stat. 919; 42 U.S.C. § 2011-296 (1946)
(US).
Cable Communication Policy Act amend. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1984) (US).
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act amend. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710-2711 (1992, 1994) (US).
California Financial Information Privacy Act amend. California Finance Code
xli
§§ 4050-4060 (2003) (US).
California Health and Safety Code § 130200-130203 (US).
California Invasion of Privacy to Capture Physical Impression Act amend.
California Penal Code,§ 632, subd. (a) (1989) (US).
California Penal Code. § 633 (2006) (US).
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) amend. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501-6506 (1998) (US).
Communications Act of 1934 amend. ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605) (1934) (US).
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) amend. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994)
(US).
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act amend. 5 USC 552a (1988)
(US).
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 amend. 5 U.S.C sec.
552a (1988) (US).
Copyright Act amend. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 810 (1976) (US).
Digital Telephony Act aka, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act 1994 amend. 18 USC 2510-2522 (1994) (US).
E-government Act amend. (Pub.L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 44 U.S.C. § 101,
H.R. 2458/S. 803) (2002) (US).
Electronic Communications Privacy Act amend. (ECPA Title I) 18 U.S.C.A. §§
2510-2521 (1986) (US).
Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act, amend. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2003)
(US).
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) amend. Public Law No. 91-508 (1970) (US).
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) amend. 20 U.S.C. §
1232g; 34 CFR Part 99 (1974) (US).
Federal Power Act amend. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-797, 798-824a, and 824b-
825r, June 10, 1920, as amended 1930, 1935, 1936, 1948, 1949,
1951, 1953, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1968, 1970, 1978, 1980, 1982,
1986, 1988, 1990-1992 and 1996. (1920) (US).
Federal Telecommunications Act amend. (18 USC 2511(2)(a) (1996) (US).
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) amend. See 16 C.F.R. 701 ("the Disclosure
Rule") and 16 C.F.R. 702 ("the Pre-Sale Availability Rule") (2000) (US).
xlii
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914) (US).
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) amend. Public Law 95-511, 92
Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1811) (1978) (US).
Freedom of Information Act amend. 5 U.S.C. sec. 552(b)(6)(7) (1974) (US).
Freedom of Information Act amend. 5 USC, 552 (2005) (US).
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act aka Financial Services Modernization Act amend.
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (US).
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) amend. 42
U.S.C. § 1320 (1996) (US).
Higher Education Amendments amend. Public Law No. 102-325, § 1555(a),
106 Stat. 448, 840 (1992) (US).
Information Practices Act amend. California Civil Code, § 1798 (1977) (US).
Inventions Secrecy Act of 1951 amend. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1951) (US).
Lanham Act amend. 15 U.S.C.1127 (1994) (US).
Mail Fraud Act amend. 39 U.S.C. § 3623 (1994), 39 C.F.R. § 233.3 (1996)
(US).
National Research Act amend. 45 CFR 46 (1974) (US).
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act amend. Pub. L. No. 90-350, 82
Stat. 197 18 U.S.C. § 2511-2520) (1968) (US).
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device Use amend. 18 U.S.C. II, 206, §
3121 (1984) (US).
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) amend. 44
U.S.C. § 2111 (1974) (US).
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act amend. 44 U.S.C. §
2107 (1970 ed., Supp. V). (1974) (US).
Privacy Act of 1974 amend. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1974) (US).
Privacy Protection Act amend. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)(a) et seq (1980) (US).
Public Records Act, California Government Code, 6250. (1996), at
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cacodes/gov/6250-6270.html (accessed
10 September 2011).(US).
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 Author. (2003), at
http://www.nccusl.org/pressrel/UCITAQA.HTM#_edn26 (accessed 5
September 2011).
xliii
Restatement of American Common Law. (2002), at
http://www.ali.org/ali/newprds.htm (accessed 20 November 2011).
Restatement of Contracts 2d. . (1979), at
http://www.law.onu.edu/review/contracts/warner/rsk/71.html § 71
http://www.law.onu.edu/review/contracts/warner/rsk/90.html § 90
http://www.law.onu.edu/review/contracts/warner/rsk/344.html § 344
(accessed 10 November 2011).
Right to Financial Privacy Act amend. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401 3422 (1978) (US).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act . Corporate Responsibility amend. 15 USC 7201 (2002)
(US).
Stored Communications Act amend. 18 U.S.C. 121, 2702 (1986) (US).
Telecommunications Act of 1996 amend. Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996) (US).
The Freedom of Information Act amend. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966) (US).
Trademark (Lanham) Act amend. ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427. (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127 (1994) (1946) (US).
Trademark Law Revision Act amend. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935.
15 U.S.C.1051-1127 (1994) (US).
United States Code Congressional and Administrative News (USCCAN)
amend. 102 Stat. 3935, 5603 (1988) (US).
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) amend.
Public Law No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1804(a)(7)(B)) (2001) (US).
US Federal Information Policy amend. 44 U.S.C § 3542 (b)(1) (2006) (US).
Video Privacy Protection Act. Pub L. No, 104-104 § 222, 110 Stat. 56 (US).
(1966), at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/2710.shtml (accessed
21 September 2011).
xliv
Table of Authorities
Table of International Conventions, Declarations, and Treaties –
Alphabetical
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Declaration of Principles
on Freedom of Expression in Africa. (2002), at
http://www.achpr.org/english/declarations/declaration_freedom_exp_en
.html (accessed 21 January 2012).
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2009 on the Draft
Commission Decision on Standard Contractual Clauses for the
Transfer of Personal Data to Processors Established in Third
Countries, under Directive 95/46/EC. (2009), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp161_
en.pdf (accessed 26 December 2011).
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Data
Protection Issues Related to RFID Technology (10107/05/EN-WP 105).
(2005), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_e
n.pdf (accessed 29 August 2011).
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document Setting Up a
Table with the Elements and Principles to be Found in Binding
Corporate Rules (1271-00-00/08/EN-WP 153). (2008), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp153_
en.pdf (accessed 26 December 2011).
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Privacy Framework. (2004,
November 17-18), at
http://www.nacpec.org/docs/APEC_Privacy_Framework.pdf (accessed
21 December 2011).
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, What is Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation? (2009), at http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html
(accessed 10 October 2011).
Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,
xlv
regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows. (2001), at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=18
1&CM=1&DF=11/5/2008&CL=ENG (accessed 4 March 2011).
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. (1950), at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (accessed
20 August 2011).
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. (2009), at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (accessed 5
August 2011).
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data: Strasbourg, 28.I.1981. (1981),
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/108.htm
(accessed 15 January 2011).
Council of Europe, Council of Europe's Convention on the Automated
Processing of Personal Data (2004), at
http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/dataprot/counceur/conv.html (accessed
29 May 2011).
Council of Europe, Model Contract. (2006), at
http://www.coe.fr/DataProtection/ectype.htm (accessed 23 August
2011).
Council of Europe, Resolution (73) 22 on the Protection of the Privacy of
Individuals vis-àvis Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector. (1973),
at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co%2Doperation/data_protecti
on/documents/international_legal_instruments/Resolution(73)22_EN.p
df (accessed 20 January 2011).
Council of Europe, Resolution (74) 29 on the Protection of the Privacy of
Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Public Sector. (1974),
at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-
operation/Data_protection/Documents/International_legal_instruments/
Resolution %2874%29 29.asp -
TopOfPagehttp://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-
xlvi
operation/Data_protection/Documents/International_legal_instruments/
Resolution %2874%29 29.asp - TopOfPage (accessed 22 January
2011).
Council of the European Union, Agreement between the European
Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of
API/PNR data (2006/230/EC). (2005), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/adequacy/pnr/canada
_ec_230_2006_en.pdf (accessed 26 December 2011).
Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23
July 2007 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of
America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record
(PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement) ((2007, August 4),
at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_204/l_20420070804en0016
0017.pdf (accessed 28 September 2011).
Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13
December 2004 on Standards for Security Features and Biometrics in
Passports and Travel Documents Issued by Member sSates. (2004,
December 29), at
http://dematerialisedid.com/PDFs/l_38520041229en00010006.pdf
(accessed 28 September 2011).
Court of Justice of the European Communities (Including Court of First
Instance Decisions), Lindquist (Approximation of laws) [2003] EUECJ
C-101/01 (06 November 2003) [2004] QB 1014, C-101/01, [2003]
EUECJ C-101/01, [2004] All ER (EC) 561 ((2004), at
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2003/C10101.html (accessed 28
September 2011).
Court of Justice, European Parliament v Council of the European Union.
(Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04). (2006/C 178/02). (2006), at
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:178:0001:000
2:EN:PDF (accessed 29 May 2011).
xlvii
Court of Justice, Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others and
Christa Neukomm and Joseph Lauermann v. Österreichischer
RundfunkJoined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01. (2003), at
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000J0465:EN:
HTML (accessed 29 May 2011).
European Commission, General Data Protection Regulation. (2012), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (accessed 25
January 2012).
European Commission, General Data Protection Regulation: Impact
Assessment. (2012), at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/sec_2012_72_en.pdf (accessed 25
January 2012).
European Commission, How Will the "Safe Harbor" Arrangement for Personal
Data Transfers to the US Work? (2009), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/adequacy-
faq1_en.htm (accessed 26 December 2011).
European Commission, Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Counsel on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data (General
Data Protection Regulation). (2012), at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (accessed
11/3).
European Commission, Submission to the House of Representatives
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Concerning its Inquiry
into the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000.
MARKT/E1//FB/fb D(2000). (2000), at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/Privacybill/sub113.pdf
(accessed 30 December 2011).
European Commission, US-EU Safe Harbor Frameworks. (2011), at
http://export.gov/safeharbor/index.asp (accessed 4 August 2011).
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
xlviii
(1950), at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm
(accessed 24 September 2011).
European Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security
and Justice in the European Union, Official Journal of the European
Union, C 53(1), pp 1-14. (2005), at http://eurocrim.jura.uni-
tuebingen.de/cms/en/doc/557.pdf (accessed 10 September 2011).
European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data
Protection Supervisor on the Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament and the Council on the Follow-Up of the Work
Programme for Better Implementation of the Data Protection Directive,
Official Journal of the European Union, 27.10.2007, C 255/1 - 14.
(2007, July 25), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:255:0001:001
2:EN:PDF (accessed 22 September 2011).
European Parliament Council - Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(2007/C 303/01). (2007), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0001:001
6:EN:PDF (accessed 21 December 2011).
European Parliament, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(2000/C 364/01). (2000), at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf (accessed 5
August 2011).
European Patent Office, Persistent Client State in a Hypertext Transfer
Protocol Based Client-Server System. European G06F17/30W9;
H04L29/08N1; USA US19950540342 19951006 (1998, June 30), at
http://v3.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?CC=US&NR=577467
0&KC=&FT=E (accessed 5 January 2011).
European Union Directives, Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic
Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications). (2002), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:EN:
xlix
HTML (accessed 4 January 2011).
European Union Directives, Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data
Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly
Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public
Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC.
(2006), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:006
3:EN:PDF (accessed 4 September 2011).
European Union Directives, European Union Protection Directive. (2004), at
http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/dataprot/directiv/directiv.html (accessed
27 May 2011).
European Union Directives, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of such Data (1995), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:
HTML (accessed 4 January 2011).
OECD, Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data. (1980), at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(80)58
(accessed 22 January 2011).
OECD, Implementing the OECD "Privacy Guidelines" in the Electronic
Environment: Focus on the Internet. DSTI/ICCP/REG(97) 6/FINAL.
(1997), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/43/2096272.pdf (accessed
20 July 2011).
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines for
Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce. (2002),
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/13/34023235.pdf (accessed 6
January 2011).
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights.
(1969), at http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html
(accessed 10 June 2011).
Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and
lDuties of Man. (1948), at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-
Res98/Eres1591.htm (accessed 10 June 2011).
United Nations, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. (1958), at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-
conv/XXII_1_e.pdf (accessed 20 August 2011).
United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child. UN General Assembly
Document A/RES/44/25. (1989), at
http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-convention/ (accessed 20 August
2011).
United Nations, Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files.
Adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1990. (1990), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/instruments/un_en.htm
(accessed 3 January 2011).
United Nations, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. (1990), at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r158.htm (accessed 20
August 2011).
United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (ICCPR).
Article 17. (1966), at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm
(accessed 20 August 2011).
United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), at
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/udhr.html (accessed 20 August 2011).
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Copyright Treaty. (1996), at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html (accessed 15
June 2011).
li
Table of Governmental Documents
Australia (AU)
Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
Administrative Arrangements, Australian Government (2011 October),
at http://www.dpmc.gov.au/privacy/causeofaction/ (accessed 20
October 2011).
Australian Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Credit Reporting
Fact Sheet 7: Credit Reporting Databases (May 1996). (2009), at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/factsheets/view/6494
(accessed 16 February 2011).
Australian Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Issues Paper: A
Commonwealth Statutory Cause of Action for Serious Invasion of
Privacy; Submission to the Attorney-General’s Department, Author.
(2011), at
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/%289A5D88DBA63
D32A661E6369859739356%29%7E14B+-
+Office+of+the+Australian+Information+Commissioner+-
+Word.pdf/$file/14B+-
+Office+of+the+Australian+Information+Commissioner+-+Word.pdf
(accessed 12 December 2011).
Australian Government, Australian Government. (2010), at
http://australia.gov.au/ (accessed 5 August 2011).
Australian Government, Australian Privacy Principles: Companion Guide,
Author. (2010 June), at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/fapa_ctte/priv_exp_drafts/Gui
de/companion_guide.pdf (accessed 26 June 2011).
Australian Government, Australian Privacy Principles: Exposure Draft. (2010),
at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/fapa_ctte/priv_exp_drafts/Gui
de/exposure_draft.pdf (accessed 26 June 2011).
Australian Human Rights Commission, About the Commission. (2010), at
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/index.html (accessed 27 July 2011).
Australian Office of the Federal Privacy Commission, Information Privacy
lii
Principles. (2009), at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/law/view/6892 (accessed 27
December 2011).
Australian Office of the Federal Privacy Commission, Privacy and Business.
(2001, July), at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/rbusiness.html
(accessed 5 January 2011).
Australian Privacy Foundation, Recommendations for Improvements to APEC
Privacy Principles (Version 9). (2004), at
http://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/APEC0403.html (accessed 29 July
2011).
Commonwealth of Australia Law, Market and Social Research Privacy Code.
(2003), at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/legislation/legislativeinstrument1.nsf
/framelodgmentattachments/0671CDE24C557D58CA257309000A399
E (accessed 29 December 2011).
Commonwealth of Australia, Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000.
Act - C2004A00748. (2000), at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/3E8F716C0
779E822CA256F72000B40F8?OpenDocument (accessed 29
December 2011).
Commonwealth of Australia, Privacy Amendment Act of 2004. (2004), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/paa2004188/sch1.htm
l (accessed 29 December 2011).
Government of Australia, High Court of Australia. (2010), at
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/ (accessed 5 August 2011).
Government of Australia, Parliament of Australia. (2010), at
http://www.aph.gov.au/ (accessed 5 August 2011).
Government of Australia, Prime Minister of Australia. (2010), at
http://www.pm.gov.au/ (accessed 5 August 2011).
Government of South Australia, Information Privacy Principles (IPPs)
Instruction, and Premier and Cabinet Circular 12, as amended by
Cabinet 18 May 2009 (SA-AU). (1989), at
http://www.premcab.sa.gov.au/pdf/circulars/pc12_privacy.pdf
(accessed 9 January 2011).
liii
High Court of Australia, About the Court. (2010), at
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about.html (accessed 5 July 2011).
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Privacy Impact
Assessment Guide (Revised May 2010). (2010), at
http://www.oaic.gov.au/publications/guidelines/Privacy_Impact_Assess
ment_Guide.html (accessed 20 June 2011).
Parliament of New South Wales, Legislation Review Committee: Strict and
Absolute Liability. (2006), at
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/8821
2f7a0a84b436ca2571870022bc55/$FILE/Strict%20and%20Absolute%
20Liability%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf (accessed 6 December 2011).
Tasmania Ombudsman, Personal Information Protection. (2009), at
http://www.ombudsman.tas.gov.au/personal_information_protection
(accessed 9 January 2011).
Tasmania, Constitution Act 1934, Act 94 of 1934; Royal Assent 14 January
1935. (1934), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/tas/consol_act/ca1934188/
(accessed 16 February 2011).
Tasmanian Legislation, Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas).
(2004), at
http://www.thelaw.tas.gov.au/tocview/index.w3p;cond=;doc_id=46%2B
%2B2004%2BAT%40EN%2B20100110130000;histon=;prompt=;rec=;t
erm= (accessed 9 January 2011).
Victoria Government, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006.
(2006, amended 2010), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/cohrara2006433/
(accessed 27 July 2011). (Vic AU)
Victoria Government, Constitution Act 1975, No. 8750 of 1975. Version
incorporating amendments as at 1 January 2010. (1975), at
http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubLawTo
day.nsf/a12f6f60fbd56800ca256de500201e54/4C214C9ECF03BDFFC
A257695000AFCAC/$FILE/75-8750a194.pdf (accessed 16 February
2011). (Vic AU)
Victoria Government, Privacy Regulation Across Australia. (2003), at
liv
http://www.privacy.vic.gov.au/privacy/web.nsf/download/11344F7F305
0AF9ECA256D58000597A7/$FILE/03.03_Interstate.pdf (accessed 27
March 2011).
Western Australia, Constitution Act 1889 (1889), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/ca1889188/
(accessed 16 February 2011).
Western Australia, Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA). (1992), at
http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/legislation/agency.nsf/foi_main_mrtitle_353_h
omepage.html (accessed 9 January 2011).
Canada (CA)
Canadian Bar Association, Comprehensive Revision of Privacy Act:
Resolution 08-06a. (2008, September 26), at
http://www.cba.org/cba/resolutions/pdf/08-06-a-pdf.pdf (accessed 26
September 2011).
Canadian Constitution Act, Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (CA). at
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/const/const1982.html (accessed 3 August
2011).
Canadian Constitution Act, Constitution Acts from 1867 to 1982. (1867), at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/c1867_e.html (accessed 2 August
2011).
Canadian Constitution Act, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
(1982), at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/ (accessed 25 July 2011).
Canadian Constitutional Documents, A Legal History. (2004), at
http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/ (accessed 6 July
2011).
Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. (1985), at
http://www.canlii.org/ca/sta/c-46/sec184.html (accessed 15 August
2011).
Canadian Federal Government, Canadian Privacy Act - R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21.
(1982), at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/P-21/index.html (accessed 7
November 2011).
lv
Canadian Federal Government, Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Document Act. (2000), at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-8.6 (accessed 1 November
2011).
Canadian Laws, Canadian Consumer Protection Laws. (2010), at
http://www.canadianlawsite.ca/consumer-protection.htm#g (accessed
3 January 2011).
Canadian Privacy Commissioner, Privacy by the Numbers in 2007. (2007), at
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/ar/200708/2007_pipeda_e.asp
(accessed 4 September 2011).
Canadian Standards Association, Model Code for the Protection of Personal
Information. (1996), at
http://www.csa.ca/standards/privacy/code/Default.asp?language=Engli
sh (accessed 15 June 2011).
Constitution Act, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. (1982), at
http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/ca_1982.html
(accessed 29 February 2011).
Government of Alberta, Personal Information Protection Amendment Act,
2009. (2009), at
http://www.qp.alberta.ca/546.cfm?page=CH50_09.CFM&leg_type=fall
(accessed 8 July 2011).
Government of Canada, Government of Canada. (2010), at
http://www.canada.gc.ca/home.html (accessed 5 August 2011).
Government of Canada, Parliament of Canada. (2010), at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/index.asp?Language=E (accessed 5
August 2011).
Government of Canada, Prime Minister of Canada. (2010), at
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/index.asp (accessed 5 August 2011).
Government of Canada, Privacy and Your business (2010), at
http://www.canadabusiness.ca/eng/guide/2338/ (accessed 19 July
2011).
Government of Canada, Supreme Court of Canada. (2010), at http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/home-accueil/index-eng.asp (accessed 5 August 2011).
Government of the Northwest Territories, Access to Information Protection of
lvi
Privacy Act. (1996), at
http://www.justice.gov.nt.ca/pdf/ACTS/Access_to_Information.pdf
(accessed 24 September 2011).
Government of Yukon, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
(2002), at http://www.gov.yk.ca/legislation/acts/atipp.pdf (accessed 19
September 2011).
Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, Commissioner Cavoukian to
Unveil Best Practices for Smart Grid Privacy Protection at Toronto
Summit, June 16. (2010), at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/2010-06-14-Smart-Grid-Paper-
Media-Advisory.pdf (accessed 14 June 2011).
Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, The New Federated Privacy
Impact Assessment (F-PIA): Building Privacy and Trust-enabled
Federation, Author. (2009), at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/Resources/Discussion-Papers/Discussion-
Papers-Summary/?id=836 (accessed 2 March 2011).
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report to Parliament
2009: Report on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act. (2010), at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/ar/200910/2009_pipeda_e.pdf
(accessed 8 July 2011).
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Canadians Concerned
Corporate Cost Cutting Could Affect their Privacy: Poll. . (2009, April
27), at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/survey/2009/ekos_2009_01_e.cfm
(accessed 28 April 2011).
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, PIPEDA Self-Assessment
Tool: Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.
(2008. August 8), at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/pub/ar-
vr/pipeda_sa_tool_200807_e.asp (accessed 10 August 2011).
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, PIPEDA: Processing Personal
Data Across Borders Guidelines, Author. (2009), at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2009/gl_dab_090127_e.pdf
(accessed 2 July 2011).
lvii
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Poll: Canadian Businesses
Unconcerned About Privacy Breach Risk. (2010), at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/nr-c_100527_e.cfm (accessed
27 May 2011).
Supreme Court of Canada, About the Court. (2010), at http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/court-cour/index-eng.asp (accessed 5 July 2011).
South Africa
Constitutional Court of South Africa, Constitutional Court of South Africa.
(2011), at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/home.htm
(accessed 29 May 2011).
Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108.
(1996), at
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/index.htm
(accessed 24 January 2011).
South Africa Government, Executive Authority. (2010), at
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/exec.htm (accessed 5 August 2011).
South Africa Government, Justice System. (2010), at
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/justice/courts.htm (accessed 5
August 2011).
South Africa Government, National Legislature - Parliament. (2010), at
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/parliament/index.htm (accessed 5
August 2011).
South Africa Government, South Africa Government Online. (2010), at
http://www.gov.za/ (accessed 5 August 2011).
South African Law Reform Commission, Issue Paper on Privacy and Data
Protection. (2003), at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/ipapers.htm
(accessed 6 March 2011).
South African Law Reform Commission, Media Statement by the South
African Law Reform Commission: Project 124: Privacy and Data
Protection. (2005), at http://www.nqf.org.za/download_files/nqf-
support/Privacy%20and%20Data%20protection%20Paper%2024%20P
roject%20124.pdf (accessed 2 May 2011).
lviii
United Kingdom (UK)
Information Commissioner Office, Information Commissioner’s Guidance
About the Issue of Monetary Penalties Prepared and Issued Under
Section 55C (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, Author. (2010), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detaile
d_specialist_guides/ico_guidance_monetary_penalties.pdf (accessed
12 September 2011).
Information Commissioner Office, Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook.
(2009), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pia_handbook_html_v2/html/0
-advice.html (accessed 6 October 2011).
Information Commissioner Office, Privacy Notices Code of Practice. (2009), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detaile
d_specialist_guides/privacy_notices_cop_final.pdf (accessed 6 July
2011).
Information Commissioner Office, The Information Commissioner’s Response
to the Ministry of Justice’s Call for Evidence on the Current Data
Protection Legislative Framework. (2010), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/notices
/response_to_moj_dpframework.pdf (accessed 6 October 2011).
Information Commissioner’s Office, Banks in Unacceptable Data Protection
Breach. (2007, March 13), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pressreleases/2007/banks_in
_unacceptable_data_protection_breach.pdf (accessed 17 June 2011).
Information Commissioner’s Office, Enforcement Notices. (2008), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover/data_protection/enforcement.asp
x (accessed 29 September 2011).
Information Commissioner’s Office, Mark & Spencer v. ICO. (2008, January
23), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/notices
/m_and_s_sanitiseden.pdf (accessed 29 September 2011).
Information Commissioner’s Office, Ministers breach Data Protection Act,
Contractor UK. (2008), at
lix
http://www.contractoruk.com/news/004075.html (accessed 18
November 2011).
Information Commissioner’s Office, The Information Commissioner’s
Inspection Powers and Funding Arrangements under the Data
Protection Act 1998: Response of the Information Commissioner to the
Ministry of Justice’s Consultation Paper of 16 July 2008. (2008, August
22), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/notices/resp
onse_of_ic_to_moj_consultation_paper.pdf (accessed 12 September
2011).
Information Commissioner's Office, Orange Personal Communication
Services v. ICO UK. (2007, March 21), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/notices
/orange_undertaking.pdf (accessed 30 September 2011).
Magna Carta, Magna Carta. (1215), at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/magframe.htm
(accessed 24 September 2011).
Scottish Executive, Data Protection Act 1998 Explanatory Guidance. (1998),
at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1066/0006064.pdf
(accessed 19 August 2011).
Statutes of Great Britain, The British North America Act. (1867), at
http://home.cc.umanitoba.ca/~sprague/bna.htm (accessed 29
February 2011).
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, The Supreme Court. (2010), at
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/ (accessed 30 December 2011).
United Kingdom Government, Data Protection Tracking Research. (1995-
1996-1997), at http://www.open.gov.uk/dpr/report97/%21app8.pdf
(accessed 1 September 2011).
United Kingdom Government, Government, Citizens and Rights. (2010), at
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/index.htm
(accessed 5 August 2011).
United Kingdom Government, Parliament. (2010), at http://www.parliament.uk/
(accessed 5 August 2011).
United Kingdom Government, The Official Site of the Prime Minister's Office.
lx
(2010), at http://www.number10.gov.uk/ (accessed 5 August 2011).
United Kingdom Government, The Supreme Court. (2010), at
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/index.html (accessed 5 August 2011).
United Kingdom Government, The U.K. Data Protection Act of 1998. (1998),
at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1984/1984035.htm (accessed 17
May 2011).
United Kingdom Home Office, Retention of Communications Data under part
11: Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2001, Voluntary Code of
Practice. (2001), at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2003/draft/5b.pdf
(accessed 10 October 2011).
United Kingdom, Data Protection Act 1998: 1998 Chapter 29. (1998), at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980029_en_1
(accessed 5 June 2011).
United Kingdom, Human Rights Act 1998: 1998 Chapter 42. (1998), at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980042_en_1
(accessed 5 June 2011).
United Kingdom, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: 2000 Chapter
23. (2000), at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_1.htm
(accessed 5 June 2011).
United Kingdom, United Kingdom Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
Chapter 24 (2001), at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/ukpga_20010024_en_1
(accessed 2 July 2011).
United States (US)
California Constitution, Privacy. (2003), at
http://www.csc.calpoly.edu/~aeaston/california-sp.html (accessed 10
June 2011).
California Senate, Senate Bill No. 541. (2008), at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0501-
0550/sb_541_bill_20080930_chaptered.pdf (accessed 1 October
2011).
Department of Health and Human Services, Resolution Agreement. (2008), at
lxi
http://www.dhhs.gov/ocr/privacy/enforcement/agreement.pdf
(accessed 29 July 2011).
Federal Communication Commission, Commission Orders Comcast to End
Discriminatory Network Management Practices. (2008), at
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2008/db0801/DOC-
284286A1.txt (accessed 2 August 2011).
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC. (2007), at http://www.fdic.gov/
(accessed 30 August 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. (DOCKET NO. C-
4148). (2005, September 23), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305comp0423160.pdf
(accessed 24 July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Bonzi Software, Inc., A Corporation, and Joe
Bonzi and Jay Bonzi, Individually and as Officers of Said Corporation
(DOCKET NO. C-4126). (2004, October 13), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423016/041013cmp0423016.pdf
(accessed 25 July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, CardSystems Solutions, Inc., & Solidus
Networks, Inc., d/b/a/ Pay By Touch Solutions. (DOCKET NO. C-4168).
(2006, September 8), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323040/041008comp0323040.pdf
(accessed 23 July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Inc. (2006 December 6), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf
(accessed 1 August 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, DirecTV, a California Corporation; D.R.D., Inc.,
also d/b/a Power Direct, an Ohio Corporation; Daniel R. Delfino,
individually & as an officer of D.R.D., Inc.; & Nomrah Records, also
d/b/a Direct Activation, a Florida Corporation (File No. 042 3039).
(2006, December 14), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423039/0423039.shtm (accessed 12
August 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Dot Com Disclosure. (2003), at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/index.html
lxii
(accessed 22 May 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, DSW, Inc. (DOCKET NO. C-4157). (2006, March
7), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523096/0523096c4157DSWComplaint.p
df (accessed 23 July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Education Research Center of American, Inc.,
Student Marketing Group, Inc., Marian Sanjana, & Jan Stumacher
(DOCKET NO. C-4079). (2003, May 9), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/05/ERCAcomplaint.pdf (accessed 1 August
2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Eli Lilly Company. (DOCKET NO. C-4047).
(2002, May 10), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillycmp.htm
(accessed 23 July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Executive Financial Home Loan Corp., d/b/a
Executive Home Loan, a California Corporation, Michael Nikravesh,
Individually & as an Officer of Executive Financial Home Loan Corp., &
Ron Fattal, Individually & as an Officer of Executive Financial Home
Loan Corp. (2006, June 21), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423143/0423143ExechomeLoanCmplt.p
df (accessed 21 July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Facebook, Inc. (DOCKET NO. C-4365). (2012),
at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/120810facebookcmpt.pdf
(accessed 10 August 2012).
Federal Trade Commission, FTC Consumer Alert. (2005, June), at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/disposalalrt.shtm (accessed
2 September 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, FTC Recommends Congressional Action to
Protect Consumer Privacy Online (2002), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/privacy2k.htm (accessed 22 May
2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Gateway Learning Corporation (DOCKET NO. C-
4120). (2004, September 14), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423047/040917comp0423047.pdf
(accessed 24 July 2011).
lxiii
Federal Trade Commission, GeoCities. (1998), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/02/9823015cmp.htm (accessed 2 June
2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Google, Inc. (Docket C-4335). (2012), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c4336/120809googlecmptexhibits.pdf
(accessed 20 November 2012).
Federal Trade Commission, Guess?, Inc., and Guess.com, Inc. (DOCKET
NO. C-4091). (2003, August 5), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0223260.shtm (accessed 19 July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Hersey Food Corporation. (2003, February 27a),
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/02/hersheycmp.htm (accessed 26 July
2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Kids. (1997), at
www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/9712/kids.htm (accessed 20 February 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Letter. (1999), at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990010.htm (accessed 15 November 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Microsoft Corporation. (DOCKET NO. C-4069).
(2002, December 24), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0123240/microsoftcmp.pdf (accessed 22
July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Mrs. Fields Famous Brands, Inc., Mrs. Fields'
Holding Company, Inc., and Mrs. Fields' Original Cookies, Inc. (2003
February 27b), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/02/mrsfieldscmp.htm
(accessed 9 August 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, MTS, Inc., d/b/a Tower Records/Books/Video, a
corporation, and Tower Direct, LLC, d/b/a TowerRecords.com, a
corporation. (DOCKET NO. C-4110). (2004, June 2), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323209/040602comp0323209.pdf
(accessed 21 July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. (DOCKET NO. C-
4133). (2005, March 8), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323221/050308comp0323221.pdf
(accessed 20 July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Pretexting: Enforcement Cases. (2007), at
lxiv
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/pretexting_enf.html
(accessed 2 September 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress. (1998), at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.shtm (accessed 10 May 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the
Electronic Marketplace: A Report to Congress. (2000), at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (accessed 26
July 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Workshop '97 Hearings Transcripts for
Session 2, panel 2, part 3. (1997), at http://consumer-
info.org/FTCpriv97/FTCprivacyw.asp (accessed 2 March 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Privacy. (1998), at
www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9806/privacy2.htm (accessed 20 February
2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change:
Recommendations for Business and Policymakers. (2012), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (accessed 26
March 2012).
Federal Trade Commission, Superior Mortgage Corporation (Docket C-4153).
(2005, December 16), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523136/051216comp0523136.pdf
(accessed 2 August 2011).
Federal Trade Commission, The Fair Credit Reporting Act. (2004), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/031224fcra.pdf (accessed 11 June
2011).
Federal Trade Commission, The Ohio Art Company (FTC File Nos. 022-
3028). (2005, April 22), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/ohioartconsent.htm (accessed 24 July
2011).
Federal Trade Commission, Vision I Properties, LLC d/b/a CartManager
International, Inc. (2005, April 26), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423068/050426comp0423068.pdf
(accessed 21 July 2011).
Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress on
lxv
Implementation of the Federal Information Security Management Act of
2002. (2009), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/F
Y09_FISMA.pdf (accessed 12 March 2012).
State of Alaska, Constitution. (1956), at http://old-www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-
bin/folioisa.dll/acontxt/query=*/doc/%7Bt25%7D (accessed 10 July
2011).
State of Arizona, Constitution. (1881), at
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/const/2/8.htm (accessed 10 July 2011).
State of California, California Office of Information Security and Privacy
Protection. (2009), at http://www.oispp.ca.gov/ (accessed 4 September
2011).
State of California, Constitution. (1879), at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/waisgate?waisdocid=8071921924+0+0+0&waisaction=retrieve
(accessed 10 July 2011).
State of California, The California Security Breach Information Act (SB-1386),
Civil Code §1798.29,, §1798.82, & 1798.84 (2002), at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-
1400/sb_1386_bill_20020926_chaptered.html (accessed 3 July 2011).
State of Florida, Constitution. (1968), at
http://www.flsenate.gov/Statutes/index.cfm?Mode=Constitution&Subme
nu=3&Tab=statutes#A01S23 (accessed 10 July 2011).
State of Hawaii, Constitution. (1978), at
http://www.state.hi.us/lrb/con/conart1.html (accessed 10 July 2011).
State of Illinois, Constitution. (1970), at
http://www.ilga.gov/commission/lrb/con1.htm (accessed 10 July 2011).
State of Louisiana, Constitution. (1974), at
http://www.senate.legis.state.la.us/Documents/Constitution/Article1.htm
#%EF%BF%BD5.%20Right%20to%20Privacy (accessed 10 July
2011).
State of Montana, Constitution. (1972), at
http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/mca/const/II/10.htm (accessed 10 July
2011).
State of New Jersey, Constitution. (1947), at
lxvi
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/lawsconstitution/constitution.asp (accessed
10 July 2011).
State of South Carolina, Constitution. (2006), at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/scconstitution/a01.htm (accessed 10 July
2011).
State of Utah, Constitution. (1895), at
http://le.utah.gov/~code/const/htm/CO_02015.htm (accessed 10 July
2011).
State of Washington, Constitution. (1889), at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/education/constitution/index.cfm?fa=educatio
n_constitution.display&displayid=Article-01 (accessed 10 July 2011).
Supreme Court of the United States, About the Supreme Court. (2010), at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/ (accessed 5 July 2011).
The Alien Act, An Act Respecting Alien Enemies. (1798), at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/alien.htm (accessed 15
June 2011).
The Sedition Act, An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the
United States. (1798), at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/sedact.htm (accessed 15
June 2011).
The Sedition Act, An Amendment to Section 3 of the Espionage Act of June
15, 1917. (1918), at http://www.wfu.edu/~zulick/341/sedition1918.html
(accessed 15 June 2011).
U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Governmental Operations, Legislative
History of the Privacy Act of 1974: Source Book on Privacy. (1976), at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LH_privacy_act-1974.pdf
(accessed 2 January 2011).
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Information Policy,
Author. (2011), at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ (accessed 14 July
2011).
U.S. Department of Justice, Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974. (2010), at
http://www.justice.gov/opcl/1974intro.htm (accessed 4 January 2011).
United State GAO, Information Security: Agencies Continue to Report
Progress, but Need to Mitigate Persistent Weaknesses. (2009), at
lxvii
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09546.pdf (accessed 23 July 2011).
United States Codes, United States Codes. 17 U.S.C. Section 102(b) (2003),
at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/102.html; Computer
Programs http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/117.html;
Exceptions http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/110.html; Fair Use
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.html; Library
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/108.html; Recordings
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/112.html; Secondary Transfer
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/111.html; Transfer
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/109.htm (accessed 25
November 2011).
United States Congress, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as
amended (Pub. L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, January 1, 1970, as
amended by Pub. L. 94-52, July 3, 1975, Pub. L. 94-83, August 9,
1975, and Pub. L. 97-258,� 4(b), Sept. 13, 1982). (1969), at
http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/nepa/nepaeqia.htm (accessed 5
March 2011).
United States Constitution, United States Constitution. (1788), at
http://www.kearney.net/~tclayton/The%20Constitution%20of%20the%2
0United%20States.htm (accessed 4 July 2011).
United States Declaration of Independence, Declaration of Independence
(1776), at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/1.htm
(accessed 26 September 2011).
United States Department of Defense Technology and Privacy Advisory
Committee, Safeguarding Privacy in the Fight Against Terrorism.
(2004, March), at
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf (accessed 5
December 2011).
United States Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Office - DHS Data
Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee. (2008), at
http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/committees/editorial_0512.shtm
(accessed 10 December 2011).
United States Department of Justice, Microsoft Agrees to End Unfair
lxviii
Monopolistic Practices. (1994), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/July94/94387.txt.html (accessed 8
April 2011).
United States Department of Justice, The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge
of Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the Internet. (2003), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm (accessed 19
May 2011).
United States Government Accountability Office, Agencies Should Ensure that
Designated Senior Officials Have Oversight of Key Functions. (2008,
May 30), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08603.pdf (accessed 18
June 2011).
United States Government Accountability Office, Alternatives Exist for
Enhancing Protection of Personally Identifiable Information. (2008,
April 19), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08536.pdf (accessed 19
June 2011).
United States Government Accountability Office, Congress Should Consider
Alternatives for Strengthening Protection of Personally Identifiable
Information. (2008, June 18), at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08795t.pdf (accessed 18 June 2011).
United States Government Accountability Office, Data Mining: Federal Efforts
Cover a Wide Range of Uses. (2004), at
http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/gao_dm_rpt.pdf (accessed 23 June
2011).
United States Government Accountability Office, Information Secuirty: FBI
Needs to Address Weaknesses in Critical Network. (2007), at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07368.pdf (accessed 31 December
2011).
United States of America, Find Government Agencies. (2010), at
http://www.usa.gov/ (accessed 5 August 2011).
United States of America, Supreme Court of the United States. (2010), at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/ (accessed 5 August 2011).
United States of America, The Executive Branch. (2010), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government/executive-branch
(accessed 5 August 2011).
lxix
United States of America, United States House of Representatives. (2010), at
http://www.house.gov/ (accessed 5 August 2011).
United States of America, United States Senate. (2010), at
http://www.senate.gov/ (accessed 5 August 2011).
US Department of Health & Human Services, The Belmont Report: Ethical
Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research; The National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. (1979), at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html
(accessed 21 July 2011).
US Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Civil Procedure. (2006), at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/index.html (accessed 25
September 2011).
US Rules of Evidence, Rules of Evidence. (2006), at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/index.html (accessed 22
September 2011).
lxx
Detailed Outline
Chapter One: Data Protection and Security Law: The Problem
Chapter One 1
1.0 Overview of Chapter One 2
1.1 Statement of the Problem 3
1.2 Background of the Problem 5
1.3 Purpose of the Study and Approach 13
1.4 Theoretical Framework 15
1.5 Questions and Objectives Investigated 16
1.6 Conceptual and Substantive Assumptions 18
1.7 Legal Rationale 19
1.8 Importance of the Study 20
1.9 Definition of Terms 21
1.10 Description of Research Methodology and Approach 23
1.11 Data Collection Procedures 27
1.12 Data Processing and Analysis 29
1.13 Comparative Law Analysis 31
1.14 Methodological Assumptions 32
1.15 Limitations of Assumptions 33
1.16 Summary of Problem 34
1.17 Summary of Literature and Issues Reviewed 34
1.18 Outline of the Thesis 36
Chapter Two: Data Protection And Security Law: Sociolegal Issues
Chapter Two 38
2.0 Overview 38
2.1 Psychosocial Factors of Data Protection, Security and
Information Privacy
39
2.2 The Majority of People want Data Protection and Security
Legal Standards.
44
2.2.1 Australia 44
lxxi
2.2.2 Canada 45
2.2.3 The Republic of South Africa 46
2.2.4 United Kingdom / European Union 46
2.2.5 United States of America 47
2.3 Personal Information Had Become A Valuable Commodity. 49
2.4 Governments and Businesses Failed to Adequately Address
DPSIP Issues.
55
2.4.1 Business Issues 55
2.4.2 Governmental Issues 73
2.5 Data protection and security violations violated analogous
legal principle including informed consent, confidentiality,
impact assessments, and audits.
79
2.5.1 Informed Consent and Confidentiality Issues 80
2.5.2 Privacy Impact Approval 85
2.6 Technological innovations received governmental approval
and protection without examining information privacy, data
protection, and data security assessments.
92
2.7 Data protection and security violations threatened related
legal principles and the security of individuals, businesses,
and governments.
96
2.7.1 Asset Protection Standards 96
2.7.2 Contract Law Issues 99
2.7.3 Information and Knowledge Control Law 103
2.7.4 Intellectual Property Law Issues 113
2.7.5 Personal Property Law Issues 119
2.7.6 Tort Law Issues 124
2.7.7 Privacy Law Conflicts 130
2.8 Summary of the Sociolegal Literature and Issues Reviewed 134
Chapter Three: Data Protection and Security Law: International Legal
Standards
Chapter Three 135
lxxii
3.0 Overview 135
3.1 Background 135
3.2 Ancient Codes 136
3.3 Modern International Treaties 138
3.3.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 139
3.3.2 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 140
3.3.3 European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms
141
3.3.4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 142
3.3.5 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 143
3.3.6 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
144
3.3.7 EU General Assembly Guidelines Concerning Computerized
Personal Data Files
144
3.4 European Declarations 146
3.4.1 OECD Guidelines 146
3.4.1.1 Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow
of Personal Data
149
3.4.1.2 Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of
Electronic Commerce
152
3.4.2 Council of Europe Convention on Data Protection 152
3.4.3 European Union Directives on Data Protection 158
3.4.3.1 Third Country Rules 172
3.4.3.2 Analysis 175
3.4.4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 178
3.5 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Privacy Charter 180
3.5.1 Analysis 183
3.6 African Privacy Declarations 187
3.7 National and Non-Governmental Organization Standards 189
3.8 International Legal Standards and Guidelines Critique 198
3.9 Summary of International Literature and Issues Reviewed 205
lxxiii
Chapter Four: Data Protection and Security Law: Australian Legal
Standards
Chapter Four 207
4.0 Overview 207
4.1 Background 208
4.2 Australian Commonwealth Constitutional Declarations 211
4.3 The Australian Commonwealth Legislation 211
4.4 Australian Commonwealth Case Law 220
4.5 Australian State Constitutional Declarations 222
4.6 Australian State Legislation 223
4.6.1 New South Wales 223
4.6.1.1 NSW Privacy and Personal Data Protection Act 1998 224
4.6.1.2 NSW Criminal Records Act of 1991 226
4.6.1.3 NSW Health Records and Information Privacy Act of 2002 227
4.6.2 Northern Territory 227
4.6.3 Queensland 229
4.6.4 South Australia 230
4.6.5 Tasmania 231
4.6.6 Victoria 232
4.6.7 Western Australia 234
4.7 Australian State Case Law 236
4.71 New South Wales Case Law 236
4.72 Queensland Case Law 239
4.73 Victoria Case Law 240
4.8 Australian Standards and Remedies 241
4.9 Australian Implementation System 243
4.10 Australian Sociolegal Concerns 243
4.11 Australian Critique 247
4.12 Summary of Australian Literature and Issues Reviewed 255
lxxiv
Chapter Five: Data Protection and Security Law: Canadian Legal
Standards
Chapter Five 262
5.0 Overview 262
5.1 Background 263
5.2 Canadian Federal Constitutional Declarations 268
5.3 Canadian Federal Legislation 270
5.3.1 Canadian Criminal Code of 1985 - Part VI: Invasion of Privacy 271
5.3.2 The Federal Privacy Act of 1985 272
5.3.3 The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document
Act (PIPEDA)
274
5.3.4 The Canadian Anti-Spam Act 281
5.4 Canadian Federal Case Law 281
5.5 Canadian Provincial Constitutional Declarations 291
5.6 Canadian Provincial Legislation 291
5.6.1 Alberta Personal Information Privacy Act 292
5.6.2 British Columbia Personal Information Privacy Act 294
5.6.3 New Brunswick Protection of Personal Information Act 294
5.6.4 Quebec Privacy Protections 295
5.6.5 Sectoral Legislation 296
5.6.5.1 Provincial Freedom of Information Acts 296
5.6.5.2 Provincial Health Privacy Acts 299
5.7 Canadian Provincial Case Law 302
5.7.1 Alberta Case Law 302
5.7.2 British Columbia Case Law 303
5.7.3 Northwest Territories Case Law 304
5.7.4 Nova Scotia Case Law 304
5.7.5 Ontario Case Law 305
5.7.6 Prince Edward Island Case Law 306
5.7.7 Quebec Case Law 306
5.8 Canadian Standards and Remedies 307
5.9 Canadian Implementation System 309
lxxv
5.9.1 Self Regulation Approaches 310
5.9.2 Privacy Commissioner Approaches 311
5.10 Canadian Sociolegal Concerns 315
5.11 Canadian Critique 318
5.12 Summary of Canadian Literature and Issues Reviewed 324
Chapter Six: Data Protection and Security Law: South African Legal
Standards
Chapter Six 330
6.0 Overview 330
6.1 Background 332
6.2 Republic of South Africa Constitutional Declarations 334
6.3 South African Legislation 337
6.4 South African Case Law 346
6.5 Protection of Personal Information Bill Background 353
6.6 Protection of Personal Information Bill Provisions 358
6.7 South African Standards and Remedies 367
6.6 South African Implementation System 367
6.7 South African Sociolegal Concerns 368
6.8 South African Critique 370
6.9 Summary of South African Literature and Issues Reviewed 371
Chapter Seven: Data Protection and Security Law: United Kingdom
Legal Standards
Chapter Seven 377
7.0 Overview 377
7.1 Background 378
7.2 United Kingdom Constitutional Declarations 381
7.3 United Kingdom Federal Legislation 381
7.3.1 Human Rights Act of 1998 382
7.3.2 Data Protection Act of 1998 383
7.3.3 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 387
lxxvi
7.4 United Kingdom Federal Case Law 388
7.4.1 Information Tribunal 398
7.5 European Union Case Law 401
7.6 Constituent Government Constitutional Declarations 407
7.7 Constituent Government Legislation 408
7.8 Constituent Government Case Law 409
7.9 United Kingdom Standards and Remedies 409
7.10 United Kingdom Implementation System 409
7.11 United Kingdom Sociolegal Concerns 412
7.12 United Kingdom Critique 414
7.13 Summary of United Kingdom Literature and Issues
Reviewed
427
Chapter Eight: Data Protection and Security Law: United States of
America Legal Standards
Chapter Eight 433
8.0 Overview 433
8.1 Background 434
8.2 United States of America Constitutional Declarations 438
8.3 United States of America Federal Legislation and
Standards
441
8.3.1 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 442
8.3.2 The Federal Wiretap Act of 1968 442
8.3.3 The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 443
8.3.4 The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 445
8.3.5 The Freedom of Information Act of 1974 446
8.3.6 The Privacy Act of 1974 447
8.3.7 Privacy Protection Act of 1980 449
8.3.8 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 450
8.3.9 Computer Matching and Protection Privacy Act of 1988 453
8.3.10 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 454
8.3.11 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 456
8.3.12 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 457
lxxvii
8.3.13 Patriot Act of 2001 459
8.3.14 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 461
8.3.15 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health of 2009
462
8.4 United States of America Federal Cases 463
8.4.1 United States Federal Trade Commission Case Law 465
8.4.2 United States of America Federal Case Law 470
8.4.2.1 Decisional – Information Cases 476
8.4.2.2 Expectation of Privacy Cases 477
8.4.2.3 Informed Consent Consideration Cases 479
8.4.2.4 Opt-in versus Opt-out Cases 483
8.5 US State Constitutional Declarations 484
8.6 US State Legislation 486
8.7 US State Case Law 488
8.8 US Standards and Remedies 490
8.8.1 Principles of Fair Information Practices 491
8.9 United States of America Implementation System 495
8.9.1 Self-Regulation 496
8.9.2 Safe Harbor Agreement 501
8.10 United States Sociolegal Concerns 504
8.11 United States of America Critique 511
8.12 Summary of United States of America Literature and Issues
Reviewed
522
Chapter Nine: Data Protection and Security Law: Comparative
Evaluation
Chapter Nine 529
9.0 Overview of the Chapter 529
9.1 Summary of Research Question Findings 529
9.1.1 Is the Bifurcation of Information Privacy, Data Protection, and
Data Security Justified?
535
9.2 Legal Analysis 536
lxxviii
9.2.1 Sociolegal Analysis 536
9.2.2 Comparative Law - Business Practices 537
9.2.3 Comparative DPSIP Positive Law Analysis 542
9.2.3.1 Legal Support of DPSIP Protections 542
9.2.3.2 Support of Corporate Privacy and Data Property Protection
Issues
543
9.2.3.3 DPSIP Declarations 543
9.2.3.4 Regulatory Agency Powers 544
9.2.3.5 Sectoral DPSIP Legislation 544
9.2.3.6 DPSIP Data Controller Standards 545
9.2.3.7 DPSIP Data Processor Requirements 545
9.2.3.8 DPSIP Data Security Standards 545
9.3 DPSIP Legal Justification 546
9.4 Comparative Legal and Policy Research Findings 550
9.5 Comparative Textual Research Findings 553
9.5.1 Definition: Data Protection 554
9.5.2 Textual Definitions: Information Privacy 555
9.6 Summary 560
Chapter Ten: Data Protection and Security Law: Gold Standard
Proposal
Chapter Ten 561
10.0 Overview of the Chapter 561
10.1 Comparative Gold Standard of DPSIP Principles—
DPSIP 3.0
562
10.2 Data Security 563
10.3 Data Protection and Information Privacy 566
10.3.1 Administration 566
10.3.2 Applicability Scope 568
10.3.3 Breaches 569
10.3.4 Breach Notification 570
10.3.5 Compatibility Declarations 570
lxxix
10.3.6 Data 571
10.3.7 Data Mining 571
10.3.8 Data Ownership 572
10.3.9 Data Retention Limits 573
10.3.10 Independence of Office 573
10.3.11 Information Privacy Rights 575
10.3.12 Informed Consent and Confidentiality 576
10.3.13 Liability 576
10.3.14 Licensure 576
10.3.15 Opt-in 579
10.3.16 Privacy by Design—Privacy by Default 579
10.3.17 Private Right of Action 580
10.3.18 Privacy Impact Assessment 580
10.3.19 Reports 583
10.3.20 Right to be Forgotten 583
10.3.21 Right to Data Portability 584
10.3.22 Subject Rights 585
10.3.23 Technology-Based Surveillance 585
10.3.24 Violations 587
10.4 Exemptions 587
10.5 Alternative Legal Considerations 588
10.6 Limitations of the Current Study and Future Research
Recommendations
589
10.7 The Need for DPSIP 3.0 Vigilance 590
Appendix A International Treaties and Conventions 600
Bibliography Books 602
Books: Edited
Book: Sections
631
633
Journal Articles 638
Newspaper Articles 655
Electronic Sources 657
Conference Papers 717
Chapter One: The Problem 1
CHAPTER ONE: DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW:
THE PROBLEM
The law is not a series of calculating machines where
definitions and answers come tumbling out when the
right levers are pushed. Justice William O. Douglas1
There is … unanimity that opportunists, for private gain,
cannot be permitted to arm themselves with an
acceptable principle, (to) proceed to use it as an iron
standard to smooth their path by crushing the living
rights of others to privacy and repose. Stanley F. Reed2
At the time of this writing, the Republic of South Africa (SA) has engineered
the largest Internet connectivity of any country on the African continent, and
has been investigating and developing data protection legal standards. This
thesis examines the legal strategies of developed countries relevant to data
collection, security, storage, use, and transfer, along with the integrity of these
legal approaches.
Material reviewed for comparison included both international legal standards
and governmental and nongovernmental protection and security guidelines
from five countries that had a contradictory history of dealing with the issues:
the Commonwealth of Australia (AU), the Government of Canada (CA), SA,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), and the
United States of America (US).3
1 William Orville Douglas, The Dissent, A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 Journal of the
American Judicial Society 104, 105 (1948).
2 Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 625–26, (1951). (US)
3 The purpose and function of a cite and reference system is to help readers and researchers
find relevant information. Given that the contradictory and inconsistent national and
international systems related to the use of abbreviations and citations, the author
selected a consistent approach, with the permission of the promoter. Abbreviations
follow the UK system of eliminating full stops or periods and two letter country codes.
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1.0 Overview of Chapter One
This chapter presents a statement of the problem and relevant background
information; an overview of the research strategy used in this study; the
purpose, legal rationale, and importance of the study; and the approach to be
used. The theoretical framework, questions, and objectives to be investigated
in this study will also be examined in chapter one.
Every study is based on conceptual and substantive assumptions. This
chapter presents the assumptions made; provides key definitions; describes
the research methodology and approach used in the study; presents a
justification for using a comparative law analysis model; and explains the data
collection procedures and data processing and analysis used. The chapter
ends with a summary of the problem, a summary of the literature and issues
reviewed, and an outline of the entire thesis.
1.1 Statement of the Problem
As access to and use of the World Wide Web expanded, the market for
personal information became global. Various countries and regions have
established, or were in the process of establishing, data protection, data
The footnote format system followed the Association of Legal Writing Directors
(ALWD) (4th ed.) Citation Manual as it is the closest to the unique South African legal
citation system yet it was internationally recognized and consistent with the
comparative focus of this work. One exception was the citation of international
sources for which ALWD was silent and somewhat ethnocentric (due to yet
unpublished but projected manuals based on proprietary gain). In such situations,
the author applied rules 20.3 and 20.5 of the BlueBook (18th ed.) system, which
added country identification at the end of cases and statutes. Publication names are
spelled out due to the international nature of the sources used. This standard is
based on the APA (6th ed.) which is the behavior, policy, and social science standard
in the US and the majority of the English speaking word. Journal titles are in italics as
directed by my professor, the SA approach, and the APA standard. Copies of all
electronically collected files are on file with the author. The vast majority of in-print
journals and books are also on file with the author. When the intellectual property
(IP) laws apply, the IP law will be applied. Generally, a copy of the cited books, book
chapters, journals, journal articles, and electronic sources are on file with the Author.
Internet and intranet resources have been verified on a yearly basis. The UNISA
School of Law has some unique standards which have been followed – like access or
visit data.
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security, and information privacy (DPSIP) laws. The international debate on
privacy concerns was prominent. Business abuses were evident. Consumers
wanted clearer protections.4
Existing data protection and information privacy laws were generally out-of-
date, ignored, inadequate, or nonexistent. In 2008, David Weisbrot, the
president of the Australian Law Reform Commission, documented the need
for a reevaluation. He declared:
Recent advances in information, communication and surveillance
technologies have created and intensified a range of privacy issues.
The internet, biometrics, digital phones and cameras, powerful
computers and radio-frequency identification have all contributed to
making it easier, cheaper and faster for government agencies and
business organizations to collect, store and aggregate large amounts
of personal and sensitive information.5
Integrated DPSIP laws administered by independent regulatory agencies are
essential but lacking. The following ten findings substantiate the need for
such laws:6
1. Behavioral science research showed DPSIP was essential to
psychological, psychosocial, community, and cultural survival.
2. Independent surveys showed the majority of people in the selected
countries wanted information privacy protection but were not
receiving it. Behavioral science research showed that information
privacy was vital to human and societal functioning.
4 William Mitting, Data Privacy Debate to Come to the Fore, Experts Say. (2009), at
http://www.printweek.com/digital/news/915730/Data-privacy-debate-to-fore-experts-
say/ (last visited on 25 June 2012).
5 David Weisbrot, Technology-Neutral Privacy Principles Should Govern Rapidly Developing
ICT. (2008, August 11), at http://www.alrc.gov.au/media/2008/mbn2.pdf (last visited
on 11 August 2012).
6 The data supporting the first seven principles are documented in Chapter Two. The data for
the rest of the points are found in the comparative legal standards chapters.
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3. Personal information had become a valuable commodity that was
easily acquired, accessed, stored, traded, transferred, and sold
without permission or quality controls.
4. Governments and business organizations often failed to adequately
address civil liberties, human rights, consumer protection, and
personal property standards related to DPSIP. Because of the
desire for control and their greed, governments and business also
often failed in their duty to adequately protect and secure the data
they held.
5. DPSIP practices violated analogous principles including informed
consent, confidentiality, impact assessments, and audits.
6. Technological innovations received governmental approval and
protection without there being any examination of information
privacy, data protection, and data security assessments.
7. DPSIP violations threatened related legal principles and the security
of individuals, businesses, and governments. The issues include
asset protection, contract law, information control, intellectual
property law, property laws, tort law, and privacy law conflicts.
8. Different national laws and regulatory approaches were inconsistent
and often contradictory, making predictability often impractical.
9. Different national laws and regulatory approaches made DPSIP
vulnerable to unauthorized use and abuse.
10. Different national laws and regulatory approaches made DPSIP
violations and violators unaccountable.
The need for integrated DPSIP laws that these findings validate are well
documented. David Holtzman7 studied issues of technology and privacy,
finding seven technological sins against privacy, including the following: (1)
the Sin of Intrusion, which is a violation of one’s physical and virtual spaces;
(2) the Sin of Latency, which includes the “excessive hoarding” of personal
data; (3) the Sin of Deception, which includes the use of private data for
7 David H. Holtzman, Privacy Lost: How Technology is Endangering your Privacy, (Jossey-
Bass ed. 2006).
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purposes other than those approved or consented to; (4) the Sin of Profiling,
which is the mishandling of personal data (including data mining); (5) the Sin
of Identity Theft, includes criminal theft, and also the sale of data without
consent or adequate data security; (6) the Sin of Outing, which includes
misuse of personal data and sharing data without permission; and (7) the Sin
of Lost Dignity, which includes using personal data for social control and
abuses by powerful sources, including businesses and governments.8
Holtzman concluded that as these sins harm individuals and society, privacy
and data protection laws are required.
1.2 Background of the Problem
For centuries, informational privacy and data were protected by the
technology of the age. Collected data was handwritten and later typed and
placed in location-secure specific files. Such information was limited, not
openly shared, and difficult to find, but it was also economically unimportant.
The historic pattern was suddenly changed with the advent of the computer,
information economy and the Internet, as information became economically
valuable. Data could be mined (i.e., automatically scanned and collected) and
easily shared, so information became instantly available and collectable.
The impact of data mining was established as early as 1997 when the
Minneapolis Star Tribune received permission from a randomly selected
individual to determine the depth and breadth of available information
sources. The searchers determined where the person was born, lived, went
to school, and worked. Data on the individual’s preferences in beer,
entertainment, food, politics, and vacations were also easily found.9
In the late nineteenth century, most modern governments also started a
system of collecting and analyzing personal data for legitimate service
purposes. In the mid-twentieth century, businesses followed this pattern,
8 Id. at 5–34. The UNISA School of Law standard uses Ibid. In the US, Id. is used in legal
citations and Ibid. is used in non-legal systems.
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especially in credit reporting. However, data storage was via file cabinets,
and access was limited.10 The processes changed when the US government
gave TRW Incorporated governmental computer programs to computerize
credit reporting. Subsequently, the collection methods, uses, and value of
information expanded.
As the Internet became commercial and companies demanded access and
control over more data and databases, an economically powerful global
system emerged. Large global corporations (including Acxiom, ChoicePoint,
Experian, and LexisNexis) began purchasing databases from thousands of
businesses and organizations to build extensive databases of their own on
millions of people in the US alone. The data aggregators built electronic
dossiers on millions of individuals that could then be filtered for specific data
and sold on demand.11
More data was more easily available than ever before, and that data could be
shared at unprecedented speeds. Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau12
documented that at the start of the nineteenth century, it took the UK
government eighteen weeks to send a message to the New Delhi
ambassador. By the end of the next century, the same message took only a
couple of days, and then decreased to an hour. Currently the message could
be sent in seconds. However, each increase in speed due to technological
advances, resulted in a decrease in privacy protections.
There was a general realization that these privacy infringements required
legal remedies, but information technology evolved faster than traditional legal
bases could respond. The law largely ignored evolving privacy concerns. For
example, intellectual property protections were awarded with no attention to
privacy enhancing technology design. In effect, the law followed a traditional
9 Jeffrey Rothfeder, No Privacy on the Net, PC World, 223 (1997, February).
10 James B. Rule, Privacy in Peril: How We Are Sacrificing a Fundamental Right in Exchange
for Security and Convenience, (Oxford University Press ed. 2007).
11 Robert O'Harrow, No Place to Hide, (Free Press ed. 2006).
12 Whitfield Diffie & Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and
Encryption, (The MIT Press. ed. 1998).
Chapter One: The Problem 7
reactive pattern when the significance of these changes required a proactive
legal response. The Internet and increased computer access, and the nature,
speed, and implications of this technology presented a number of legal and
policy challenges to traditional legal models and methods. The central legal
issue was what hypotheses, deductions, objectives, and questions ought to
be addressed. These developments challenged traditional common law views
of asset protection, civil rights, consumer protection, data protection, data
security, human rights, information privacy, and personal property rights.13
Powerful interests worked to make those challenges greater and to delay any
emerging legal protections. Large corporations used the battle cry of
marketing services and free speech, while governments used the need for
national security. Both claimed ownership of data mining methods and data.
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) defined data mining as “the
application of database technology and techniques—such as statistical
analysis and modeling—to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in
data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of future results.”14
Individual intellectual property rights, knowledge control, confidentiality rules,
tort principles, and the legal principle of informed consent were ignored along
with existing legal constraints. The US government violated its own laws and
pulled data from private sources for its own purposes. For example, JetBlue
Airlines released personal data on five million passengers when the
government asked—no warrant, only a request for information.15 Similar data
were released under the same circumstances by several major
telecommunication companies. There were no legal constraints in the United
States to stop governments and private businesses from collecting, using, or
sharing personal information. Corporations were found to share such
information as they wanted to be seen as being nice or to avoid the problems
13 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0, (Basic Books ed. 2006). See also Virginia
Postrel, The Future and its Enemies: The Growing Conflict Over Creativity,
Enterprise, and Progress, (The Free Press ed. 1998).
14 United States Government Accountability Office, Data Mining: Federal Efforts Cover a
Wide Range of Uses. (2004), at http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/gao_dm_rpt.pdf (last
visited on 23 June 2012).
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related to saying no. Neil Richards16 analyzed the government business
connection, and concluded the system allowed the government to circumvent
statutory and constitutional constraints protecting individual privacy.
Personal data was now a unit of exchange that was usually secretly collected
and monitored, then used to increase wealth and power. Modern data
regarding an individual’s existence included name, home address, pictures,
social security number, medical treatment, and insurance records. Data on
livelihood included the individual’s airline and other travel information, certified
and registered mail sent or received, computer uses by the individual, credit
information on cards, credit history, delivery services used, listings in
directories, driver’s license, and information held by Federal Express. The
data also included licensing information, Internet research records, office
phone and fax numbers, online testing services, passport data, membership
in professional organizations, publications, research used, security systems
data, records of telephone calls, testifying records, websites used, and work
address. Data that individuals gave voluntarily (such as for goods, services,
causes, or vanity) included data on airport VIP cards, data in cable TV
records, directories, frequent flyer/staying cards, merchant loyalty cards, and
data related to political registrations. A staggering volume of private
information was readily available on any given person.
This information was obtained from individuals via a number of methods
ranging from fraudulently, involuntarily, and under duress to unknowingly and
voluntarily. The sources included public records; quasi-public records;
marketing data; business, financial, and personal records; and Internet use.
The data would often be accessed online (either for free or via subscription),
independent of location or authority. The individual’s level of control was
poor-to-moderate. With the aid of laws and judicial decisions, some
businesses and governments had taken the information and declared it their
15 Markle Foundation, Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security.
(2003), at http://www.markletaskforce.org/ (last visited on 11 January 2012).
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own to use, abuse, and share. An example was the Work Number Company,
for which Carrie Teegardin17 published data. The company collected detailed
employment records of employees from a number of sources. The data
included generally private data such as social security number, employer, job
title, and wages. The Work Number then collected and sold the data to others
without the employees’ consent. The data included private information on a
third of all American employees and constituted over 165 million records.
There were no legal constraints on the collection or sale of this data—in fact,
the US government was a customer.
By now it is clear that such individual employment data and other personal
information should be secure, but are not. A recent study by Deloitte &
Touche18 found that data protection breaches and information privacy
violations were increasing. In a study of over 827 privacy professionals, thirty-
five percent reported six to ten privacy breach incidents, with forty-three
percent reporting more than ten incidents in the last several months. Eighty-
five percent reported at least one, and sixty-three percent reported multiple
significant breaches. Of the breaches, thirty-four percent involved over 1,000
records and ten percent over 25,000 files. The Irish Privacy Commission
reported that the office received 300 complaints in 2005, 658 in 2006, and in
2007 over 1,000 complaints.19
A similar pattern was found in the United States with privacy thefts. In 2006
there were 49.7 million reports, while in 2007 over 162 million records were
lost or stolen. Disclosures came from “98 companies, 85 schools, 80
16 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA Law
Review, 4, 1149 (2005).
17 Carrie Teegardin, Guess Who Knows How Much You Earn Each Week?, The Atlanta
Journal-Constitution. (2008), at
http://www.ajc.com/search/content/business/stories/2008/01/20/worknumber_0120.ht
ml (last visited on 23 May 2012).
18 Deloitte & Touche, LLP, Enterprise@Risk: Insights Into the Emerging Privacy and Data
Protection Function (2007),
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_risk_s%26P_2007%20Privacy10Dec2
007final.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2008).
19 Ciara O'Brien, Data Protection Complaints Soar. (2007 December 12), at
http://www.electricnews.net/article/10123588.html (last visited on 26 December
2012).
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government agencies and 39 hospitals and clinics.”20 For example, records of
6,313 medical patients at the University of California-San Francisco were
mistakenly made available on the Internet. The university took six months to
make any notification to the individuals involved. The released data included
names, addresses, medical identification numbers, treating physician and
department records, financial information, donation history, and neighborhood
maps.21
DPSIP data loss and breach violations alone were massive. Cline22
determined that from 2000 to 2008, publically reported breaches alone
involved more than 530 billion records (see Figure 1.1). The number was
greater than the entire population of the European Union (EU) or of CA, the
Caribbean, Central America, Mexico, and the US combined. The reported
DPSIP violations accounted for more that the entire population of Africa.
Figure 1.1 Source of Breaches
20 Byron Acohido, Theft of Personal Data More Than Triples This Year. (2007, December 9),
at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2007-12-09-data-
theft_N.htm?POE=click-refer (last visited on 2 January 2012).
21 Elizabeth Fernandez, 6,000 UCSF Patients' Data Got Put Online, San Francisco Chronicle
(2008, May 2), at A1.
22 Jay Cline, 530M Records Exposed, and Counting, Computerworld (2008, September 9), at
http://computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyNa
me=Privacy&articleId=9114176&taxonomyId=84&pageNumber=1 (last visited on 9
September 2012).
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Since 1997, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), located in the
US and Privacy International, located in the UK, have researched worldwide
privacy policies. The 2007 EPIC report revealed that DPSIP legal standards
had diminished. The US and UK were some of the weakest data protectors,
with AU being in the second worst category. CA was one of the best data
protectors, the EU was declining, and SA was in the development phase. The
report showed “an increasing trend amongst governments to archive data on
the geographic, communications and financial records of all their citizens and
residents. This trend leads to the conclusion that all citizens, regardless of
legal status, are under suspicion.”23 The researchers examined constitutional
protections, privacy enforcement, and statutory protections. A world map
graphically illustrates the relevant privacy ratings of the study:
Figure 1.2 State of Privacy Map
23 Privacy International, Leading Surveillance Societies in the EU and the World 2007. (2007,
December 28), at http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-
559597 (last visited on 2 January 2012).
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24
The map illustrates global surveillance levels per se, but this study also
addressed the key issues of constitutional protection, communications data
retention, communication interception, data-sharing, democratic safeguards,
government access to data, privacy enforcement, statutory protection,
surveillance of medical, financial and movement and found safeguards lacking
worldwide.
The advent of modern computer technology provided businesses and
governments the ability to amass, through grand mechanisms, the means to
collect and build on data that left the owner–giver less control.25 Alexander
Rosenberg26 described a "degenerate case of the peeping tom's invasion of
our privacy" where "suffering is caused just by the voyeur's acquiring the
information." A tension existed between the enlightened self-interest of the
owner–giver and the economic or political advantage of the data collectors, who
used an argument of social benefit and economic efficiency. Information
gatherers tended to decay the value of the information and thus produced
allocation of resource distortions.27 The data controllers argued that the pattern
of ignoring DPSIP legal standards was in the name of efficiency and public
order. The impact was to destabilize the essential boundaries among
governments, individuals, and society.28 DPSIP legal standards are a public
good29 that the government must control to preserve democratic objectives.30
24 Id. at 1.
25 Hal R. Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, in Privacy and Self-Regulation in the
Information Age (U.S. Department of Commerce ed.eds., U.S. Department of
Commerce 1996); Hal R. Varian, The Information Economy: How Much Will Two Bits
Be Worth in the Digital Marketplace? (1996), at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/pages/sciam.html (last visited on 4 July 2012).
26 Alexander Rosenberg, Privacy as a Matter of Taste and Right, in The Right to Privacy
(Ellen Krankel Paul, et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2000).
27 Roger V. Clarke, Computer Matching by Government Agencies: The Failure of Cost/Benefit
Analysis as a Control Mechanism, 4 Information Infrastructure and Policy, 1, 29
(1995).
28 David Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life, (Open University ed. 2001).
See also David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital
Discrimination (David Lyon ed., Routlegde ed. 2003).
29 An economics term for a good or service that enhances the well-being of the public and
society.
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Over 30 years ago, Jack Hirshleifer31 maintained that respecting privacy rights
provided an evolutionary advantage for people and societies. More recently
Richard Epstein32 argued that information privacy is a form of private property
so that any taking or confiscation must be compensated. The legal challenge
is to develop laws to rebalance informational asymmetries.
1.3 Purpose of the Study and Approach
The purpose of the study was to explore and evaluate the legal implications of
DPSIP issues. The comparative study data were intended to be used to
assist attorneys, business executives, judges, legal academics, governmental
officials, and policy makers on both best practices and areas of improvement
based on the experience of the international community—specifically, AU, CA,
SA, the UK, and the US.
The approach involved three classic levels of policy analysis: macro, mezzo,
and micro. The macro level of analysis involved looking at general theory and
principles of international legal standards and generally accepted principles.
The mezzo level involved research on the DPSIP laws, policies, and practices
in AU, CA, the UK, and the US Finally, at the micro level, certain DPSIP law
specifics were examined and then compared. The conclusions and
recommendations were based on an integration and selection of best
practices on all three levels.
Not all countries share a common interest or concern about DPSIP legal
issues, and some do not even agree on the terminology or definitions.
Accordingly, a range of legal responses was identified. This thesis examines
the strict DPSIP legal standards of the E.U. and the UK, the “inadequate”
30 David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between
Privacy and Freedom? (Basic Books ed. 1998).
31 Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function and Future, 9 Journal of Legal Studies 4, 649
(1980).
32 Richard A Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: And Putting It Back Together Again, in The
Right to Privacy (Ellen Krankel Paul, et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2000).
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protections of AU, the “adequate” protections of CA, the sectoral “patchwork”
pattern of protection laws in the US, and the evolving approach found in SA.33
As indicated above, key legal policies were not always common across these
countries, and some terms were ill-defined. Thus, the study used the
qualitative research strategy of textual analysis to help define essential terms.
The texts included laws, treaties, court decisions, and authors who have
focused on DPSIP. In addition to addressing poorly defined terms with
linguistic-based approaches, essential common concepts were determined.
Both linguistic and statistical techniques were used to derive useful
categorical definitions and comparative insights.
1.4 Theoretical Framework
DPSIP issues cross a number of academic disciplines, including data,
research, and theory from business, economics, jurisprudence, law,
philosophy, political science, psychology, sociology, and technology. A
multidisciplinary-systems thinking approach was appropriate as it was the
standard in social science research. Thus, although the general focus of the
study involved a comparative law research approach, the justification for
concern was based on a sociolegal34 approach.35
A comparative law research approach was used to focus on a legal analysis
of various DPSIP approaches to the legal and policy issues. Academic
research resources, black letter law, cases, and statutes presented a basis for
comparison. A goal was to elucidate general approaches and results as
distillation of essential lessons that would be legally and socially useful in
legal policy reform. Lessons learned from other jurisdictions aided in
establishing effective legal regulation. The approach involved critical
33 Privacy International (2007, December).
34 Some writers in the field, hyphenate sociolegal as Socio-legal.
35 Roger Cotterrell, Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central; A View of Socio-Legal
Studies, 29 Journal of Law and Society 4, 675 (2002). See also Denis J. Galligan,
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questioning of different legal practices, examination of legal effectiveness, and
exploration of conflicts and differences using both primary and secondary
sources.
The comparative law approach has both its supporters and critics.36 The
approach used in the current study attempts to maximize the strengths and
compensate for the weaknesses of the model. The comparative law
approach uses qualitative research methods; however, it also uses the rigor of
the experimental approach.37 The study compares worst case and best case
approaches in building to a set of DPSIP legal recommendations.
1.5 Questions and Objectives Investigated
The basic questions and objectives investigated in this thesis were based on
Sir Edward William Cooke’s legal interpretation standards set in the Heydon’s
Case.38 The issues must be addressed as they relate to the legal challenges
of DPSIP. The Cooke tasks, as reworded for modernization and specificity,
are:
1. “What was the common law before the making of the act.” What
were the laws and international standards related to DPSIP legal
principles before the advent of personal information becoming a
commodity and means of social control?
2. “What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide.” What was the mischief and defect that allowed
Socio-Legal Studies in Context: The Oxford Centre Past and Future (Journal of Law
and Society Special Issues) (Denis J. Galligan ed., Wiley-Blackwell ed. 1995).
36 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Past and Future of Comparative Law, 43 American Journal of
Comparative Law 3, 477 (1995); Alan Watson, Law Out of Context, (University of
Georgia Press ed. 2000). For a critical review, see George A Bermann, The Discipline
of Comparative Law in the United States., 51 Ruevu Internationale De Droit Compare'
4, 1041 (1999).
37 Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. (The University of Chicago
Press. 1986).
38 Heydon’s Case 76 Eng. Rep. 637, (1584) (UK).
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businesses and governments to violate DPSIP standards that the
law did not adequately provide?
3. “What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of the commonwealth.” What comparative legal principles
and procedures formed the “cure for the diseases” of the
invasions of DPSIP?
4. “The true reason of the remedy; … to make such construction as shall
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and
add force and life to the cure and remedy.” How can SA best respond
to the DPSIP law principles?
These issues and legal challenges must also be examined with a clear
understanding of the context within which they emerged. The Internet began
as an establishment39 response to the need for connectivity between
computer users. The early developmental phase was open and at times
liberating. A policy decision was made to allow commercial activities on the
Net, and access and activities grew internationally. Those who believed in
behavioral control (Neo-Conservatives40) claimed that the Net and the
information economy must be controlled using Industrial Age legal concepts.
Claims were made that the Internet was a chaotic “Western wilderness.”
Commercial interests demanded historic protections and new opportunities.
Then politicians, legislators, lawyers, and judges entered the fray, but
fundamental DPSIP issues and questions remained unresolved. Initial
responses ranged from the legally naive to the technologically and
39 A government sponsored project between the military and academic establishments.
40 A legal and political philosophy that resurrects fascist, Neo-Nazi, and pro-business
positions that support unfettered capitalism, unregulated business, bare-bones
government, and distains Judeo-Christian views. See Gary Weiss, Ann Rand Nation:
The Hidden Struggle for America's Soul (St. Martin's Press ed. 2012) and Steven M.
Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the
Law (Princeton University Press ed. 2008).
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developmentally ignorant.41 This thesis seeks to clarify the issues and
principles to escape from the business/legal/political quagmire.
The general research questions were:
1. Could the law effectively respond to the fundamental DPSIP legal
principles raised by computer technology and the information
economy violations?
2. What were the national and international legal standards related to
DPSIP legal principles before the advent of computer technology
and the information economy violations?
3. What were the DPSIP mischiefs and defects that computer
technology and the information economy opened up that the
existing law did not adequately protect?
4. What DPSIP legal principles and procedures should form the “cure
of the diseases” of the new information economy violations?
5. How can the law best respond to computer technology and the
information economy challenges of fundamental principles of
DPSIP law?
Specific research questions were:
1. Can DPSIP be protected from computer technology and the
information economy violations?
2. What was the appropriate DPSIP law, and what was it based upon?
3. How are DPSIP legal principles violated?
4. Should DPSIP legal principles ever be violated?
5. Is there a proposal on how to best establish DPSIP law protections?
1.6 Conceptual and Substantive Assumptions
41 Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It, (Yale University Press ed.
2008). For an opposing view, see Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, (Basic Books
ed. 1999).
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The study was based on a set of conceptual and substantive assumptions.
These assumptions influenced the definition of the research problem and
primarily directed the finding of relationships, making of comparisons, noting
of changes, and identifying of possible cause-and-effect relationships. These
assumptions included:
1. The Internet and information economy were in their infancy and would
continue to evolve. The law has yet to play a significant role in the
evolutionary development of the information economy. The law has
understandably been reactive, but must also take a proactive role. The
information economy would be better if general legal principles were
established even if there were increased costs. DPSIP law must
accept that different societies, countries, and groups have conflicts
between different methods of and standards for acceptable behavior
that must be harmonized. The issues involved major systemic
concerns.
2. The law must be normative so that it encourages valued behaviors but
does not ignore or fail to conform to data from other fields of study and
research. The law must contribute to the evolution of a more orderly
and just worldwide society.
3. The law must facilitate the will of the majority and protect the rights of
the minority (i.e., the strong must not be able to dominate the weak).
The law must openly encourage people to communicate, resolve
differences, buy, sell, increase wealth, and protect information privacy
data with their rights being predictable and protected. History shows
that the law can be ignored, misused, used for oppressive or political
purposes, or poorly reasoned.42
4. The law must be proactive in protecting data, security, and information
privacy. Given that the information economy created much of the
problem, this was the time for constructive correction and limitations on
the power of the powerful.
42 Detailed examples are discussed in Chapter Two.
Chapter One: The Problem 19
1.7 Legal Rationale
DPSIP law should confront difficult, conflicting, diverse beliefs, and multiple
issues, implications, and theories. Yet some legal principles remain constant,
including that no people or states ought to profit from their own wrong
behavior. People are entitled to dignity and autonomy, and they deserve to
have their personal data and information privacy protected. In addition,
people—not businesses or governments—must have control over their
property and confidentiality rights. The law ought to protect the individual
while constraining business and governmental abuses.
Furthermore, the law ought to guard against and eliminate arbitrary,
capricious, and oppressive uses of state or business power. Unjustifiable
arbiter or judicial decisions are not legitimate as they are not logically derived
from generally accepted legal principles. The legal system must be
obligatory.
DPSIP law must seek and maintain a high level of legitimacy via the effective
and legitimate use of official power with sound checks and balances. Such
laws and legal principles must deserve the people’s respect.43
The law must address the challenges of DPSIP in an Information economy.
The law must address the challenges from a multinational comparative
analysis perspective.
1.8 Importance of the Study
The debate regarding computer technology and the information economy
shifted from participant-determined consensus standards to the external
regulators (software producers and business interests), then to nation-state
laws and judicial standards, often with little regard for DPSIP. Some conflicts
43 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, (Princeton University Press ed. 2006).
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were addressed, but the implications were often ignored.44 The nature of the
new age and technology raised fundamental questions about historic DPSIP
legal and policy concepts. Power bases were established and challenged.
Nation-state courts and nongovernmental adjudicators issued conflicting,
contradictory, and unenforceable decisions.45
This study addresses the fundamental issues by examining comparative
DPSIP common law principles as the principles may or may not be related to
the new legal challenges. The study defines the principles of DPSIP law, then
compares and contrasts the DPSIP law found internationally in AU, CA, SA,
the UK, and the US. Accordingly, the study provides a basis for clarifying the
debates and exploring an action alternative for dealing with complex legal and
technological issues on both a national and global basis.
On 20 August 2013, the SA National Assembly passed the Protection of
Personal Information Act of 2013 (B9D-2009) (POPI).46 Professor Graham
Greenleaf noted that the POPI was the world’s 101st DPSIP related law; the
twentieth enacted in this decade, and the eleventh such law in sub-Saharan
Africa.47 The number of statutes is increasing and so are the differences.
1.9 Definition of Terms
The study uses some key terms, variables, and words of art that require
clarity and preliminary definitions. Key operational definitions follow,
including:
44 See Lessig, supra note 13 (both works); see also Postrel, supra note 13.
45 See Chapter Two through Chapter Nine.
46 At the time of this writing, the bill still had to be translated into Afrikaans and the signature
of President Jacob Zuma. The text can be found at
http://d2zmx6mlqh7g3a.cloudfront.net/cdn/farfuture/HRSY-
yvz5dgSfW8uBeBhCYbXCQLX14dx-
YS7wdyFpfc/mtime:1376915982/files/130618b9d-2009.pdf.
47 David Graham, Protection of Personal Information Bill will make or break online marketing
in SA. (1 September 2013, at <http://ph.news.yahoo.com/protection-personal-
information-bill-break-online-marketing-sa-043852707.html?.tsrc=warhol>.
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Common Law: The legal tradition stemming from the use of judicial
decisions, based on precedence, to define the law as opposed to a set
written code. This tradition is in contrast to the civil law tradition where
there is a basic written code. The UK, the US (except Louisiana), CA
(except Quebec), and AU have a strong common law tradition. SA,
Quebec, and Louisiana have a mixed jurisdiction tradition. The
responses of these common law countries to DPSIP vary, and are
explored in the study. Each of these countries has developed an
increased reliance on comprehensive codes48 but fundamental
concepts of the nature of law and rights generally remain.
Data Protection: Technical security and legal restrictions on the use,
release, sale, rent, lease, sharing, and theft of personal information.
Most data protection statues require: (1) that the data be accurate; (2)
that the collection be adequate, relevant, and not excessive; (3) that
the information be fairly and lawfully processed; (4) that the information
be kept secure and not be kept longer than necessary; (5) that the
information not be transferred abroad without adequate protection; (6)
that the data be processed only for limited purposes; and (6) that the
data be processed in accordance with informational privacy rights.
Although data protection refers to computer and data security issues,
the term was used in the EU as synonymous with information privacy.
Data Security: Closely related to data protection and information
privacy with the concepts and practices being interdependent. Tasks
cover all administrative, physical, and technical safeguards used in an
information system. Security involves access to data; its disclosure,
disruption, destruction, unauthorized modification, or use; and
protection from data corruption. Data backups, encryption, firewalls
48 US Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Civil Procedure. (2006), at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/index.html (last visited on 25 September 2012).
US Rules of Evidence, Rules of Evidence. (2006), at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/index.html (last visited on 22 September 2012).
Uniform Commercial Code, Uniform Commercial Code. (2001), at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/ucc.table.html (last visited on 22 September 2012).
Chapter One: The Problem 22
controlling access, technical protections, and use are cardinal
elements. The International Standard ISO/IEC 1779 addresses these
protections as information security. The literature also uses the terms
computer security and information assurance. Data holders must
identify the parties who are clearly responsible to protect and control
access to the data.49
Information Privacy: The right of “individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about themselves is communicated to others."50 The law recognized a
legal right to informational privacy and a limited right to access
governmental information. Individuals have a legal interest in control
over personal information. The only modifier is when there is a
significant public need.51 Information privacy is a form of information
control, confidential knowledge control, and an asset that has property
right considerations owned by the person—the right to exercise legal
control over the person’s information.52 The responsibility for protecting
information privacy resides within the law and governments committed
to the rule of law. The focus is on personally identifiable information
(PII) and data mining that can lead to PII.
49 ISO/IEC, 17799:2005 Information Technology - Security Techniques - Code of Practice for
Information Security Management. (2005), at
http://www.iso.org/iso/support/faqs/faqs_widely_used_standards/widely_used_standa
rds_other/information_security.htm (last visited on 1 June 2012). See also 44 U.S.C §
3542(b)(1) (2006). (US)
50 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, (Atheneum ed. 1967). See also Allen F. Westin &
Michael A. Baker, Databanks in a Free Society: Computers, Record-Keeping &
Privacy. National Academy of Sciences. Washington. D.C. Project on Computer
Databanks, (Quadrangle Books ed. 1972).
51 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977).
52 See Richard A Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: And Putting It Back Together Again, in The
Right to Privacy (Ellen Krankel Paul, et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2000);
Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, (Basic Books ed. 1999); and
Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0, (Basic Books ed. 2006).
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Information Privacy Law: “A mosaic of various types of law: tort law,
constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, evidentiary
privileges, property law, and contract law.”53
Privacy: The term is used in a broad range of situations. The legal
literature notes that there are four types of privacy: decisional,
informational, physical, and proprietary.54 The focus of this work is on
information privacy with some consideration of proprietary concepts.
1.10 Description of Research Methodology and Approach
The basic structure of the study involves building on the author’s strong
professional interest in the topic. A general research strategy was developed
that included identifying resources and issues. The research topics were
carefully defined, questions were developed, theories were reviewed, and
rationales were delineated. Then the collection and organization of additional
information was begun, with the process including periodic evaluation of the
research questions, methodologies, and data collected. Additional
information was organized and evaluated, and interpretive theories were
revised. Finally, the results were interpreted and the findings prepared.55
This study used a hermeneutic approach in that laws, cases, writings, and
policies were interpreted and meanings transcribed. The focus was on
understanding the issues and the context that gave them meaning. The
textual meaning was considered to be an interaction between the views that
meaning was independent from the interpreter and that it was dependent on
the interpreter. The source materials were analyzed within a historical context
53 Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, (New
York University Press ed. 2004).
54 Anita L Allen, Privacy as Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the
Paradigm, 32 Connecticut Law Review 3, 861 (2000); Anita L. Allen, Privacy in
American Law, in Privacies: Philosophical Evaluations (Beate Rossler ed., Stanford
University Press 2004).
55 See R. Murray Thomas & Dale L. Brubaker, Theses and Dissertations: A Guide to
Planning, Research, and Writing, (Bergin & Garvey ed. 2000).
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but applied to current problems. Martin Packer56 argued that “The difference
between a rationalist or empiricist explanation and a hermeneutic
interpretation was like the difference between a map of a city and an account
of that city by someone who lives in it and walks its streets.” This study used
both perspectives.
The focus of the research was on generating knowledge rather than
accumulating information. The expressed purpose was to present
alternatives and action for legal analysis and change.57
The research approach involved an integration of key components of the
major social science and legal research approaches and methodologies.
Questions were developed based on education, training, and experiences.
Data were obtained by a systematic use of primary, secondary, and
theoretical sources. The focus was on providing perspectives for evaluating
alternative decisions and policies.
Historical approaches were used to accurately and objectively reconstruct key
issues and principles as much as possible. The areas of concern were
approached from a descriptive methodology to accurately, factually, and
systematically describe the DPSIP legal issues and trends. The shift from the
industrial economy to an information economy was evaluated from a
developmental perspective to identify the changes, patterns, and sequences
over time. Causal-comparative or ex post facto approaches were used to
observe possible and plausible casual privacy invasion factors. The approach
ended with an action orientation to identify approaches to address the
information age-related legal challenges as a catalyst for a rational exploration
of fundamental DPSIP law principles.58 The integrated research design was
56 Martin J. Packer, Hermeneutic Inquiry in the Study of Human Conduct, 40 American
Psychologist 10, 1081 (1985).
57 Davydd J. Greenwood & Morten Levin, Introduction to Action Research: Social Research
for Social Change, (Sage ed. 1998).
58 Stephen Isacc & William B. Michael, Handbook in Research and Evaluation: A Collection
of Principles, Methods, and Strategies Useful in the Planning, Design, and Evaluation
Chapter One: The Problem 25
necessary because of the complexity and importance of the DPSIP legal
issues in the current age.59
Given that the design depended on historic information written and observed
by others, such information was analyzed to determine the accuracy,
authenticity, and significance of the materials. The design required a
demanding, disciplined, exhaustive, rigorous, and systematic approach so as
to collect appropriate, reliable, and unbiased information. Thus, the design
required the author to constantly monitor biases, motives, and information that
might filter out possible distortions or exaggerations or permit key data to be
overlooked. The steps included defining the problem, stating the research
objectives, collecting the data, evaluating the information, and reporting the
findings. There were sufficient primary and secondary balanced data
available for examination of the issues. Attempts were taken to adequately
evaluate the historical data. Personal biases were monitored so as to not
negatively influence the process. The data were integrated and synthesized
in order to reach meaningful conclusions.60
This comparison of the international legal, regulatory, and enforcement
mechanism of the AU, CA, SA, the UK, and US approaches to DPSIP law or
developments was essentially a case study design. A focus included the
developing DPSIP privacy law in SA. A case study approach was
appropriate for this thesis because it was a “strategy for doing research
which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary
of Studies in Education and the Behavioral Sciences, (Edits/ Educational and
Industrial Testing Services 3rd ed. 1995).
59 Id. at 48–59. The descriptions include Action: develop new skills or new approaches and
to solve problems with direct application to the world setting Causal-comparative:
investigate possible cause-and-effect relationships by observing some existing
consequence and searching back through the data for plausible causal factors. This
was in contrast to the experimental method which collects its data under controlled
conditions in the present. Descriptive: describe systematically the facts and
characteristics of a given … area of interest, factually and accurately.
Developmental: investigate patterns and sequences of growth and/or changes as a
function of time. Historical: reconstruct the past systematically and objectively by
collecting, evaluating, verifying, and synthesizing evidence to establish facts and
reach defensible conclusions often in relation to particular hypotheses.
60 Ibid.
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phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of
evidence.”61 Yin and Campbell declared that “in general, case studies are
the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed.”62
The design required describing events, situations, policies, treaties, legal
principles, laws, and court decisions. The accumulated efforts resulted in a
detailed database, which was used to explain relationships, formulate
implications, make predictions, identify meaningful patterns, and test
hypotheses. The patterns of the variables were examined to determine their
development, growth, and regressions. Interrelated factors and sequences
were tracked. A look at the developmental patterns globally and within
selected nations avoided possible attribution errors and biases.63
The design involved looking at areas of interest that had already occurred.
The effort included analyzing “causes, relationships, and their meanings.”64
Classic experimental methods were considered to be inappropriate to the
topics. Such methods were also not possible because dependent and
independent factors could not be reliably selected, controlled, or manipulated
in a non-artificial or realistic manner. However, the design did provide reliable
data about the DPSIP legal issues in the information economy.
The design provides practical and relevant information for lawyers, judges,
legal scholars, legislatures, business executives, and policy makers. The
effort provides a structural model for problem solving, guidelines, and
principles for evaluating new developments. In addition, the thesis design
provides for a means to avoid fragmentary, impressionistic, short-term, and ill-
advised decisions.
61 Colin Robson, Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-
Researchers, (Blackwell 2nd ed. 2002).
62 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (Sage Publications 4th ed.
2009).
63 Isacc & Michael, supra note 53.
64 Id.at 54.
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1.11 Data Collection Procedures
The data was obtained by the use of phenomenological and more objective
data collection procedures. This research was influenced by both sets of
approaches.
The phenomenological experiences included the author’s experience with
information technology, the Internet, and information privacy concerns. The
author’s first experiences started with the use of the University of Southern
California’s punch card computer system and the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) to do the statistical analysis for a PhD dissertation65
and the use of an Apple II Plus floppy disk computer with a 300 baud modem
to connect with a regional bulletin board and users’ group.
Data and insights that included international perspectives were obtained from
the author’s years of teaching, consulting, mediating, and arbitrating regarding
information age, Internet, and legal issues. Participation in the World
Intellectual Property Organization’s WIPO Workshop for Arbitrators in Geneva
showed the intense conflicts and feelings related to the issues. Additional
participation in and facilitation of interest groups at three Harvard Law
School/Beckman Center for Internet and Society and one Stanford University
Law School’s Internet Law Summer programs provided data, perspectives,
and discussions with faculty and participants from a range of countries. In
addition to prior thesis and dissertation research and teaching, the data
collection training included participation in the Legal Research on the Internet
program conducted by the University of Toronto Law School. Assistance was
also found at the University of Ottawa Law’s The Internet and the Law: A
Global Conversation program, and Yale University Law School’s The Global
Flow of Information: Law, Culture and Political Economy. Faculty input from
the International Association of Privacy Professionals 2006 Privacy Academy
and the 2007 Privacy Summit was also used.
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Objective data collection included research strategies using Lexis-Nexis,
Westlaw, governmental websites, legal research sites, mega and specific
search engines, local university and law school libraries, and the law school
library at the University of South Africa. Careful notes were taken on desk
and laptop computers.
Books, collections, and journals were consulted. Statutory, administrative,
and common law sources were reviewed using case reports and digests.
Primary sources (including constitutions, declarations, court decisions,
regulations, statues, treaties, and hearing records) were consulted to
determine mandatory and persuasive authorities. Secondary sources
including American Law Reports Annotated, commentaries, Current Law
Index, hornbooks, Index to Legal Periodicals, law review articles, legal
encyclopedias (Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence 2nd),
Legal Resource Index, legal treatises, legislative histories, Restatements of
the Law, Uniform Laws and Model Acts, Words and Phrases, and other
writings were researched.
The data collection process followed a structured system approach. The
approach included searching: computerized legal research tactics;
generalized sources in law, policy, business, and the Internet; known topics;
known authorities; descriptive words; descriptive facts; and legal authority
updates.66
The process was guided by the principles that the purpose of legal research is
to examine sets of actual or potential facts to determine the legal
consequences. The process included preparation and redefining of the initial
issues statement; preparing and refining search terms; outlining potential
sources; gathering the facts to narrow the research focus; analyzing the facts;
65 Known as a thesis in SA, the UK and some other countries and institutions.
66 Christopher G. Wren & Jill R. Wren, The Legal Research Manual: A Game Plan for Legal
Research and Analysis, 77-78 (Adams & Ambrose Publishing 2nd ed. 1986).
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gathering more facts; identifying the legal issues raised by the facts; and
arranging the legal issues in a logical order for research.67
1.12 Data Processing and Analysis
As much as possible, steps were taken to insure the reliability and validity of
the data. Safeguards included obtaining multiple accounts and diverse views
as well as integrating social, cultural, political, business, and information
technology views as part of the legal analysis. Only respectable sources and
authors were consulted. Data and studies were synthesized, diversities were
revealed, inconsistencies and exceptions presented, applications illustrated,
and principles and propositions were generated.68
The analysis and interpretation of the data were subjected to a preset plan.
The steps included comparing and contrasting the factors addressed. Where
possible, patterns were identified to determine if correlations existed based on
explanatory or predictive interpretations. Trends and patterns were identified.
Conventional wisdom was challenged, and some alternative meanings
proposed. The issues of altering beliefs and behaviors were examined.
Business practices, technological events, and legal practices were also
evaluated.69
The black letter law70 of the selected nations provided descriptions of the
formal legal principles, and rules were applied. Cases and statutes were
examined. A formal black letter law approach for this topic was rejected as
being too narrow.
67 Id. at 29; Amy E. Sloan, Basic Legal Research: Tools and Strategies, (Aspen Law &
Business ed. 2000).
68 R. Murray Thomas & Dale L. Brubaker, Theses and Dissertations: A Guide to Planning,
Research, and Writing, (Bergin & Garvey ed. 2000).
69 Ibid.
70 Legal principles that are accepted, fundamental, and well-settled. See Bryan A. Garner,
Black's Law Dictionary 163 (Bryan A. Garner ed., West Group 17 ed. 1990).
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Use of sociolegal research strategies provided a means to address relevant
qualitative and quantitative data. DPSIP law operates within cultural,
business, economic, political, psychological, and social contexts, so
establishing sound legal standards required an interdisciplinary approach.
Thomas argued that “Empirically, law is a component part of the wider social
and political structure, is inextricably related to it in an infinite variety of way,
and can therefore only be properly understood if studied in that context.”71
Some elements of a historical approach were used. Understanding the
comparative developments of DPSIP law was critical to understanding the
issues and current practices. Understanding the context of national and
international standards was essential in critically evaluating the success and
failure of different national approaches to the issue. The past and present
DPSIP issues were part of the legacy and current responses.
The major structure of the approach was a comparative law one. The
globalization of DPSIP legal realities dictated the need for understanding and
approaching the extant differences in standards in the various countries. The
approach provided data for SA to learn from the successes and failures of
other national approaches. Academic articles, cases, and statutes from the
selected nations were reviewed.
Although the approaches taken by the countries included in this study differ
widely, issues confronted by different nations are not unique; therefore, the
methodology employed in this study allowed for an examination of parochial
assumptions. Although not always binding, different national experiences and
standards can be persuasive authority. Conflicts and differences in legal
standards and approaches can be used to develop a more common ground
approach.72
71 Phillip Thomas, Curriculum Development in Legal Studies, 20 Law Teacher 2, 110 (1986).
72 See Michael Salter & Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide
to the Conduct of Legal Research, (Pearson Longman ed. 2007).
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The methodology also incorporated the qualitative research strategy of textual
analysis. The texts analyzed included laws, treaties, court decisions, and
authors addressing DPSIP legal issues. Moreover, both linguistic and
statistical techniques were used to derive useful categories of definitions and
comparative insights. Version 2.1 of the SPSS Text Analysis and Version 7 of
the Nvivo software were used to assist in determining analysis patterns.
The function of the data processing and analysis was to attend to key legal
issues and responses to DPSIP. The task was to raise questions and
suggest a possible course of action. In the collection of data, treatment, and
data processing procedures, the author used standard research and legal
scholarship methods.
1.13 Comparative Law Analysis
In a comparative law study, a similar set of issues ought to be used to gather
information on the laws, jurisprudence, and policies of all of the nations in the
study. In this study a number of general factors are considered as questions.
A comparative law analysis of the positive law and policies of each country
will be reported. The responses include current, historical, and proposed
legal standards. The questions are:
1.Do the legal standards in the country provide a legal basis for DPSIP
Protections?
2.Does the country provide legal support for corporate privacy and data or
property protections?
3.Do the DPSIP declarations provide clear information privacy, data
protection, and data security standards?
4. Does the law and policy of the country require DPSIP Regulatory
Agencies?
5.Do the laws of the county provide for related consumer protection
standards?
6.Are legal standards established that apply to data controllers?
7.Does the country have data processor requirements?
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8.Are data subjects legally protected?
9.Does the law provide for strong data security and destruction standards?
10.Does the law address cross-border data flows and transfers?
11.Does the law provide for checks and balances related to exemptions
and exceptions?
From an international perspective, DPSIP laws and policies have gone
through, at this time, four evolutional stages. The current standards of each
country will be evaluated based on a continuum:
Figure 1.3 Continuum of DPSIP Approaches
Limited
DPSIP legal
standards are
established.
Establishes selected
personal information
targets; legal standards
address some security
issues; focus is on
limited legal consent
and notice.
Accepts personal information
standards; does not fully
address security issues but
provides more comprehensive
standards that DPISP level 2.0;
focus is on a legally based
harm based analysis.
All sensitive and non-sensitive personal
data is fused; information privacy, data
protection, and security issues are
interrelated; legal audits, checks, and
balances needed for all personal
information stakeholders. New
technologies are required to pass privacy
audits (example - RFID) and require use of
privacy enhancing technologies in all new
IP approvals.
DPSIP.0 DPISP.1.0 DPSIP.2.0 DPSIP.3.0
Contiumuum from weakest to strongest Data Protection, Data Security, and Information Privacy Level
1.14 Methodological Assumptions
Stephen Isacc and William Michael argued that “measurement of multiple
outcomes is preferable to measurement of a single outcome.”73 Thus, this
study was based on a set of operational and methodological assumptions that
included: (1) no single research or legal methodology could adequately
address the legal issues involved; and (2) black letter law, socio-legal, and
comparative law research strategies would provide the most comprehensive
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research approach. A systematic review of the primary and secondary legal
resources could contribute to understanding the issues and address trend
concerns. The selected methods and the study could be a preliminary view
and call for action. Finally, the study could provide a basis for further work
and actions.
The methodology met the fundamental assumptions of the qualitative
method.74 The holistic assumption was that the entirety of the legal issues with
DPSIP law were more than and differed from the sum of the parts. The focus
of the study sought to address the DPSIP phenomena and to develop a more
complete understanding of the issues. The inductive assumption was that the
approach could use specific observations as a means toward understanding
emerging general patterns. The naturalistic inquiry assumption was that the
phenomena could be understood in the natural national and international
environment.
1.15 Limitations of Assumptions
As the study included a trend studies approach, the approach may have been
“vulnerable to unpredictable factors.”75 The design did not involve any direct
control over the variables, but plausible rival data and hypotheses were
considered. Accordingly, some relevant causal issues may have been
missed. Some other combinations or interactions may have occurred, and
cause-and-effect relationships may have been misinterpreted. Although every
effort was made to be thorough, DPSIP is an emerging field of study, and
some other factors may not have been recognized. Specifically, some of the
factors and issues may have been too political, unclear, variable, or
transitory.76 In addition, some of the sources relied upon may have been
“incomplete or badly biased.”77
73 Isacc & Michael, supra note 53, at 100.
74 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods, (Sage 3rd ed. 2001).
75 Isacc & Michael, supra note 53, at 100.
76 Ibid.
77 R. Murray Thomas & Dale L. Brubaker, Theses and Dissertations: A Guide to Planning,
Research, and Writing, (Bergin & Garvey ed. 2000).
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1.16 Summary of Problem
Advances in computer technology (including data collection, uses, abuses,
and cost reductions) impacted data protection and security concerns.
Personal information became a valuable commodity. Businesses and
governments used and abused their access to and use of personal data.
Traditional views, powers, and legal abilities of nation-states to deal with
emerging DPSIP legal issues became inadequate. The legal response was
understandably slow, with the law generally not being timely in responding to
the technology-driven evolution.
The law could respond to the changes by denying the change and imposing
traditional legal standards. Alternatively, the law could adopt technology-
specific standards, and specialized courts of special jurisdiction could be
established. The law could accept the view that technology issues often mask
complex legal issues. A comparative evaluation of international and different
national legal traditions could provide direction to SA’s approach to
establishing DPSIP legal standards. The legal standards, approaches, and
problems of AU, CA, SA, the UK, and the US were selected for evaluation.
1.17 Summary of Literature and Issues Reviewed
Chapter one introduced the importance DPSIP law and many of the problems
related to it since the development of computer technology and the
information economy. Private data has always been collected, but massive
abuses and potentials of abuse were evident. During World War II, Germany
was the first nation-state to use computers and data to help identify and kill
millions. More modern governments and business concerns used the process
to further power goals. Private information became a valuable commodity that
was bought and sold without the individuals involved being aware. The
problems of DPSIP law were introduced, and the concerns for people’s
privacy were examined. Data on security flaws were presented along with
business use and abuses that went along with governmental use and abuses.
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The grab for power over information and knowledge was described. DPSIP
law threats and problems were explored, and the background of the problem
was examined. Finally, the advantage of a comparative study of DPSIP law
approaches was documented.
The study rationale and theoretical framework have been addressed. The
study questions and objectives, conceptual and substantive assumptions, and
legal rationale have been described. The research approach, study
questions, importance of the study, definition of terms, and methodology
overview were presented. The research design, data collection procedures,
data processing and analysis have been described. The methodological
assumptions, limitations of assumptions, and null conceptual and research
questions have been described.
The methodology involved the integrated use of classic action, causal-
comparative or ex post factor, descriptive, developmental, and historical
designs. The work involved collection, review, and analysis of theoretical,
policy, legislative actions, and court cases related to DPSIP issues. A major
focus was on activities in common law countries. Developments in AU, CA,
the E.U., the UK, and the US along with related international actions were
introduced.
The focus of this thesis was to compare the background, models, and laws of
selected jurisdictions that had taken different approaches to the issues. The
work presents the best practices found in each area to help make
recommendations for changes and adoptions regarding each system. The
work looks at the errors of the DPSIP approach in each country to formally
address the issues while the thesis looks at the SA experience in the hope
that it did not repeat the errors of others in its efforts to establish greater
protections. The thesis made recommendations for changes for each national
and international approach.
1.18 Outline of the Thesis
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The thesis chapters follow a consistent organizational structure that involve
macro, mezzo, and micro levels of analysis. The chapters address specific
DPSIP legal issues confronted by computer technology and the information
economy.
Each of the issue chapters addresses the topics from both a legal and
multidisciplinary (legal, political, technology, cyber culture, psychosocial, and
business) perspective. Generally, each contains an overview followed by a
presentation of historical definitions, developmental history, and historic and
current legal and policy standards. Information economy challenges and
evolving information economy legal standards are addressed. Present and
predicted future policy concerns are delineated. Each chapter concludes with
a summary of the findings and issues reviewed with a preview of the next
chapter.
The chapter topics addressed include:
 “Chapter Two: Data Protection and Security Law: Socio-Legal Issues,”
which looks at the question: What are the multidisciplinary contributions
to understanding DPSIP legal issues?
 “Chapter Three: International Legal Standards and Guidelines” wrestles
with the question: What international legal standards, governmental
guidelines, and nongovernmental guidelines address DPSIP issues?
 “Chapter Four: Australian Legal Standards and Approaches” presents
and critically evaluates this national approach to DPSIP issues and
experience, with both success and failures being examined.
 “Chapter Five: Canadian Legal Standards and Approaches” presents
and critically evaluates this national approach to DPSIP issues and
experience, with again success and failures being examined.
 “Chapter Six: South African Legal Standards and Approaches” presents
and critically evaluates this national approach to DPSIP issues and
experience, as always success and failures are examined.
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 “Chapter Seven: United Kingdom Legal Standards and Approaches”
presents and critically evaluates this national approach to DPSIP
issues and experience; success and failures are examined.
 “Chapter Eight: United States Legal Standards and Approaches”
presents and critically evaluates this national approach to DPSIP
issues and experience, and also examines success and failures.
 “Chapter Nine: Data Protection and Security Law: Comparative
Evaluation” presents an interdisciplinary comparative analysis of the
insights and legal principles gained in the prior chapters and
perspectives. The results of case study, linguistic analysis, positive
law, qualitative, quantitative, and sociolegal research approaches are
presented.
 “Chapter Ten: Data Protection and Security Law: Gold Standard
Proposal” presents proactive implementation recommendations based
on recent and current DPSIP experience, legal developments,
literature, and research. The chapter argues that SA ought to seriously
consider the new gold standard in its DPSIP legal approach. The
chapter further argues that the nation states and regions addressed in
the study ought to learn from one another and adopt the new DPSIP
gold standard.
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CHAPTER TWO: DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW:
SOCIOLEGAL ISSUES
An ideal system of law should draw its postulates and its
legislative justification from science. As it is now, we rely upon
tradition, or vague sentiment, or the fact that we never thought
of any other way of doing things, as our only warrant for rules,
which we enforce with as much confidence as if they embodied
revealed wisdom. … How much has reason had to do in
deciding how far, if at all, it is expedient for the State to meddle.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1
2.0 Overview
Chapter two examines DPSIP issues from a sociolegal perspective. The
psychosocial research relevant to DPSIP and public concerns for increased
legal involvement are explored. Data is presented from AU, CA, SA, UK, and
US research. The chapter presents an analysis of the psychosocial and legal
factors related to DPSIP problems.
Data is presented that considers the psychosocial factors of DPSIP issues
and establishes the need for legal regulations to address DPSIP problems.
The majority of those surveyed in the five target countries wanted increased
data protection and data security legal standards. The research showed that
personal information had become a valuable commodity. The sociolegal
literature revealed that businesses and governments had not adequately
addressed DPSIP issues. A number of analogous legal principles support the
need for strong DPSIP legal and regulatory standards. The principles include
informed consent, confidentiality, impact assessments, and the need for
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers, at 139 (Harcourt Brace and Company
1920).
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audits. The research showed that governments had even granted intellectual
property protections for technological innovations without assessing or
examining the DPSIP implications. Research is presented that shows that
data protection and security violations threatened basic legal principles and
the security of individuals, businesses, and even governments. Asset
protection standards, contract law issues, information and knowledge control
law issues, intellectual property law issues, personal property law issues, tort
law issues, and privacy law conflicts are assessed. The chapter ends with a
summary of the sociolegal literature and issues.
2.1 Psychosocial Factors of Data Protection, Security and Information
Privacy
Data protection and security is more than a legal debate. The concepts,
principles, and laws form legal standards, yet psychological and psychosocial
realities also exist. The law must recognize relevant psychological and
psychosocial research findings. Psychologically, the ability to control personal
information is critical for human development and functioning. Such control
impacts on the public self’s ability to influence the boundaries between the
self and others.2
DPSIP has been the focus of study from a range of disciplines. Ideally, the
law should integrate aspects of theory, research, and data from legal history,
business practices, political science, philosophy, psychology, and sociology.
Eric Fromm, the famous psychoanalyst, wrote about issues of freedom and
liberty, and data protection. He declared that freedom, liberty, and privacy
controls impact individual and group functioning. Having faith in oneself and
life are essential. Utmost vigor is required to ensure people’s sensitive
information remains under their control. The issues are quantitative and
qualitative.3 Many prominent legal scholars, philosophers, psychologists, and
2 Bradley J. Alge, Effects of Computer Surveillance on Perceptions of Privacy and Procedural
Justice, 86 Journal of Applied Psychology 4, 708 (2001), at 798.
3 Eric Fromm, Escape from Freedom, at 126 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1941).
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other thinkers have weighed in on these issues; a summary of the most
important positions with commentary from the current author follows.
Oscar Ruebhausen and O. Brim support the Fromm position. The authors
found that people need to have the power to determine when and with whom
personal information is shared. People function at a higher level when they
can control the sharing or withholding of information on attitudes, behavior,
beliefs, and options. Privacy control is a freedom essential to personal
dignity.4
Perhaps the best description of the psychological and psychosocial
principle supporting the need for data protection and information privacy
was argued by Immanuel Kant. He explained, “Man is inclined to be
reserved. ... Everyone has a right to prevent others from watching and
scrutinizing his actions."5
Writing from a legal perspective, Charles Fried expanded the Kantian view.
He maintained that information privacy is critical to maintaining functional
relationships. Such privacy and control is a means and an end to respect and
trust.6
Information privacy represents and performs a vital psychological and
social function. Individuals are more than social and political entities.
Individuals are discrete human beings with rights. Information privacy
has a vital psychological aspect that is an integral part of functional
autonomy and self-development.
4 Oscar M. Ruebhausen & O. G. Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 Columbia Law
Review 2, 1184 (1965), at 1211.
5 Immanuel Kant, Ethical Duties Toward Others: Truthfulness, at 225 (Louis Infield trans.,
Hackett Publishing Company 1930).
6 Charles Fried, Privacy (A Moral Analysis), in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An
Anthology at 205 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., Cambridge University Press
1984).
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Abraham Maslow7 wrote about human needs. The basic need, the one
upon which all other psychological needs are based, was security.
Information privacy is an element of security. Julie Inness wrote that
privacy infringements resulted in a sense of harm including a fundamental
loss of agency and even violation.8 Privacy allowed people to interact with
others on the basis of individual demands and to influence interpersonal
relationships. Protections against the public gaze were seen as
essential for a functional emotional life. A lack of information privacy
violations crippled relationships for other productive purposes.9
Alan Westin argued that all animals, including humans, have mechanisms that
protect privacy between other members of the species.10 Robert Ardrey11
established a biologically based need for a range of privacy protections.
Louis Hodges12 argued that privacy was necessary for civilization and sound
human relationships.
Louis Fried supported the psychological need for information privacy in
social relations. Fried argued that information was a moral capital that
people can choose to share or not share.13 Ruth Gavison took the need
for information privacy a step further, arguing that information privacy allowed
autonomy, human relations, liberty, and the survival of a free society.14
The importance of and correlation of information privacy and psychological well-
being have been the subject of a number of scientific studies. The two principles
and dynamics are connected. Judee Burgoon established the psychological and
7 Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (3rd ed., John Wiley & Sons 1999).
8 Julie C. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation, at 3 (Oxford University Press 1992).
9 Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 3 (1998),
at 17 & 20.
10 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom, at 8 (Atheneum 1967).
11 Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (Atheneum 1966).
12 Louis W. Hodges, The Journalist and Privacy, 9 Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 4, 97
(1994), at 200.
13 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale Law Journal 75, 475 (1968), at 492.
14 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale Law Journal 3, 421 (1980), at 423.
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psychosocial significance of people having control over information release and
subsequent distribution and use.15 Irwin Altman clearly documented the need for
information privacy as a psychological imperative for psychosocial well-being and
functioning. Privacy involved access control for the individual and the group.16
Sandra Petronio showed the psychological importance of having control over one’s
personal information. She found that historically, people had established criteria and
rules to protect themselves and those things seen as critical. Modern technology did
not eliminate the need for information control.17 Petronio also argued that privacy
management was a demand-response between at least two people. When given the
right to disclose, people used five factors in deciding when to release data: the “(1)
need to tell, (2) predicted outcome(s), (3) riskiness of revealing the specific
information, (4) privacy level of the specific information, and (5) degree of
emotional self-control.”18
Valerian Derlega and Alan Chaiken defined privacy from a psychological and
psychosocial perspective. The essential feature of information privacy was control
over all aspects of self-disclosure and was a psychological imperative. Maintaining
regulatory control over the use and release of personal information protected one
from vulnerability and others’ control.19
From a psychological and psychosocial perspective, information privacy was
an imperative. Information privacy has had powerful consequential and
meaningful impacts on personal and societal wellbeing.20 Research in
15 Judee K. Burgoon, Privacy and Communication, in Communication Yearbook 6 (Michael
Burgoon & Noel E. Doran eds., 1982), at 230.
16 Irwin Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory,
Crowding, at 18 (Brooks/Cole Publishing Company 1975). Also see Irwin Altman,
Privacy: A Conceptual Analysis, 8 Environment and Behavior, 1, 7 (1976).
17 Sandra Petronio, S. (1991). Communication Boundary Management: A Theoretical Model
of Managing Disclosure of Private Information between Marital Couples 1
Communication Theory, 4, 311, at 311.
18 Id. at 314–316.
19 Valerian J. Derlega & Alan L. Chaiken, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social
Relationships, 33 Journal of Social Issues 3, 102 (1977), at 102,103, 109.
20 Gary B. Melton, The Significance of Law in the Everyday Lives of Children and Families,
22 Georgia Law Review 851 (1988); James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4
Chapter Two: Sociolegal Issues 43
anthropology, architecture, design professions, law, political science,
psychology, and sociology supports that conclusion.21 "Respect for another's
privacy is a legitimate expectation in all social relationships. As a value,
privacy does not exist in isolation, but is part and parcel of the system and
values that regulates action in society."22
Alan Westin summarized the psychological and sociological research related
to information privacy. People had a need for autonomy, avoidance of
manipulation, and protection from dominance by others. Inner zones of
privacy control were essential to survival.23 Westin also noted cases where
information privacy violations caused damage including nervous breakdowns
and suicides. The sources of violation included governments and businesses.
He argued that only grave policy needs could be used to justify information
privacy exemptions.24
Robert Laufer and Maxine Wolfe25 maintained that information privacy involved
information and interaction management. The study found that individuals whose
private data were violated reported significant levels of loss of control not only of the
information but also in interaction boundaries.
Ferdinand Schoeman26 analyzed the psychological and psychosocial research
related to information privacy. He found that both the information content and the role
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 4, 323 (1975); Charles R. Tremper & Mark A. Small,
Privacy Regulation of Computer-Assisted Testing and Instruction, 63 Washington
Law Review 3, 841 (1988).
21 Irwin Altman, Privacy: A Conceptual Analysis, 8 Environment and Behavior 1, 7 (1976), at
7.
22 Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is Not An Isolated Freedom, in Privacy (Nomos, XIII), at 71 (J.
Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., Atherton Press 1971).
23 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom, at 33 (Atheneum 1967). Also see Allen F. Westin &
Michael A. Baker, Databanks in a Free Society: Computers, Record-Keeping &
Privacy. National Academy of Sciences. Washington. D.C. Project on Computer
Databanks (Quadrangle Books 1972).
24 Id. at 33–34.
25 Robert S. Laufer & Maxine Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue: A
Multidimensional Developmental Theory, 33 Journal of Social Issues 3, 22 (1977).
26 Ferdinand D. Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in Philosophical Dimensions of
Privacy: An Anthology, at 405-406 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., Cambridge
University Press 1984).
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that the information played were critical to an individual’s sense of self and
relationships with others.
As this brief review of the major psychosocial and legal factors related to DPSIP
problems clearly establishes, legal regulation of DPSIP issues is justified by
psychological and sociological research including the benefits such regulation has for
individual, family, group, and governmental survival and growth.
2.2 The Majority of People want Data Protection and Security Legal
Standards.
In a democracy, republic, or even a corporate republic, the attitudes of the
people toward DPSIP legal issues ought to be considered. Studies in AU,
CA, SA, the UK, and the US that illustrate attitudes in those countries are
considered below.
2.2.1 Australia
The AU Office of the Federal Privacy Commission conducted research on
public privacy concerns for a number of years. In 2001, the levels of privacy
concerns were higher than a similar 1997 study. In the 2001 study,27 ninety-
one percent of the sample thought that businesses should ask permission
prior to collecting personal data even if it was inconvenient. The sample
reported that businesses that collected data should inform customers
regarding the uses of the data (eighty-nine percent). Over ninety-two percent
reported that privacy violations included businesses transferring personal data
without permission and using the data for purposes other than that claimed at
the time of collection. The highest support was that businesses ought to show
‘respect for, and protection of, my personal information.’28
27 Australian Office of the Federal Privacy Commission, Privacy and the Community (Author
2001).
28 Id. at 4.
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The research showed that in AU, citizens and even business executives were
concerned about DPSIP concerns and violations. Representative
governments should establish laws that reflect citizen concerns rather than
special interests.
2.2.2 Canada
The Federation Nationale des Associations de Consommateurs du
Quebec/Public Interest Advocacy Centre29 surveyed 2,000 Canadians in
Ontario and Quebec. Over fifty percent of the subjects reported that they had
privacy violations as a concern and high information privacy concerns. The
research of Smith, Milberg, and Burke30 showed that the major privacy
concerns were improper access and unauthorized secondary use. Another
study of 7,088 adults, by Ipsos/Queen's University31 found that sixty-nine
percent of Canadians were concerned about the protection of personal
information.
In 2009, the Canadian Office of the Privacy Commissioner conducted a public
research project. The data showed that eighty-seven percent of Canadians
distrusted businesses in the protection of their private information, especially
during hard economic times. Seventy-one percent of the sample favored
stronger privacy protection laws. The vast majority (eighty-three percent)
were concerned about genetic privacy.32
29 Federation Nationale Des Associations De Consommateurs Du Quebec/Public Interest
Advocacy Centre, Surveying Boundaries: Canadians and their Personal Information
(Author 1995).
30 H. Jeff Smith, et al., Information Privacy: Measuring Individuals' Concerns About
Organizational Practices, 20 Management Information Systems 2, 167 (1996, June).
31 Ipsos / Queen's University, Interviews with 7,088 Adults in Brazil, Canada, France,
Hungary, Mexico, Spain and the United States (2006), http://www.angus-
reid.com/polls/view/13849 (last visited on 3 March 2012).
32 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Canadians Concerned Corporate Cost
Cutting Could Affect their Privacy: Poll (2009, April 27),
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/survey/2009/ekos_2009_01_e.cfm (last visited on
28 April 2012).
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2.2.3 The Republic of South Africa
Research on public concerns regarding data protection and security concerns
in SA covered a period of many decades after the EU data protection directive
standards. A survey conducted in SA revealed that seventy-three percent of
those sampled reported concerns about the loss of control over their personal
information.33
Data protection and security concerns in SA showed that organizational
leaders ranked amongst the world’s most informed about issues related to
data protection and security. Sixty-seven percent reported that such concerns
were critical, yet twenty-four percent expressed concerns about the
effectiveness of current DPSIP efforts in that country. The majority noted
governmental policy motivated business interest.34
The research conducted in SA revealed that the majority of people wanted
DPSIP legal protections. The data also showed that business organizations
in the country were behaving below international standards.35 The lack of
governmental DPSIP laws and regulatory agencies compounded the problem.
2.2.4 United Kingdom / European Union
Almost seventy-five percent of Europeans reported that they were worried
about their lack of control of personal information. While more than fifty
percent trusted employers, financial institutions, local governments, medical
services, police, social security, and tax authorities to follow data protection
33 Jaco Van Der Walt, Trust and Privacy are the Cornerstones of Successful Relationships
between Consumers and Business. (2003, March 13),
http://www.ey.com/GLOBAL/content.nsf/South_Africa/15_May_03_Trust_And_
Privacy (last visited on 5 June 2012).
34 Ernst & Young, South African CEOs are Getting More Hands-On with Information Security
Issues, Tech News (2004, November),
http://cbr.co.za/article.aspx?pklArticleId=3290&pklCategoryId=378 (last visited on 22
March 2012).
35 Ibid.
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and security standards, less than half trusted credit card agencies, credit
reference agencies, mail order companies, marketing companies, nonprofit
organizations, opinion research companies, and travel businesses. The loss
of personal data for 25 million persons by the UK Government was a strong
area of concern.36 The Angus Reid37 data showed that fifty-nine percent were
concerned about new technology being used to violate personal privacy
standards.
A study by the European Commission found that eighty percent of the youths
studied were concerned about governments and businesses using their
personal data without permission and sharing it with third parties. The sample
also thought governmental regulation was necessary and that few use current
protection technology.38
2.2.5 United States of America
Kim Sheehan39 did a meta-analysis of studies of forty-three established and
respectable public opinion poll studies related to information privacy views in
the US. The data showed a number of population concerns regarding
information privacy. The Sheehan mega-data showed that the majority of
those polled in the various studies maintained that the government should
pass laws that protect information privacy and that individuals should have the
power to protect their rights, including private causes of action. The data
supported the view that information privacy was in trouble in the US. The
36 Aoife White, EU Poll Shows Three Out of Four Europeans Worried about Personal Data
Online (22 January 2008), http://news.theage.com.au/technology/eu-poll-shows-
three-out-of-four-europeans-worried-about-personal-data-online-20080122-1nba.html
(last visited on 22 April 2012).
37 Angus Reid Global Monitor, Five Countries Review Privacy, Technology (2006),
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/11915 (last visited on 31 March 2012).
38 Judith Crosbie, Commission Seeks External Advice on Internet Privacy (2009, April 28),
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/04/commission-seeks-external-advice-on-
internet-privacy/64717.aspx (last visited on 29 April 2012).
39 Kim Bartel Sheehan, How Public Opinion Polls Define and Circumscribe Online Privacy, 9
First Monday, 7 (2004), http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue9_7/sheehan/ (last
visited on 24 June 2012).
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people studied maintained that there was or should be a right to privacy, and
control over who gets information and over the collection of information. The
subjects were concerned about information theft and about the lack of Internet
privacy.
A Harris40 poll found eighty-three percent of Americans reported that they
would stop doing business with a company that did not protect personal
information. Ninety percent wanted a transparent privacy policy. Sixty-two
percent wanted an independent monitor on the practices, and ninety-one
percent would do business with such a firm if the practices were audited.
Susannah Fox and Oliver Lewis41 have conducted a number of relevant
studies. They found that seventy percent of Americans supported new laws
to protect information privacy. Fox found that eighty-six percent favored opt-in
to data collection processes and expressed the opinion that companies
should ask permission prior to using personal data. Fifty-four percent
reported that web site tracking of activities was harmful and a privacy
violation. Ninety-four percent argued for legal punishment for privacy
violators. Eleven percent wanted violating company owners sent to prison.
Twenty-seven percent wanted violating owners fined. Twenty-six percent
wanted any violating web site shut down. Thirty percent wanted a published
list of privacy violating fraudulent web sites.42
Independent research in all of the countries addressed in this study revealed
that citizens and business executives were significantly concerned about
40 Harris Interactive, Privacy On and Off the Internet: What Consumers Want (Study No.
15229) (Author 2002).
41 Susannah Fox & Oliver Lewis, Fear of Online Crime: Americans Support FBI Interception of
Criminal Suspects’ Email and New Laws to Protect Online Privacy, Pew Internet &
American Life Project (2001),
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2001/PIP_Fear_of_crime.pdf.pdf
(last visited on 24 May 2012).
42 Susannah Fox, et al., Trust and Privacy Online: Why Americans Want to Rewrite the
Rules, Pew Internet & American Life Project (2000),
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2000/PIP_Trust_Privacy_Report.pd
f.pdf (last visited on 7 June 2012).
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DPSIP issues. Many of the concerns were counter to national legislation and
court decisions.
2.3 Personal Information as a Valuable Commodity
That people in all the countries addressed in this study are concerned about
DPSIP issues is one illustration that personal information is a valuable
commodity, and the research confirms this fact. This section summarizes
relevant research and findings on the issue.
Richard Mason43 argued that the increased interests in DPSIP were related
to new technology that allowed increased information storage and retrieval. A
second factor was increased information value.
Of the nations studied, the US was one of the leaders in information
technology. In 1951, the US Census Bureau purchased the first commercial
electronic computer – UNIVAC – to collect and process massive data.44
Starting in the 1950s and 1960s, marketing firms and government
bureaucracies started programs that involved massive amounts of data
collection, storage, and selling. Robert Smith explained that data collection
was related to other cultural experiences including countries becoming
credentialed societies based on personal data.45
Alan Westin showed that in 1966, the Federal government owned 2,600
computers – more than any other organization. As a little boy with a new
hammer who finds all kinds of things to pound, the government started to
collect more data. “Once an organization purchases a giant computer, it inevitably
43 Richard O. Mason, Four Ethical Issues for the Information Age, 7 MIS Quarterly 2, 4
(1986).
44 Charles T. Meadow, Online Database Industry Timeline, 11 Database Magazine 5, 23
(1988).
45 Robert Ellis Smith, Ben Franklin's Web Site: Privacy and Curiosity from Plymouth Rock to
the Internet, at 314 (Privacy Journal 2004).
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begins to collect more information."46 In 1981, with the massive introduction of
personal computers, the demand to access personal information increased.
George Duncan, Thomas Jabine, and Virgina deWolf published a report of the
Panel on Confidentiality and Data Access. The report found that computer and
communication advances allowed data users to demand more individual or micro-
data. The development of large databases was the result of lower storage costs,
improved transmission, computerized data entry, and software developments.
Confidentiality became more important, but businesses and governments ignored
the threats to it.47
Pricilla Regan found that both businesses and governments had an insatiable
hunger for more individual information. As information became an increasingly
valuable commodity, DPSIP concerns were ignored or circumvented.48
David Burnham warned of the loss of personal information privacy and showed the
danger of the power differential between individuals’ ability to protect their privacy and
the combined ability of businesses and governments to violate it.49 Pricilla Regan50
agreed with Westin and Baker that the catalyst for the change was the
computer, but the computer was not the source of the problems. Businesses
and governments joined forces to destroy information privacy and eliminate
individual control over the collection, use, and transfer of personal
information.51
Although businesses and government ignored the concerns expressed by
individuals, people recognized that their personal information was valuable
46 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom, at 160 (Atheneum 1967).
47 George T. Duncan, et al., Private Lives and Public Policies: Confidentiality and
Accessibility of Government Statistics, at 52 (National Academy Press 1993).
48 Pricilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy, at 69
(University of North Carolina Press 1995).
49 David Burnham, The Rise of the Computer State, at 9 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1983).
50 Pricilla M. Regan, (1995).
51 Allen F. Westin & Michael A. Baker. Databanks in a Free Society: Computers, Record-
Keeping & Privacy. National Academy of Sciences. Washington. D.C. Project on
Computer Databanks, at 75 (Quadrangle Books 1972).
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from the earliest use of computers to collect and store such data. In 1965, the
US Federal government proposed a comprehensive governmental database.
The public reaction was so negative that the proposal was limited and
essentially went underground. A similar pattern was revealed when Lotus
developed and tried to market a program called Marketplace that included
massive personal information.52 Private businesses obtained government
technology. The businesses were encouraged to create massive databases
and thus, the data aggregator industry was privately born. The government
then accessed the data that it could not collect by itself.
Simson Garfinkel argued that the rejection of a governmental database was a
mistake. Stronger controls, checks and balances, and a process for redress
could have prevented business and governmental abuses, errors, and kept
the practices debatable in public.53 The flaw in his thinking was that private
businesses and the government got access anyway. Even when controls,
checks, and balances were established, businesses and governments still
failed to protect the data
Governments compelled people to surrender personal information and then
sold it to private companies. The companies added additional information.
The government often purchased the new records, thus by-passing the
citizen’s rejection of a central database. The symbiotic government - private
business relationship was more than political. Governments made fortunes
selling their information on individuals to marketing and other business
firms.54
52 Laura J. Gurak, Persuasion and Privacy in Cyberspace: The Online Protests over Lotus
Marketplace and the Clipper Chip (Yale University Press 1997). Also see Laura J.
Gurak, Logging in with Laura J. Gurak: Minnesota Professor Takes a Critical Look at
Online-Privacy Issues, The Chronicle of Higher Education (19 February 2002),
http://chronicle.com/free/2002/02/2002021901t.htm (last visited on 4 May 2012).
53 Simson Garfinkel, Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century, at 35
(O'Reilly 2000).
54 Charles J. Sykes, The End of Privacy: Personal Rights in the Surveillance Society, at 29
(St. Martin's Press 1999).
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Technological progress reached the point where knowledge discovery in
databases (KDD) was a reality. Such private information was a commodity.
The technology involved data mining and dataveillance. Several large data
aggregator companies established data dossiers on billions of people.
Acxiom, ChoicePoint, Experian, Equifax, LexisNexis, and Trans Union
purchased data and data companies to expand data resources.55 In the US,
since September 11, 2001, the government had gained increased access to
the data aggregator’s records. The data had been collected by the
government and repurchased for a fee, to protect against terrorists and
maintain social control.
Knowledge based databases used subject-oriented link analysis to collect
data behavior, intentions, lifestyles, and relationships. Correlation pattern
analysis revealed new patterns. Pattern matching subject classes used
algorithms in large databases to identify individuals and patterns.
James Dempsey and Laura Flint argued that pattern analysis was the most
significant threat to civil liberties and privacy in decades. Daily lawful
behaviors were examined using a massive surveillance monitoring strategy.
The approach ignored the legal principles that prior to a search, individual
suspicion must be established. Fundamental legal constructs including a
presumption of innocence were ignored.56
Private information in digital dossiers became “commodities, bought and sold
like bags of potato chips and six packs of beer.”57 Cees Hamelink58 argued
that advanced data-mining technology became a tradable commodity,
especially in capitalistic countries.
55 Robert O'Harrow, No Place to Hide (Free Press 2006).
56 James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 George
Washington Law Review 6, 1459, 1476 (2004), at 1466–1467.
57 Andrew J. Mcclurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to
Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Northwestern University Law Review 1, 63 (2003), at
142.
58 Cees J. Hamelink, The Ethics Of Cyberspace (Sage 2000).
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The real owners of the data, the data subjects, were compelled to release the
data, fraudulently induced to share it, not compensated for its collection or
use, and all without informed consent. The process created data shadows
which were free of controls all over the world. The shadows did not even
have to be correct or accurate. People and even institutions became
vulnerable subjects that could be punished or retaliated against even for
behavior that was never committed.59
Anita Allen60 explained that information privacy referred to the right to control
the use of personal data or information, and that privacy law should empower
an individual’s control over such information. The principle also applies to
access to public records data.
Daniel Solove declared that the mutual collection and sale of private data
between governments and businesses violated basic DPSIP legal principles
and demonstrated that marketers and businesses collect sell, and use
massive amounts of public data unlawfully.61
Another factor in the massive collection, sale, and use of data was the speed
of data transfer. As memory became less expensive, larger databases could
be maintained. Steven Miller demonstrated the impact of the increased speed
of transfer when he described that transmitting the Encyclopedia Britannica
took more than eighty-four hours, in the 1980’s; by 1994 it took less than five
seconds.62 Personal data was at higher risk as database size, digitization,
manipulation, replication ability, and speed of transfer increased. A couple of
seemingly insignificant pieces of personal data could quickly lead to a massive
dossier. Similarly, Andre Bacard showed the need for strong information
59 Garfinkel, 2000, at 70.
60 Anita L Allen, Privacy as Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the
Paradigm, 32 Connecticut Law Review 9, 861 (2000), at 863. See also Anita L. Allen,
Privacy in American Law, in Privacies: Philosophical Evaluations (Beate Rossler ed.,
Stanford University Press2004).
61 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution,
86 Minnesota Law Review 6, 1137 (2002), at 1194-1195.
62 Steven E. Miller, Civilizing Cyberspace: Policy, Power, and the Information Superhighway,
at 36 (ACM Press 1995).
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privacy legal intervention because of technology changes including (1) vast
memory capacity; (2) permanent, de-contextualized data; (3) sophisticated
search and matching capabilities; and (4) ease of transferability.63
In addition to the lack of control over the collection, sale, and use of their
personal data, people had little to no ability to correct data errors because they
had no access to information in the massive databases that were aggregated
and because the law did not establish their right to such access for all
databases and transfers. Richard Spinello proclaimed many data files were
incomplete and even outdated. Larger data bases compound the problems
exponentially. As data is shared, corrections become almost impossible.64
Richard Miller described the issue of data aggregation, mining, and profiling
from a historical perspective. Data bits were scattered and transient. Any
attempt to collect the data was arduous, complicated, labor intensive, and
slow. When the data was electronically stored, data from a range of sources
were combined and cross tabulated. No checks and balances were in place
to ensure accuracy.65
Such practices had the effect of making people objects and assaulted human
autonomy and dignity. Error correction and data context were an essential
part of the management of databases that contained information privacy data,
and DPSIP law must address these issues. The opportunity that the advent
of computers presented to make personal data a commodity was similar to
the tort law principle of an attractive nuisance.66
63 Andre Bacard, The Computer Privacy Handbook, at 36 (Peachpit Press 1995).
64 Richard A. Spinello, Ethical Aspects of Information Technology, at 119 (Prentice Hall
1995).
65 Miller, 1995, at 264.
66 Creating an attractive situation that could lure a person into a situation that could be
harmful.
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2.4 Governments and Businesses failed to Adequately Address DPSIP
Issues
Clearly people wanted their personal information protected and objected to its
commoditization and use without their knowledge or consent, and while they
may have had no expectation that businesses would serve their interests,
citizens might have expected more from their governments. The information
economy placed value on data, information, and knowledge. New information
markets opened and business laid claim to them. Businesses pushed
technologies for targeting consumers and manipulating markets - usually
without informed consent - in the name of improved marketing and saving free
markets.
Governments colluded in the information theft that ensued. Some policy
makers, special interest groups, and judges argued that the outdated principle
of caveat emptor or public waiving of DPSIP rights applied. Consumer
protection standards were ignored, and conflicting laws and court decisions
created additional DPSIP issues.
2.4.1 Business Issues
Because of this failure to adequately address DPSIP issues, modern
corporations, with the assistance of some questionable court decisions, had
considerable power to divert the will of the people. The majority of the 100
world’s largest economies were corporations (fifty-one percent corporations,
forty-nine percent countries). The top 200 corporations had more economic
and political power than all but nine countries, controlling twenty-five percent
of international economic activities. Thirty-three percent of all world trade
involved corporate transfers within the same company.67 Large corporations
influenced not only economic decisions but also legal ones.
67 Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power, (Global
Policy Forum 2000),
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The warnings about business and corporate power and the beacon call to
regulate and limit business and corporate power on the law was not new. The
pattern in the US is a prime example. Thomas Jefferson, President of the US
from 1801 to 1809 made the first declaration. "I hope we shall crush in its
birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already to
challenge our government to a trial by strength, and bid defiance to the laws
of our country."68
On November 21, 1864, Abraham Lincoln, President of the US from 1861 to
1865, prophetically shared his concerns on corporations, the law, and
government. He wrote:
I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and
causes me to tremble for the safety of my country... Corporations have
been enthroned and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and
the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by
working upon the prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated
in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed.69
In 1888, Rutherford Birchard Hayes, President of the US from 1877 to 1881,
made a similar corporate pronouncement. He declared:
All laws on corporations, on taxation, on trusts, wills, descent, and the
like, need examination and extensive change. This is a government of
the people, by the people, and for the people no longer. It is a
government of corporations, by corporations, and for corporations.70
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221/47211.html (last visited on
15 June 2012).
68 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to George Logan, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 69
(Paul Leicester Ford ed. G. P. Putnam's Sons 1816).
69 Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Colonel William F. Elkins, November 21, 1864, in The Lincoln
Encyclopaedia (1950) (Archer H. Shall ed., Macmillan 1864), at 1.
70 Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, in U.S.
President. Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes: Nineteenth President of
the United States, at 374 (Charles Richard Williams ed., The Ohio State
Archaeological and Historical Society 1888).
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In the same year, Grover Cleveland, President of the US from 1885 to 1889
and 1892 to 1896 mirrored the concern, but little was done. He declared,
"Corporations, which should be the carefully restrained creatures of the law
and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people's masters."71
In 1906, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the US from 1901 to 1910
proclaimed:
Behind the ostensible government, sits enthroned an invisible
Government, owing no allegiance and acknowledging no responsibility
to the people. To destroy this invisible Government, to dissolve the
unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics, is the
first task of the statesmanship of the day.... This country belongs to the
people. Its resources, its business, its laws, its institutions, should be
utilized, maintained, or altered in whatever manner will best promote
the general interest.72
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the US from 1933 until his death in 1945,
addressed a similar legal concern:
The first truth is that the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people
tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes
stronger than their democratic state itself. That, in its essence, is
fascism - ownership of government by an individual, by a group, or by
any other controlling private power.73
The power of business interests over data protection, information privacy law,
and corporate social responsibility was not new. The historic four dimensions
of legal public policy – the executive branch of government, congress, courts,
71 Grover Cleveland, Fourth Annual Message to Congress, 3 Dec. 1888, in Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, at 773-774 (James D. Richardson ed., Government Printing
Office 1888).
72 Theodore Roosevelt, Declaration of Principles of the Progressive Party (1906),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/presidents/26_t_roosevelt/psources/ps_trprogress.ht
ml (last visited on 4 July 2012), at 5.
73 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the Concentration of Economic Power
(1938, April 29), http://informationclearinghouse.info/article12058.htm (last visited on
27 July 2012), at ¶ 2.
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and the press – ignored powerful corporate and wealth holdings. Corporate
interests in the US controlled the press and corporate power and belief
systems influenced, if not controlled all four dimensions. The corporate
mindset was not new.
Cornelius (Commodore) Vanderbilt, the patriarch of the Vanderbilt family,
responded to the business versus law struggle. He declared the universal
corporate mindset, "What do I care about the law? Haven’t I got the power?"74
In 1882, the railroad magnate and robber baron75 William Henry Vanderbilt
declared "The public be damned! I work for my stockholders.”76 The
stockholders were not independent, all knowing agents. Stockholders
responded to what management communicated.
The mindset continued through the 1901 US market crash caused by the
battle between J. Pierpont Morgan and J.P. Harriman which destroyed
thousands of investors. J. P. Morgan was asked by a reporter “Don't you
think, that since you are being blamed for a panic that has ruined thousands
of people and disturbed a whole nation, some statement is due the public?”
Morgan replied, “I owe the public nothing”77 Morgan continued the view that
“Men owning property should do what they like with it.”78
The graft, corruption, and control of the robber baron era did not just influence
the executive and legislative branches of the US government. The influence
also included the judiciary. The Supreme Court railroad commission opinion
was actually a consolidation of three railroad, county, and state taxation cases
74 Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists, 1861-1901, at
15 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1962).
75 A reference to exploitive, powerful, and unethical business leaders.
76 Rufus Hatch, Hatch on Vanderbilt, Chicago Daily Tribune. (1882, October 17), at 12.
77 New York Herald – World, Giants of Wall Street, in Fierce Battle Over Mastery, Precipitate
Crash that Brings Ruins to Hordes of Pygmies New York Herald – World (1901, May
11), at 22.
78 Lewis Corey, The House of Morgan: A Social Biography of the Maters of Money, at 289
(G. Howard Watt 1930).
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on property given to the railroads. The three cases were the California v.
Central Pacific Railroad Company, California v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Company, and Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company
cases.79
In 1886, twenty-one years after Lincoln’s assassination, Justice John Marshal
Harlan (appointed by Rutherford B. Hayes) and his clerk legally established
what Lincoln so feared. The case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad 80 gave powerful corporations the legal status of personhood. The
Court not only sided with the robber barons but granted corporations the legal
status of a legal person. Corporations were no longer state created but
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Prior to hearing oral arguments, Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite made a
unique declaration. The statement was included above the opinion and thus
technically had no legal importance except that Courts and authors accepted
it as persuasive. He stated:
The court did not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbad
a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that
it does.81
The statement was entered into the summary record by a court reporter. The
reporter added a syllabus statement that
The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause
in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
79 Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 331 (1886). (US)
80 118 US 394-417, (1886). (US)
81 Id. at 394.
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US, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.82
The result was to grant unprecedented legal power to corporations. No
challenges succeeded. The court never addressed the issue. The error
spread internationally. The SA constitution even accepted the same flawed
political reasoning.
In the Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Glander83 case, a state tax case,
Justices Douglas and Black dissented. The case was a combination of the
Wheeling Steel Corporation v Glander, Tax Commissioner of Ohio and
National Distillers Products Corporation, N.Y. v Glander, Tax Commissioner of
Ohio84 Justices Douglas and Black’s opinion cited the statement in Justice
Waite’s 1886 opinion and replied “There was no history, logic, or reason given
to support that view. Nor was the result so obvious that exposition was
unnecessary.”85 Note that the opinion was in dissent of the majority of the
Court.
The dangerous legal fiction continued. In Buckley v Valeo,86 the US Supreme
Court extended corporate constitutional rights to include First Amendment
free speech rights. By making political contribution limits unconstitutional, the
Court determined that the corporations could use corporate money to
influence elections as a matter of free speech. The right did not require
stockholder permission.
The mentality of corporate robber barons and neo-conservatives continued.
The Courts continued to perpetuate the legal fiction of deference to corporate
82 Id. at 1.
83 337 US 562, (1949). (US)
84 Id. at No. 447 - 478.
85 Id. at Dissent, at 2.
86 (No. 75-436) No. 75-36, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 519 F.2d 821, affirmed in part and
reversed in part; No. 75-437, 401 F.Supp. 1235, affirmed, (1976). (US)
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power. Robert Reich, the Secretary of Labor during the Clinton87
administration showed the continued impact of the judicial verdict in Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad over 120 years later. In 2008,
Reich declared:
There's no longer any countervailing power in Washington. Business is
in complete control of the machinery of government. The House, the
Senate and the White House are all run by business-friendly
Republicans who are deeply indebted to American business for their
electoral victories.88
Business organizations that made money on the collection, use, and sale of
private information represented a large and powerful legislative lobby.
Business concerns argued that privacy was a special issue and that the
concerns were exaggerated and costly to business. Without opt-in informed
consent, people gave information away to business concerns. Privacy issues,
framed as trivial, resulted in considerable money being spent protecting
business rights to use private information without payment or informed
consent. After all, business was only magnanimously helping people.
Consumers were not aware of the unique ways that their lives were scanned
and data collected.89
Businesses collected more and more private information to make more
money. Many also joined to meet competitive pressures and to sell more ill
gotten data. Tracing transfers became impossible.90 Jeff Smith91 found that
87 Behaviourally, Clinton was the youngest neo-conservative – Republican / Democrat
president in US history.
88 Robert Reich, Corporate Power in Overdrive, New York Times. (2001, March 18),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D04E2DA153DF93BA25750C0A967
9C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1 (last visited on 20 August 2012), at 2. The
current situation is no different with a Democratic President. See Lawrence Lessig,
Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress - and a Plan to Stop It, (Twelve -
Hachette Hook Group ed. 2011).
89 Winnie Chung & John Paynter, Privacy Issues on the Internet (2002),
http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2002/1435/07/14350193b.pdf (last
visited on 10 June 2012), at 2.
90 Gurpreet S Dhillon & Trevor T. Moores, Internet Privacy: Interpreting Key Issues, 14
Information Research Management Journal 4, 33 (2001).
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corporations in a range of industries did not have any standard ways of
dealing with personal information. Self-regulation resulted in no regulation.
Some business organizations used collected data to sell goods. Other
businesses used data mining to influence democratic elections. The
corporation named Aristotle bought voter information from counties and
states. Candidates and special interest groups then bought the expanded
data. The company openly sold a powerful database that included:
information about a voter's address and the number of children he or
she has, but also a lot of other information that may include how much
your house is worth, what kind of car you drive, what Web sites you
visit, and whether you went to college, attend church, own guns, have
had a sex change, or have been convicted of a felony or sex crime.92
A more traditional business approach was RealJukeBox’s sale of personal
data without permission. The information included customer’s name, e-mail
address, musical preferences, amount of music on hard disks and other
data.93
The Direct Marketing Association,94 an industry lobby group, advocated for an
opt-out option for data collection to make it less expensive for members.
91 Jeff Smith, Managing Privacy: Information Technology and Corporate America (The
University of North Carolina Press 1994).
92 Kim Zette, Voter Privacy Is Gone -- Get Over It (2008, January 31),
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/01/voter-privacy-i.html (last visited on 3
February 2012), at 6.
93 Eric C. Turner & Subhasish Dasgupta, Privacy on the Web: an Examination of User
Concerns, Technology, and Implications for Business Organizations and Individuals,
20 Information System Management 8 (2003).
94 Direct Marketing Association, Direct Marketing Association’s Online Marketing Guidelines
and Do the Right Thing Commentary (2006), http://www.the-
dma.org/guidelines/onlineguidelines.shtml (last visited on 12 August 2012).
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However, the majority of non-industry funded research showed that the
majority of people preferred an opt-in approach to data collection.95
Marketers suggested that some businesses offered privacy protections.
Those that wanted information privacy protections could pay more for non-
disclosure (blackmail?).96 People who wanted information privacy protections
could pay collectors for not collecting the data.97 The major problem with the
libertarian–market approach was that it was impossible to know all of the
sources that had collected personal data, so contracting was a practical
impossibility. John Hagel98 and Kenneth Laudon99 suggested that
consumers should be paid for use of their information.
Corporations often claimed that DPSIP standards should be balanced with the
argument of computer cost saving and business profits. Research in the field
showed that the cost cutting claims were unfounded.100 Don Tapscott and
David Ticoll maintained that, “Corporations have the right to have secrets -
called information security. As individuals we have a right to something
different - privacy.”101 “Consent, limiting collection, identifying purpose,
95 George R. Milne & Andrew J. Rohm, Consumer Privacy and Name Removal Across Direct
Marketing Channels: Exploring Opt-in and Opt-out Alternatives, 19 Journal of Public
Policy and Marketing 2, 238 (2000); A. D. Miyazaki & A Fernandez, Internet Privacy
and Security: An Examination of Online Retailer Disclosures, 19 Journal of Public
Policy and Marketing 1, 54 (2000).
96 David D. Friedman, Future Imperfect: Technology and Freedom in an Uncertain World
(Cambridge University Press 2008); Mary J. Culnan & Sandra J. Milberg, Consumer
Privacy, in Information Privacy: Looking Forward, Looking Back (M. Culnan, et al.
eds., Cambridge University Press1999); Mary J. Culnan, Protecting Privacy Online :
Is Self-Regulation Working, 19 Journal of Public Policy Marketing 1, 20 (2000).
97 Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, The Internet and the Law: Privacy in the Digital Age:
Work in Progress, 23 Nova Law Review 2, 549 (1999); George J. Stingler, An
Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 Journal of Legal Studies 4, 623
(1980).
98 John Hagel, The Coming Battle for Customer Information, 75 Harvard Business Review 4,
53 (1997).
99 Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 Communications of the Association for
Computing Machinery, 9, 92 (1996, September).
100 Ann Cavoukian & Don Tapscott, Who Knows: Safeguarding your Privacy in a Networked
World (Random House of Canada 1995); John Shattuck, Computer Matching is a
Serious Threat to Individual Rights, 27 Communications of the ACM 6, 538 (1984).
101 Don Tapscott & David Ticoll, The Naked Corporation: How the Age of Transparency Will
Revolutionize Business, at 312 (Free Press 2003).
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limiting use, disclosure, and retention” standards were ignored by
corporations and the government.102
Justified concerns about governments abusing personal information and even
ignoring privacy laws existed. Timothy Schoechle103 showed that in
capitalistic countries, large corporations and information processing firms
posed a more significant concern. Profit, self-interest, and wealth
accumulation were the only corporate values sought in the absence of strong
legal regulation.
In the first seven months of 2008, more data breaches were reported than in
the entire prior year. The reason so many data protection and information
privacy breaches was that businesses did not care. There was no “real
incentive to invest more than the minimum required in security.”104 The Chief
Security Technology Officer at the BT Group, Bruce Schneier commented on
the state of affairs in a Wall Street Journal article, he proclaimed that “For the
most part a company doesn’t lose its data, they lose your data.”105 The real
victims had no power to punish the businesses involved.
Self-regulation had failed. While everyone could contribute, “individual
businesses don’t have a reason to do anything about it.”106 Bruce Schneier
argued that the best way to improve security is a governmental incentive. The
incentive should be strong civil fines, criminal actions, or a private cause of
action.107 There was a forth alternative however – this was to do all three.
102 Id. at 181.
103 Timothy D Schoechle, Privacy on the Information Superhighway: Will My House Still Be
My Castle? 19 Telecommunications Policy 6, 435 (1995).
104 Ben Worthen, Why All The Data Breaches? Businesses Just Don’t Care (2008,
September 9), http://blogs.wsj.com/biztech/2008/09/09/why-all-the-data-breaches-
businesses-just-dont-care/ (last visited on 9 September 2012), at 3.
105 Bruce Schneier, What Our Top Spy Doesn't Get: Security and Privacy Aren't Opposites
(2008, January 24),
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/01/securitym
atters_0124?currentPage=all (last visited on 24 January 2012), at 4.
106 Id. at 6.
107 Id. at 8.
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Over the past four decades, a major cultural revolution had taken place in
economics, politics, business, and the law. Corporate republics replaced
representative democratic republics. “Corporate republic” was a term coined
by James Galbraith.108 Milton Friedman led the free market cult in academic
circles. Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
US Federal Reserve System took the lead in monetary policy. In every case
where the model was applied, it failed. In Congressional testimony on the
2008 market crash, Greenspan admitted that there was “a flaw in a lifetime of
economic thinking and that he was in a ‘state of shocked disbelief.”109
Greenspan had two gurus he followed – one was Friedman, the corporate
controlled free market advocate and the other was the Social Darwinist, Ayn
Rand.110
The political coup establishing corporate republics began with the elections of
Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US. An unproven
and questionable theory became a political plan. Regulatory checks and
balances stopped, services were privatized, and corporate representatives
controlled governmental regulatory boards. The fiction spread to AU and CA.
In the US, the program progressed through both Presidents Bush and
Clinton.111 At the time of this writing, the US was a Corporate Republic.112
108 James K. Galbraith, The Predator State: How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market
and Why Liberals Should Too (Free Press 2008).
109 Alan Greenspan, Greenspan Admits ‘Mistake’ that Helped Crisis (2008, October 23),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27335454/ (last visited on 24 October 2012), at 1.
110 See Gary Weiss, Ann Rand Nation: The Hidden Struggle for America's Soul (St. Martin's
Press ed. 2012). Rand did not believe in the rule of law, opposed any governmental
regulations of business, and advocated for untrammelled capitalism. She advocated
that government should only have three functions: 1. The armed services for internal
and external defence, 2. the police to control any dissent, and 3. the courts to serve a
partisan agenda. There should be no income taxes and no human rights protections.
at 262.
111 See David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government (Plume 1992).
112 A term describing when big business determines and profits from a governmental
coalition that diminished the will and accountability of the people. Businesses take
control of historical governmental functions. See Interview by Bill Moyers with James K.
Galbraith (8 October 2008),
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/10242008/transcript2.html (last visited on 8
October 2012); James K. Galbraith, The Predator State: How Conservatives
Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too (Free Press 2008).
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The pattern has continued with the election of Barack Hussein Obama II, as
the US President.
The business establishment either structured or took advantage of the coup
as business interests took precedence over a range of human rights,
consumer protections, civil liberties, environmental safeguards, data security,
data protection, and information privacy legal concerns. Business and
business interests groups controlled regulatory boards and public discourse.
The new standard was that if some business could make money, then
traditional legal standards should be abandoned.113 The cult mantra was that
if a business model was not artificially maintained or was restricted, then the
world would cave in - like Chicken Little.114 The argument was that if those
few who control the wealth of the world did not maximize their profits, the
entire world would end. In 2008, the projections failed.
The law, which was theoretically above such shifts, succumbed to the coupe.
The principle abandonment was both legislative and judicial. The reality was
that laws were passed by politicians as indentured servants to business
interests and their own self-illusions. Business and business interests groups,
rather than legislators, wrote much of the legislation. From the beginning of
the coup, judges were appointed to advance the coup’s political and legal
agendas.115
A legal fiction argued that basic legal and constitutional rights were balanced
against greed, profit, and business concerns. A second legal fiction argued
113 See Timothy P Carney, The Big Ripoff: How Big Business and Big Government Steal Your
Money (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2006); John W. Dean, The Rehnquist Choice: The
Untold Story of the Nixon Appointment that Redefined the Supreme Court (The Free
Press 2001); John W. Dean, Broken Government: How Republican Rule Destroyed
the Legislative, Executive, and Judical Branches (Viking 2007); Mark Green, Losing
Our Democracy: How Bush, the Far Right and Big Business are Betraying Americans
for Power and Profit (Sourcebooks, Inc. 2006).
114 A reference to the children’s story based on an African folktale about an animal that
made a faulty judgment and hysterically proclaimed that the sky was falling resulting
in mass hysteria.
115 See Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for
Control of the Law (Princeton University Press 2008).
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that possible business and security interests are balanced against data
protection and information privacy law concerns. A third legal fiction argued
that business interests should not be held to a standard of data protection or
general legal principles. The legislative and judicial history shows that in
almost all reported cases, the balance is in favor of business or the
government.116
A classic and relevant example is the issue of protecting children on the
Internet. Of course, the issue ignored parental monitoring of such activities.
The business response was that the free market could develop adequate
protections. Although the research showed that most abused children were
abused by family members, close relatives, and friends, the response of law
enforcement and business was to establish a business focus on monitoring
and privately controlling children’s data - at a cost of course. A new market
opportunity was created and several firms jumped into the mix.
One such firm was eGuardian of Ontario, California. The company met and
even sold its services in the name of protecting children on the Internet. The
company collected fees from parents, in the hope of secure protections.
Parents entered key personal data on the child which was then compared to
data provided to and by the schools. In prior contexts, this would be
considered an illegal protection scheme. The company signed up 750,000
children. The company then sold the data to data miners and advertizing
firms without consent or constraints.117 What is the law to balance? The issue
116 Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Free Press
2004); Mark Green, Losing Our Democracy: How Bush, the Far Right and Big
Business are Betraying Americans for Power and Profit (Sourcebooks, Inc. 2006);
Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the
Theft of Human Rights (Rodale. 2002); Arianna Huffington, Pigs at the Trough: How
Corporate Greed and Political Corruption are Undermining America (Crown
Publishing Group 2004); Wade Rowland, Greed, Inc: Why Corporations Rule Our
World (Arcade Publishing 2006); David Sciulli, Corporate Power in Civil Society: An
Application of Societal Constitutionalism (New York University Press 2001); Benjamin
Wittes, Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror (The
Penguin Press 2008).
117 Brad Stone, Online Age Verification for Children Brings Privacy Worries (2008, November
15),
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was whether to enforce historical and individual rights or allow business
interests to negate fundamental legal principles. Business interests prevailed.
In the US, special interest groups pushed for the passage of the Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1996 that allowed release of mailing lists and subject
selections unless the customers chose to opt-out (at considerable hassle).
Magazine publishers could sell subscription list data.118 The Cato Institute (a
powerful rightwing conservative think tank) argued that companies should
have a near-absolute right to sell customer collected information.119
A Federal Trade Commission120 study found that ninety percent of child
oriented sites illegally collected information, and only four percent required
parental permission. In 1998, the situation was not much better, eighty-nine
percent of the sites collected information, only half disclosed their practices,
and fewer than ten percent provided parental control.
Banks in the US moved into traditional police activities by fingerprinting non-
customers who wished to cash checks. Banks and other businesses used
cards that contained name, address, identification numbers, photographs, and
fingerprints stored on magnetic strips or microchips.
Business data was also abused. On the day GeoCities121 claimed voluntary
TRUSTe privacy self-regulation, the FTC settled a case with GeoCities for
selling collected information, contrary to their stated policy.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/business/16ping.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rs
s (last visited on 17 November 2012).
118 Shirley v. Time, Inc., 45 Ohio App. 2d 69, 341 NE2d 337 (Ohio App. 1975). (US)
119 B. Hiawatha, Europe's View of Online Privacy, The Boston Globe. (1998), at
http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/classes/cyber/1998/nov5.html (last visited on 22
July 2012).
120 Federal Trade Commission, Kids (1997), www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/9712/kids.htm (last
visited on 20 February 2012).
121 Geocities, Truste (1998), www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9808/geocitie.htm (last visited on 22 May
2012).
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A study by the University of Washington found 1.9 billion documented data
breaches of personal information between 1980 and 2006. The 2007 rate
was over 200,000 per month. Businesses accounted for sixty-one percent of
the breaches. Thirty-one percent were from external sources. An IT Policy
Compliance Group study found that seventy-five percent of the breaches were
by businesses. Twenty-five percent were from external sources. A Computer
World study found that only eleven percent of breaches were from external
sources.122
In California, a supermarket company used loyalty card data to threaten a
plaintiff with data on how much alcohol he had purchased from the store. In
another jurisdiction, law enforcement officials – with a subpoena – accessed
"club card" purchase information to discover if a person had purchased large
numbers of plastic garbage bags. The Selective Service used ice cream
marketing data to track eighteen year olds who were required to register for a
possible draft. Governmental agencies had secretly purchased marketing
data for investigations.123
In a sample of Fortune 500 companies, twenty-five percent released
confidential information to government agencies without a subpoena.
Seventy percent did the same to credit agencies.124 In 2006, US telephone
companies turned over private information to the government without any
warrant. The action was part of the major debate on the passage of a
Machiavellian wiretapping bill.125
122 Jaikumar Vijayan, Forget Hackers; Companies Responsible for Most Data Breaches,
Study Says (2007, March 10),
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId
=9013142&intsrc=news_list (last visited on 2 January 2012).
123 David Banisar, Big Brother Goes Hi-Tech, Covert Action Quarterly (2003),
http://mediafilter.org/caq/CAQ56brother.html (last visited on 11 June 2012).
124 Rodger Doyle, Privacy in the Workplace, Scientific American (1999),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=privacy-in-the-workplace (last visited
on 1 June 2012).
125 Richard Martin, Carriers Try to Avoid the Warrantless Eavesdropping Spotlight: The
Telecoms, Including AT&T, Verizon, and Qwest, Face What AT&T Officials Have
Called "A Maelstrom" of Civil Lawsuits Over the Eavesdropping Program (2007,
November 19),
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In 2006, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that Choice Point had
released personal information related to 163,000 customers.126 In a similar
situation, Tower Records allowed the personal data of 5,225 customers to be
released.127 Two years after the FTC Choice Point original settlement
agreement, the data revealed that over 100 million persons’ privacy had been
violated. The sources of the data included Boeing, Atena, and several
universities.128
On 6 September 2006, Starbucks discovered that four “retired” laptop
computers were missing and waited until November 4 to report the loss. The
computers had the personal data of 60,000 employees in the US and 80
Canadian partners. A company representative made light of the breach, since
the computers contained no secret coffee recipes.129
Poor data protection efforts by the T.J. Maxx and Marshalls retail stores
allowed the release of 45.7 million personal data files. An additional 455
million records for customers who returned merchandise were open.130 By
May 16, 2007, the parent company reported to Security regulators that it had
spent $25 million related to dealing with the breach and expected to pay even
http://www.informationweek.com/security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=203103309
(last visited on 31 December 2012).
126 Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Inc. (2006 December 6),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf (last visited on 1
August 2012). (US)
127 Federal Trade Commission, MTS, Inc., d/b/a Tower Records/Books/Video, a corporation,
and Tower Direct, LLC, d/b/a TowerRecords.com, a corporation. (DOCKET NO. C-
4110) (2004, June 2),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323209/040602comp0323209.pdf (last visited on 21
July 2012) (U.S.).
128 Tom Zeller, An Ominous Milestone: 100 Million Data Leaks (2006, December 18),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/18/technology/18link.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (last
visited on 26 December 2012).
129 Martin H. Bosworth, Starbucks Data Loss No Laughing Matter: Company Loses Laptops
Containing 60,000 Employees' Information (2006, November 6), at
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/11/starbucks_data.html (last visited on
1 January 2012).
130 Jenn Abelson, Breach of Data at TJX is Called the Biggest Ever (2007, March 29),
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2007/03/29/breach_of_data_at_tjx_is_called
_the_biggest_ever/ (last visited on 5 December 2012).
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more when litigation began.131 A report, three months later, showed the costs
had mounted to 256 million generally in technology correction efforts. The
corporation’s stock had gone down but the next quarter sales figures were up
nine percent.132 Yahoo turned personal information over to the Chinese
government. The sharing of e-mail information resulted in a 10 year sentence
for Chinese journalist Shi Tao, who summarized his government’s directive to
media outlets to downplay the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square
crackdown in an email using his Yahoo! account.133
Certegy Check Services a subsidiary of Fidelity National Information Services
Inc. sold personal information on 8.5 million people to marketing companies.
Senior management claimed that the sale was not authorized.134
The State of California in the US, had a privacy constitutional amendment and
the most advanced privacy laws in the country. In 2005 and later in 2006,
Hewlett Packard [HP] instituted a privacy violating spying program on
employees and its board of directors. When the State Attorney General
investigated, HP agreed to pay a $14.5 million (USD) fine to settle the
case.135 Privacy laws showed that they could and did work.
Marketing companies wanted full access to all information. A 2007 study of
300 marketing professionals conducted by the Ponemon Institute found that
131 Ross Kerber, TJX Puts Cost for Breach at $25m So Far (2007, May 16),
http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/articles/2007/05/16/tjx_puts_cost_fo
r_breach_at_25m_so_far/ (last visited on 2 January 2012).
132 Ross Kerber, Cost of Data Breach at TJX Soars to $256m: Suits, Computer Fix Add to
Expenses (2007, August 15),
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2007/08/15/cost_of_data_breach_at_tj
x_soars_to_256m/ (last visited on 15 August 2012).
133 Joe Lewis, Digital Privacy a Shattered Utopia (2006, October 30),
http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2006/10/30/digital-privacy-a-shattered-utopia
(last visited on 1 January 2012).
134 Tampa Bay Business Journal, Californian Sues Certegy Over Data Theft (2007, August
16), http://tampabay.bizjournals.com/tampabay/stories/2007/08/13/daily45.html (last
visited on 2 January 2012).
135 Scott Ferguson, HP Settles Civil Complaint for $14.5M, PCMAG.Com. (2006, December
8), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2704,2070117,00.asp (last visited on 26
December 2012).
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seventy percent thought that privacy standards added unnecessary marketing
costs. Fifty-one percent thought that privacy standards made marketing more
difficult. Twenty-six percent found no issues. Ninety-four percent reported
that privacy standards reduced possible easy leads. A mere forty-four
percent had worked with their privacy office in mounting a campaign.136
Some businesses established privacy statements, but few followed them.
Many focused on protecting the company rather than the consumer.137 Few
users trusted such statements.138
Current privacy legislation in all of the countries in the study had approaches
that were inadequate, and privacy legislation was misused. Diminished legal
standards were established. For example, in the US the standards for illegal
data collection rejected strict liability principles over a negligence or
reasonable care standard.139 The data showed a need to have DPSIP laws
apply to business. While businesses objected, the data showed that such
regulation was in the long-term interests of business survival. John Schwartz
made the issue very clear. The key abuse issue was that businesses were
the problem rather than the claimed fears of governmental regulation.140
Corporations influenced the enactment and implementation of DPSIP laws
and regulations. Corporate power was a global phenomenon. The focus of
136 Charles Giordano, Use Privacy to Build Customer Trust, Loyalty, DM News, 4-5. (2007,
March 22), http://www.dmnews.com/Use-privacy-to-build-customer-trust-
loyalty/article/94933/ (last visited on 2 January 2012).
137 Zizi Papacharissi & Jan Fernback, Online Privacy and Consumer Protection: An Analysis
of Portal Privacy Statements, 49 Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 3, 259
(2005, October); Anne Kandra, The Myth of Secure E-Shopping, 19 PC World 7, 29
(2001).
138 J. Reagle & L.F. Cranor, The Platform for Privacy Preferences, 42 Communications of
the ACM 2, 48 (1999).
139 Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 936 F2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1991). (US)
140 John Schwartz, DoubleClick Takes It On The Chin; New Privacy Lawsuit Looms; Stock
Price Drops, The Washington Post E1 (2000, February 18), at A1.
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those with power was on increasing their power, not sound legal and public
policy.141
2.4.2 Governmental Issues
Business interests worked against individuals’ rights to information privacy,
and the circumstances surrounding DPSIP issues and the governments of the
US and CA illustrates how global DPSP laws remain largely ineffective. The
Canadian Privacy Act was passed in 1983 to set up some rules for dealing
with personal information; it also established the federal office of Privacy
Commissioner. In 2008, Jennifer Stoddart, then current Privacy
Commissioner of CA, reported that the government’s desire for more
information and businesses wanting more profits were threatening privacy.
Privacy rights were becoming more fragile and CA was moving into a
surveillance society. Government privacy complaints dropped from 839 to
759 in the current 2008 year. The number still showed that the DPSIP
legislation was not working well. The Stoddart conclusion was that the
“Privacy Act needs to be overhauled.”142 A number of Canadian
governmental offices received privacy violation complaints.143 Updating the
141 See Katherine Albrecht & Liz Mcintyre, Spychips: How Major Corporations and
Government Plan to Track Your Every Move with RFID (Nelson Current 2005); Joel
Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Free Press
2004); and Wade Rowland, Greed, Inc.: Why Corporations Rule Our World (Arcade
Publishing 2006).
142 Jennifer Stoddart, Annual Report to Parliament 2007-2008: Report on the Privacy Act
(2008), http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/ar/200708/200708_pa_e.asp (last
visited on 6 December 2012), at 29.
143 The list included Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Canada Border Services Agency,
Canada Post Corporation, Canada Revenue Agency, Canada School for Public
Service, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, Canadian Food Inspection
Agency, Canadian Human Rights Commission, Canadian Security Intelligence
Service, Canadian Space Agency, and Canadian Transportation Agency. Citizenship
and Immigration Canada, Correctional Service Canada, Environment Canada,
Department of Justice Canada, Export Development Corporation, Fisheries and
Oceans, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Freshwater Fish Marketing
Corporation, Health Canada, Human Resources and Social Development Canada,
Immigration and Refugee Board, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, and Industry
Canada received violation notices. The Office of the Inspector General of the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Library and Archives Canada, National
Defence, National Parole Board, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Privy Council
Office, Public Safety Canada, Public Service Commission Canada, Public Works and
Government Services Canada, and even the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were
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Privacy Act was only a beginning. The data showed significant compliance
problems.
The common law traditional Zone of Privacy, was diminishing. Virtually every
major change in life was recorded and shared somewhere in government
databases directly or purchased from private firms. California’s criminal
database had more listings than the state’s entire population. Under current
law, discovered DPSIP violations were useless unless there was a finding of
individual harmful effects.144 The legal standard resulted in few to no
enforceable checks and balances on abuses.
Recent US federal administrative policies favored governmental and business
interests over personal or private interests. For example, the Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act145 gave federal agencies the power to
match or bar use of data with no private right of action.
The government could publish personal data based upon arrest (not just
conviction) records.146 Florida matched registration, notification, driver
license, vehicle titles, geo-matching, and imaging software. The data was
open to the public, in the name of public safety.147 During the first Bush148
campaign, the Florida system used data mining program databases to delete
voters that could potentially vote Democratic.149 An increasing number of
states were publishing name, address, and photographs of released sex
offenders on the net.150
violators. Service Canada, Statistics Canada, Transport Canada, Treasury Board of
Canada Secretariat, and Veterans Affairs Canada finished the list.
144 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, (1977). (US)
145 5 USC 552a (1988). (US)
146 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, (1976). (US)
147 James T. Moore, Sexual Predators Can’t Hide Thanks to Public Safety Information Act, 6
Community Policing Exchange Phase V, 21, 8 (1998).
148 Aka George W Bush, Bush 43, Bush Junior, or Bush the Second.
149 John W. Dean, Broken Government: How Republican Rule Destroyed the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Branches (Viking. 2007).
150 Charisse Jones, States Name Sex Offenders on Net, US TODAY (1999, January 19),
http://sige260.tripod.com/megnet.html (last visited on 20 July 2012).
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Fractions within the US government itself used the Internet to limit, shape
discourse, and propagandize, with relative immunity. Speaker of the House
Gingrich used Thomas, a government site, over which he had significant
control, for partisan political purposes.
The Digital Telephony Act151 gave officials power to "tap" any voice, text,
data, or digital technology. All telephone companies had to comply when
presented with a warrant. Under Federal policy, police officials could
eavesdrop-record telephone conversations, without a court order, if one of the
parties consented. Wiretapping was on the rise - 600 percent from 1968 to
1996 in the US. The data from 1996 to 2006 showed a 1996 report of almost
600 instances of wiretapping that increased to over 1300 in 2006 reports.
Beginning in 1997, state courts issued more wiretapping warrants than federal
courts.152
The Terrorist Identities’ Datamart Environment (TIDE) was US President
George W Bush’s effort to collect data on potential terrorists. At first, the list
only included foreigners but the policy changed to include US citizens. The
database grew from 100,000 in 2003 to over 435,000 in four years. Once a
person was on the list, it was almost impossible to get off. There was no
uniform standard for inclusion. Russ Travers, the TIDE director reported that
the biggest problem related to the list was quality control. He further
disavowed any responsibility for how governmental agencies use the data.153
151 Digital Telephony Act aka, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 1994
§ 18 USC 2510-2522 (1994). (US)
152 Office Of The United States Courts, Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the
Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications (2007),
http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap06/2006WT.pdf (last visited on 31 December 2012),
at 7.
153 Karen Deyoung, Terrorism Database is Ballooning, Keepers Say (2007, March 26),
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/03/26/terrorism_databa
se_is_ballooning_keepers_say/ (last visited on 2 January 2012).
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Evidence of governmental agencies not following the law was rampant, for
example illegal use of wiretaps and use of governmental powers.
Governments established rules that did not necessarily apply to them. When
an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employee exceeded his authorized access
to view the files of several persons, the courts ruled that he did not misuse the
federal computer or violate any laws.154
Federal agencies even ignored the principle of data accuracy. Only twenty-
five percent of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal files were
accurate or complete. There was little computer security or control. Abuses
occurred regularly.155
In May of 2006, the Veterans Administration (VA) lost control of personal data
of 26.5 million veterans. In February 2007, the VA lost control of personal
data for 535,000 veterans and 1.3 million doctors. Much of the data was not
encrypted.156
The Californian State Retirement Board allowed the publication of 445,000
names, addresses and social security numbers. The Board complied with
state notification laws and decided to review privacy practices.157
During his Presidency, George W. Bush signed and issued over 750 signing
statements,158 which in essence, stated that the law did not apply to him.
154 U.S. v. Czubinski, 106 F3d 1069 (1st Cir.), (1997). (US)
155 United States Government Accountability Office, Information: FBI Needs to Address
Weaknesses in Critical Network. (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07368.pdf
(last visited on 31 December 2012).
156 Sharon Gaudin, Missing Hard Drive Holds Sensitive Data On 535K Vets, 1.3M Doctors,
Information Week: The Business Value of Technology (2007, February 13),
http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=197005769 (last
visited on 1 January 2012).
157 Jaikumar Vijayan, Oops! Calif. State Pension Fund Admits Breach of Retiree Data (2007,
August 22),
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId
=9032159&intsrc=hm_list (last visited on 2 January 2012).
158 President Reagan wanted a line item veto on any signed legislation. This power was
denied as the Constitution only gave the president three options; do nothing, sign the
bill, or veto the entire bill. Regan invented another option – giving a signing
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When the 2006 postal renewal legislation was re-authorized, George W.
Bush’s signing statement included the power to open first class mail without a
court warrant. No prior authority to do this existed in the entire history of the
country.159
In 2003, Congress stopped a Pentagon data-mining program because of
privacy violations voiced by the public. In 2007, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) tested a similar program. The DHS test used real citizen data
including hotel reservations and flight information. According to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Analysis, Dissemination,
Visualization, Insight and Semantic Enhancement (ADVISE) program violated
data protection and information privacy legal principles. There was no
notification, the agency lied about the data source, and the data analysis
included a purpose other than that for which the data was collected.160
From 2003 through 2005, the FBI used administrative subpoenas, called
national security letters which were not subject to judicial review to obtain
personal information on over 142,000 citizens. There were no legal controls,
checks, or balances over the data collection. The Office of the Inspector
General reviewed the practices and found that the FBI under reported the
actual data by at least twenty-two percent. The FBI data was stored in data
bases open to 12,000 governmental agencies including foreign
governments.161
statement that declared that the law would or would not be followed. Bush I and
Bush II, and even Obama have continued the practice. The practice under minds the
principles of the rule of law and separation of powers under the Constitution.
159 Associated Press, Bush's Statement Opens Up Mail Privacy Debate (2007, January 7),
http://www.sptimes.com/2007/01/07/Worldandnation/Bush_s_statement_open.shtml
(last visited on 2 December 2012).
160 Ellen Nakashima & Alec Klein, New Profiling Program Raises Privacy Concerns (2007,
February 28), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/27/AR2007022701542.html (last visited on 3 December
2012).
161 R. Jeffrey Smith, Report Details Missteps in Data Collection (2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/09/AR2007030902353.html (last visited on 2 January
2012).
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DPSIP legal issues related to government were unsettled. Moves to lower the
privacy protection standard came from both business and government.
Meanwhile in 2007, 162 million personal records were violated: three times
more than the 49.7 million the year before.162 The current DPSIP approach
was not working.
The GAO reported that, contrary to law, the federal government did not
consistently provide privacy protections on the collection and use of data.
The report found that the federal government was not “Ensuring that collection
and use of personally identifiable information is limited to a stated
purpose.”163 Agencies did not justify the collection and use of personally
identifiable information. The use of the Federal Registry, the federal
government’s public notice release, was difficult to decode and was not an
effective manner to release information to citizens.
A follow-up report found that contrary to law, federal agencies did not
consistently have a designated senior privacy officer who had authority to
monitor all key privacy issues. Fifty percent of the agencies studied failed to
meet legal mandates.164
The GAO called for major revisions of the Privacy Law165 and the E-
Government Act.166 The acts were too narrowly defined so that massive
privacy violations are legally possible. Personal information was collected
162 Byron Acohido, Theft of Personal Data More Than Triples This Year (2007, December 9),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2007-12-09-data-
theft_N.htm?POE=click-refer (last visited on 2 January 2012). See Jaikumar Vilayan,
Forget Hackers; Companies Responsible for Most Data Breaches, Study Says (2007,
March 10),
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId
=9013142&intsrc=news_list (last visited on 2 January 2012).
163 United States Government Accountability Office, Alternatives Exist for Enhancing
Protection of Personally Identifiable Information (2008, April 19),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08536.pdf (last visited on 19 June 2012), at 2.
164 United States Government Accountability Office, Agencies Should Ensure that
Designated Senior Officials Have Oversight of Key Functions (2008, May 30),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08603.pdf (last visited on 18 June 2012).
165 Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1974). (US)
166 E-Government Act of 2002 amend. 44 USC 101 (2002). (US)
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and used beyond a stated purpose. There was no “effective mechanisms for
informing the public about privacy protections.”167
Not only did governments not protect the privacy rights of their citizens, the
governments themselves violated citizens rights. As noted in this section,
data from CA and the US revealed patterns of governmental abuses of DPSIP
legal principles. Data on governmental abuses in the other countries in this
study are found in the appropriate country chapters.
2.5 Data Protection and Security Violations; Analogous Legal Issues
Including Informed Consent, Confidentiality, Impact Assessments, and
Audits
Although businesses and governments colluded to prevent the creation of
effective DPSIP laws, there are related basic legal principles, that are typically
ignored but, that should apply to DPSIP law. These legal principles come
from two different legal traditions. The first is health care law, where the legal
standard is informed consent. The second comes from environmental law,
where the legal standard is the requirement to conduct an environmental
impact study and get approval prior to acting. Both legal principles can be
applied to the topic at hand.
Prior to collecting, storing, using, distributing, or selling personal information
data, the data subject of the information should give an informed consent.
The informed consent should meet the legal requirements for any lawful
informed consent. Prior to using any business method or the government
granting any intellectual property protection, the party should conduct and
gain approval of the proposal through a privacy impact study and approval.
167 United States Government Accountability Office, Congress Should Consider Alternatives
for Strengthening Protection of Personally Identifiable Information (2008, June 18),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08795t.pdf (last visited on 18 June 2012) at 2.
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2.5.1 Informed Consent and Confidentiality Issues
A body of legal literature addresses the right and obligations of clients,
consumers, customers, patients, and research subjects to give consent to the
nature of the effects of products and services. The nature of such rights and
obligations should certainly expand to data protection and information privacy
law.
Informed consent is a legal concept that is best known in medical and
research law. The basic structure of a duty of care also applies to DPSIP law.
The advent of computer technology and the interdependence of technology,
people, and holders of data create a tension. Transparency helps to resolve
the tension and helps to keep all parties honest. Informed consent
establishes that prior to collecting, using, or distributing sensitive data the
holder should obtain consent from the subject, the real personal owner of the
data. Informed consent includes giving people sufficient information about the
process, so they can make an aware, educated choice or decision. The
process is essential when it puts people at risk or the holder obtains financial
or strategic gains that were not compensated.168 Owners of the raw data
should be compensated if taken without consent,
Informed consent law promotes personal autonomy and a sense of control.
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress define autonomy as a "personal rule of
the self that is free from both controlling interferences by others and from
personal limitations that prevent meaningful choice."169 Research in the field
shows that when informed consent is instituted, there are better deliberations,
168 Jessica W. Berg, et al., Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice (2nd ed.,
Oxford University Press 2001); Ruth Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and
Theory of Informed Consent (Oxford University Press 1986); E.S. Glass,
Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship,
179 Yale Law Journal 8, 1533 (1970).
169 Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 121 (4th
ed., Oxford University Press 1994).
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decreased stress, less litigation, more consumer respect, more positive
relationships, mutual decision making, and negotiations.170
In the medical field, informed consent honors and safeguards patients' bodily
integrity, and fosters deliberation, negotiation, and mutual decision making.
Informed consent is also important for pragmatic reasons because studies
showed practitioner disclosures positively related to outcomes such as
patients' post-procedure adjustment, patient attitudes toward medical staff,
treatment efficacy, and decreased stress.171 The principle of informed
consent protects the individual from unknown decision-making knowledge and
risks. The principle also protects the holder of the information or service
provider from litigation due to a lack of transparency. All the characteristics of
informed consent would hold true where DPSIP issues are at stake.
From an ethical perspective, informed consent is an Immanuel Kant172
categorical imperative of treating all people as ends rather than simply means
applied. Using coercion, deception, misdirection, or not providing
knowledgeable consent was a significant violation. Failing to provide
informed consent was a form of manipulation. A corollary was the principle of
liberal individualism. The principle was defined as “the conception that in a
democratic society a certain space must be carved out within which the
individual is protected and allowed to pursue personal projects."173
170 Ibid.
171 Irving L. Janis, Psychological Stress: Psychoanalytic and Behavioral Studies of Surgical
Patients (Wiley & Sons 1958); R. T. Mills & D. S. Krantz, Information, Choice, and
Reactions to Stress: A Field Experiment in a Blood Bank with Laboratory Analogue,
37 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4, 608 (1979); David T. Vernon &
Douglas A. Bigelow, Effects of Information About a Potentially Stressful Situation on
Responses to Stress Impact, 29 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1, 50
(1974).
172 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. (Originally published in two parts in 1797 as
the Doctrine of right and the Doctrine of virtue) (Mary Gregor trans, Cambridge
University Press 1797/1996).
173 Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, at 70 (4th ed.,
Oxford University Press 1994).
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Several national Federal Courts have recognized the concept of consent and
limiting business activities. The District Court of Wyoming ordered Abika.com,
an Internet company, to “stop selling telephone records without owners'
consent and to turn over nearly $200,000 in profits from the operation.”174
The Company had been using "false pretenses, fraudulent statements,
fraudulent or stolen documents or other misrepresentations to induce telecom
carriers to disclose the confidential records.”175 The court found that the
company's ways of obtaining phone records, without consumers' consent,
was "necessarily accomplished through illegal means, and those defendants
knew that the phone records were being obtained surreptitiously.”176 The
action was justifiable under an administrative law fact finding directive of the
Federal Trade Commission that was supported by the courts. The Court
clearly established that consent applied to collecting, storing, and selling or
distributing personal data. The court also established the principle that the
Courts can force businesses to cease-and-desist practices that were a
violation of DPSIP law.
The legal principle of informed consent was a comparatively recent
development. The standards had been clearly established in research
standards with human subjects; counseling, psychotherapy, and medicine
practices; and consumer protection laws. Many of the regulatory principles
applied, in principle, to DPSIP law.
Constitutional and tort law in many jurisdictions have established individual
privacy rights as the right to be left alone by business, commercial,
174 Grant Gross, Update: Court Bars Company from Online Sale of Phone Records
InfoWorld. (2008, January 28), at http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/01/28/Court-
bars-company-from-online-sale-of-phone-records_1.html (last visited on 28 January
2012), at 2.
175 Id. at 1.
176 Id. at 8.
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governmental, individual, and professional sources.177 The UK case of Slater
v Baker and Stapelton178 established consent requirements prior to medical
treatment. Since that time, courts have determined that deceptive, fraudulent,
or misleading disclosures violate the legal standard of consent.179
In Whalen v. Roe180 the US Court ruled that each individual had the
constitutional right to “avoid the disclosure of personal matters.” The case
involved a New York state law that required physicians to inform the state of
individuals’ prescribed addictive medications. The ruling limited the
government’s role in obtaining, accessing, and analyzing personal
information. The government circumvented this ruling by buying information
from data collecting companies that it helped to form. The restrictions needed
to expanded to include governments and businesses.
Informed consent should be a minimum for most if not all data collection, and
confidentiality principles also apply to DPSIP issues. When discussing the
collection and use of information data, Justice John Paul Stevens ruled that
“The right to collect and use (personal information) for public purposes is
typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures . . . in some circumstances that duty arguably has its
roots in the Constitution.”181 Justice Stephens further ruled: “The cases
sometimes characterized as protecting privacy have in fact involved at least
two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions.”182 Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Stevens argued that the New York statute “threatens to
impair both (patients’) interest in the nondisclosure of private information and
177 W. Page Keeton, et al., Posser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (West Publishing 1984).
178 Slater v. Baker & Stapelton, 95 English Reporter 860 (K. B.), (1767) (UK).
179 See Hunt v. Bradshaw, 88 S.E. 2d 762 (N.C. 1955); Paulsen v. Gundersen, 260 N.W.
448 (Wis. 1935); Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943); Waynick v. Reardon, 72
S.E.2d 4 (N.C. 1952). (US)
180 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, (1977) at 600. (US)
181 Id. at 589.
182 Id. at 589-600.
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also their interest in making important decisions independently.”183 The
decision had limited global impact because Justice Stephens also declared
that the case did not “decide any question which might be presented by the
unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data whether intentional or
unintentional or by a system that did not contain comparable security
provisions.”184
The Nixon v. Administrator of General Services185 case cited the “Whalen
case.” Nixon was fighting the release of records under the 1974 - Nixon
specific - Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act.186 Justice
William Brennan wrote that the law provided safeguards to protecting
President Nixon’s private papers. Justice Brennan wrote that “One element of
privacy has been characterized as ‘the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters . . . public officials, including the President, are
not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of
personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public capacity.”187
As early as 1980, Willis Ware188 wrote about the importance of control over
personal and confidential information. Ware argued that confidentiality
needed to protect on three levels. The first was that sensitive information
should be protected against improper use. The second was that there must
be an agreement establishing an agreement between the people dealing with
sensitive information. The third was granting a legal confidentiality privilege
that covered those involved in handling sensitive data.
2.5.2 Privacy Impact Assessment
183 Id. at 600.
184 Id. at 605-606.
185 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, (1977). (US)
186 Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) amend. 44 U.S.C.
§ 2111 (1974). (US).
187 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, at 457. (US)
188 Willis H. Ware, Privacy and Information Technology — The Years Ahead, in Computers
and Privacy in the Next Decade (Lance J. Hoffman ed. Academic Press1980).
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In addition to establishing informed consent in laws governing data collection
and use, the laws should require those who would use personal information
for gain to conduct impact studies and get approval prior to acting in some
circumstances. Over the past several decades, a growing mistrust of the
interaction between governments, business–industry, and technology have
grown. Responses to problems have resulted in the development of new
legal and regulatory standards. A classic example began in environmental
law with the establishment of a requirement that an environmental
assessment, impact and studies must be done. Similar standards can be
applied to DPSIP law. The fields shared issues of technology, governmental
failures, business abuses, and the need for protection. Each must address
risk assessment, communication, and management.
A number of authors had defined “impact assessment” and studied the
approaches followed in this regard. Each definition contributed to
understanding the process and its relevance to DPSIP legal issues. Gordon
Duinker and Peter Beanlands offered a definition of “a process or set of
activities designed to contribute pertinent environmental information to a
project or program decision-making.”189 Dipper suggested that the process
was a “systematic procedure for enabling the possible environmental impacts
of developments to be considered before a decision is made on whether the
project should be given approval to proceed.”190
Draper and Reed concluded that such assessments involved sound scientific
research and documentation to reveal potential consequences of the
proposed action, product or process.191 Gibson suggested such assessments
should consider environmental, financial, political, and technical factors in the
189 Gordon E. Duinker & Peter N. Beanlands, An Ecological Framework for Environmental
Impact Assessment in Canada, at 18 (Institute for Environmental Systems, Dalhousie
University 1983).
190 Ben Dipper, et al., Monitoring and Post Auditing in Environmental Impact Assessment: A
Review, 41 Journal of Environmental Planning Management 6, 731 (1998), at 731.
191 Dianne Louise Draper & Maureen G. Reed, Our Environment: A Canadian Perspective,
at 554 (Thompson Nelson 2006).
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decision making process.192
Robert Munn proffered that assessments address issues such as identifying,
interpreting, predicting, and communicating impacts.193 Ortolano and
Shepherd maintained that impact assessments are an effective means to
evaluate and predict unintended consequences of project approvals.194 Smith
suggested that such an approach is a resource management process that
aids in the introduction of sound system changes.195
The UK Department of the Environment defined Environment Impact
Assessments as:
essentially a technique for drawing together in a systematic way, expert
qualitative assessment of a project's environmental effects and presenting the
results in a way that enables the importance of the predicted effects and the
scope for integrating or mitigating them, to be properly-evaluated by the
relevant decisions making bodies before a decision is given.196
Macha and Makaramba provided a United Nations (UN) definition. Impact
assessments were:
a technique and a process by which information about the environmental
effects of a project is collected, both by the developer and from other
sources and taken into account by the decision making authority in forming a
192 Robert B. Gibson, Environmental Assessment Design: Lessons from the Canadian
Experience, 15 The Environmental Professional, 12 (1993), at 12.
193 Robert Edward Munn, Environmental Impact Assessment: Principles and Procedures:
Scope Report 5 (United Nations Environment Program; Environment Canada; United
Nations Educational, Scientific And Cultural Organization 1985), at 159.
194 Leonard Ortolano & Anne Shepherd, Environmental Impact Assessment: Challenges and
Opportunities, 13 Impact Assessment, 1, 3 (1995), at 3.
195 L. Graham Smith, Impact Assessment and Sustainable Resource Management, at 95
(Longman Scientific and Technical 1993).
196 United Kingdom Department of The Environment, Environmental Assessment, Circular
15/1988 (FaLSO 1988), at 7.
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judgement on whether the development should go ahead.197
The public and impacted stakeholders needed a forum where they could
express concerns, gain education and information, and have an impact on
decision-making. The process makes sure that all of the relevant factors are
considered in the decision making process.198 The law should allow individual,
class action, and public interest causes of action. A range of options provided a means to
adapt to public ignorance about the issues, other survival concerns, time concerns, lack of
connection to interest groups that may have adequate resources, and lack of political will.
William Sheate established that early assessment and public involvement were
critical, because it would result in essential issues not being ignored.199 The decision-
making process and data would become more accountable, effective, responsible,
and transparent. Checks and balances require compliance on the part of all
parties and decision-makers. Corruption must be illegal.
DPSIP law impact processes should follow the Canadian environmental standards.
Under the Canadian law, the federal and provincial governments had a shared
responsibility. Each province had the power to set standards while the federal
government addressed inter-provincial issues and international compliance. The legal
standards should function to “restore the social equilibrium, to set forth the legal
consequences of actions, and to educate people in order that they be aware
of emerging social problems.”200 Fines and other interventions must be a real
deterrent and “satisfy (the) public demand for aggressive governmental
intervention.”201 Courts and administrative agencies must apply the
197 V. Macha & R. Makaramba, The Development and Harmonization of EIA Regulations —
Tanzania Country Report, in The Development and Harmonization of Environmental
Laws in East Africa: Development and Harmonization of EJA Regulations, at 117
(Joint Project on Environmental Law And Institutions In Africa ed. 1999).
198 Neil A. F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions That Affect the Environment, 10
Pace Environmental Law Review 2, 683-709 (1993, Spring), at 698.
199 William R. Sheate, Public Participation: The Key to Effective Environmental Assessment,
21 Environmental Policy and Law 3/4, 156 (1991), at 156.
200 David Trezise, Alternative Approaches to Legal Control of Environmental Quality in
Canada, 21 McGill Law Journal 404 (1975), at 404.
201 Id. at 406.
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statutory fines and requirements. Similar to environmental
standards, DPSIP law should establish that no injury in fact is
required for liability. Strict liability principles should apply to the
purchase or sale of DPSIP data. Failure to follow DPSIP standards
is presumptively unsafe.202
While some argued there should be a different response to DPSIP
violations based upon degree of damage, this approach could be
difficult to determine in the immediate period. Determining if a
violation would result in a temporary impairment, permanent impairment,
or complete destruction was not always clear-cut. No violation was
insignificant or acceptable. An individual violation could result in cumulative
effects. The US Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) set a key impact assessment
standard. The court ruled that such assessments must consider
“unrelated but reasonably foreseeable future actions."203 In a similar
case, the same court ruled that the plaintiff only needed to allege, not
conclusively prove, significant impact potentials in an impact
assessment.204
Manufacturers of new products and products for use in CA needed to provide
an environmental risk assessment and be approved by the appropriate
regulatory body. The major legislation in this area included the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA),205 Canadian Environmental
Protection Act (CEPA),206 and Pest Control Products Act (PCPA).207 The
standards were based on the UK Robert May208 guidelines. Early
assessment and intervention based on sound principles, review, and
202 David Wright & Paul. De Hert, Privacy Impact Assessment (Springer ed. 2012).
203 Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714 (9th Cir., (1988), at 720. (US)
204 Sierra Club v. United State Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988). (US)
205 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) amend. S.C. 1992, c. 37 (1992). S.C.
1992, c. 37 (CA)
206 Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) amend. c. 15.31 (1999). (CA)
207 Canadian Pest Control Products Act (PCPA) amend. S.C. 2002, c. 28 (2002). (CA)
208 Robert May, Guidelines 2000: Scientific Advice and Policy Making (UK Office of Science
and Technology 2000).
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accountability were critical. The same principle of impact audits should apply
to DPSIP legal principles and issues.
The Supreme Court of CA, in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd209 clarified
a key issue related to impact statements and information privacy. The
Court ruled that the government and even private firms that held data
were open to regulation.
The Provincial Environmental Bill of Rights210 registration legislation
supported impact assessments. The Act generally protected personal privacy
data and trade secrets. Malcolmson and Myers211 maintained that
impact assessments and the Charter of Rights respected individual
privacy rights.
Canada is not the only country included in this thesis to have well established
legal principles incorporating impact assessment. In 1990, AU started using a
privacy impact assessment program. The in-depth approach was used
through the project life cycle and engaged all stakeholders.212 However, the
business sector and some governmental agencies endeavored to weaken
privacy protections and the power of the privacy impact assessment
approach.213
The UK approach used privacy impact assessments at various stages of
development of the process. Standards were established for the initial
assessment, full-scale, and small-scale situations. The approach examined
privacy law and data protection compliance.214
209 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., (1986) 2 S.C.R. 713 at 779, (1986) (CA).
210 See http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp281-e.htm
211 Patrick Malcolmson & Richard Myers, The Canadian Regime: An Introduction to
Parliamentary Government in Canada (3rd ed., University of Toronto 2005).
212 David Wright & Paul. De Hert, Privacy Impact Assessment (Springer ed. 2012) at 121.
213 Id. at 147.
214 David Wright & Paul. De Hert, Privacy Impact Assessment (Springer ed. 2012).
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The use of privacy impact assessments is limited to selected governmental
actions. The E-Government Act of 2002215 focused on developing or
procuring information technology. The use of the privacy impact approach
was limited and not effective.216 The implementation was limited due to
problems with access, technical knowledge, and supervision that lacked
regulatory intensity.217
The acceptance of impact assessments became an internationally recognized
and generally enforced approach to addressing DPSIP issues. Impact
assessments were a preventive management tool for governments and
private businesses. The function was to analyze, identify, quantify, and mitigate
the effects of activities, planning, policies, and projects. The goal was to prevent
damaging impacts through mitigation of technology and privacy practices.
Impact and risk assessments included the application of scientific principles to
logically evaluate the probability of decisions and technology to have a
harmful effect. The focus was on accountability, information, transparency,
and examining unintended consequences prior to implementation of a policy
or technology.
In the 1970s, the US federal government started implementing formal risk
impact assessment standards.218 The assessment, conducted by
governmental agencies, businesses, or industries, corrected or prevented
hazards. The World Health Organization219 established international risk
assessment standards. The assessments included computer modeling, data
monitoring, or historical data. The process involved objective examination of
215 E-government Act amend. (Pub.L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 44 U.S.C. § 101, H.R.
2458/S. 803) § (2002). (US)
216 David Wright & Paul. De Hert, Privacy Impact Assessment (Springer ed. 2012).
217 Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 3, 707 (1987, March).
218 Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, Risk Assessment and Risk
Management in Regulatory Decision-Making: Final Report (Volume 2) (Government
Printing Office 1997).
219 World Health Organization, Risk Assessment - The Programme (2008), www.who.int (last
visited on 2 March 2012).
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alternatives considered, bias, information, context, key conclusions,
perspective, policy choices, research needs, scientific assumptions, sensitive
subpopulations, strengths uncertainty, variability, and weaknesses.220 The
following figure graphically shows the decision making process.
Figure 2.0 Impact Assessment Decision Making Model
This risk assessment decision-making model provided a structured process to
determine areas of concerns and policy directions. No model or process was
ever one hundred percent accurate. In the more complex models, there were
always concerns about data errors, human errors, lack of independence,
political or economic agendas, political or economic incentives, technological
illiteracy, uncertainly, and value judgments that must be controlled.
The legal and regulatory principles included the supremacy of the individual
including the ability to offer free and informed consent. Respects for the rule
of law formal and material legitimacy were essential. Continuous scrutiny was
a major part of establishing and monitoring the actor’s duty and liability. This
model required that government and business processes must be
transparent,221 that the process must be free from intimidation and political
pressure, that the legal and regulatory process must be a democratic
220 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Science Policy Council Handbook: Risk
Characterization (Government Printing Office 2000).
221 Jeffery Hutchings, et al., Is Scientific Inquiry Incompatible with Government Information
Control? 54 Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 5, 1198 (1997).
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safeguard.222 And that the risk assessment must be independent and not a
duplication of stakeholder interests.223
The US 1974 Privacy Act224 requires that all federal agencies conduct
Privacy Impact Assessments on new programs. The reality is that
compliance is slow. Two major problems with the law exist. The first is
that the principle only applied to federal agencies, not all governmental and
business organizations. The second is that the principle does not apply to
government issued protections such as trademarks, patents, or copyright.
A sound data protection and information privacy law must correct the
problems found in the US approach.
2.6 Technological Innovations Received Governmental Approval and
Protection without Examining Information Privacy, Data Protection, and
Data Security Assessments
Not only were appropriate impact assessments not conducted, the research
showed that governments had even granted intellectual property protections
for technological innovations without assessing or examining the DPSIP
implications.
Many Internet businesses used “cookies” and click streams225 to monitor and
collect information.226 In 1994, Netscape developed cookies in response to
interest from business concerns to help make on-line shopping easier. Greed
222 Robert May, Guidelines 2000: Scientific Advice and Policy Making (UK Office of Science
and Technology 2000).
223 Jeremy D. Fraiberg & Michae J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Technocratic and
Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform, 43 McGill Law Journal 4, 835 (1998).
224 5 U.S.C. 552a. (US)
225 Technological methods to track and record activities by collecting use information. The
data is collected without notice and IP protection was afforded without an impact
audit.
226 When Netscape first introduced cookies in October 1994, the corporation obtained
intellectual property protection in 1998 with no legal review or privacy impact audit.
See European Patent Office, Persistent client state in a hypertext transfer protocol
based client-server system. European G06F17/30W9; H04L29/08N1; U.S.
US19950540342 19951006 (1998, June 30),
http://v3.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?CC=US&NR=5774670&KC=&FT=E
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and power took over. Some sites (e.g. Microsoft) would not allow entry
without cookies. Some sites required that users provide their name, address,
and other personal information prior to allowing entry. Most did not ever state
information on how the data collected will be used or shred with other parties.
Many businesses had not accepted "anonymous profiling."227 One firm
established a single identification card for all net activities. The database
could track all related transactions.228
Netscape introduced cookies as a default feature of its new browser without
getting informed consent of the customer or even letting customers know that
cookies will be used. Cookies were hidden and not transparent by design.
No documentation provided information on cookies or the privacy implications.
The practices violated a range of contract, tort, and privacy law standards with
legal protections. The Netscape program existed for two years before it was
discovered that cookies were used. Jackson broke the story in the London
Financial Times.229
The effect of cookies on protection of privacy on the Internet is illustrated by
the statement of John Schwartz agreeing with Lawrence Lessig that “Before
cookies, the Web was essentially private. After cookies, the Web became a
space capable of extraordinary monitoring."230
Persistent Client State HTTP Cookies were developed. Rather than just
assisting in shopping, these types of cookies tracked considerable personal
information and shared it with unknown sources. So called “attached referrer
information” made privacy right violations much higher. Without consent,
227 Demographic information is released, but not personally identifying data.
228 Jon Healey, California Firm Develops Single ID for Users of Online Services (1999,
November 2),
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/comsite5/bin/comsite5.pl?page=library&item_id=028
6-5612708&override=Y&zip=92706&authtime= (last visited on 9 September 2012).
229 Tim Jackson, This Bug in Your PC is a Smart Cookie, Financial Times (1996, February
12), at A1.
230 John Schwartz, Giving the Web a Memory Cost Its Users Privacy, New York Times
(2001, September 4), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/04/technology/04Cook.html
(last visited on 10 May 2012), at 4.
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environmental impact studies, or any reasonable regulatory response, cookies
were everywhere. Collection, storage, and sharing of personal information
ignored that data subjects must retain control over ones personal information
and even consideration of the question of ownership. These are part of the
core DPSIP law principles. Since HTTP cookies could be blocked or
removed, flash cookies were developed that were harder to remove or block.
Fifty-four of the top one hundred web sites quickly adopted the new flash
cookies.231
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) was determined to set standards
for state management of the Internet. The Netscape standard won the
process. The Task Force erroneously rejected the proposal by Kristol232 that
information available to the state be limited to the immediate site only. When
the visit was over, the data would be destroyed and there was no allowance
for third party cookies. IETF accepted the rejection of third party cookies but
Netscape objected. The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC)233 held
hearings on cookies but lacked the minimal technological sophistication to
make a sound decision. Netscape lied to the commission with no
ramifications. Governmental regulators, legislators, and the courts did nothing
to require that the user must consent to processing, or to require that impact
studies be done, or that computer privacy must be protected. Microsoft’s
Internet Explorer, also used default cookies and allowed third party cookies.
At the time of this writing, Netscape was out of business, but cookies
continued to impact information privacy worldwide with no constraints.
Many in the computer field argued that universities rather than business
organizations should develop web browsers and computer infrastructures.
231 Angela Moscaritolo, Top Websites Using Flash Cookies to Track User Behavior, SC
Magazine for IT Security Professionals (2009, August 11),
http://www.scmagazineus.com/Top-websites-using-Flash-cookies-to-track-user-
behavior/article/141486/ (last visited on 12 August 2012).
232 David M. Kristol, HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and Politics, 1 ACM Transactions
Internet Technology 2, 151 (2001).
233 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Workshop '97 Hearings Transcripts for Session 2,
panel 2, part 3. (1997), http://consumer-info.org/FTCpriv97/FTCprivacyw.asp (last
visited on 2 March 2012).
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Batya Friedman, Daniel Howe and Edward Felten234 reported on university
activities that focused on building privacy into browsers and other basic
computer code. Laura Gurak made the same argument and called for a
comprehensive discussion about the issues involving key stakeholders.235
The calls remained academic (in the negative sense) and government action
was made subservient to the business interests.
Entrepreneurial web site owners collected user information without a full
informed consent. Advertising firms bought and mined data for more
information and use the information for profit.236 Moreover, governments
protected the violating technologies without considering the impact. No one
seemed to be asking the right questions because of the overall ignorance of
DPSIP legal issues.
2.7 Data Protection and Security Violations Threatened Related Legal
Principles and the Security of Individuals, Businesses, and
Governments
DPSIP violations threaten the legal rights, obligations, and security of
individuals, businesses, and governments. The issues include asset
protection, consumer protection law, contract law, information control,
intellectual property law, property law, tort law, and privacy law conflicts.
234 Batya Friedman, et al., Informed Consent in the Mozilla Web Browser: Implementing
Value-Sensitive Design, Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Hawaii International
Conference on System Science (2002, January 7-10),
http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2002/1435/08/14350247.pdf (last
visited on 4 May 2012).
235 Laura J. Gurak, Logging in with Laura J. Gurak: Minnesota Professor Takes a Critical
Look at Online-Privacy Issues, The Chronicle of Higher Education. (2002 February
19), http://chronicle.com/free/2002/02/2002021901t.htm (last visited on 4 May 2012).
236 B. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy In Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stanford Law Review
4,1193 (April 1998).
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2.7.1 Asset Protection Standards
The asset protection standard is a comprehensive managerial strategy to
proactively mitigate risk while safeguarding information, people, and property
assets. During the 1990s, the data management industry and businesses
desired more personal information control, under the claim that more targeted
marketing would be a public good. Paul Schwartz237 declared that
information privacy was a “personal right to control the use of one’s data.”
Anita Allen suggested a paradigm of a bundle of information privacy rights
that included promoting personal control over personal information and
data.238
The asset protection model suggests that data protection and information
privacy is an individual right, but more importantly, it is a societal protection
from misuse of power. The focus is on the relationship with the government
and third parties who have access to the information.239 The model
empowers the individual to have access to and control personal data. The
model increases the need for state of the art data protection security upon
those who held the data. In terms of this model, the collection and use of
personal information should involve an informed consent on the part of the
data subject. Furthermore, the law must provide means to control the use of
the data. An even greater danger developed as soon as the information
becomes knowledge.
The prophetic warning of Orwell’s 1984 and Big Brother evolved to include
Kafka’s The Trial. Daniel Solove made the distinction that “[i]nformation
consists of raw facts, while knowledge is information that has been sifted,
237 Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 Connecticut Law Review 3, 815
(2000), at 838.
238 Anita L Allen, Privacy as Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the
Paradigm, 32 Connecticut Law Review 3, 861 (2000), at 863.
239 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution,
86 Minnesota Law Review 6, 1137 (2002a), at 1194.
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sorted, and analyzed.”240 The shift better described a “more thoughtless
process of bureaucratic indifference, arbitrary errors, and dehumanization, a
world where people feel powerless and vulnerable, without any meaningful
form of participation in the collection and use of their information.”241 This
description included data held by businesses, not just governments. Privacy
as knowledge control was an advancement that covered not only information
privacy but also included data in databases, and data mining practices. Large
databases destroyed the concept of practical obscurity when information was
available but difficult to find practically.242
Benn and Gaus243 noted that the central factor in information privacy was
information access. They argued that information violations are related to
who benefits and suffers from access abuses, who consents, and who gains
power or economic rewards.
Judith DeCew saw information privacy as a means of keeping certain
information from the public discourse. She declared that "information about
one's daily activities, personal lifestyle, finances, medical history, and
academic achievement, whether written or not, part of the public record or not,
may be viewed by an individual as information he or she need not divulge and
can expect others to guard as well."244 DeCew further argued that the
"expectation of privacy is grounded in the fear concerning how the information
might be used or appropriated to pressure or embarrass one, to damage
one's credibility or economic status, and so on."245
240 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 Stanford Law Review 6, 1393 (2001), at 1456.
241 Id. at 1398.
242 U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, (1989). (US)
243 Stanley I. Benn & G. F. Gaus, The Public and the Private: Concepts and Action, in Public
and Private in Social Life, at 8 (Stanley I. Benn & G. F. Gaus eds., Croon Helm,
Ltd1983).
244 Judith W. Decew, The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics, 5 Law and Philosophy 2, 32
(1986), at 75.
245 Ibid.
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Arthur Miller argued that personal privacy legal standards protect the right of a
person to live in different roles. One’s aspirations and performance in one
context should not be placed in another context without permission. The
rights include the individual control over the flow of information not only
concerning him but describing him.246
David Flaherty classified the information privacy issue as one of "information
self-determination."247 Flaherty also showed that the US approach was not as
adequate as data protections laws in other countries.
Steven Spinello described how governments and private businesses had
appropriated private personal information without consent or payment.
Information was no longer confidential. “Rather, information has become a
commodity to be bought and sold for a reasonable fee.”248
Governments and corporations had taken private information for commercial
gain, taken possession of personal information, and exercised control over
this form of intangible personal property. Such behavior constituted a tort in
some countries.249 Steven Miller supported the legal principle that a person
owns their personal data that includes control over the collection or use of
personal data. Such "people deserve a royalty payment any time information
about them is sold."250
246 Arthur R Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New
Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 Michigan Law Review 6, 1089
(1969), at 1107.
247 David H. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protection,
41 Case Western Law Review 3, 831 (1991), at 832.
248 Richard A. Spinello, Ethical Aspects of Information Technology, at 111 (Prentice Hall
1995). The term originated in German law: the German constitutional court declared
that an individual has the right of informational self-determination.
249 SA law does not accept this legal position.
250 Steven E. Miller, Civilizing Cyberspace: Policy, Power, and the Information
Superhighway, at 279 (ACM Press 1995).
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According to Don Tapscott, "all personal information, from your weight to your
social security number, belongs to you."251 He argues that people had to assert
the ownership right or have it asserted for them. "If people stop giving away
their information and started thinking about it as they do other forms of property,
expecting to have some control over it, and get paid for its use, then things would
begin to change."252 Unless and until people begin to see their personal data as
the asset it is, effective DPSIP protections will not be established.
2.7.2 Contract Law Issues
The concept of applying fundamental principles of contract law to information
privacy originated in the UK, and these principles were the basis for contract
issues in AU, CA, SA, and the US. The contract law model saw DPSIP issues
in contractual terms, which allowed people to negotiate the use of their
personal property. The model argued that the default position would be for all
holders of personal information to have contractual ownership. Richard
Murphy argued, “Because information is voluntarily disclosed, there is no
reason both sets of consumers [i.e. the people whose data is held and those
that collect, hold, and use it] cannot be satisfied through a contracting
process.”253
Charles Sykes declared that:
We can begin to give individuals that control by creating a presumption
of privacy as the default setting of the Information Age. Our
presumption of privacy should be as strongly held—and jealously
guarded—as our presumption that we have free speech, freedom to
worship, the right to own private property, and equality of opportunity,
251 Don Tapscott, The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril In The Age of Networked
Intelligence, at 282 (McGraw-Hill 1995).
252 Ann Cavoukian & Don Tapscott, Who Knows: Safeguarding your Privacy in a Networked
World, at 90 (Random House of Canada 1995).
253 Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defence of
Privacy, 84 Georgetown Law Journal 2381–2417 (July, 1996), at 2406.
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all values that are deeply ingrained in our culture, law, and politics. In
the case of the presumption of privacy, the burden should be on others
to say why they have any right to know about our lives. Absent that,
the presumption should be that each of us has control over such
information. In practical terms that means that we should not be
required to opt-out of a system that invades our privacy; the
presumption of privacy would dictate that no one is allowed onto our
zone of privacy without our specific choice to opt-in.254
Eugene Volokh made a free speech cautionary argument. He ignored the fact
that free speech was not unlimited and not a legal standard in all countries.
He did agree that personal information privacy protection was viable under
contract law.255
For the contract model to have legal influence, the issue of data ownership is
essential. The Liberty Alliance, using the EU Model, makes a cautious
ownership declaration. The Liberty Alliance conference256 evaluates the
issue of who owns information privacy – personal data. The following chart
summaries the Alliances’ Personally Identifiable Information (PII) findings.
Table 2.0 PII Ownership257
Term Description
Data subject The person or entity referred to by some data. In the case
of PII, the data subject is more or less identified by that
data; in the case of transaction records, the data itself may
not identify the data subject but may provide a log of
historical activity that records behavior. Used in conjunction
254 Charles J. Sykes, The End of Privacy: Personal Rights in the Surveillance Society, at 246
(St. Martin's Press 1999).
255 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications
of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stanford Law Review 5,
1049 (2000), at 1073.
256 Liberty Alliance, Privacy summit. (2007), at www.projectliberty.org/ liberty/ content/
download/ 3114/ 20838/ file/ Privacy-Summit-Final.pdf (last visited on 9 July 2012), at
5. The Alliance is an organization of 30 organizations and businesses that addresses
information concerns.
257 Ibid.
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with PII, the behavior could be ascribed to a specific entity.
Data 'owner' This reflects the concept that a data subject may have some
kind of right (perhaps a statutory one) to know what data
someone else has about them. Thus, although someone
else has the data, the data subject might be said to have
some degree of ownership of it.
Data controller A legally defined role expressed in the EU Data Protection
Directive; the person who determines how and why
personal data are to be processed.
Data custodian A legally defined role providing for the controlled disclosure
of PII through a form of trusted proxy. For instance, in
Germany a company could be legally prohibited from
disclosing the PII of its employees, but might legally do so
by entrusting the disclosure mechanisms to an independent
data custodian within the organization. This could serve as
a good example of privacy protection through a combination
of legal, policy and structural measures.
Critics of the model suggested that seeing privacy as only a contractual issue
would side-step constitutional principles. The critics made a logical error in
that not all countries had the same constitutional arguments. In fact, SA had
a much stronger privacy protection in their current constitution than other
countries in the study. The critics suggested that each model was
independent and that the issues were a zero-sum game. This was not the
case. The principles of each model could be integrated, especially if a data
protection and information privacy ombudsman was involved in the regulation
of the problems.
When information privacy was subjected to contract law, each party’s rights
and responsibilities were defined and even negotiated. A privacy contract
would establish clear obligations on the use, trade, or sale of the data. The
contractual default was one of a presumption of privacy. The burden of
establishing the right to know was on the government or business that wanted
the data. The default for all data sharing should be an opt-in based on
reliable information.258 Such an opt-in default position empowers individuals
to deal with larger, more powerful organizations. The opt-out model rejects
the scientific data on people’s neuropsychological programming.
258 Charles J. Sykes, The End of Privacy: Personal Rights in the Surveillance Society, at 246
(St. Martin's Press 1999).
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Business and marketing firms did not like an opt-in standard because when
given a full choice, most people did not opt-in. Such organizations wanted to
take advantage of healthy people’s neurologically based decision-making
processes that prefer not to decide. Such organizations were exploiting a
known human defect to increase profits.
Anne Branscomb described the increased value of personal information. She
showed that information that was historically considered worthless became
valuable. New conflicts, issues, and tensions evolved because businesses
want to take control and make profits while ignoring and rejecting data
subjects’ interests.259
Richard Spinello made it very clear that "when a consumer provides personal
information, he or she does not assign to that vendor a right to use the information for
other purposes."260 David Barron made it clear that data collected for one
purpose could be used for another without checks, balances, regulation, or
recourse.261
Agreement, confidentiality, due process, and privacy legal principles must
apply to all data protection and information privacy recordkeeping systems.
These principles must consider whenever an information privacy contract is
formed. That the collection and use of personal information required a
contract was clearly affirmed through standard contacting principles. A valid
offer, acceptance, consideration,262 intent to be bound, specific terms, and
performance should be required.
259 Anne Wells Branscomb, Who Owns Information? From Privacy to Public Access, at 3
(Basic Books 1994).
260 Richard A. Spinello, Ethical Aspects of Information Technology, at 118 (Prentice Hall
1995).
261 David W Barron, People, Not Computers, in Privacy, at 321 (J. B. Young ed. John Wiley
& Sons 1978).
262 Consideration is not required unde SA law.
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2.7.3 Information and Knowledge Control Law
In addition to considering asset protection standards and contract law issues,
there is considerable research in the field on information and knowledge
control law issues; the following provides a summary of this research.
Whalen v. Roe263 established a new contextual definition of information
privacy law. The US court established that people had a declared right to
avoid the disclosure of personal matters – in other words, they had a right to
control over their information. The right included the process of accessing
and even analyzing personal information. Information control had evolved
into a duty of data holders to respect the person’s confidentiality. In Whalen,
Justice Stevens declared that “The right to collect and use (data) for public
purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory
duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures … (I)n some circumstances that duty
arguably has its roots in the Constitution.”264 For example in one case the
police had access to computer databases that stored confidential patient data.
Justice Stevens further wrote that privacy cases actually had different
interests. “One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions.”265 The case applied the Fourteenth Amendment, thus
the court must balance the interest in collecting the information and any
infringement on the privacy right. Intermediate scrutiny rather than the
principles of strict scrutiny was applied.266 The highest level of protection
applied to medical information related to sex and essential corporate
information. General medical and financial data involved mid-level protection.
263 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, (1977), at 600. (US)
264 Id. at 605.
265 Id. at 598-600.
266 Under US constitutional law, the court can apply three levels of scrutiny. The highest is
strict which requires a compelling governmental interest, be narrowly tailored and be
the least restrictive approach. The intermediate approach requires an action that
furthers an important governmental interest. Rational basis is the lowest standard
that reflects a legitimate interest like due process or equal right protection.
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Data that was a matter of public record involved the lowest protection. Why
some medical and corporation data involve higher protection than individual
information remained unclear. This issue needs revisiting. The government’s
(or data holder’s) interest must be established as legitimate, substantial, and
compelling.
Neil Richard wrote on the way that the government avoided any judicial or
constitutional standards. He noted that the government funded and then
purchased data from private-sector firms. The scheme was not considered a
state action,267 but in reality the government outsourced surveillance of
citizens with legislative and constitutional immunity.268 Where entangled
interaction existed, then any such behavior would be a state action.269 An
alternative was to make both parties responsible for data protection and
information privacy legal protections.
In Miller v. Taylor270 Justice Yates delivered the judgement that was on point.
"It is certain every man has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he
pleases. He has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them
public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends."
Grant Hammond argued that legally, personal information was not relative or
static.271 The reality was that the issue was protecting personal information
from government and business misuse. Mendes identified five types of potential
privacy violations: “(1) aggregation (the "unauthorized collection of information" to
create profiles of individuals); (2) intrusion (surveillance or tapping of transmissions);
267 Under US law, a state action is necessary for addressing the Constitutional rights of
individuals.
268 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA Law
Review, 4, 1149 (2005), at 1158-1159.
269 See Norwood v Harrison 413 U.S. 455, (1973); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715, (1961). (US)
270 Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379, (1769), at 2379. (UK)
271 R.Grant Hammond, The Misappropriation of Commercial Information in the Computer
Age, 64 Canadian Bar Review 2, 342 (1986), at 352.
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(3) misuse; (4) piracy (use authorization, usually for profit); and (5) unauthorized
access.”272 The focus of his thesis was on aggregation misuse.
Concerns regarding technology and privacy were not new. In looking at electricity in
the nineteenth century, Carolyn Marvin wrote about concerns that the technology
threatened the private secrets and public knowledge balance.273 Subsequent
history showed the concerns warranted. On the other side of the debate were those
that claimed that new information technology provided advantages to democracy.
Such technology provided better access and even networking of interested parties.
The Panel on the 1967 Privacy and Behavior Research Report by the
President's Office of Science and Technology addressed the information
privacy issue. The conclusion was that “The right to privacy is the right of
the individual to decide for himselve how much he will share with
others his thoughts, his feelings, and the facts of his personal life.”274
The concept of privacy as the right to be left alone was not just based on Warren and
Brandeis.275 The concept was a reference to McIntrye Colley’s Treatise on the Law
of Torts.276
Ithiel Pool argued that "electronic technology is conducive to freedom …it is not
computers but policy (law) that threatens freedom."277 Hope can be found in
communication advances, individual rights, and pluralism.278
272 M. Mendes, Privacy and Computer-Based Information Systems, in Issues in New
Information Technology (Benjamin M. Compaine ed., Ablex Publishing 1988), at 193-
264.
273 Carolyn Marvin, When Old Technologies Were New: Thinking About Electric
Communication in the Late Eighteenth Century, at 64 (Oxford University Press 1988).
274 Executive Office of the President - Office of Science and Technology, Privacy and
Behavioral Research (Government Printing Office 1967), at 8.
275 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review, 5,
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In US Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, Justice
Thomas wrote for the majority in the case involving the Federal Freedom of
Information Act. Thomas argued that just because information may be made
publically available, it does not mean that a person does not have a legal right to
control dissemination of the information.279
Pricilla Regan defined privacy as a collective, not just an individual value. The value
was based on the economic view of collective and public goods. One can not
benefit from a collective good without others benefiting.280 Free riders,
governmental or business, should not use information without legally obtaining
consent and paying for it.281
Oscar Gandy studied the issues of DPSIP protection. Gandy wrote that “it is in the
area of private corporate action that the law is most in need of attention."282 Powerful
business forces had access to the inner halls of governmental power and opposed
data protection and information privacy legal standards in the private sector.
Arguments in opposition of data protection included the alleged sanctity of
commercial marketplace freedom, free commercial speech, and freedom from
governmental restrictions. However, governmental regulations and restrictions exist
for other social values and legal principles - some of which are related to privacy.
Violations should be subject to the legal principles of strict liability and the burden of
proof should be placed on the defendant(s).
Without competent DPSIP laws and regulations, business organizations and
marketers would draw their own boundaries. The boundaries were self-serving and
279 U. S. Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 114 S.Ct. 1006,
(1994), at 1015. Thomas generally supports business, then government, and rarely
individual rights. (US)
280 Pricilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy
(University of North Carolina Press 1995), at 227.
281 Id. at 228.
282 Oscar H. Gandy, The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information, at 178
(Westview Press 1993).
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ignored privacy concerns with the exception of trade secrets. L. Graham Smith283
showed that business organizations did not take a proactive stance and only dealt
with privacy concerns when confronted with organizational risks or threats. Those
few organizations that showed some concern about the issues, relied on self-
regulation, which lacked any systematic approach or consistency. The codes
provided inadequate coverage, consumer awareness, and sanctions.284
Alan Vickery argued for information privacy and tort reform, based on breach
of confidence. The tort violation included all "un-consented, unprivileged
disclosure to a third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has
learned within a confidential relationship."285 Contract and fiduciary legal
principles were the basis for this UK tort.286 The purpose was to compensate
those whose information was breached and experienced damage to
reputation and some emotional distress. A very limited public's-right-to-know
privilege existed, but enforcement and clarification needed to be stronger.
Susan Gerety proposed an information privacy definition based on information
control. "Privacy will be defined here as an autonomy or control over the
intimacies of personal identity."287
When an employer released employee Social Security Numbers (SSN) to a third
party, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the release violated information privacy
legal standards. The court in Beacon Journal Publishing v. Akron ruled that:
Thanks to the abundance of data bases in the private sector that include
the SSNs of persons listed in their files, an intruder using an SSN can
283 L. Graham Smith, Impact Assessment and Sustainable Resource Management
(Longman Scientific and Technical 1993).
284 Ann Cavoukian & Don Tapscott, Who Knows: Safeguarding Your Privacy in a Networked
World (Random House of Canada 1995).
285 Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 Columbia Law Review
1426 (November, 1982), at 1455.
286 Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasion of
Privacy, 43 Buffalo Law Review, 1 (Spring, 1995).
287 Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review 2,
233 (1977), at 236.
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quietly discover the intimate details of a victim's personal life without the
victim ever knowing of the intrusion.288
Business practices that used covert data collection, matching, and profiling,
without the person’s consent was found unlawful. The marketplace of ideas
theory did not apply to private data.
As early as 1941, Zechariah Chafee argued that information privacy was a
significant social value similar to free speech. The value was so important
that only critical national needs should be a legal balance. The harm or
damages were not just individual but related to the social value of data
protection and information privacy.289
Alan Westin advocated the need for individuals to have control over their
personal information. He argued that free societies recognize a personal
information privacy right. Only extraordinary exceptions should trump this
right.290
Gary Melton argued that information privacy involved the “maintenance of
active decisional control over the disclosure of personal information contained
in documents or known by other parties."291 The law must provide "protection
from nonconsensual examination of such information."292
DPSIP principles have been violated and the person(s) involved were
damaged by a number of events. David O’Brien argued that causal and
interpretive access compromises privacy.293 O’Brien also argued that the law
should provide "limitations on the accumulation and disclosure of information
288 70 Ohio St. 3d 605, (1994), at 611. (US)
289 Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Harvard University Press 1941).
290 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom, at 42 (Atheneum 1967).
291 Gary B. Melton, Minors and Privacy: Are Legal and Psychological Concepts Compatible?
62 Nebraska Law Review, 455 (1983), at 459.
292 Ibid.
293 David M. O'brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, at 18 (Praeger 1979).
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about an individual … In most situations, privacy is valuable.”294
William Parent maintained that information privacy was "the condition of not
having undocumented personal information about oneself known by
others."295 Such information did not belong in the public domain. Parent
showed that "privacy is control over when and by whom the various parts of us
can be sensed by others."296
Bruce Schneier made a strong case that security and privacy are not
opposites. These legal and policy issues are not a zero-sum game. Police
states provide security but there are no major immigration trends to those
states.297 He further explained that the two must work together.298 Anti-
privacy security tactics do not significantly improve security and often do
harm. Government claims for security are wrong or address fake cases.299
The issue is one of a false dichotomy based on fear. The reality is that “There
is no security without privacy. And liberty requires both security and
privacy.”300 Data mining efforts were secret and had no legal controls.
The issue was not one of individual rights against the great communal good
but one of maintaining everyone’s freedom from interference and
governmental – business control. Everyone, including the body incarnate,
had the right to structure the terms on the use of personal information held by
third parties. The principle should apply to governmental and business
parties.
294 Ibid.
295 William A. Parent, A New Definition of Privacy for the Law, 2 Law and Philosophy 3, 305
(1983), at 306.
296 Id. at 281.
297 Bruce Schneier, What Our Top Spy Doesn't Get: Security and Privacy Aren't Opposites
(2008, January 24),
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/01/securitym
atters_0124?currentPage=all (last visited on 24 January 2012), at 4.
298 Id. at 6.
299 Id. at 8.
300 Id. at 12.
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Colin Bennett and Rebecca Grant argued that privacy was a fundamental right
to retreat.301 A second issue was “the right to control information about
oneself, even after divulging it to others.”302 Jean Camp agreed that people
had a right to control their information.303 Research conducted by Cathy
Goodwin indicated that people were concerned about the collection of
personal information and its secondary use.304
Anita Allen identified a couple of market failures associated with information
privacy law based on personal control over the information. Many people
shared personal information with little knowledge or awareness of the
consequences. Thus, information privacy laws must include an informed
consent requirement prior to third parties doing anything with the data.
Significant constraints must be on governments and business organizations
that used data mining or shared data without meaningful informed consent.
Individuals did not have the resources to track the uses of their personal data.
Information privacy law must re-allocate economic structures, relationships,
power, and social structures.305
Businesses take personal information claiming that it has no value and works
against legal personal privacy control protections. Yet, when the same
businesses use the information for profit, the businesses claim that the
information has economic value and demand protection of business privacy
and secrets. The businesses do not pay any type of asset taxes on the data.
301 Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant, Visions of Privacy: Policy Choice for the Digital Age,
at 101 (University of Toronto Press 1999).
302 Ibid.
303 L. Jean Camp, Web Security and Privacy: An American Perspective, 15 The Information
Society 4, 249 (1999).
304 Cathy Goodwin, Privacy: Recognition of a Consumer Right, 10 Journal of Public Policy
and Marketing 1, 149 (1991, Spring).
305 Anita L Allen, Privacy as Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the
Paradigm, 32 Connecticut Law Review 3, 861 (2000); Anita L. Allen, Privacy in
American Law, In Privacies: Philosophical Evaluations (Beate Rossler ed., Stanford
University Press 2004).
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After carefully reviewing a hundred years of privacy law, Ken Gromley found
four major concepts and needs for protection. The concepts include privacy
as (1) "An expression of one's personality or personhood, focusing upon the
right of the individual to define his or her essence as a human being." (2)
Linked to "autonomy - the moral freedom of the individual to engage in his or
her own thoughts, actions, and decisions" (3) "Citizens' ability to regulate
information about themselves," and (4) a "mix-and-match approach” of specific
issues.306
David Richards saw information privacy as essential to the democratic
experiment in that it supported self-governing. Having control over personal
information is a form of self-government that protects the individual against
more powerful forces.307 Ruth Gavison argued that DPSIP laws help to protect
free societies by aiding autonomy, liberty, human relationships, and selfhood.308
While some argued that public policy and social interests may trump information
privacy, the argument ignored the “functions privacy has in our lives.”309
Sissela Bok made a necessary bifurcation of privacy and secrecy. "Privacy need not
hide, and secrecy hides far more than what is private."310 Privacy is "the condition of
being protected from unwanted access by others."311 Bok maintains that secrecy is
"intentional concealment."312
Communications Canada examined the issues of informational privacy. The
study found that in terms of telecommunications, privacy was “protection
against unwanted intrusion that is the right to be left alone and not to be
306 Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wisconsin Law Review, 1335
(September/October, 1992), at 1337.
307 David A. J. Richards, Liberalism, Public Morality, and Constitutional Law: Prolegomenon
to a Theory of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 51 Law and Contemporary
Problems 1, 123 (1988), at 138.
308 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale Law Journal 3, 421 (1980), at 423.
309 Ibid.
310 Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation, at 11 (Pantheon
1982).
311 Id. at 10.
312 Ibid.
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monitored; the ability to control information about oneself and one's activities;
the right to remain anonymous."313
In the US, collecting personal information practices, starting with the Nixon
administration, has increased. Personal information has been obtained by the
government without probable cause and a warrant. Such actions were a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The collection of some personal
information was actually self-incrimination, under the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Justice William Howard Taft (former President of the US) modified the
application of the Fourth Amendment in the 1928 Olmstead v. United
States314 case. He changed the Fourth and Fifth Amendments legal analysis.
Telephones could be legally wiretapped as there was, in his mind, no search
or seizure. The injustice of Taft’s Olmstead ruling changed with Justice Potter
Stewart’s writing for the Court in Katz v. United States.315 The case brought
forth the concept of privacy away from space, to a self-defined expectation of
privacy, the right to decide what to reveal, reasonable expectations, and
eventually to information control.
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissent in Smith v. Maryland laid the ground for
further privacy rights. He wrote that “Those who disclose certain facts to a
bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that
this information will be released to other persons for other purposes.316
Oscar Ruebhausen and O. G. Brim317 addressed information privacy
concerns with research studies and technology. They rejected the view that
technology was the problem. The law and policy related to information privacy
313 Communications Canada, Telecommunications Privacy Principles, at 5 (Supply and
Services Canada 1992).
314 277 U.S. 438, 478 S. Ct. 564. 66 ALR 376, 72 L.Ed. 944, (1928). (US)
315 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, (1967). (US)
316 442 U.S. 735, (1979), at 749. (US)
317 Oscar M. Ruebhausen & O. G. Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 Columbia Law
Review 1, 1184 (1965).
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was the problem.318 The authors argued that information privacy involved the
right to select with whom information would be shared and the timing of
information sharing. One has the right to determine “the extent to which his
attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions are to be shared with or withheld from
others.”319
From this discussion it is clear that DPSIP laws should establish very clear
standards. Furthermore, data controllers must recognize asset protection
standards. Ownership of personally identifiable data rests with the person to
whom the data relates.
2.7.4 Intellectual Property Law Issues
Intellectual property law issues are closely related to information and
knowledge control issues. Intellectual property law created legal protections
for information created by the use of a person’s mind. The law protects the
interests of the author of published and unpublished information.320 The
Copyright Act321 provides the owner an exclusive right to display, distribute,
license, perform, or reproduce all of part of his or her work.322 An exclusive
right to license or produce derivatives of the work is also granted by all of the
countries studied.323 Information privacy data, as defined in this work,
certainly meets the definition of a work created through one’s writings and
behavior. The author has the intellectual property right to publish or not. The
Geneva World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty
protects such rights internationally for all signatories.324 The alternative
rationale is that a corporation that collects the pre-written data can claim
318 Id. at 1190.
319 Id. at 1189.
320 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8. (US)
321 U.S. Copyright Act amend. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976). (US)
322 Id. at 106.
323 Id. at 201(d).
324 World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html (last visited on 15 June
2012).
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ownership as an intellectual property right. Is the conclusion, therefore that
those corporations can claim a property right when the raw material supplier
has none?
Just as copyright law preserves the right to access creative works, the
intellectual property model is the model of access to self, as seen in Justice
Brandeis’s dissent in the Olmstead case. He wrote the “makers of our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. . . . They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.”325 The self included beliefs, bodily fluids, body, intellect, personality,
and thoughts. From a sociological perspective, Stephen Nock proclaimed that
information privacy is a “socially-recognized legitimate right to restrict others
from observing or knowing about one’s actions.”326 DPSIP law has an
intellectual property law dimension that needs to be considered.
Whether by intent, design, or regulatory ignorance, intellectual property law
has become a major force negating some DPSIP legal principles. Granting
anti-privacy intellectual property protections gave intellectual property owners
considerable legal power and protection. The intellectual property codes do
not require any type of environmental or technological impact study prior to
granting a patent or copyright. Because of this failure, to stay current with
regulatory standards in other fields, legal protections as applied to technology
or software that violate privacy rights need to be re-considered. Two major
problems developed. Software patent protections started, despite a long
history against awarding protections to mathematical formulations and
business practices. Second, cookies received legal protection without a
sound legal review.
325 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 S. Ct. 564. 66 ALR 376, 72 L.Ed. 944, (1928), at
478. (US)
326 Stephen L. Nock, The Cost of Privacy, Surveillance and Reputation in America, at 11-12
(Transaction Publishers 1993).
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Sissela Bok327 advanced another intellectual property position. She
maintained that information privacy protects one from unwanted access. The
law needed to protect one from attention, personal information, or physical
access. In Whalen v Roe328 the Court found a constitutionally protected right
to control over personal information.
Online profiling by governments, businesses, and Internet Service Providers
(ISP) was a reality. ISPs did not ask user’s permission to collect, store, share,
or sell personal information. Collection included the source and activity of on-
line sessions. Firms attached cookies and stored files to the users’
computers. Advocates of the ill-gotten information argued that the system
helps consumers through on-line profiling of assumed interests. Yet, the data
was collected through clandestine maneuvers and those that may attempt to
opt-out (not participate) are denied access to the site. A classic example was
Microsoft. The National Advertising Initiative suggested guidelines but
adherence to the guidelines was voluntary and self-regulating.329
Evolving technologies were developed, used, and planned with no legal
accountability. Many of the technologies that were developed threatened
expansive data protection and security violation problems that governments
had not shown a significant interest in preventing or regulating. Examples
included the following examples.
Developments in biotechnology raised significant DPSIP concerns.
Biotechnology includes biochemical, genetic, and molecular biology records
and data based on human tissue samples. Great financial benefits have gone
to those developing new technologies, but the developers have been allowed
to ignore impact, ownership, and privacy concerns. The advances in this area
327 Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (Pantheon 1982).
328 429 U.S. 589, (1977). (US)
329 National Advertising Initiative, Helping You Protect Your Privacy Online (2009),
http://www.networkadvertising.org/ (last visited on 16 August 2012); Michael D.
Birnhack, The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime, 24
Computer Law & Security Report 6, 508 (2008).
Chapter Two: Sociolegal Issues 116
are leading to personalized medicine (PM) which determines treatment based
on genetics. The question is how is the data gathered, stored, and
transferred? Corporations, governments, insurance companies, and
employers can misuse biotechnology data, despite a finding that there was a
breach of informed consent, fiduciary duties, and ownership rights. The
California Supreme Court refused to grant Moore relief in Moore v Regents of
the University of California.330 Biotechnology data was collected from Moore
without his consent. The samples were used in researches that lead to new
treatments that the University patented. No DPSIP impact study was done
prior to granting intellectual property (IP) protections. Thus, the awarding of
IP protections to the University without a privacy impact audit creates more
problems because it limits the movement by developers to privacy by design.
Moore’s DNA was essentially stolen, the University benefited, and Moore had
no recourse.
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) which used satellite systems to monitor
radio beacons were another example. The most developed at the time of this
thesis was the US system, which used forty satellites that circled the globe
twice a day. Similar systems were under development in China, the EU,
India, Russia, and Sweden. The entire continent of Africa was covered by
these systems.331
GPS units were very small and helped people to navigate while driving or
walking. The units identified latitude, longitude, and altitude for military and
personal uses. Attached devises included cars, cellular telephones, and other
electronics. When combined with other databases, the system could track
individuals and movements without warrants or legal protections. Most users
thought that the system was one way, but it was not. GPS also monitored the
user. There were no legal privacy protections of the storage or use of the
330 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). (US)
331 GPS World, Wayfinder Expands Coverage to Southeast Asia, Africa (2008, January 23),
http://lbs.gpsworld.com/gpslbs/LBS+News/Wayfinder-Expands-Coverage-to-
Southeast-Asia-
Afric/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/486451?contextCategoryId=44174&searchString=c
ountries (last visited on 12 March 2012).
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data collected by means of the GPS unites. Intellectual property protections
were issued to those operating the GPS systems without a DPSIP impact
study.
Another example was keystroke logging or keylogging, which involved
hardware, software, or wireless mechanisms that recorded and transmitted
computer users’ key strokes. A complete record of a user’s session was
monitored. These keystroke logging approaches collected any type of subject
data. A case on point, United States v. Scarfo,332 found that the approach
was not a warrant violation under the Fourth Amendment or an unlawful wire
communication violation under federal law.
The field of medical informatics provided another example where
governments ignored issues of data protection and security violation problems
caused by emerging technologies. Medical informatics includes the
technological collection, storage, and use of health and medical records.
Advocates argued that computerizing health and medical records would save
lives and money without doing extensive risk benefit studies. The movement
argues for more predictive, personalized, and preemptive treatment. Data
protection and security concerns are mentioned, but not fully addressed. Few
protections are proposed or legally enforced. Even without full
computerization, the evidence showed that employers, governments, and
insurance companies misuse medical data. As far back as 2001, twenty-five
percent of Fortune 500 companies admitted using DNA testing to eliminate
potential employees who might have a possibility for a genetic disease.333
Moreover, no computer system is totally safe or secure. The US Department
of Defense secured a 300 billion dollar, Joint Strike Fighter computer project
that was breached.334 Less expensive health and medical systems are more
332 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 576 (D.N.J. 2001). (US)
333 Aaron P. Stevens, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA Databases in America,
79 Texas Law Review 4, 921 (2001).
334 Siobhan Gorman, et al., Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project, Wall Street Journal
(21 April 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124027491029837401.html (last
visited on 21 April 2012).
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vulnerable. Data security has not been adequately addressed for
computerized health and medical records. Protection and security must be a
matter of law.
Radio Frequency Information Devices (RFID), small chips that collect data,
identify objects, and transmit information to a reader served as a final
example. The chips track movement and location. The data can track
purchases and purchasers. Passive RFIDs are not active until read. Active
RFIDs transmit data all of the time. At first, RFIDs were limited in
transmission areas but the transmission expanded. Some RFIDs could read
through water and on metals with a 99.99 percent accuracy rate.335
RFIDs can track individual movement by monitoring products worn by the
user or products in the user’s possession. Some Canadian provinces
advocate using RFIDs in driver licenses. The federal government in the US
took no action to regulate RFIDs, but several states passed laws limiting RFID
use. Intellectual property protections are legally awarded with no data
protection, security, or privacy audits. Another self-regulatory set of
guidelines suggested that Electronic Product Code (EPC) tags should be
capable of being disabled and discarded, and that consumers should have
access to the data EPC tags provide.336 However, those guidelines did not
have the force of law.
DPSIP legal issues have an intellectual property law justification. The major
problem is that most intellectual property organizations and agencies exist to
perpetuate the power and control of major corporations rather than to protect
the privacy rights of individuals.
2.7.5 Personal Property Law Issues
335 Omni-Id, Why RFID? The Reliability Problem (2009), http://www.omni-id.com/technology/
(last visited on 21 April 2012).
336 Eocglobal, EPCglobal Guidelines on EPC for Consumer Products (2005),
http://www.epcglobalinc.org/public/ppsc_guide/ (last visited on 10 April 2012).
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The personal property law model considered privacy as property - like any
other ownership right. The following authors advocate for this position.
Richard Murphy proclaimed, “Personal information is in fact, property.”337
Judith Thomson critically evaluated a number of privacy-based cases. She
argued that the basis of the problem were a violation of property law and
concluded that some cases were a violation of access to the person.338
Anne Branscomb argued that information was a commercial asset.339 As such,
private information was a property interest best protected by property law.
She wrote that people had a legal right to withhold private information and
prevent violations of their right to privacy. New rules were needed to provide
checks and balances.340 One essential issue was who owned the information
and what was its value?
Eugene Volokh noted that those that violate DPSIP legal principles were free
riders and thieves.341 Under the property model, with the exception of a lawful
warrant, third parties could not share personal information with law
enforcement, share personal information without the person’s consent, or use
such information for direct marketing purposes.
Critics of the model falsely proclaimed that the model required the
government to establish a completely new property right in information, which
would be difficult to do.342 Such a view ignored the ease of creating
337 Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
Privacy, 84 Georgetown Law Journal 2381–2417 (July, 1996), at 2393.
338 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, 295 (1975).
339 Anne Wells Branscomb, Property Rights in Information, in Information Technologies And
Social Transformation (Bruce R Guile Ed., National Academy Press 1985); Anne
Wells Branscomb, Who Owns Information? From Privacy to Public Access (Basic
Books 1994).
340 Id. 1994, at 185.
341 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications
of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stanford Law Review 5,
1049 (2000), at 1074.
342 Andrew J. Mcclurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to
Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Northwestern University Law Review 1, 63 (2003).
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intellectual property rights in words, information, and knowledge that already
existed. Critics further argued the fact that individuals often give their
personal information for a low transaction cost, so there is no property right in
the information. Such a position ignored that the vast majority of people
declared in surveys that their personal information was valuable and needed
protection. Such a view also ignored that informed consent and a property
interest in information privacy had not been the standard, at least in some of
the countries in this study.
Richard Posner343 argued that Warren and Brandeis were right in maintaining
that information privacy was a property right but wrong in the assignment of
the right. Rather than assigning the right to the owner of the information kept
private, it belonged to the person who needed the information. Posner argued
that data subjects should have no control.344 Posner distorted the basic
principles of information privacy. He asserted, without documentation
or scientific evidence that privacy concerns were used to mislead
others.345 In the past, no other form of property ownership right was
transferred to those who might need to use it. The only possible exception
might be eminent domain, and even in such cases, the government must
tender fair payment for the property confiscated.
Jerry Kang346 showed that individuals should control their information. To do
otherwise would place substantial research and collective action costs on the
person. The collector and holder of the information were in a better position
to identify and pay for the valuable resource. Richard Murphy agreed.347
343 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 The American Economic Review 2,
405–409 (1981).
344 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, in Philosophical Dimensions of
Privacy: An Anthology, at 337 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., Cambridge University Press
1984).
345 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 The American Economic Review 2,
405–409 (1981), at 406.
346 B. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stanford Law Review
4, 1193 (1998).
347 Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
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Personal information was a form of property in which the individual held
ownership rights. Privacy information was not a collective value but an
individual value that placed ownership with the individual.348 Kattrin Schwartz
declared that use of individually owned data required a default opt-in format
and obtaining an informed consent.349
Information privacy, is in fact, a form of property and subject to property
laws.350 Eugene Volokh351 established that governments and businesses
that collect and trade personal information were freeloaders who used other
person’s property without compensation or permission. He argued that the
law must protect individual data and make individuals equals when dealing
with governments and business organizations. Furthermore, the sale,
surrender, or trade of personal information and data must be constrained, and
users must follow strict legal standards. In Volokh’s perspective, information
privacy was an inalienable property right that placed restrictions on all of
those who hold or use the information. Paul Schwartz also argued that
DPSIP law should restrict the use and transfer of personal information.352 The
property right extended to compiled dossiers and discovered knowledge
based on the individual’s personal information. Schwartz reasoned tht
personal property rights extend to facts, information, and knowledge.
In Folsom v. Marsh353 Justice Story explored the issue of information and
knowledge control, privacy rights as property, and granting intellectual
property rights. The situations he described were current today.
348 Kattrin Schartz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the
Electronic Communications Environment, 24 Rutgers Computer & Technology Law
Journal 1, 1 (1998).
349 Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harvard Law Review 7,
2055 (2004).
350 Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
Privacy, 84 Georgetown Law Journal 2381–2417 (July, 1996).
351 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications
of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stanford Law Review 5,
1049 (2000).
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2055 (2004), at 2098.
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Alan Westin argued that the right to control personal information was a
property right and due process standards should give protection to such right
against private and public violators.354 Annie Branscomb argued in the same
vein that information privacy data is a form of property, including intellectual
property, and must have general property protections. The protections included
the right to control “accessibility, commerciality, commonality, confidentiality,
equity, integrity, interoperability, liability, privacy, publicity, reciprocity,
responsibility, and secrecy.”355
J.T. Johnson suggested that attorneys tend to think of information privacy as
property while social scientists think of information privacy as control of
information.356 The reality was that the two models address the same issues.
Academic discipline differences should not impede an integrated understanding
of DPSIP legal issues. The oft-used deductive reasoning of the law and the
inductive reasoning of the social sciences both contributed to understanding the
issues and establishing sound laws and public policy. Data protection and
information privacy was, at the same time, a claim, concept, condition,
construct, interest, right, state, and topic. Sound contributions involved each
approach.
A.R. Miller attempted to clarify the two distinctions. Miller argued that
information privacy controls were a property right owned by the data subject -
If a holder of a letter: attempts to publish such letter or letters on other occasions, not
justifiable, a court of equity will prevent the publication by an injunction, as a breach
of private confidence or contract, or of the rights of the author; and a fortiori, if he
attempts to publish them for profit; for then it is not a mere breach of confidence or
contract, but it is a violation of the exclusive copyright of the writer. . . The general
property, and the general rights incident to property, belong to the writer, whether the
letters are literary compositions, or familiar letters, or details of facts, or letters of
business. The general property in the manuscripts remains in the writer and his
representatives, as well as the general copyright. A fortiori, third persons, standing in
no privity with either party, are not entitled to publish them, to subserve their own
private purposes of interest, or curiosity, or passion (p. 111).
354 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom, at 324 (Atheneum 1967).
355 Anne Wells Branscomb, Who Owns Information? From Privacy to Public Access, at 181
(Basic Books 1994).
356 J. T Johnson, The Private I, You, They, 9 Journal of Mass Media Ethics 4, 223 (1994), at
226-227.
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with all of the constitutional, legal, and theft protections recognized by the
property law.357
Warren and Brandeis argued the information privacy data was comparable to
intellectual property law. The authors thought that privacy was a higher
individual property right. Privacy violations damaged the person and the
community. They wrote that “the common-law protection enables him to
control absolutely the act of publication, and in the exercise of his own
discretion, to decide whether there shall be any publication at all.358
David Linowes assessed the impact of the Warren and Brandeis article. The
work became an international legal and policy standard.359 At the time,
corporations did not have the legal rights of a person. Information was not as
valuable as it was in the information economy. The legal fiction of corporate
natural entity legal protections was not yet established. The Constitution
protected people’s rights, not the government or businesses. The people’s
right to a free press did not mean that corporate owned information or
entertainment businesses could do anything that they wanted. Corporations
cannot logically claim legal protections for trade secrets and proprietary
information while claiming ownership of information privacy data.
2.7.6 Tort Law Issues
Having considered asset protection standards, contract law issues,
information and knowledge control law issues, intellectual property law issues,
and personal property law issues, the final two sections in this chapter will
357 Arthur R Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New
Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 Michigan Law Review 6, 1089
(1969), at 1224-1225.
358 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review 5,
193 (1890), at 197.
359 David F. Linowes, Privacy in America: Is Your Private Life in the Public Eye? (University
of Illinois Press. 1989), at 12.
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consider tort law issues, and privacy law conflicts. Tort law developed in
different patterns in the countries studied. In the US, the law protected the
privacy of people from appropriation of a person’s likeness for gain and
intrusions upon one’s private affairs, appropriation, false light, public
disclosure of private facts, and the right to seclusion, or solitude.360 One
could not disclose private facts about another that might violate these
principles. The major problem for privacy violations under tort law was the
determination of damages. Other countries in this study took a different
approach.
Some saw the historic tort model of privacy as secrecy or third party control.
The Daniel Solove361 model described the issues as a grouping of views that
suggested that the individual must take steps to keep private those things so
desired. The general assumption was that the public would favor release of
all information.
The model was suggested in Katz v. United States when the Court stated that
constitutional protections did not apply when the person released information;
only if one sought to protect the data, and it was protected.362 Legal and
medical privacy rules were an example of the model. The person controlled
the information. Critics, like Stephen Henderson, maintained that the major
problem with the model was that it treated private data “as an indivisible
commodity.”363
Edward Bloustein argued that, "privacy began its modern history as a tort."364
Privacy tort law began with the publication of an article written by Warren and
360 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, at § 652B-C (The
American Law Institute 1977).
361 Daniel J. Solove, et al., Privacy, Information, and Technology (2nd ed., Aspen Publishers
2006).
362 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, (1967), at 351. (US)
363 Stephen E Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine
of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 Mercer Law Review 507, 524 (2005), at 546.
364 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 New York University Law Review 962, 985 (1964), at 963.
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Brandeis. The work advocated protections against unwanted publication of
personal information while protecting the "products and processes of the
mind"365 and protected one’s "inviolate personality."366 The authors argued
that "political, social and economic changes entail recognition of new rights
and the common law... grows to meet the demands of society."367 Warren
and Brandeis argued that privacy rights required “protection, without the
interposition of the legislature"368
In Melvin v. Reid,369 the California court protected the privacy of Melvin. A
movie had been made of her life prior to the movie and used her real name.
The court found that the advertisements and movie violated her privacy.
The American Law Institute’s First Restatement of Tort Law defined the tort of
interference with privacy in the following words: "A person who unreasonably
and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known
to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other."370 The
"interest appears only in a comparatively highly developed society."371
The American Law Institute’s Second Restatement of Tort Law identified the
major areas of privacy related to tort law. The first was intrusion upon
seclusion.372 The second was false light.373 The third was public disclosure of
private facts.374 The fourth was appropriation.375 Prosser provided
problematic examples of each. Invasion of seclusion and private affairs must
365 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review, 5,
193 (1890), at 194.
366 Id. at 192.
367 Id. at 193.
368 Id. at 195.
369 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, (1931). (US)
370 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Torts. Ch. 42, Sec. 867, at 398
(American Law Institute 1939).
371 Id. at 398-399.
372 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts (The American Law
Institute 1977), at § 652B.
373 Id. at § 653E.
374 Encyclopaedia Britannica Id. at § 652D.
375 Id. at § 653C
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be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” False light must also meet the
same measure. Public disclosure of private facts must meet the first test plus
there must not be a matter of public concern. Appropriation allowed litigation
when the use of one’s name or likeness resulted in a benefit to the defendant.
Information privacy as a matter of information or knowledge control was a
basis for privacy litigation.
Edward Bloustein criticized the reductionism of the Prosser argument.
However, the point was that information privacy was not just an isolated
individual issue. Blousten declared that most of the populace held to the right
to determine "to what extent thoughts, sentiments, emotions shall be
communicated to others."376
William Parent argued that information privacy violations could be classified
into two different groups. The list included gratuitous and indiscriminate
violations. The list included:
1. Those that served no legitimate purpose, being simply products of
idle curiosity or malicious pranksters (gratuitous);
2. Those that were unnecessary in that less intrusive means of
obtaining the needed information were available (gratuitous);
3. Those that were arbitrary and capricious (gratuitous);
4. Those that acquired information that was not relevant to the
justifying purpose involved (indiscriminate);
5. Those that were carried out in such a way so persons with no
business knowing the personal facts acquired were permitted
cognitive access to them (indiscriminate).377
Parent also suggested some safeguards to prevent unlawful information
privacy violations. The list included:
376 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 New York University Law Review, 962 (1964), at 969.
377 William A. Parent, A New Definition of Privacy for the Law, 2 Law and Philosophy 3, 305
(1983), at 310.
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1. There must be a valid or legitimate need for invading the privacy.
2. There must be probable cause to believe that the information
sought is relevant to the justifying need. There must be probable
cause to believe that this information (and not some other,
irrelevant information) was obtainable by the techniques
recommended.
3. There must not be any alternative, less intrusive means
available for obtaining the desired information.
4. An impartial judicial officer must issue a warrant particularly
describing the place searched and the information sought.
5. There must be restrictions on cognitive access to the
information during the times of its acquisition, disclosure, and
storage so that only persons entitled to know the facts have
them.378
Parent defined information privacy as undocumented information. The
problem with this model was that once information became public under this
definition, the individual had no further rights of information privacy.
Ferdinand Schoeman maintained that there were two important aspects to
privacy. The first was “freedom from intrusions by others.”379 The concept
protected people from intrusions by governments, businesses, those seeking
social control, and others. The second was “freedom for developing a
variety of important relationships of varying degrees of intimacy.”380
This second concept allowed for greater expression, through
membership in different organizations. The problem was that the
second concept tended to increase social pressure for more
information. No one entity or power group should have access to all of
378 Id. at 311.
379 Ferdinand David Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom, at 21 (Cambridge University
Press 2008).
380 Id. at 156.
Chapter Two: Sociolegal Issues 128
the personal information. Such a position protects people from
extensive efforts of social control.
Teeter and LeDuc argued that tort law principles alone, was not enough to
gain a full understanding of information privacy law. They argued that judges
and legislators ignored the broad DPSIP legal issues.381
In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company, the State of Georgia
Supreme court unanimously ruled on a key privacy appropriation case. The
court found that “no one had the right to use someone else's image or name
in an advertisement without permission.”382
William Prosser383 suggested that three information privacy legal issues to be
resolved. The current thesis maintained that a strong balancing test with a set
bias toward maintaining information privacy standards should be the order of
the day. The first issue was whether being in public negated information
privacy rights. Just because a person made a bank deposit in a public bank
did not negate the person’s right to have financial records held private.
The second was whether information in public records would be private.
Some public demands for wanting to know where ex-convicts live would argue
for public record transparency. The reality was that the government released
and protected data, essentially on a whim. If a news story unlawfully released
information, the data was then in the public record. The issue was more
complex because some companies could data-mine public records and add
additional information that was more private and then sell it to anyone willing
to pay. Public record data release should only occur when there is a strong
societal need to know and then only to those that can accurately analyze the
data. The US military had DNA on every soldier. The data was a public
381 Don L. Teeter & Dwight L. Le Duc, Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control
of Print and Broadcast Media, at 250 (7th ed., Foundation Press 1992).
382 Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company, 122 Ga. 190; 50 S.E. 68; 1905 Ga.
LEXIS 156, (1905), at 31. (US)
383 William Lloyd Prosser, Privacy, 48 California Law Review 3, 383 (1960).
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record in that the public had paid for the information gathering, testing, and
storage. Such public records should remain private. Reasonable suspicion
and a warrant from a court of competent jurisdiction should be required when
privacy rights involved public records.
In Time v. Hill,384 the US Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs could sue for
invasion of privacy when a newspaper made “false reports of matters of public
interest.”385 The case centered on a family that was taken hostage and some
time later, the newspaper reported false information about what had
happened.
The last concern was private information revealed after a long length of time.
Some courts have determined that even death does not provide for a breach
of confidentiality and privacy. The Warren Commission inquiry into the
assassination of US President John F. Kennedy was sealed and even
extended. The above noted actions should require a strong societal need to
know, limited release, and where applicable, reasonable suspicion and a
warrant from a court of competent jurisdiction should apply.
The approaches found in the countries in this study explore different DPSIP
strategies. The current analysis provides an analysis of effective approaches,
standards, and policies. The largest threat to DPSIP is the lack of consistent
enforceable laws and systems that apply to corporations and governments.
The comparative analysis documents problems in each of the countries
studied. Each of the countries is considered a representative democracy, yet
the laws in force do not fully represent the will of the people. The laws and
courts often represent the interests of the governments and corporations.
384 385 US 374, 383, (1967). (US)
385 Id. at 388.
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2.7.7 Privacy Law Conflicts
Amitai Etzioni,386 a sociologist, argued that communities must balance social
responsibilities and individual rights. He maintained that limiting privacy rights
curtailed governmental control and intrusion. Friends, neighbors, and
organizational members could use approbation, censure, and recognition to
insure pro-social behavior. Public health and safety trumped informational
privacy. Privacy was only one of many rights that had no a priori priority over
other rights. Social conditions ought to modify information privacy rights.
Etzioni made the classic assumption of belief error.387 The issue of data
protection and information privacy was not just an individual issue but a
societal issue.
Etzioni joined Robert Bellah388 and Mary Ann Glendon389 in claiming, without
sound evidence, that informational privacy rights had blocked “needed” public
policies, chilled common good public policies for fear of litigation, stopped
devices and technology innovations, and successfully delayed public actions
through the courts. The common good definition suffered from the utilitarian
ethical criticism. Who defined the “greatest good for the greatest number” and
how were minority rights protected?
Four factors determined if privacy and common good concerns were out of
balance. Etzioni390 suggested that a “well-balanced communitarian society”
must use sociological tests.
386 Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (Basic Books 1999).
387 A term coined by the current author in previous sociolegal publications to describe when
one assumes that his or her beliefs are in fact factual and historically correct.
388 Robert N. Bellah, et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American
Life (University of California Press 1985).
389 Mary Ann Glendon, Right Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (Free Press
1991).
390 Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, at 12-13 (Basic Books 1999).
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While arguing for public distribution of HIV testing, criminal record publication,
national identification cards, medical record release, communication
monitoring, and internment of sexual offenders and Aids patients, Etzioni
explored another informational privacy danger. He argued that the greatest
privacy threat was not just from the government but also from private
companies that functioned as privacy merchants. No one was protected from
bankers, corporate surveillance, insurance companies, and marketers. The
“Big Bucks” of Little Brother were to be feared more than “Big Brother.”
Recent events in the countries in the study have showed that both are a major
danger.
Justice William O. Douglas’ dissenting statement in Osborn needs a friendly
amendment. He wrote: “We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where
everyone is open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from
the government (and data merchants).”391 We are already there.
Justice Brandeis dissented from the majority who ruled in Olmstead v. United
States that telephone wire taping without a warrant was not a violation of
constitutional protections against illegal search and seizure because there
was no search or seizure. Brandeis argued that with the development of the
telephone, “subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy had
become available to the Government.”392 The same holds true for current
computer technologies.
1. Limits information privacy only if it faces a well-developed and macroscopic threat
to the common good, not a merely hypothetical danger.
2. Responding to a tangible and macroscopic danger does not start with resorting to
measures that might restrict privacy rights.
3. When privacy-curbing measures must be introduced, the approach must be as
minimally intrusive as possible.
4. Measures that treat undesirable side effects of needed privacy-diminishing
measures are preferred over those that ignore these effects.
5. When the above four measures are met, there should be increased penalties for
privacy violations.
391 Osborn v. United States, 385 341, (1966). (US)
392 In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 S. Ct. 564. 66 ALR 376, 72 L.Ed. 944, (1928), at
438. (US) It was held that:
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Having knowledge about an individual’s personal information was to have
power over that individual. Having knowledge about a near entire
population’s personal information was to control the population. The holder of
the data could control the population’s information and strongly influence the
decisional privacy of the people.
Paul Schwartz clarified the connection between decisions and information.
“Decisional and information privacy are not unrelated; the use, transfer, or
processing of personal data by public and private sector organizations will
affect the choices that we make.”393 The issues were so important that the US
Supreme Court clarified the issues of information privacy in Whalen v.
Roe.394 Information privacy was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision referenced the Griswold v. Connecticut395 case which held that
“The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion.”396
Charles Sykes showed that “By invoking fears of drug cartels, kidnappings,
and international terrorism, the FBI has sought the power to be a fly on the
wall in the new information age.”397 Jeffrey Rosen further explained that when
“intimate information is removed from its original context and revealed to
The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater than
that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is
tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded and all
conversations (277 U.S. 476) between them upon any subject, and, although
proper, confidential, and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping
of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every
other person he may call or who may call him. As a means of espionage,
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny
and oppression when compared with wiretapping.
393 Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harvard Law Review 7,
2055 (2004), at 2058.
394 429 U.S. 589, (1977). (US)
395 38 1 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, (1965). (US)
396 Id. at 483.
397 Charles J. Sykes, The End of Privacy: Personal Rights in the Surveillance Society, at 156
(St. Martin's Press 1999).
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strangers, we are vulnerable to being misjudged on the basis of our most
embarrassing, and therefore most memorable, tastes and preferences.”398
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks provided a number of insights
and suggestions. Increased surveillance can negatively affect civil rights.
“This shift of power and authority to the government calls for an enhanced
system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital
to our way of life.”399 The commission recommended that the President work
to protect privacy rights and that the government monitor the protections.
Neither recommendation was effectively followed.
Jeffrey Rosen concluded that dataveillance was like general rather than
specific warrants. Privacy should be considered first because scanning
innocent information to find a sign of guilt was a resource diversion that
threatened equality, privacy, and ignored more effective terrorism
protections.400 Such behavior was a violation of the Fourth Amendment but
was done during the Nixon era and by subsequent US presidential
administrations. In fact, Podesta and Goyle401 determined that the George
W. Bush administration was more extensive in spreading privacy surveillance
on domestic citizens than J. Edgar Hoover did during the Nixon years.
Chris Hoofnagle402 documented that the government did not have to collect
all of the information within the existing legal constraints. The government
398 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America, at 9.
(Random House 2000).
399 National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, the 9/11
Commission Report 394 (Authorized 1st ed.) (Government Printing Office 2004), at
394.
400 Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age,
at 24 (Random House 2004).
401 John D. Podesta & Raj Goyle, Lost in Cyberspace? Finding American Liberties in a
Dangerous Digital World, 23 Yale Law and Policy Review 2, 509 (2005).
402 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 4, 595
(2004).
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could and did buy data from data aggregators. Such data collection would be
illegal for government to directly collect. The data was delivered in any format
requested. The research described revealed over 1,500 documents related to
companies soliciting government business with aggressive and tailored
databases for law enforcement. The list of companies included ChoicePoint,
Database Technologies Online, Dun & Bradstreet, Experian, and LexisNexis.
2.8 Summary of the Sociolegal Literature and Issues Reviewed
This Chapter examined the sociolegal justifications for DPSIP legal
intervention. Data about and by DPSIP protagonists were addressed.
Research, theory, legislation, and court decisions have shown the need for a
sound legal approach. The approach drew on literature from the nations
involved in the current study, namely AU, CA, SA, the UK, and the US.
Chapter Three changes the focus to historic international legal standards and
guidelines. The data drew on legal documents, treaties, conventions, and
cases. The data shows that SA and other nations could draw on the
collective international perspective when addressing DPSIP legal issues.
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW:
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS
Instead of a model act or international privacy regulation, the
solution will most likely involve a multifaceted approach that will
include both international oversight checked by local
governance and changes in social institutions. It cannot be a
comprehensive initiative, nor can it be left totally to each
municipality or state to decide. It will have to have a broad
international framework within which local flexibility is allowed
and encouraged. Dan Bustillos1
3.0 Overview
As SA develops and other nations evaluate and update DPSIP laws and
regulations, an understanding of historic and current international standards
provides essential facts and insights. Much of the current flow of information
is international. This chapter examines a number of ancient legal documents
that address DPSIP-related issues. Modern international treaties2 are
analyzed. The various European Declarations, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Charter, and relevant African privacy
declarations are explored. Selected national and non-governmental
organizations’ privacy standards are studied. A critique of International
DPSIP legal standards is provided. The international literature and issues are
summarized and reviewed.
1 Dan Bustillos, Privacy and Consent Concerns in International Genetic Databanks. (2005), at
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/August2005/(DB)GeneticDatabanks.pdf
(last visited on 7 September 2012), at 3.
2 Also termed accord; conventions, covenants, declarations, pact, or guidelines. See Bryan
A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Garner ed., West Group 17 ed. 1990), at
1507. Also termed agreement, mutual understanding, promise, protocol, and
stipulation. See William C. Burton, Legal Thesaurus (Maxwell Macmillan 2nd ed.
1992), at 966.
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3.1 Background
A number of historic codes of behavior and laws present insights into modern
DPSIP issues. Some were formal legal codes. Others were international
treaties that bound the signatories to accept the principles as a matter of law.
A third set was an organizational or national declaration on the proper
protection of private information. An understanding of those areas of
consensus is an important background to comparing AU, CA, SA, UK, and US
DPSIP standards. Principles and concepts that have particular relevance to
DPSIP issues are highlighted in bold face font in the discussion below.
3.2 Ancient Codes
The Code of Hammurabi establishes a principle for privacy and data
protection law responsibilities. Section 53 declared: “If any one be too lazy to
keep his dam in proper condition, and does not so keep it; if then the
dam break and all the fields be flooded, then shall he in whose dam the
break occurred be sold for money, and the money shall replace the corn
which he has caused to be ruined.”3 The Code presents a doctrine of
responsibility that should apply to businesses and governments that collect
and hold personal data because like agricultural land, personal data is an
asset and commodity that has value that can be distributed. Such data is
personal property that can be misused or stolen.
Section 125 of the Code of Hammurabi establishes the principle of liability for
lost property, even personal property, entrusted to another.
If any one place his property with another for safe keeping, and
there, either through thieves or robbers, his property and the property
of the other man be lost, the owner of the house, through whose
3 Code of Hammurabi, Code of Hammurabi. (1780 BCE), at
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/hamcode.html (last visited on 24 September
2012), at 53. (emphasis added)
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neglect the loss took place, shall compensate the owner for all that
was given to him in charge.4
Data subjects have a reasonable expectation that data controllers will protect
their property.
The classic Hippocratic Oath, which has historically been taken by physicians,
specifically refers to privacy and data protection concepts. “What I may see
or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treatment in
regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I
will keep to myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken about.”5
While the oath was and is sworn by physicians, the principle of confidentiality
applies to many business and governmental DPSIP activities. The concept is
also the basis for trade secret laws.
The maxim of the Code of Justinian, established in the Roman Empire during
the 6th century A.D. is to “live honestly, to hurt no one, to give every one his
due.”6 This code also addresses the issue of ownership of property. Part 1,
Divisions of Things, declares: “But things sold and delivered are not
acquired by the buyer until he has paid the seller the price, or satisfied
him in some way or other, as by procuring some one to be security, or by
giving a pledge.”7 The Justinian code shows that possession of another’s
data does not constitute ownership. Any transfer of ownership must be clear
and involve compensation.
Part XIV, entitled Other Ways of Contracting an Obligatio, addresses the
principle behind the obligation to protect any personal data collected. The
4 Id. at § 125. (emphasis added)
5 Hippocrates, The Classical Hippocratic Oath. (2005), at
http://www.mnsu.edu/emuseum/prehistory/aegean/culture/greekmedicine.html (last
visited on 20 August 2012). at 7. (emphasis added)
6Code of Justinian, Codex Justinianus. (529), at
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/535institutes.html (last visited on 26 September
2012). (emphasis added)
7 Id. at § 41. (emphasis added)
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Code declares the following: “But he who has received a thing lent for his
use, is indeed bound to employ his utmost diligence in keeping and
preserving it; nor will it suffice that he should take the same care of it,
which he was accustomed to take of his own property.”8
Book IV, entitled Obligations Arising from Delicta (acts that fall short of some
approved standard of conduct), addresses the holder’s misuse of property
and recognizes that the owner of property has the power to determine its use.
The Section reads: “It is theft, not only when anyone takes away a thing
belonging to another, in order to appropriate it, but generally when
anyone deals with the property of another contrary to the wishes of its
owner.”9 Personal data is often appropriated and misused without informed
consent.
These ancient codes no longer have legal power except as persuasive
authority. However, the principles noted in the codes do relate to some
current DPSIP legal issues of ownership and data collectors’ responsibilities.
3.3 Modern International Treaties
Additional persuasive authority and some binding legal authority can be found
in modern international treaties and declarations that address civil and human
rights related to DPSIP legal responses. Signatories are bound to comply
with the documents, and the treaties set a general standard for businesses
and governments.
8 Id. at § 2. (emphasis added)
9 Id. at § 6. (emphasis added)
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3.3.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights10 declares a number of DPSIP
related principles. The declaration is the cornerstone of all modern privacy
protections. Article 12 of the declaration makes the following proclamation:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.
Moreover, Article 12 makes two relevant proclamations:
1. “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others.”
2. “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”
The Declaration is not a legally binding treaty but originally was a General
Assembly resolution. Over time, however, the declaration reached the status
of international customary legal standards binding on all member states.
While the declaration clearly establishes privacy and related property rights as
a human right, seeking redress is difficult if not impossible.
3.3.2 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
The Organization of American States (OAS) is one of a number of regional
alliances the US helped to form after the Second World War. In 1948, the
OAS passed the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
Article 5 declares that, “Every person has the right to the protection of the
law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation, and his private
10United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), at
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/udhr.html (last visited on 20 August 2012). (emphasis
added)
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and family life.” Article 9 declares, “Every person has the right to the
inviolability of his home.” Article 10 declares, “Every person has the right to
the inviolability and transmission of his correspondence.”11 The
Declaration recognizes a privacy right, including the right to have boundaries
and privacy in one’s correspondence. The right to privacy in one’s
correspondence, family, and home life is echoed in a number of other
declarations as noted below and is the basis for the right to data protection,
data security, and information privacy.
Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights addresses the Right
to Privacy. The article makes the following declarations:
1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity
recognized.
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with
his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of
unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.12
The Convention permits cases only when there are state parties. If two states
are involved, both must agree to the same jurisdiction. Despite its role in
creating the organization, the US never ratified the agreement.
In May of 1948, the newly organized Organization of American States (OAS)
established the declaration of rights and duties of man. In 1979, the OAS
agreement created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights ruled that the Declaration “defines the human rights referred to
11Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
(1948), at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-Res98/Eres1591.htm (last visited on
10 June 2012). (emphasis added)
12Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights. (1969), at
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html (last visited on 10 June
2012), at § 11. (emphasis added)
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in the Charter…and is a source of international obligations related to the
Charter of the Organization.”13 The Court determined that the declaration is a
source on international obligation. However, the decisions of the Court are
not legally binding.
3.3.3 European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms
The European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also
addresses the issue of privacy and data protection. Article 8, Section 1, Right
to respect for private and family life declares, “Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”
Section 2 provided a number of exemptions, some of which need mentioning:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.14
The European Court of Human Rights enforces the convention. The Court
can evaluate individual and inter-state disputes. The decisions are only
binding on state parties. The Convention not only provides for a government
obligation to respect the right to abstain from intervention but also a positive
obligation to protect the rights.
13 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, I-A. Court H.R.,
Series A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 10, at 45 (1989).
14European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, European
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. (1950), at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited on 24
September 2012). (emphasis added)
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3.3.4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Part Three, Article 17, Section 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights15 declares that, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.” Section 2 states that,
“Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.” The major flaw of the covenant is that individuals
have no clear legal mechanism to enforce privacy rights.
The US ratified the Covenant as a matter of international law. However, the
Senate declared that Articles 1 to 26 of the Covenant are not self-executing;
thus, the ratification “will not create a private cause of action [in] the US
Courts.”16 Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor rejected this view.
She argues that the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution gives legal
force to treaties and thus full compliance for the Covenant.17
Australia also signed the Covenant, but it does not automatically become
national law without enabling domestic legislation.18 The Covenant does have
indirect influence in statutory interpretations and common law development.19
The Covenant is binding on all member states to promote, protect, and
respect the rights, but there is no individual right of action. The EU General
Assembly declared that:
15 United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (ICCPR). Article 17.
(1966), at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (last visited on 20 August
2012). (emphasis added)
16 United States Senate, Report on Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights § Exec. Rep. No. 102-123, 15 (1992).
17 Sandra Day O’Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics 1-2, 35 (1996). at 42.
18 Dietrich v The Queen, 177 CLR 292 at 305, (1992). (AU); Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs v Teoh, 183 CLR 273 at 286-305 (1995). (AU)
19 Ibid. Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, 176 CLR 1 at 38, (1992). (AU) Also see
Kristen Walker, Treaties and the Internationalisation of Australian Law in Courts of
Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (Cheryl Saunders ed. Federation
Press 1966).
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Effective measures have to be taken by States to ensure that
information concerning a person's private life does not reach the
hands of persons who are not authorized by law to receive,
process and use it, and is never used for purposes incompatible
with the Covenant. In order to have the most effective protection of his
private life, every individual should have the right to ascertain in an
intelligible form, whether, and if so, what personal data is stored
in automatic data files, and for what purposes. Every individual
should also be able to ascertain which public authorities or private
individuals or bodies control or may control their files. If such
files contain incorrect personal data or have been collected or
processed contrary to the provisions of the law, every individual
should have the right to request rectification or elimination.20
This is perhaps the modern treaty that most directly addresses data subjects’
rights to privacy and control of their personal information as part of a general
principle of civil rights.
3.3.5 The Convention on the Rights of the Child
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 16, states that:
No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his or her honor and reputation. The child has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.21
Thus, under the principles of the UN Convention, even children have privacy
rights.
20 United Nations, Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files. Adopted by
the General Assembly on 14 December 1990. (1990b), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/instruments/un_en.htm (last visited on 3
January 2012), at 10. (emphasis added)
21 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child. UN General Assembly Document
A/RES/44/25. (1989), at http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-convention/ (last visited
on 20 August 2012). (emphasis added)
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3.3.6 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
In 1990, the EU adopted a convention regarding migrant workers that
addresses privacy issues. Part III, Human Rights of all Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families, addresses the issues of migrant worker
privacy and property.
Article 14: No migrant worker or member of his or her family shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her
privacy, family, home, correspondence or other communications,
or to unlawful attacks on his or her honor and reputation. Each migrant
worker and member of his or her family shall have the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Article 15: No migrant worker or member of his or her family shall be
arbitrarily deprived of property, whether owned individually or in
association with others. Where, under the legislation in force in the
State of employment, the assets of a migrant worker or a member of
his or her family are expropriated in whole or in part, the person
concerned shall have the right to fair and adequate
compensation.22
3.3.7 EU General Assembly Guidelines Concerning Computerized
Personal Data Files
In addition to these broader statements affirming individuals’ right to privacy,
in 1990 the EU General Assembly adopted rules specifically for computerized
22 United Nations, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families. (1990a), at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r158.htm (last visited on 20 August 2012).
(emphasis added)
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personal data files.23 However, the guidelines provide minimal DPSIP
direction.
These EU General Assembly guidelines apply to international organizations
and provide directions for national legislation. The essential principle is that
information collected and stored in computerized data bases should be fair,
lawful, and adhere to the UN Charter.
The principle of accuracy suggests that the persons holding the data should
ensure that the data is accurate, relevant, and current. The principle of the
purpose-specification requires that the purpose must be legitimate, that data
be used for the specified purpose, and with the informed consent of the data
subject. The data subject must consent to use and disclosure. Time limits on
data holdings also apply.
The principle of interested-person access requires that the data holder pay
any rectification costs. Those with proof of identity should have access
without undue delay or expense. Any data communication involves informing
the party. The rule applies to all persons. Compilation of discriminatory data
is unlawful. The discriminatory list includes “information on racial or ethnic
origin, color, sex life, political opinions, religious, philosophical and other
beliefs as well as membership of an association or trade union.” Exceptions,
with operational standards, include “national security, public order, public
health, or morality.” Exceptions also include situations involving human rights
and fundamental freedom.24
The principle of security requires that databases should be secure. The
security threats include unauthorized access, destruction, fraudulent misuse,
loss, manmade and natural dangers, and IT viruses. The principle of
23 United Nations, Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files. Adopted by the
General Assembly on 14 December 1990. (1990b), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/instruments/un_en.htm (last visited on 3
January 2012).
24 Id. at 5, 6, 9.
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supervision and sanctions requires the appointment of an independent and
impartial privacy authority. Criminal and other penalties should apply.
Transborder data flow requires safeguards to protect privacy issues. The
guidelines apply to all private and public computerized files.
The guidelines apply only to electronic files but incorporate many of the older
OECD guideline principles. The standard sets minimum guarantees on
national legislations. One of the most important guarantees is that
“Information about persons should not be collected or processed in
unfair or unlawful ways, nor should it be used for ends contrary to the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”25 The
document establishes “principles of lawfulness and fairness, accuracy,
purpose-specification, interested person access, non-discrimination, power
to make exceptions, security, supervision and sanctions, transborder
data flows, and field of application to all public and private computerized
files.”26
3.4 European Declarations
There are three significant European DPSIP declarations: the OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal
Data, the Council of Europe Convention on Data Protection, and the EU
Directives on Data Protection.
3.4.1 OECD Guidelines
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was
the first group to address information privacy through harmonizing member
state laws. In November of 1950, the OECD opened the Protection of
Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Convention for signature.
25 Id. at Principle 1. (emphasis added)
26 Id. at Principles 1-10. (emphasis added)
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In September of 1953, the Convention went into effect. The Preamble
declares that the members reaffirm:
[T]heir profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the
foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained
on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other
by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon
which they depend.27
Article 8 declares:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.28
The guidelines clearly establish information privacy as a fundamental
freedom; however, the exceptions create significant problems in legal
accountability. Each exempt category is open to a wide range of operational,
political, and self-serving interpretations and definitions. Historically,
exception claims have been used for unreasonable violation of basic civil
liberty and human rights. For example, since 1990, the UN Human Rights
Committee found AU guilty of seventeen violations of basic human rights.29
27Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. (1950), at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last
visited on 20 August 2012), at 1.
28 Id. at 2. (emphasis added)
29 N.S.W. Council for Civil Liberties, Does Australia Violate Human Rights? (2009), at
http://www.nswccl.org.au/issues/hr_violations.php (last visited on 1 January 2012).
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Japanese and Ukrainian Canadians were subject to internment during the
Second World War.30 A clear example in Europe is the World War II
concentration camps and holocaust.31 Examples in the US include the World
War II Japanese internment camps,32 the 1950s McCarthyism,33 and the
Nixon and Bush–Cheney administrations.34 Therese Marie Sacco
documented some human rights violations in SA.35
The exception of the economic well-being of the country is also troublesome.
Such decisions are based on corporate power or corporate and governmental
policies. Tom Sharman documents how the UK government and UK-based
corporations use an economic well-being argument to violate human rights.36
The economic, political, and policy making power of large corporations is well
documented. The oppressive power is domestic and international. The
“economic well-being of the country” is often defined as what is in the best
interest of the corporation.37
30 Frederic P. Miller, et al., Japanese Canadian Internment: World War II, Empire of Japan,
Pearl Harbor, Brian Mulroney, Japanese American internment, Ukrainian Canadian
internment, run internment camps during World War II (Alphascript Publishing. 2009).
31 Jacques Delarue, The Gestapo: A History of Horror (Mervyn Savill trans., Frontline Books.
2008); Richard Lawrence Miller, Nazi Justice: Law of the Holocaust (Praeger. 1995);
Ingo Müller, Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich (Deborah Lucas Schneider
trans., Harvard University Press. 1991). Michael Stolleis, The Law under the
Swastika: Studies in Legal History in Nazi Germany (Thomas Dunlap trans., The
University of Chicago Press. 1998).
32 Alan Brinkly, A Familiar Story: Lessons from Past Assaults on Freedom, in The War on
Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig
eds., Public Affairs 2003).
33 Ibid. and David Cole & James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing
Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security (The New Press 2nd ed. 2002).
34 Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War
on American Ideals. (Doubleday. 2008).
35 Therese Marie Sacco, Social Exclusion: Experiences of Some of Apartheid’s Victims of
Human Rights Violations Post The Truth And Reconciliation Commission, 6 IUC
Journal of Social Work: Theory and Practice, 2 (2003).
36 Tom Sharman, How the UK Government is Enabling the Violation of Human Rights
Overseas: ActionAid UK submission to the Universal Periodic Review of the UN
Human Rights Council. (2007), (last visited on 1 January 2012).
37 See Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Free
Press. 2004); John C. Bogle, The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism (Yale University
Press. 2005); Lee Drutman & Charlie Cray, The People's Business: Controlling
Corporations and Restoring Democracy (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 2004);
Byron L. Dorgan, Take this Job and Ship It: How Corporate Greed and Brain-Dead
Politics are Selling out America (Thomas Dunne Books / St. Martin Press. 2006).
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The Honorable Justice Michael Kirby38 of the AU Court and Chair of the
OECD Expert Group reports that the OECD guidelines are largely obsolete.
He argues for new rights, including a right to “not be indexed … to encrypt
personal communications … [to] fair treatment in public key infrastructures ...
human checking … human checking of adverse automated decisions …
beyond the aspiration of the OECD openness principle.”39
3.4.1.1 Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of
Personal Data
On September 23, 1980, the OECD published The Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal Data. The
transborder guidelines are voluntary. Some basic principles subsequently
became law. The US approved the guidelines calling them "benchmark
norms for fair information practice."40
The OECD Transborder Guidelines apply to all personal data in both the
private and public sector.41 Any exceptions should be at a minimum and
known to the public.42 The guidelines established basic principles, including:
Paragraph 7. There should be limits to the collection of personal
data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means
and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data
Greg Farrell, Corporate Crooks: How Rogue Executives Ripped Off Americans ....
and Congress Helped Them Do It! (Prometheus Books. 2006); and Wade Rowland,
Greed, Inc: Why Corporations Rule Our World (Arcade Publishing. 2006).
38 Kirby was awarded the 2010 International Privacy Champion prize from the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC). Liz Tay, Kirby Crowned International Privacy
Champion, SC Magazine for IT Security Professionals. (2010), at
http://www.securecomputing.net.au/News/166776,kirby-crowned-international-
privacy-champion.aspx (last visited on 9 February 2012).
39 The Hon Justice Michael D Kirby, Privacy in Cyberspace, 21 University of New South
Wales Law Journal, 2, 323 (1998), at 330.
40 Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 Berkeley
Technology Law Journal, 771 (Spring 1999), at 771.
41OECD, Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data. (1980), at http://www.olis.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(80)58 (last
visited on 22 January 2012), at 2.
42 Id. at 4.
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subject. 8. Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for
which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those
purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date. 9. The
purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not
later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited
to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not
incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each
occasion of change of purpose. 10. Personal data should not be
disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other
than those specified in accordance with Paragraph 9 except: a) with
the consent of the data subject; or b) by the authority of law. 11.
Personal data should be protected by reasonable security
safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access,
destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data. 12. There should
be a general policy of openness about developments, practices
and policies with respect to personal data. 13. An individual should
have the right: a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise,
confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data
relating to him; b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him;
i) within a reasonable time; ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;
iii) in a reasonable manner; and iv) in a form that is readily intelligible to
him; c) to be given reasons if a request made under sub-paragraphs a)
and b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and d) to
challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful, to
have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended.43
The OECD requires that collection of personal information should be lawful,
fair, and generally performed with the knowledge or consent of the subject.
The data must be accurate, complete, necessary, relevant, and kept updated.
The data must not be disclosed, made available, or used for any other
purpose than that for which it is collected, unless the subject consents or by
authority of law. The data must have reasonable security safeguards. The
43 Id. at 7–13. (emphasis added)
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safeguards should provide protection against all destruction, loss,
modification, risks, unauthorized access, use, or disclosure. Personal data
controllers should provide a means and policy of openness related to
developments, practices, and policies. The transparency rule requires that
the identity and usual residence of the controller, existence and nature of the
personal data, as well as main purposes and use be readily available.44
The guidelines grant individuals rights. The subject must be able to access,
confirm, and obtain whether or not the subject’s data is held. The data
controller’s response must be given within a reasonable time and must be in
an intelligible form. If the controller refuses, the subject must be able to
challenge the denial and challenge the use of the subject’s data. If the
challenge is accepted, the subject could require that the data be amended,
completed, erased, or rectified. The data controller is accountable for
complying with the guidelines.45
The OECD guidelines consider the transborder flow of personal information.
Member states are required to take all appropriate and reasonable steps to
make sure that transborder personal data flows are secure and uninterrupted.
A state can refuse transfer if the re-export would circumvent its domestic
privacy laws or when the other state does not substantially observe the
guidelines. Restrictions can apply for certain personal data categories
covered by domestic legislation when the other state does not provide
equivalent protection. A state should not attempt to circumvent transborder
data flows by enacting laws, policies, and practices in the name of protection
information privacy and individual liberties.46
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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3.4.1.2 Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic
Commerce
The OECD maintains that international consultation and cooperation is
needed to effectively deal with different national laws to balance business and
consumer concerns and build consumer confidence. Consumer laws,
policies, and lawful practices must be maintained. Laws must be focused on
preventing and punishing fraudulent, misleading, and unfair commercial
conduct.47
The general principles maintain that organizations should have transparent
and effective consumer protection and fair business, advertising, and
marketing practices. Online data should provide accurate information about
the business, about the goods or services, information about the transaction,
and a secure confirmation and payment process. Dispute resolution and
redress processes should adhere to the applicable law and jurisdiction
including alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and redress. Privacy standards
should provide appropriate and effective consumer protections. Businesses,
consumer groups, and governments should also focus on privacy awareness
and education. Governments should actively work to protect the standards.48
3.4.2 Council of Europe Convention on Data Protection
The first data protection and information privacy laws in Europe were passed
by Germany in 1970 and then in 1973 by Sweden. Since the passage of
these acts, the issues of privacy expanded to the entire continent. The
European data protection position was influenced by privacy violation in World
War II by the Nazis, fascists, and the result of Communist actions after the
47 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines for Consumer
Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce. (2002), at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/13/34023235.pdf (last visited on 6 January 2012).
48 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines for Consumer
Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce. (2002), at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/13/34023235.pdf (last visited on 6 January 2012).
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war. Distrust of governmental personal data bases expanded to corporate
data bases.49
The next European declaration to consider is the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data, which was adopted by the Council of Europe50 in 1981 and is a
multilateral treaty. The majority of member states (but not all) has signed the
document. The document is the first international document that protects
personal data against collection and processing abuses. The Council makes
the connection between human rights and data protection and information
privacy clear. The preamble of the convention, which the member states
agreed on, addresses basic DPSIP principles.51
Chapter 2, Article 5 set standards for maintaining data quality. The article
reads:
Personal data undergoing automatic processing shall be:
a. obtained and processed fairly and lawfully;
b. stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a
way incompatible with those purposes;
49 See Marsha Cope Huie, et al., The Right of Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods the
U.S. and Controversy Continues, 9 Tulsa Journal of International and Comparative
Law, 391, 441 (Spring 2002); Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy
Directive and Internal Relations, 9 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 655, 668
(March 2002).
50 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data: Strasbourg, 28.I.1981. (1981), at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/108.htm (last visited on 15 January
2012).
51 Id. at 1. Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater unity
between its members, based in particular on respect for the rule of law, as well as
human rights and fundamental freedoms; Considering that it is desirable to extend
the safeguards for everyone's rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular the
right to the respect for privacy, taking account of the increasing flow across frontiers
of personal data undergoing automatic processing; Reaffirming at the same time their
commitment to freedom of information regardless of frontiers; Recognizing that it is
necessary to reconcile the fundamental values of the respect for privacy and the free
flow of information between peoples.
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c. adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes
for which they are stored;
d. accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date;
e. preserved in a form which permits identification of the data
subjects for no longer than is required for the purpose for which
those data are stored.52
Article 6 addresses the problems of special categories. Such data can not be
automatically processed unless national laws provide additional protections.
The categories include data involving beliefs, criminal convictions, health,
political opinions, racial origin, religious beliefs, and sexual lifestyle.53
The Explanatory Report of the Council of Europe advances sound DPSIP
principles. Sound laws, regulations, and administrative guidelines are
needed. Such legal standards aid in voluntary compliance and even technical
product innovation. The declaration rejects the folly of the US self-regulation
policy. The Report declares that “voluntary measures are not by themselves
sufficient to ensure full compliance with the convention.”54
Article 10 stresses the importance of effective sanction and remedies for
protection violations. Data users’ duties must be fulfilled. Data subjects’
rights must be protected. The sanctions and remedies are based on the act,
a prima facie case, strict liability, and no proven damages. The remedies may
include administrative, civil, and/or criminal sanctions and interventions.
In August of 2001, an Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,
Regarding Supervisory Authorities and Transborder Data Flows was
52 Id. at Chapter 2, Article 5.
53 Id. at Chapter 2, Article 6.
54 Id. at 39.
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approved.55 The major changes establish national supervisory bodies and
standards for transborder data flows to non-contracting states. Article One
establishes that, at a minimum:
1. Each Party shall provide for one or more authorities to be
responsible for ensuring compliance with the measures in its
domestic law …
2. a. To this end, the said authorities shall have, in particular, powers
of investigation and intervention, as well as the power to engage in
legal proceedings or bring to the attention of the competent
judicial authorities violations of provisions of domestic law giving
effect to the principles …b. Each supervisory authority shall hear
claims lodged by any person concerning the protection of his/her
rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the processing of
personal data within its competence.
3. The supervisory authorities shall exercise their functions in
complete independence.56
Article Two declares that “Each party shall provide for the transfer of personal
data to a recipient that is subject to the jurisdiction of a State or organization
that is not Party to the Convention only if that State or organization ensures
an adequate level of protection for the intended data transfer.”57 The Article
gives credence to the view that DPSIP is an international concern.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has the power to make
highly influential but not legally binding recommendations to the member
55 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, regarding supervisory
authorities and transborder data flows. (2001), at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=181&CM=1&DF
=11/5/2008&CL=ENG (last visited on 4 March 2012).
56 Id. at 1. (emphasis added)
57 Id. at Article 2.
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states. The following table shows recommendations that identify specific data
protection and information privacy concerns.
Table 3.0 Resolutions
Issue Resolution Title
Databanks in the
private sector
Resolution Res
(73)22
On the protection of privacy of
individuals vis-à-vis electronic
databanks in the private sector
Databanks in the
public sector
Resolution Res
(74)29
On the protection of individuals vis-à-
vis electronic data banks in the public
sector
Direct marketing Recommendation
Rec (85)20
On the protection of personal data
used for the purposes of direct
marketing
Employment purposes Recommendation
Rec (89)2
On the protection of personal data
used for employment purposes
Insurance purposes Recommendation
Rec (2002)9
On the protection of personal data
collected and processed for insurance
purposes
Medical data Recommendation
Rec (97)5
On the protection of medical data
Medical databanks Recommendation
Rec (81)
On regulations for automated medical
data banks
Payment and other
related operations
Recommendation
Rec(90)19
On the protection of personal data
used for payment and other related
operations
Personal data held by
public bodies
Recommendation
Rec (91)10
On the communication to third parties
of personal data held by public bodies
Police sector Recommendation
Rec (87)15
On regulating the use of personal
data in the police sector
Privacy on the Internet Recommendation
Rec (99)5
On the protection of privacy on the
Internet
Public authorities Recommendation
Rec (81)19
On the access to information held by
public authorities
Scientific research and
statistics
Recommendation
Rec (83)10
On the protection of personal data
used for scientific research and
statistics
Social security
purposes
Recommendation
Rec (86)1
On the protection of personal data
used for social security purposes
Statistical purposes Recommendation
Rec (97)18
Concerning the protection of personal
data collected and processed for
statistical purposes
Telecommunication
services, with
Recommendation
Rec (95)4
On the protection of personal data in
the area of telecommunication
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telephone services services, with particular reference to
telephone services
58
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe identifies a number of
DPSIP concerns. The concerns include issues with databanks in the private
and public sector. Specialized concerns also include employment purposes,
insurance purposes, medical data, medical databanks, payment and other
related operations, personal data held by public bodies, police sectors,
privacy on the Internet, and public authorities. Additional issues include
scientific research and statistics, social security purposes, statistical
purposes, as well as telecommunication and telephone services.59
In November of 2004, the European Council became more interested in
sharing personal data for security reasons. The Hague Program allows law
enforcement officers from any area in the EU to have direct access to a
massive data base of personal and biometric information. The Council,
perhaps naively, declared that six principles must be followed.60 The list
includes:
(1) the exchange may only take place in order that legal tasks may be
performed,
(2) the integrity of the data to be exchanged must be guaranteed,
(3) the need to protect sources of information and to secure the
confidentiality of the data at all stages of the exchange, and
subsequently,
(4) common standards for access to the data and common technical
standards must be applied,
(5) supervision of respect for data protection, and appropriate
control prior to and after the exchange must be ensured, (6) individuals
58 Committee of Ministers, XVIII. Protection of Personal Data: Resolutions and
Recommendations Adopted by the Committee of Ministers. (2008), at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/about_us/treaties_and_recommendations/listall.as
p#P389_25201 (last visited on 22 August 2012).
59 Ibid.
60 European Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice
in the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C 53(1), pp 1-14.
(2005), at http://eurocrim.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/cms/en/doc/557.pdf (last visited on 10
September 2012).
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must be protected from abuse of data and have the right to seek
correction of incorrect data.61
3.4.3 European Union Directives on Data Protection
The third and final additional relevant declarations from Europe considered
here are the EU Directives on Data Protection. From 1968 through 1970, The
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly studied the issue of data
protection and information privacy with technology devices. The Committee
found that then current declarations were inadequate to deal with
technological intrusions into privacy from public and private sources. The
Committee recommended a number of privacy principles that included:
1. The information stored should be accurate and should be kept up
to date. In general, information relating to the intimate private life of
persons or information which might lead to unfair discrimination
should not be recorded or, if recorded, should not be disseminated.
2. The information should be appropriate and relevant with regard to
the purpose for which it has been stored.
3. The information should not be obtained by fraudulent or unfair
means.
4. Rules should be laid down to specify the periods beyond which
certain categories of information should no longer be kept or
used.
5. Without appropriate authorization, information should not be used
for purposes other than those for which it has been stored, nor
communicated to third parties.
6. As a general rule, the person concerned should have the right to
know the information stored about him, the purpose for which it
has been recorded, and particulars of each release of this
information.
61 Id. at 8. (emphasis added)
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7. Every care should be taken to correct inaccurate information and
to erase obsolete information or information obtained in an unlawful
way.
8. Precautions should be taken against any abuse or misuse of
information. Electronic data banks should be equipped with
security systems.
9. Access to the information stored should be confined to persons
who have a valid reason to know it.
10. Statistical data should be released only in aggregate form and
in such a way that it is impossible to link the information to a
particular person.62
The Committee provides some general definitions for the resolution. The
“term ‘personal information’ means information relating to individuals (physical
persons), and the term ‘electronic data bank’ means any electronic data
processing system which is used to handle personal information and to
disseminate such information.”63
In 1974, the Council of Europe addressed similar concerns in a second
resolution related to public agencies. Article 6 of the Council of Europe
Convention provides for special categories for shared data. The Article
declares,
Personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or
other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or sexual life,
may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides
appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to personal data relating
to criminal convictions.64
62 Council of Europe, Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy of individuals vis-à-
vis electronic data banks in the private sector. (1973), at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co%2Doperation/data_protection/documents/
international_legal_instruments/Resolution(73)22_EN.pdf (last visited on 20 January
2012). (emphasis added)
63 Id. at 10.
64Council of Europe, Resolution (74) 29 on the protection of the privacy of individuals vis-à-
vis electronic data banks in the public sector. (1974), at
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Article two defined personal information or data as “any information relating to
an identified or identifiable individual (‘data subject’).”65
Starting on October 24, 1995, the EU passed a number of Data Protection
Directives (95/46/EC).66 The Directives are a consensus of what individual
countries must incorporate into national legislation. The EU is interested in
harmonizing national laws to aid in a single-market approach. The focus is
based on a historic distrust of governmental and even corporate data handling
based on the history with the fascists during the Second World War and post-
war Communists.67
The Directive provides a blueprint or framework for data protection through
national laws. The omnibus nature of the Directive is in sharp contrast to the
sectoral, near laissez-faire, nature of privacy legislation in the US that only
addressed discrete data categories. The Directive addresses all data
collection, processing, and storage including transfers to non-EU nations.68
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-
operation/Data_protection/Documents/International_legal_instruments/Resolution
%2874%29 29.asp - TopOfPagehttp://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-
operation/Data_protection/Documents/International_legal_instruments/Resolution
%2874%29 29.asp - TopOfPage (last visited on 22 January 2012).
65 Ibid.
66European Union Directives, The 95/46/EC Directive. (1995), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML (last
visited on 4 January 2012).
67 See Marsha Cope Huie, et al., The Right of Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods the
U.S. and Controversy Continues, 9 Tulsa Journal of International and Comparative
Law, 391, 441 (Spring 2002); Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy
Directive and Internal Relations, 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 655
(March 2002).
68 On 25 January 2012, The European Commission proposed considerable changes in the
directive. The proposal was to establish an EU law rather than a directive. Given
that at the time of this writing, the change is only a proposal; the complete details will
not be address. The essence of the changes will be integrated in Chapter 9 of this
work. For information on the proposal see: European Commission, General Data
Protection Regulation. (2012), at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (last visited on 25 January
2012) and European Commission, General Data Protection Regulation: Impact
Assessment. (2012), at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/sec_2012_72_en.pdf (last visited on 25 January
2012).
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Chapter 1 Article 2 provides key legal definitions. Personal Data is “any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data
subject'); … identified, directly or indirectly, …[linked to] an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”69 Processing of personal data
addresses
any operation or set of operations … performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording,
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.70
The data controller is the “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data.”71 The data subject’s consent
applies to “any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by
which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him
being processed.”72
Under the Directive, data quality must be maintained. The data must be
characterized by the following:
processed fairly and lawfully;
collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for
which they are collected and/or further processed;
accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable
step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or
69 European Union Directives, The 95/46/EC Directive. (1995), Ch. I, Art. 2(a).
70 Id. at 2(b).
71 Id. at 2(d).
72 Id. at 2(h).
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incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were
collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or
rectified;
kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were
collected or for which they are further processed.73
Data processing can take place only when “(a) the data subject has
unambiguously given his consent.”74 The only exceptions include when the
processing was necessary:
for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party
for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is
subject;
to protect the vital interests of the data subject;
for a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official
authority
for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or
by the third party … except where such interests are overridden by the
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject
which require protection.75
The 1997 Directive 97/66/EC applies the principles to the telecommunications
industry. However, it was repealed in 2002 with the Directive 2002/58/EC,
which extended the principles to all electronic communications.76 On March
73 Id. at Ch. II, Art. 6(1)(a)-(e). (emphasis added)
74 Id. at Ch. II, Art. 7(a).
75 Id. at Ch. II, Art. 7(b)-(f). (emphasis added)
76European Union Directives, Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy
and Electronic Communications). (2002), at http://eur-
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15, 2006, the EU passed Directive 2006/24/EC titled The Retention of Data
Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available
Electronic Communication Services or of Public Communications Networks.77
Graham Greenleaf declares that the 1995 directive was the “most important
international development in data protection in the last decade.”78
The 1995 EU Directive uses similar language with the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data. The Directive declares the following:
Whereas data-processing systems are designed to serve man;
whereas they must, whatever the nationality or residence of natural
persons, respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably
the right to privacy, and contribute to economic and social progress,
trade expansion and the well-being of individuals.79
Article 8 requires explicit consent for the collection of certain types of data.
The list includes special categories like ethnicity, medical data, political
affiliation, race, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and union membership.80
The directive establishes security principles that include organizational and
technical protections. The purpose is to protect against alteration,
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:EN:HTML (last
visited on 4 January 2012).
77European Union Directives, Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in
Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications
Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive
2002/58/EC. (2006), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF
(last visited on 4 September 2012).
78 Graham Greenleaf, The European Privacy Directive - Completed, 2 Privacy Law & Policy
Reporter 5, 81 (1995), at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/1995/52.html
(last visited on 3 March 2012), at 81.
79European Union Directives, The 95/46/EC Directive. (1995), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML (last
visited on 4 January 2012), at 2.
80 Id. at Art 8.
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destruction, loss, unauthorized access, and unauthorized disclosure.81
Decisions based on the database can not be subject to automated
processing.82
The EU and its members established the most comprehensive data protection
and information privacy law in the world. In addition to establishing legal
standards, the addition of offices of data controllers provided for independent
implementation.
However, the devil is always in the details. The EU 95/46/EC Directive
exempts the “processing of data by a natural person in the course of purely
personal or household activities.”83 This exception makes sense. The one
exception that does not have adequate checks and balances is the exception
that the Directive does not apply for “operations concerning public security,
defense, or state security.”84
Article 8 defines sensitive data, which can not be processed. Section 1
declares that “Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning
health or sex life.” However, the Directive standard exceptions apply.85
The Directive prohibits secret processing of personal data by governments or
businesses. A person/data subject has the legal right to know what
information was collected and what was being done with the data.86 The
notice includes why the data is collected, who collects it, and who has
access.87 The Directive requires that data subjects have access, “without
81 Id. at Art. 17(1).
82 Id. at Art. 15(1).
83 Id. at Art. 3.2.
84 Id. at Art. 3.1.
85 Id. at Art 8.
86 Directive at Ch. II, Arts. 10, 11; Arts 12, 14.
87 Id. at Ch. II, Arts. 10-12, 14.
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constraint at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or expense.”88
A data subject can request error corrections free of charge.89 The legal
problem is how one discovers that personal data is secretly being processed.
The Directive also requires that all member states harmonize data protection
and information privacy law within three years. The approach is based on the
view that information privacy is a fundamental human right that requires legal
standards to ensure and monitor data processing, data quality, data security,
international data transfer rules, and the rights of data subjects. The purpose
was to protect information privacy and harmonize the nations in the EU, for
the free exchange of information in internal markets. The Directive expands
on the data protection standards of the 1981 Convention. This Directive
includes data that is not automatically processed. Article 3(1) states that it
covers “the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means,
and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal data
which form part of a filing system or are intended to form a part of a filing
system.”90
The directive establishes new privacy law rights. Article 6 addresses data
quality. All data processing must meet a quality standard:
(a) processed fairly and lawfully;
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and
not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.
Further processing of data for historical, statistical or scientific
purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that
Member States provide appropriate safeguards;
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed;
88 Id. at Art. 12(a).
89 Id. at Art. 14(b).
90 Id. at § 3(1). (emphasis added)
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(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable
step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or
incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were
collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or
rectified;
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for
no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data
were collected or for which they are further processed. Member States
shall lay down appropriate safeguards for personal data stored for
longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific use.91
Article 7 establishes standards for legitimate data processing. The law
requires the following:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which
the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the
data subject prior to entering into a contract; or
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to
which the controller is subject; or
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests
of the data subject; or
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in
the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the
controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to
whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are
overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the
data subject which require protection under Article 1(1).92
91 Id. at § 6. (emphasis added)
92 Id. at §7. (emphasis added)
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Article 8 establishes the rights of data subjects. The Directive declares that,
“Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-
union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex
life.”93
Article 12 declares that every data subject have a right of access.
Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to
obtain from the controller: (a) without constraint at reasonable
intervals and without excessive delay or expense: - confirmation as
to whether or not data relating to him are being processed and
information at least as to the purposes of the processing, the
categories of data concerned, and the recipients or categories of
recipients to whom the data are disclosed, - communication to him in
an intelligible form of the data undergoing processing and of any
available information as to their source, - knowledge of the logic
involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him at
least in the case of the automated decisions referred to in Article 15
(1);
(b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the
processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this
Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature
of the data;
(c) notification to third parties to whom the data have been
disclosed of any rectification, erasure or blocking carried out in
compliance with (b), unless this proves impossible or involves a
disproportionate effort.94
Article 12 also declared the right of subjects to object:
93 Id. at Article 8.
94 Id. at Article 12. (emphasis added)
Chapter Three: International Legal Standards 168
Member States shall grant the data subject the right: (a) at least in
the cases referred to in Article 7 (e) and (f), to object at any time on
compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation
to the processing of data relating to him, save where otherwise
provided by national legislation. Where there is a justified objection the
processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those
data;
(b) to object, on request and free of charge, to the processing of
personal data relating to him which the controller anticipates being
processed for the purposes of direct marketing, or to be informed
before personal data are disclosed for the first time to third
parties or used on their behalf for the purposes of direct marketing,
and to be expressly offered the right to object free of charge to such
disclosures or uses. Member States shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that data subjects are aware of the existence
of the right referred to in the first subparagraph of (b).95
Article 17 sets a standard for data security. The directive required the
appointment of Data Controllers to make sure that the data remains
confidential and secure. The Directive required the following:
1. Member States shall provide that the controller must implement
appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect
personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental
loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular
where the processing involves the transmission of data over a network,
and against all other unlawful forms of processing. Having regard to
the state of the art and the cost of their implementation, such measures
shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented
by the processing and the nature of the data to be protected.
2. The Member States shall provide that the controller must, where
processing is carried out on his behalf, choose a processor providing
95 Id. at 12. (emphasis added)
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sufficient guarantees in respect of the technical security measures
and organizational measures governing the processing to be carried
out, and must ensure compliance with those measures.
3. The carrying out of processing by way of a processor must be
governed by a contract or legal act binding the processor to the
controller and stipulating in particular that: - the processor shall act only
on instructions from the controller, - the obligations set out in paragraph
1, as defined by the law of the Member State in which the processor is
established, shall also be incumbent on the processor.
4. For the purposes of keeping proof, the parts of the contract or the
legal act relating to data protection and the requirements relating to the
measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall be in writing or in another
equivalent form.96
Article 25 recognized that the European Directive is more advanced than any
standard in the world. The issue of data transfer outside of the European
Union is set by the following standard:
1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country
of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for
processing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to
compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other
provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures an
adequate level of protection.
2. The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third
country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances
surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations;
particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the
purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or
operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the
rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in
96 Id. at 17. (emphasis added)
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question and the professional rules and security measures which are
complied with in that country.
3. The Member States and the Commission shall inform each
other of cases where they consider that a third country does not
ensure an adequate level of protection within the meaning of
paragraph 2.
4. Where the Commission finds, under the procedure provided for in
Article 31 (2), that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of
protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, Member
States shall take the measures necessary to prevent any transfer
of data of the same type to the third country in question.
5. At the appropriate time, the Commission shall enter into negotiations
with a view to remedying the situation resulting from the finding made
pursuant to paragraph 4.
6. The Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure
referred to in Article 31 (2), that a third country ensures an adequate
level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article,
by reason of its domestic law or of the international commitments it has
entered into, particularly upon conclusion of the negotiations referred to
in paragraph 5, for the protection of the private lives and basic
freedoms and rights of individuals.97
Under the directive, data subjects have a right to know of data held, how to
access it, and how to object to uses. Data controllers are accountable for
confidentiality and security of the data. Subjects have a legal right to judicial
remedies, including compensation, damages, and sanctions. The directive
addresses the problems of transnational data flow to countries that do not
have adequate protections. The directive further declares that supervisory
agencies must be able to hear complaints, be independent, initiate legal
97 Id. at Article 25. (emphasis added)
Chapter Three: International Legal Standards 171
proceedings, intervene in data processing activities, investigate, and monitor
data protection and information privacy legal issues.
The EU added to the data protection standards with a directive concerning the
processing of personal data and of privacy in the electronic communications
sector.98 The Electronic Communication Directive Article 1(1) declares that
members are “required to ensure an equivalent level of protection of
fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right to privacy,
with respect to the processing of personal data in the electronic
communication sector.”99 Article 4(1) requires that electronic providers “must
take appropriate technical and organizational measures to safeguard
security of its services … [and] ensure a level of security appropriate to
the risk presented.”100 Article 5(1) mandates that members must do the
following:
ensure the confidentiality of communications and the related traffic
data by means of a public communications network and publicly
available electronic communications services, … prohibit listening,
tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of
communications and the related traffic data by persons other than
users, without the consent of the users concerned, except when
legally authorized to do so.101
Providers are required to erase confidential information no longer
needed.102 An exception includes billing data until paid or the period for a
legal challenge expires.
98 European Union Directives, Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy
and Electronic Communications). (2002), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:EN:HTML (last
visited on 4 January 2012).
99 Id. at Article 1(1).
100 Id. at Article 4(1). (emphasis added)
101 Id. at Article 5(1). (emphasis added)
102 Id. at Article 6(1). (emphasis added)
Chapter Three: International Legal Standards 172
3.4.3.1 Third Country Rules
The European Directives apply only to members of the EU, so rules are
necessary to address the issues in other or third countries. The members
also exist in a wider economic, legal, and political system. Data controllers
could outsource data processing to other countries or companies. Other
countries, including most notably the US, consistently violated the spirit and
letter of the European law. Non-EU nations did not have a Data Protection
Authority (DPA-EU).
A major focus of the European Directive is the transfer of data to other
countries. Within the union, transfers are determined by this directive and
national laws. A key issue is the transfer of data to the rest of the world.
Transfers can be accomplished based on the adequacy of the third countries’
DPSIP standards. Transfers require that the data subject has freely given
unambiguous consent or the transfer must be necessary rather than simply
convenient.103 The country transfer test includes the “nature of the data, the
purpose and duration of the proposed …operations, the country of origin and
country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force
in the third country in question and the professional rules and security
measures which are complied with in those countries.”104 The Council
determined that data could be easily transferred to CA because the country
was determined to be adequate.105 AU and SA have not been determined to
be adequate.
Upon passage of the European Directive, some unintended consequences
appeared. For instance, members could outsource data processing to a
country that did not have strict laws and regulation. The EU was unable to get
103 Directive at Ch. IV, Art. 26(1).
104 Directive at Ch. IV, Art. 25(2).
105 Council of the European Union, Agreement between the European Community and the
Government of Canada on the processing of API/PNR data (2006/230/EC). (2005), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/adequacy/pnr/canada_ec_230_200
6_en.pdf (last visited on 26 December 2012). Chapter 5 explores the issue in more
depth.
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other countries to pass omnibus DPSIP programs. The US was a major
obstacle. The third country rules were loosened. The EU essentially
switched from a strict country to country standard to include a company-by-
company approach based on established contract clauses.
The International Chamber of Commerce advocated for the interests of multi-
jurisdictional, multinational conglomerates. Thus, the Binding Corporate
Rules (BCR) was established. BCR apply to internal and external corporate
data transfers and outsourcing partners. The rules are legally binding for data
transfers using a single set of rules. The rules are more flexible, less costly,
less time consuming, and allegedly more proactive than dealing with national
laws.106 The European Commission Data Protection Working Party
established a set of guidelines that cover the legal standards for BCR. The
rules must address the “binding nature, effectiveness, cooperation duty,
description of processing and data flows, mechanisms for reporting and
recording changes, and data protection safeguards.”107
The Commission of the European Communities passed a number of binding
legislative decisions related to standard contractual clauses concerning the
transfer of personal data to third countries. The clauses are known as binding
standard clauses or binding model contractual clauses.108 The approved
106 International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Report on Binding Corporate Rules for
International Transfers of Personal Data. (2004), at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/e-
business/pages/FINAL_ICC_BCRs_report_rev.pdf (last visited on 26 December
2012).
107 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document Setting Up a Table with the
Elements and Principles to be Found in Binding Corporate Rules (1271-00-00/08/EN-
WP 153). (2008), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp153_en.pdf (last
visited on 26 December 2012).
108 See Commission Decision (2001/497/EC), Commission Decision (2002/16/EC,
Commission Decision (2004/5271/EC) at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/modelcontracts/index_en.htm (last visited
on 26 December 2012). See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion
3/2009 on the Draft Commission Decision on standard contractual clauses for the
transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries, under Directive
95/46/EC. (2009), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp161_en.pdf (last
visited on 26 December 2012).
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contract clauses allow transfer of data that insures sufficient safeguards to
third countries. The pre-approved adhesion contracts apply to data exporters
and data importers. The clauses address automated decision making,
confidentiality, data quality, direct marketing restrictions, dispute resolution,
onward transfer restrictions, proportionality, purpose limitations, rectification,
rights of access, security, sensitive data special rules, and transparency. The
need for audits, inspections, and reasonable inquiries are addressed.
A data subject or data protection authority can litigate for injuries related to a
breach of contract. Depending on the clause, the actions can be directed
toward the data importer or exporter; the importer and exporter are liable
jointly and severally unless an indemnification agreement,109 due diligence, or
proportional liability are in place.110
The US was considered a third country in respect of the Directive. Thus, EU
data subject information could not be transferred to the US. The US objected.
A compliance problem existed based on the economic power of US
multinational corporations, ethnocentric attitudes, Neo-Conservative political
power sources, and Corporate Republic value differences. The US
government refused to comply with the EU transfer decision, threatened an
economic war, and sought a compromise. The US Department of Commerce
led the attack. A country-specific safe harbor compromise was developed.
The US promised to develop a voluntary, self-certification approach as a data
transfer alternative. The agreement applied only to personal information
related strictly to European data subjects.
Corporations that seek safe harbor protection must seek registration with
either the FTC or Department of Transportation depending on the industry
sector. The firm must notify the Department of Commerce of its self-
certification. The company pays a $200 USD application fee plus a $150
yearly fee, and completes a simple data form. A public privacy policy
109 Commission Decision (2001/497/EC), at 26.
110 Commission Decision (2004/5271/EC, at 115.
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statement is also required. Most participants develop an in-house policy only.
Some joined with or were members of a self-regulating industry group.
A safe harbor participant must agree to follow seven basic principles. The list
includes clear and conspicuous note, an opt-out option except for sensitive
information, rules for onward transfer, reasonable security efforts, as well as
providing data integrity, reasonable access, and a dispute resolution
process.111 However, relatively few applicable US corporations abide by
these principles.
3.4.3.2 Analysis
The EU 1995 Directive sets an international standard for data protection.
With technological developments, serious threats to DPSIP evolved. The
Directive attempted to confront such issues, but systemic limitations
presented obstacles.112 However, with time some key elements changed.
The UK became one of most surveillance-ridden nations in the world.
Moreover, the EU appeared to be following the pattern.
The EU 1995 Directive attempts to balance a number of privacy-related
issues. The task was made difficult due to national differences. Germany
used a constitutional justification while the UK focused on a regulatory
approach. Key terms like the “legitimate interests of a society” were rather
vague; therefore, a number of exemptions were added to abate opposition.
Most member states attributed a low priority to DPSIP concerns.113 The
drafters did not want to limit the power of some countries to shape the
111 European Commission, How Will the "Safe Harbor" Arrangement for Personal Data
Transfers to the US Work? (2009), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/adequacy-faq1_en.htm
(last visited on 26 December 2012). See also Caslon Analytics, Privacy Guide.
(2004), at http://www.caslon.com.au/privacyguide14.htm (last visited on 26
December 2012). See Chapter 6 of the current work for more analysis.
112 Patrick J. Murray, The Adequacy Standard Under Directive 95/46/EC: Does U.S. Data
Protection Meet This Standard? 21 Fordham International Law Journal, 932, 971
(1998).
113 Ulrich U. Wuermeling, Harmonisation of European Union Privacy Law, 14 John Marshall
Journal of Computer & Information Law, 411, 414 (1996).
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national law.114 The effect was that member nations could limit the
effectiveness of the DPSIP legal standard.115
Because the EU 1995 Directive did not apply to activities “outside the scope
of Community law,” such as proclaimed national security concerns,116 the
spirit of the directive could be easily avoided. No operational definitions are
provided. Member states are allowed to re-write the law. Few controls are
instituted to review the police use of personal data.117 Governments prize
efficient police operations, and the mentality tends to ignore the data subject’s
“right to know.” Spiros Simitis argued that clear access rules should “never be
totally excluded, but rather can at most be partially restricted or temporarily
suspended in a series of unequivocally defined and exhaustively listed
cases.”118 Member States can technically comply with the Directive while
ignoring the principles involved.
A data subject’s access to the data is also limited when it involves scientific
research.119 No qualifications are needed for the organization conducting the
research nor any audited purpose or quality control restrictions. Any business
can establish a research department to avoid Directive restrictions.120
Member states could define key terms like “sole research use” or “adequate
safeguards.” The exemptions are vague and fail to define measures,
decisions, or adequate legal safeguards related to the principle.121
114 Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of
Personal Data, 80 Iowa Law Review, 445 (1995). He argued that information privacy
was no longer just an individual concern and could be used for behaviour control.
115 Id. at 451.
116 Directive at 3(2), 13.
117 Jacqueline Klosek, The Development of International Police Cooperation Within the EU
and Between the EU and Third Party States: A Discussion of the Legal Bases of
Such Cooperation and the Problems and Promises Resulting Thereof, 14 American
University International Law Review 3, 599-656 (1999).
118 Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of
Personal Data, 80 Iowa Law Review 3, 445 (1995). at 460.
119 Directive Art 13(2).
120 Simitis at 457.
121 Id. at 459.
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The distinctive feature of the European approach to DPSIP is the
comprehensive nature of the legislation. Each country must establish an
independent privacy protection agency with an identified data protection/
information privacy commissioner and office that has responsibility for
compliance with laws or regulations related to data protection and information
privacy. Each organization that collects or deals with personal data must
have a similar officer and office.
DPSIP principles embody the principle of human rights. The documents are
clear about information privacy in general. However, there are three major
problems. The first is that business and governmental concerns, security, and
Neo-Conservative perspectives always trump human rights. The second is
that none of the general human rights declarations specifically addresses
information privacy concerns. The third is that the human rights perspective
ignores the related legal issues of property, ownership, intellectual property,
consumer protection, and legal protections.
In early 2012, the EU Commission proposed a strategic change related to
DPSIP standards. The historic directive would be changed to a regulation.
The regulation would apply to all EU States, impact all non-EU nations dealing
with EU parties, and eliminate the historic patchwork directive. The proposal
included a shift to an opt-in rather than opt-out agreement, a right of data
portability, a right to be forgotten, new breach notification standards, privacy
by design standards,122 and increased enforcement powers. Under the
proposed change, protecting personal information became a fundamental
right and the free flow of information became a common good.123
122 This standard is evaluated in Chapter 5 of this work. The CA government developed the
concept.
123 Given that the EU processing of Directives and Regulations has historically taken years
to the point of passage, a critical assessment of the current proposal is outside the
time limited assessment of this study. However selected features of the EU proposal
are integrated in Chapter 10 gold standard proposal. The proposed regulation can be
found at: European Commission, General Data Protection Regulation. (2012), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (last visited on 25 January
2012).
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3.4.4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
In 2007, the Lisbon conference prepared the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The Charter, which became effective on 1 December 2009, identified key
privacy issues. The list of such issues includes the principle that “Everyone
has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and
communications.”124 The work also addresses issues related to the protection
of personal data. Specifically, the Charter declares the following:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and
on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some
other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of
access to data which has been collected concerning him or her,
and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority.125
Viviane Reding, a Luxembourg politician who served as a European
Commissioner responsible for Information Society and Media, summarizes
the current thinking of the Commission on DPSIP issues. She declares that
“Without information security, protection of privacy and personal data is not
possible... A key principle of EU data protection law is that those who process
personal data have to take the necessary security measures to counter the
risks to this data.”126 She further declares that, “Those who profit from the
124 European Parliament Council - Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management,
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2007/C 303/01). (2007), Title
II, Art. 7. at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0001:0016:EN:PDF
(last visited on 21 December 2012).
125 Id. at Art. 8. (emphasis added)
126 Viviane Reding, Securing Personal Data and Fighting Data Breaches. (2009, October
23), at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/reding/docs/speeches/2009/brussels-
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information revolution must respond to the public policy responsibilities that
come with it.”127
The Charter of Fundamental Rights Commission also addresses issues
related to developing technologies like RFID tags. The standards require that
“RFID enabled products must be automatically deactivated at the point of
sale.”128 However, the consumer does have an opt-in option. Businesses
and governmental agencies are required to provide clear, simple, and
purposeful statements. RFID users need to provide product information to
potential consumers. DPSIP users are required to conduct impact
assessments prior to smart chip use. The Privacy impact assessment should
also be mandated to be reviewed by “national data protection authorities.”129
The EU Information Commissioner’s Office contracted with Rand Europe to
perform a review of the Data Protection Directive. The analysis found that the
directive was a model of good DPSIP practices that harmonized sound
principles. The model allows for some internal marketing for the data. The
Directives permits some flexibility and is technology neutral. A major strength
of the Directive is that it increased awareness of DPSIP issues. The Directive
became an international standard.
A range of DPSIP weaknesses have been found. The issues of personal data
and risks are unclear. Transparency and notification standards are, in
practice, inconsistent and ineffective. Transfer rules are found to be
outmoded and cumbersome. The functional powers, accountability
standards, and enforcement abilities of the various Data Protection Authorities
is inconsistent. Key definitions of processing entities are simplistic and
20091023.pdf (last visited on 23 December 2012), at 2. As of December 2009, she
was the EU Commissioner for Justice and Fundamental Rights.
127 Id. at 2-3.
128 Paul Melle, EC Sets Out Privacy Requirements for Smart RFID Tags, Computer World.
(2009, May 13), at
http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/scrt/5EA85E21103475EBCC2575B400729F86
(last visited on 23 December 2012), at 1.
129 Ibid.
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static.130 The study did find evidence of “information based harm, inequality,
injustice, and restriction of moral autonomy.”131 DPSIP violations cause harm
to society. The personal damage includes potential and actual economic,
personal, physical, psychological, and social harm.132 The letter of the DPSIP
laws must be clear, but the enforcers and authorities must also be
accountable and responsible.
These international treaties and declarations established a basis for DPSIP
law. Some of the documents related to the law as a personal property and
intellectual property right whereas other documents relate the legal basis as a
human and civil right. No matter the basis, an international treaty and
declaration existed for DPSIP laws. Broad declarations were important but
lacked operational specificity.
3.5 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Privacy Charter
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization was formed at
the urging of Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke.133 Three of the member
countries—AU, CA, and the US—were subjects of this study. The
organization focuses on regional economic integration. The focus includes
trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation, and economic and
technical cooperation.134
The group’s 2004 privacy charter uses some key terms and principles;
130 Hans Graux, Neil Robinson, Maarten Botterman, & Lorenzo Valeri, Review of the
European Data Protection Directive (Rand Europe. 2009).
131 Id. at 2-3.
132 Id. at 48.
133 The membership through 2010 included Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
China, China and Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore,
Thailand, United States, and Viet Nam.
134 APEC, Asian-Pacific Cooperation. (2009), at http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html
(last visited on 10 October 2012). See also
http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/PrivLRes/2003/1.html (last visited on 17 December
2012).
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however, the details reveal several errors and miscalculations. The standards
are allegedly based on the OECD privacy principles. However, they are much
weaker than the OECD standards. APEC also ignores some basic EU Data
Protection Directive standards. The standards do not require any national
legislative or regulatory mechanisms. No data protection export requirements
exist. With the exception of CA, the privacy charter was devised by countries
that did not want to meet the EU directive. The APEC framework is based on
the principle of self regulation.
The framework of APEC focuses on establishing ethical e-commerce
practices that balance business needs and commercial interests with some
consumer protections. The APEC focuses on reasonable consumer
expectations that businesses should recognize. The practices apply only to
natural persons, not legal persons.
The framework suggests a number of privacy principles. The first is to
prevent harm, meaning to prevent the misuse of information. A notice
principle included notice of the data collection, purpose of the collection,
disclosure principles, and controller identification notice before or at the time
of collection. No notice is required for alleged publically available information.
The information collection process should be fair, lawful under national
standards, and relevant to the stated purpose. The principle allows for
appropriate consent or notice, but does not require both.135 The use of the
information must be limited to the stated purpose or to other purposes that are
compatible or related purposes determined by the collector. APEC provides
exceptions that include individual consent, requested products or services, or
legal authority. The APEC framework includes weak principles for
instruments, proclamations, and pronouncements.136
135 How can one consent if there is no notice? How can notice eliminate the need for
informed consent by the data subject?
136 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Privacy Framework. (2004, November 17-18),
at http://www.nacpec.org/docs/APEC_Privacy_Framework.pdf (last visited on 21
December 2012), at 8-11.
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The APEC framework also includes language that, only when a business
determines it is appropriate, the individual should be provided a level of
choices related to the collection, disclosure, and use of the personal
information. When the organization determines that the issue is appropriate,
the choice should be accessible, affordable, clear, easily understood, and
prominent. Only when required for the stated purpose of the collection, the
controller makes sure that the data is accurate, complete, and kept up to date.
Security safeguards should be proportional to the likelihood, sensitivity, and
severity of the threatened harm as determined by the data controller. When
appropriate, safeguards should protect from data loss, disclosure, misuses,
modification, risks, unauthorized access, unauthorized destruction, or use.
When appropriate, periodic reassessments and reviews should be
conducted.137
The APEC framework also state that individuals should have access and the
ability to request corrections of the data file. Upon proving identity,
corrections could be made to challenge the accuracy of the data when
appropriate to have the data amended, completed, deleted, or rectified. The
request must be within a reasonable manner and time, generally
understandable, and not excessive. The access can be denied when the
burden or expense is disproportionate to the risk. Protection of confidential
commercial information, legal information, and protecting others’ privacy or
security issues can also result in a denial of access.138
The information controller should139 be held accountable to following the
APEC framework. When transferring data domestically or internationally, the
controller should140 obtain individual consent, do due diligence, or take
137 Id. at 12-14.
138 Id. at 15-18.
139 Should means “ought to,” but not necessarily will.
140 Ibid.
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reasonable steps to ensure protection.141 The controller has full power over
which standard would apply.
The implementation of the framework was rather open. Members were
allowed to use administrative, industry self-regulatory, legislative approaches,
or a combination of approaches. The approach, which was meant to be
flexible, might include central authorities, designated industry bodies, multi-
agency enforcement, or a combination of these elements. Each country can
decide which elements of the approach to use.142
3.5.1 Analysis
The APEC framework declares that people recognize the importance of
privacy and that it is a basic human right. However, enforcement requires
justification and proportionality. The standards for consent are insufficient.
Accountability is required but the responsibility is on the person rather than
the data collector. Openness is suggested, but the regulatory responsibility is
on the individual. The data owner must advocate for non- discrimination
issues.
Google was concerned about the impact of the EU DPSIP standards. The
corporation’s privacy counsel started a movement to abandon the strict EU
and CA standards and even some US state laws in favor of the APEC
business-friendly system.143 Not surprisingly, the company wanted to change
DPSIP law standards in favor of full industry self-regulation. Historic research
shows that the APEC approach went through several versions that were
increasingly less stringent. Graham Greenleaf144 argues that part of the
reduction of standards was due to increased participation in the process by
141 Id. at 19.
142 Id. at 20.
143 Eric Auchard, Google Says World Could Use Asian Privacy Approach, Reuters. (2008,
September 14),
http://mobile.reuters.com/mobile/m/FullArticle/CTECH/ntechnologyNews_uUSN13401
10220070914 (last visited on 14 September 2012).
144 Graham Greenleaf, APEC Privacy Principles: More Lite with Every Version. (2003), at
http://www2.austlii.edu.au/~graham/publications/2003/APECv5_article.html (last
visited on 1 August 2012).
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the US. The APEC privacy standards are “inadequate to produce a high
quality result.”145
Eric Schmidt, Google’s Chief Executive Officer, illogically and unreasonably
argues that only those who have done something wrong should be concerned
about privacy issues. He publically declared that, "If you have something that
you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first
place."146 Yet, he personally banned a news agency’s access to Google
public meetings when it published information about him that could be found
only on a Google site.147
Not surprisingly, Google ranks as the worst Internet company in terms of
privacy protection.148 The Google advocacy and the APEC standards are
clear attempts at Neo-Conservative market governance. Both suggest that
business and corporate powers should control all information privacy
activities.
The Australian Privacy Foundation is highly critical of the APEC privacy
standards and principles. The list of criticisms includes the following facts:
[APEC] categories of ‘national exceptions’ are open-ended. There are
ineffective controls on the scope of any particular ‘national exception’.
Notice is not clearly required to be given to individuals from whom
information is collected. Collection is not limited to the minimum
information necessary for a stated purpose. Secondary uses are
allowed for ‘compatible’ purposes, a very weak test. The elevation of
‘choice’ (or consent) to a separate principle facilitates the
commodification of privacy. ‘Commercial proprietary’ reasons should
145 Graham Greenleaf, APEC Privacy Principles: More Lite with Every Version. (2003), at
http://www2.austlii.edu.au/~graham/publications/2003/APECv5_article.html (last
visited on 1 August 2012), at 8.
146 Iain Thomson, Google Boss Dismisses Privacy Concerns. (2009), at
http://www.securecomputing.net.au/News/162419,google-boss-dismisses-privacy-
concerns.aspx (last visited on 10 December 2012), at 3.
147 Ibid.
148 BBC News, Google Ranked 'Worst' on Privacy. (2007, June 11), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6740075.stm (last visited on 11 June 2012).
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not be an exception to access and correction. ‘Maximizing Benefits’
should not become a principle. The OECD Principles of Purpose
Specification, Openness and Data Export Limitation are missing and
their content should be reinstated in the APEC Principles. At least an
additional Deletion Principle should be added for a minimum set.149
APEC is a trade and investment organization and has membership
enforcement options only. Chris Pounder expresses further concerns. The
framework problem list includes the following facts about the policy and
system. It:
(1) is unlikely to provide an adequate level of protection as required
by the European Data Protection Directive;
(2) is likely to result in inconsistent implementation by APEC
member states and a confused hotchpotch of national data
protection laws, regulations or rules;
(3) is likely to be policed by a very weak regulatory regime;
(4) is likely to allow member states to adopt divergent policies on
important privacy aspects with the result that the Framework is
unlikely to provide a sound, long-term, basis for the international
trade in personal data; and
(5) contains principles and procedures which could be implemented
in a way that results in an unacceptable or minimal level of
protection for personal data.150
The basic document addresses nine principles that include preventing harm;
notice; collection limitations; uses of personal information; choice; integrity of
personal information; security safeguards; access and correction; and
149 Australian Office of The Federal Privacy Commission, Community Attitudes towards
Privacy 2004 (Author. 2004), at 4.
150 Chris Pounder, Why the APEC Privacy Framework is Unlikely to Protect Privacy. (2007),
at http://www.out-law.com/page-8550 (last visited on 1 August 2012), at 5.
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accountability. While the topics are similar to other established standards, the
actual details include more business-friendly definitions and avoidance
options.
The APEC standard of preventing harm is intended to prevent information
misuse. The standard places the burden of proof on the consumer. In
contrast, other standards such as the Canadian system address issues of
unauthorized collection, disclosure, and use as per se violations with no proof
of harm required. The APEC standard fails to define remediation and
proportionality in any operational terms.
The principle of notice sets specific time periods that include before or at the
time of collection standards. No informed consent requirements are
established. The principle does not address automatic collection as in the use
of cookies.
Collection limitations are restricted to notice or consent at the time of
collection. No limitations are placed on the amount of information collected or
the potential uses.
The business or government use of personal information standard is more
extensive than the OECD standard, which requires consent or legal authority.
The APEC framework includes authority of law, consent, or when the
individual requests products or services. The company determines when the
individual request is necessary.
Choice is required only when the exercise of the choice is appropriate. The
question of who determined choice—the business or individual—is unclear.
The APEC adopted a standard concern for the integrity of personal
information found in standard DPSIP documents. The problem is that the
integrity issue is only important when a necessity of purpose exists to use the
data. Moreover, the data controllers make such decisions.
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Data security is a business and policy given.151 The APEC framework
theoretically limits the use or transfer of personal data standards that are
reasonable and proportionality balanced by a vague standard of likelihood
and severity. However, no operational standards are established.
The APEC principle of access and correction establishes the concept as a
central aspect but not an absolute right. Individuals can be denied direct
access to the information. No requirement is established to insure that
individuals should have any awareness of the extent of the information or to
whom it may have been disclosed.
Accountability standards are diminished. Data controllers are held to be
accountable for the use and disclosure of personal information. Informed
consent is suggested. However, only due diligence or reasonable steps are
needed to protect the controllers.
The approach places no restriction on data retention limits. Moreover, no
limits are placed on collection, consent, disclosure, or use of personal
information.152
3.6 African Privacy Declarations
While the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa153 provides clear
privacy rights, African continent international declarations on DPSIP legal
issues are limited. However, one can argue that Article Eleven of the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights infers a DPSIP legal right. The
151 Not subject to debate, assumed to be true.
152 See A.C.L.U. of Northern California, Google's Privacy Policy: What Would be the Real
Impact of APEC? (2007), at
http://www.aclunc.org/issues/technology/blog/asset_upload_file251_6206.pdf (last
visited on 3 November 2012).
153 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, at
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/index.htm (last visited on 19
June 2012).
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African Union’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa
specifically uses the term “privacy.”
Article eleven of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights declares
the following:
Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with
others. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to
necessary restrictions provided for by law, in particular those
enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics
and rights and freedoms of others.154
The right to assembly infers that there is a right not to assemble or share.
Ethics, rights, and freedom of others further infers a right to ethics, rights, and
freedoms that protects oneself. Human rights issues are difficult to establish
against powerful business and governmental powers. The Charter was
agreed to prior to more specific DPSIP international declarations.
Article twelve of the African Union’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression in Africa does express a perspective on privacy. The section
addresses freedom of expression and protecting reputations. Sub-section
Two declares that “Privacy laws shall not inhibit the dissemination of
information of public interest.”155 The Declaration focuses on defamation
issues156 more than information privacy issues. The first implementation
issue is who should determine the public interests and at what cost. The
second issue is that “privacy laws shall not inhibit the dissemination of
information”157 may be considered a universal negative. The argument could
154 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (Author. 1981). (emphasis added)
155 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression in Africa. (2002), at
http://www.achpr.org/english/declarations/declaration_freedom_exp_en.html (last
visited on 21 January 2012).
156 Article 19, Implementing Freedom of Expression: A Checklist for the Implementation of
the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (Author. 2006).
157 Ibid.
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be made that no privacy law shall inhibit, including established DPSIP legal
principles.
3.7 National and Non-Governmental Organization Standards
A number of governmental and non-governmental organizations have
established information privacy standards. The standards, while not
legislative, provide a means to measure a standard of care expectation. The
standards have influenced DPSIP debates and policy making. The standards
are organized chronologically rather than by nation state.
One of the first major administrative rulings was the US guidelines established
in 1973 by the Advisory Committee on Automated Data Systems of the US
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human
Services). The Code of Fair Information Practices established five principles,
which include the following:
1. There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose
very existence is secret.
2. There must be a way for a person to find out what information
about the person is in a record and how it is used.
3. There must be a way for a person to prevent information about
the person that was obtained for one purpose from being used or
made available for other purposes without the person's
consent.
4. There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a record
of identifiable information about the person.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of
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the data for their intended use and must take precautions to
prevent misuses of the data.158
In 1977, the US Privacy Protection Study Commission, established under the
Privacy Act of 1974,159 established voluntary privacy standards. The
standards restrict the “Disclosures of Personal Employment Data” while
providing for “individual access” and “informing the individual” of data
collection efforts and informed consent. Special rules were established
regarding protecting “medical records,” “use of investigative firms,” and
“Arrest, Conviction, and Security Records.”160
The report also established standards for periodic and systematic reviews.
Such review should include the following:
1. Number and types of records an employer maintains on individual
employees, former employees, and applicants;
2. Items of information contained in each type of employment record
it maintains;
3. Uses made of the items of information in each type of record;
4. Uses made of such records within the employing organization;
5. Disclosures made of such records to parties outside the employing
organization;
6. Extent to which individual employees, former employees, and
applicants are both aware and systematically informed of the uses
and disclosures that are made of information in the records kept
about them.161
158 Health & Human Services, Code of Fair Information Practices (1973), at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/Summary.htm (last visited on 30 July 2012),
at 6. (emphasis added)
159 Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1974) (U.S.).
160 Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society.
(1977), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/ (last visited on 29 July 2012),
11.
161 Ibid.
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In 1996, the CA Standard Association established a model privacy code. The
standards include the following principles:
1. An organization is responsible for personal information under its
control.
2. The purposes for collecting personal information shall be identified
at or before the time the information is collected.
3. An organization should obtain consent of the individual for the use
or disclosure of his or her personal information.
4. The collection of personal information shall be limited to the
purposes identified by the organization.
5. Personal information shall not be used or disclosed for purposes
other than those the organization states. If the organization wants
to use personal information for other purposes not identified at or
before the time the information is collected, it should obtain the
consent of the individual.
6. An organization collecting personal information should keep the
information accurate, complete, and up-to-date.
7. An organization collecting personal information should keep the
information safe.
8. An organization shall provide information about its policies and
practices with regard to its management of personal information it
collects.
9. An organization should inform the individual whose personal
information is collected about the existence, use, and disclosure of
his or her personal information. The organization should give the
individual access to one’s own personal information. An individual
shall be able to request amendment if the collected information is
inaccurate or incomplete.
10. An organization collecting personal information should designate
an individual or individuals to be accountable for the organization's
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compliance and to address complaints.162
In its 1990 model privacy code, the CA Banking Association declared that
"Canada's chartered banks have always been, and will continue to be,
concerned with maintaining accuracy, confidentiality, security and privacy of
customer information."163 In 1996, the Code was modified. The standards
include the following:
1. An organization is responsible for personal information under its
control and shall designate an individual or individuals who are
accountable for the organization's compliance with the following
principles.
2. The purposes for which personal information is collected shall
be identified at or before the time the information is collected.
3. The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the
collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except
where inappropriate.
4. The collection of personal information shall be limited to that
which is necessary for the purposes identified by the
organization. Information shall be collected by fair and lawful
means.
5. Personal information shall not be used or disclosed for purposes
other than those for which it was collected, except with the
consent of the individual or as required by law. Personal
information shall be retained only as long as necessary for the
fulfillment of those purposes.
6. Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and up-to-
date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used.
162 Canadian Standards Association, Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information.
(1996), at http://www.csa.ca/standards/privacy/code/Default.asp?language=English
(last visited on 15 June 2012), Principles 1-10.
163 Colin J. Bennett, The Protection of Personal Financial Information: An Evaluation of the
Privacy Codes of the Canadian Bankers Association and the Canadian Standards
Association. (1997), at http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/bennett/research/cba.htm (last
visited on 31 December 2012), at 4.
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7. Personal information shall be protected by security safeguards
appropriate to the sensitivity of the information.
8. An organization shall make readily available to individuals
specific information about its policies and practices relating to
the management of personal information.
9. Upon request, an individual shall be informed of the existence,
use, and disclosure of his or her personal information and shall
be given access to that information. An individual shall be able
to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the information
and have it amended as appropriate.
10.An individual shall be able to address a challenge concerning
the above principles to the designated individual or individuals
accountable for the organization's compliance.164
The newer Code is more clear and user friendly. However, the standard does
include business-friendly opt-out provisions which are subject to misuse. This
new language is more prescriptive and relevant. While each member bank
must adopt the principles, each bank has the option to establish its own key
operational definitions.165
In its 1998 Privacy Report, the US FTC established four privacy principles.
The Principles are listed below:
1. Notice – data collectors must disclose their information practices
before collecting personal information from consumers.
2. Choice – consumers must be given options with respect to
whether and how personal information collected from them may
be used for purposes beyond those for which the information
was provided.
3. Access – consumers should be able to view and contest the
accuracy and completeness of data collected about them.
164 Id. at 4.
165 Ibid.
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4. Security – data collectors must take reasonable steps to assure
that information collected from consumers is accurate and
secure from unauthorized use.166
The US FTC established several key Privacy Fair Practices. The standards
require the following:
1. Companies should give a notice to their Web site visitors about
their information practices and policies.167
2. Consumers should have a choice to limit use or disclosure of their
personal information.168
3. Consumers should be allowed to access and correct their personal
identifiable information.169
4. The information collectors should secure the collected
information and maintain the integrity of the information.170
5. An enforcement mechanism should be established to ensure
the compliance with the privacy principles and provide redress
to harmed individuals.171
In 1998, the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration
of the Department of Commerce responded with notice of public hearings.
The Department of Commerce proposed elements for protecting information
privacy that included consumer awareness, published privacy policies,
notification of changes, consumer education, choice, data security, data
integrity, consumer access, and accountability.172 The proposed follow-up
166 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress. (1998c), at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.shtm (last visited on 10 May 2012), § 3.A.
167 Id. at 7-8.
168 Id. at 8-9.
169 Id. at 9.
170 Id. at 10.
171 Id. at 10-11.
172 National Telecommunications And Information Administration - Department Of
Commerce, Elements of Effective Self Regulation for the Protection of Privacy and
Questions Related to Online Privacy. (1998, June 5), at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privacy/6_5_98fedreg.htm (last visited on 1 June
2012), § 1.
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compliance standards and data collection standard is questionable. The
Department of Commerce established fair practices include:
1. Information collectors should notify their data subjects about their
privacy policies and consumer education.
2. Information collectors should offer data subjects opportunities to
dictate the use of their personal information.
3. Information collectors should ensure data security.
4. Information collectors can keep only information that is relevant for
the purpose of the collection, and that information should be
accurate, complete, and current.
5. Data subjects should be allowed to access and correct their personal
identifiable information.
6. Information collectors are responsible for any consequences
resulting in failing to comply with its privacy policy.173
Both the FTC and the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration of the Department of Commerce took a somewhat different
stand regarding privacy regulations. While both fall in with the party line, each
declared that legal enforcement mechanisms must be established and
followed. The Clinton administration responded with a faint threat of legal
enforcement if self-regulation efforts failed.
In 1999, the Electronic Financial Services Council responded to the challenge.
The Council recognized that, “Though lacking the power to require their
members to abide by these principles, the associations recommended their
adoption.”174 The Council represents the American Bankers Association, the
Consumer Bankers Association, Bankers Roundtable, and Independent
Bankers Association of America. The Council standards include the following:
173 Id. at 731.
174 Electronic Financial Services Council, On-line Financial Privacy: Current Legal
Framework and Recent Developments. (1999), at
http://www.efscouncil.org/frames/Library/Privacy/EFSCPrivacyIssues.html (last
visited on 19 August 2012), § 4.
Chapter Three: International Legal Standards 196
Recognition of a customers’ expectation of privacy; commitment to the
use, collection and retention of customer information only if the
institution believes the customer will benefit; maintenance of accurate
customer information; limits to employee access to such information;
protection of information via established security procedures;
restrictions on the disclosure of account information; maintenance of
customer privacy in business relationships with third parties; and
disclosure of an institutions’ privacy policies to the consumer.175
The 2000 US FTC Report to Congress found that after years of studies,
“online privacy continues to present an enormous public policy challenge …
self regulatory initiatives …demonstrate that industry efforts alone have not
been sufficient.”176 The FTC recommended additional online consumer
protection legislation.
The On-line Privacy Alliance (2003) is a not-for-profit organization of over 80
global companies that agreed to protect information privacy. While the
membership is relatively small, the organization adopted some reasonable
standards. For membership and certification, a member of the organization
must prove that it has instituted a program that includes “(1) Adoption and
Implementation of a Privacy Policy; (2) Notice and Disclosure; (3) Choice and
Consent (opt-out); (4) Data Security; and (5) Data Quality and Access.”177
The Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA) established a voluntary
industry code related to DPSIP issues. The code only relates to Business to
Consumer (B2C) activities and integrates some standards in the Privacy Act
175 Ibid.
176 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace: A Report to Congress. (2000), at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (last visited on 26 July 2012),
ii.
177 On-Line Privacy Alliance, Guidelines for Online Privacy Policies. (2003), at
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/ppguidelines.shtml (last visited on 2 August
2012), 1.
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of 1988 NPPs and OECD standards. The current privacy protection
statement is as follows:
An integral part of the Code is the National Privacy Principles (NPPs).
The NPPs give consumers some control over their personal
information by limiting the amount of information that companies can
collect about individuals. In addition marketers are required to inform
consumers who are collecting the information, how the company can
be contacted and the intended usage of the personal information,
including whether it will be disclosed to third parties. Consumers must
be given the opportunity [to] opt-out of future direct marketing
approaches and block transfer of their contact details to any other
marketer.178
A review of national and interest group DPSIP concerns establish that there
are valid concerns and show an interest in establishing standards. Such an
approach is laudable; however, the strategy is insufficient to remedy the range
of DPSIP problems. National Codes apply only to the nation of origin and do
not always have the force of law. Non-governmental codes are industry
specific and are voluntary. Most are established to thwart governmental
regulation in pro-business governments. Industry and non-governmental
codes generally have little to no consumer input and little agreement on the
basic principles that need to be addressed. The macro issues are usually
ignored and the black letter aspects of the principles are misunderstood or
ignored. Such codes have considerable compliance, enforcement
mechanisms, monitoring, and sanction powers. Non-governmental codes
have no serious redress or remedies. Penalties and sanctions are a matter of
ineffectual customs and membership. Peer pressure can be applied but there
178 Australian Direct Marketing Association The ADMA Direct Marketing Code of Practice.
(2007), at http://www.adma.com.au/asp/index.asp?pgid=1985&cid=10887&id=2196
(last visited on 6 January 2012) at 1. (emphasis added)
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is no independent or neutral arbiter. The codes are self serving and do not
provide concerns for potential victims or due process.179
3.8 International Legal Standards and Guidelines Critique
Modern international treaties relate to DPSIP legal issues and reveal a
multinational concern and member consensus. The guidelines provide a legal
justification for best practices in law and business; however, the treaties tend
to be aspirations and even prescriptive rather than descriptive. The
documents certainly declare that the principles are appropriate, ethical, fair,
just, and legitimate. Compliance, on a rational personal level, should not be a
major issue.180 Some governments and major corporations are not always
rational and behave with a distorted view of self-interest. The major strength
and the major weakness of the treaties is that they are based on consensus.
The consensus principles have little to no universal enforcement powers.
Redress under the treaties is often impossible. The terms of the treaties must
be legally operational under national codes and rigorously enforced. The
same issues apply to the discussed national and non-governmental
organization standards.
The European Directives have established some sound DPSIP legal
standards. The Directives certainly need to be technology neutral and
periodically updated. The Directives have framed the debate and have been
enacted as law in several countries. The privacy laws in AU, CA, the UK, and
recent legislation in SA have grown out of the EU Directive approach. Even
the recalcitrant US policy has also been modified and improved to some
extent.
The APEC Privacy Charter stands in sharp contrast to the EU approach. The
standards are more lenient and more pro-business. Some US governmental
179 Graham Greenleaf & Nigel Waters, Direct Marketing Code of Practice Hits ACCC Snag.
(1998), at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/1998/61.html (last visited on 31
December 2012).
180 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press. 2006).
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officials and some major international corporations favor and are adding
pressure to have the Charter become the international standard.
The major strength of the EU approach to DPSIP is that the legal standards
are broad in the sense that the standards apply to all economy sectors, all
personal data types, and all entities that are involved in data processing. The
approach is in contrast to the US, which uses a sectoral approach—putting
out privacy brush fires or rearranging the chairs on the deck of the Titanic.
The US and the UK pass or reverse standards based on the issue of the
moment. Specific data types or entities are allegedly regulated with mixed
results.
The EU data protection efforts provide legal force to a number of guidelines.
The focus is on harmonizing member states’ obtaining and processing
personal information. The strategic goal is on convergence.181 Some
advocates ague that the intent was on processing rather than protecting
personal information.
One of the first measures of the effectiveness of a law and administrative
system is to see if it works. Compliance is always an issue but one would
expect governmental agencies to follow the data protection and information
privacy law. In the 2008 fiscal year, the UK Ministry of Justice admitted that it
had lost the personal data of 45,000 people in nine separate situations, but
only six had been announced. The Ministry also announced that there might
be other undisclosed cases. The Home Office also reported that it had lost
the records of 3,000 seasonal agricultural workers because of the loss of
unencrypted compact disks. The HM Revenue and Customs office lost the
data of 25 million families in the UK during the same period.182 The good
181 Colin J. Bennett, Convergence Revisited: Toward a Global Policy for the Protection of
Personal Data? in Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape (Philip Agre & Marc
Robinson eds., 1998).
182 Leo King, U.K. Justice Agency Lost 45,000 Personal Records in Past Fiscal Year. (2008,
August 18), at
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxono
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news was that the system worked to the point that agencies had an obligation
to report.
A critical factor in any DPSIP legislation or regulation process involves
exceptions. The 1995 EU Directive is a good example. The directive clearly
states a set of reasons for not following the directive. Article 13183 set the
exceptions. The exception list included the following:
(a) national security; (b) defence; (c) public security; (d) the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or of
breaches of ethics for regulated professions; (e) an important economic
or financial interest of a Member State or of the European Union,
including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters; (f) a monitoring,
inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, with the
exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e); (g)
the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of
others.184
The major problem with such a list of data protection and information privacy
law exceptions is clearly documented in Chapter Two and Section 3.4.1 of this
thesis. The issue is who watches the exceptions. Is the fox monitoring the
chicken coop?185
Article 25 allows countries to avoid EU Directive requirements. The country
could legally avoid the review by sending the data to be processed to a third
country.186
myName=storage_security&articleId=9112864&taxonomyId=153&intsrc=kc_top (last
visited on 18 August 2012). at 1.
183 An interesting number for superstitious people in some parts of the world.
184 European Union Directives, The 95/46/EC Directive. (1995), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML (last
visited on 4 January 2012), at 6.
185 Foxes sneak into chicken coops and eat the chickens.
186 Graham Pearce & Nicholas Platten, Orchestrating Transatlantic Approaches to Personal
Data Protection: A European Perspective, 22 Fordham International Law Journal, 5,
2024 (1999).
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On 13 December 2004, the European Council passed legislation that requires
biometric identification on all passports and travel documents. Technically,
the change maintains document authenticity and identifies the holder.
Electronically readable fingerprints and a picture in interoperable formats are
used.187 All of the resultant data is placed in a massive database of personal
information and all travel data.
The action violates fundamental principles of the 95/46/EC Directive and the
August 1, 2003, Article 29 Working Party document on biometric data
protection. “The Working Party is of the view that most biometric data imply
the processing of personal data. It is therefore necessary to fully respect the
data protection principles provided for in Directive 95/46/EC taking into
account the particular nature of biometrics.”188
On 15 March 2006, the EU passed Directive 2006/24/EC, which mandates
retention of all European communications data. Service providers must
collect and give governmental access to the data. The data includes e-mails,
faxes, Internet usage, mobile phone calls, party addresses, party names, phone
calls, registered users, and subscribers.189 Article 6 requires member states to
pass legislation that mandates that service providers keep the data for at least six
months and no longer than two years. The Justice and Home and Justice
Councils were not consulted.190
187 Council of Europe, Council of Europe's Convention on the Automated Processing of
Personal Data (2004), at http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/dataprot/counceur/conv.html
(last visited on 29 May 2012).
188 Working Party, Working Document on Biometrics. Article 29 - Data Protection Working
Party, 12168/02/EN WP 80. (2003, August 1), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp80_en.pdf (last
visited on 1 September 2012), at 11.
189 European Union Directives, Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in
Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications
Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive
2002/58/EC. (2006), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF
(last visited on 4 September 2012), at Article 5, 57.
190 Id. at 58.
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Behaviorally, the focus of the UK and the EU regarding DPSIP in the US and CA
has and is shifting. Rather than continuing legal policies to protect a legal right to
control personally identifiable information, the focus is on protection. Protection
is being operationally defined as protecting corporate data base proprietors from
loss and theft. Part of the problem is political; however, some of the problem is
the Nazi-derived “Big Lie” of national security and the fact that the cost of not
complying with the 1995 Data Protection Directive is set low.
The issue is compounded by the fact that litigation relief is limited by individual
and class action constraints and unconscionable damage requirements. The
legal regulators tended to be resistant and noncompliant. Neo-Conservatives in
business and government have reframed the issue. Informed consent has been
replaced with excessively long, unreadable, and small print opt-out clauses.
Over the past ten years, the concept of checks and balances has been
abandoned in the UK, EU, and the US with missionary zeal. The George W.
Bush administration undermined data protection and information privacy law
using Machiavellian techniques and strategies.191
On 25 July 2007, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)192
concluded that the Data Protection Directive does not need to be amended at
this time. However, member states must be more insistent on its
implementation. The EDPS opinion declares that no new legal principles are
needed and that the wide scope of the law should not change. Class action
litigation should be allowed. Law enforcement access must be controlled and
justified. Regulations should be easily updated when new technology
provides a threat – Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), for example.
191 For examples, see § 2.4 of this work.
192 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protection
Supervisor on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council on the Follow-Up of the Work Programme for Better Implementation
of the Data Protection Directive, Official Journal of the European Union, 27.10.2007,
C 255/1 - 14. (2007, July 25), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:255:0001:0012:EN:PDF
(last visited on 22 September 2012).
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The International Chamber of Commerce193 held a conference with forty
representatives including data protection authorities, EU institutions,
governmental authorities, international companies, and law firms. The focus
was on the distinction between data controllers and processors. While no firm
recommendations were made, the distinction between the two was
considered artificial. Some suggested that it be eliminated.
The UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office issued a number of changes that
might be made to the EU Directive-based system. While the Commissioner
had aggressive investigation rights, firms could opt-out. Routine audits,
similar to those in Ireland, ought to be accomplished. Data Sharing Reviews
showed that the UK commission did not have the power to do the tasks
effectively. Having a regulatory system that requires the data controllers to
consent to be monitored defeats the purpose of the regulation. Investigations
should be the same for public and private data controllers. The
Commissioner’s office should have “simple power to enter premises to
conduct an inspection, with appropriate notice requirements and
accountability mechanisms to ensure the power is used responsibly.”194
Operational funding should be fee based on the number of “personal data
process.”195 The fee would increase if a controller “knowingly or recklessly”
provides faulty data or has a data protection violation.
The EU and the UK could profit from one US protective approach. A number
of states have enacted strong data breach notification laws. The laws provide
DPSIP law protections. The laws also provide a motivation for increased data
193 International Chamber Of Commerce, ICC Task Force on Privacy and the Protection of
Personal Data: Summary of the Workshop on the Distinction between Data
Controllers and Data Processors. (2007, October 25 ), at
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/ebitt/id17704/index.html (last visited on 15 September
2012).
194 Information Commissioner’s Office, The Information Commissioner’s Inspection Powers
and Funding Arrangements under the Data Protection Act 1998: Response of the
Information Commissioner to the Ministry of Justice’s Consultation Paper of 16 July
2008. (2008, August 22), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/notices/response_of_ic_to_
moj_consultation_paper.pdf (last visited on 12 September 2012), at 16.
195 Id. at 20.
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security. The responsibility is placed on the data controller. Some EU
experts are suggesting such legislation, but the responsibility would be on the
customer – user.196
Despite some recent changes, the Data Protection regimen of the EU is classic,
and more and more countries outside the Union are adopting similar principles.
The task is to make sure that the same mistakes are not made.
The EU data protection and information approach keeps the issues alive. Peter
Hustinx, the EU Data Protection Supervisor, addressed some uncomfortable
truths. He reports that all companies that collect and use personal data
should adhere to the established directives. The pronouncement includes IP
addresses because personal data can be extracted. The data can be used
for a range of purposes including political profiling and behavioral
advertising.197
Some member states are passive about implementing the EU Data Protection
Directives in practice. Rather than following the spirit and letter of the law,
minimal funding and powers are established. The EU has essentially allowed
the US to violate basic directive standards. Examples include the transfer of
passenger data on flights to the US and allowing personal financial data
transferred by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT) and the Safe Harbor program.
The Directives themselves contain a number of exemptions and exceptions.
For example, no controlling principles apply to police or governmental terrorist
agencies. History shows that governments and police agencies need checks
and balances at least as much as corporations. The EU Directives and APEC
Privacy Charter do not address such constraints.
196 Miya Knights, Security Professionals Debate the Recommendations of Independent
Research to Introduce Tough European Data Breach and Security Regulations.
(2008, October 9), at http://www.itpro.co.uk/606960/security-pros-call-for-data-
breach-regulations (last visited on 11 October 2012).
197 Pinsent Masons, Hustinx: Nameless Data Can Still Be Personal, Out-law.com. (2008,
June 11), at http://www.out-law.com/page-9563 (last visited on 12 June 2012).
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With the exception of the EU Directives, historic and current international
agreements have no power to constrain business organizations or large
multinational corporations. No effective checks and balances exist to restrain
powerful, wealthy, and well-structured organizations from ignoring DPSIP
legal standards. Self interest is used to violate privacy principles.
Widespread DPSIP standards are directly and indirectly violated in a
systematic manner. International law principles must be supplemented by
national regulation approaches.
The EU proposal to move to a Data Protection Regulation approach was not
without it opponents. Not surprisingly the UK led a group of opponents that
included Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Slovenia, and Sweden. The supporting
countries included Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Spain.198
Speaking at the Data Protection Congress, European Commission Director
General for Justice Francoise Le Bail noted, "We need a regulation that is
flexible enough to be applied to technological advances that we may have no
notion of right now." Article 29 Working Party Chair Jacob Kohnstamm said
while there is "always room for improvement," the regulation's applicability
across member states is "a big step forward."199
3.9 Summary of International Literature and Issues Reviewed
Ancient codes have established long-standing legal principles related to
boundaries, confidentiality, personal property, legal responsibility, and redress
for personal wrongs. Modern international treaties have codified information
privacy rights and obligations. The EU declarations have provided clear
privacy and data transfer standards for EU nations and mechanisms for
198 Hawtalk, UK Government Opposed to the Commission’s Data Protection Regulation.
(2012), at http://amberhawk.typepad.com/amberhawk/other-information-law/ (last
visited on 12 November 2012)
199 Ibid.
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dealing with third country data standards. The APEC Privacy Charter has
provided an anti-DPSIP standard that is a pro-business and self-regulation
alternative to the EU approach. Some national and non-governmental
standards address DPSIP legal concerns with mixed success.
In the studied countries, the experience shows that compliance with DPSIP
legal standards is not consistent. Not all police officers and departments even
follow the law. Governmental agencies and business organizations do not
always follow the law. The legal standards often make it impossible for
individuals and even groups to control or monitor personal data. Institutional
checks and balances are limited. The reality is that organizations tend to
want to know everything; therefore, limitations are often by-passed. Even the
EU Data Protection Supervisor does not have authority over all of the massive
databases. Not all countries are complying with the implementation
timetables; moreover, many are opposing the system.
A number of historic and recent international legal principles support the
rationale and terms related to DPSIP legal principles. However, international
agreements are not binding on each signatory. Member states do not always
keep promises or implement standards in a consistent, effective, responsible,
or vigilant manner. The SA approach to DPSIP laws and regulations does not
need to re-invent the wheel. Instead, the SA approach needs to learn from
the successes and failures of internationally based DPSIP laws and policies.
Benchmarking others’ efforts provides a means for the SA to take a step
forward in its own legislations and policy and lead the next development of
standards for itself and the world.
Chapter Four begins a country analysis of DPSIP legal and policy issues.
The AU attempt to meet international standards has some strengths and
weaknesses. SA can learn from both.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW:
AUSTRALIAN LEGAL STANDARDS
To the extent that the individual has no control over, and
perhaps no knowledge about, the mass of identifiable data
which may be accumulated concerning him or her, and to the
extent that national law-makers, despite their best endeavours,
enjoy only limited power effectively to protect the individual in
the global web, privacy as a human right, is steadily
undermined. The Hon Justice Michael Kirby1
4.0 Overview
AU is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations and shares a common law
tradition with CA, the UK, and the US. AU has passed DPSIP laws in
response to the EU Directive. Due to some enacted provisions, AU has not
been judged as EU adequate.2 Despite some less than adequate provisions
of the DPSIP approach, AU has enacted some privacy statute provisions that
are far more data protective than the standards found in the other countries
evaluated in this study.
The AU chapter begins with presenting background on the country. The
analysis continues with an examination of the relevant AU Commonwealth
Constitutional declarations. AU federal legislation and Commonwealth case
1 The Hon Justice Michael D. Kirby, Privacy in Cyberspace, 21 University of New South Wales
Law Journal 2, 323-332 (1998), at 323.
2 European Commission, Submission to the House of Representatives Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs Concerning its Inquiry into the Privacy Amendment (Private
Sector) Bill 2000. MARKT/E1//FB/fb D(2000). (2000), at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/Privacybill/sub113.pdf (last visited on
30 December 2012).
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law is examined. The research then focuses on AU State Constitutional
declarations, State legislation, and case law. An analysis of the AU
implementation system is reviewed. AU sociolegal concerns are presented.
A critique of the AU approach is then offered. A summary of the AU literature
and issues, using the thesis comparative model of the current legal support is
then reviewed and presented.
4.1 Background
Justice Michael D. Kirby summaries the AU view of DPSIP issues. He argues
that historically, information privacy has been protected by costs,
inconvenience, impermanency, and indexing problems. The privacy concerns
of the 1980s have increased due to technical developments that have
increased the accessibility, power, storage capacity, and speed of processing.
Justice Kirby argues that the right to confidentiality of communications, honor,
privacy, and reputation must be protected.3
Justice Kirby further proposes a reasonable plan of action. He argues that
every jurisdiction must review and debate current DPSIP laws and regulations
to avoid a patchwork of ineffective legal efforts. Businesses, governments,
and organizations must establish open and transparent privacy standards.
National governments need to defend privacy rights, stand firm against
commercial resistance, and participate in an international strategy debate.4
Justice Kirby argues for enhanced privacy rights, including a right not to be
indexed. He advocates for the following rights: grant individuals access to
their data, effectively encrypt personal communications, ensure fair treatment,
implement human checking of adverse decisions, protect personal information
privacy, and understand automated decisions.5
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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Paul Keating, former AU Prime Minister, called for major DPSIP changes. He
added support for breach legislation, increased powers for the AU Privacy
Commissioner, and fines. He argued that privacy is under attack and that the
media is failing to respond.6
AU is a multi-cultural Commonwealth nation.7 The majority of the population
remains Anglo-Saxon. The culture, customs, language, legal tradition, and
manners are similar to CA, the UK, and the US.
AU has a democratically elected government that uses the British
Parliamentary system and is a federation similar to the US. The government
includes a US format of an executive branch,8 legislative branch,9 and
judiciary.10 The legal system is based on the UK and US common law
tradition. The structure includes the central government, six state
governments, and two Territories.11 The States and Territories are generally
self-governing. Since the passage of the Australia Act of 1986,12 all AU
governmental levels have been legally independent of the UK. The
government functions on the principle of separation of powers. The
Constitution of Australia was approved in 1900 by Queen Victoria.13 The
Constitution does not have a US-style Bill of Rights; rather, the constitution
6 Adam Carey, Fine Breaches of Privacy: Keating The Sydney Morning Herald. (2010), at
http://www.watoday.com.au/national/fine-breaches-of-privacy-keating-20100804-
11fny.html (last visited on 5 August 2012).
7 Australian Government, Australian Government. (2010), at http://australia.gov.au/ (last
visited on 5 August 2012). Site contains reference data for this section.
8 Government of Australia, Prime Minister of Australia. (2010), at http://www.pm.gov.au/ (last
visited on 5 August 2012).
9 Government of Australia, Parliament of Australia. (2010), at http://www.aph.gov.au/ (last
visited on 5 August 2012).The legislative branch includes a House of Representatives
and a Senate.
10 Government of Australia, High Court of Australia. (2010), at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/ (last
visited on 5 August 2012). See http://www.hcourt.gov.au/legal_04.html for links to all
courts
11 The States include New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, South Australia,
and Western Australia. The Territories include the Australian Capital Territory (the
national seat of government - Canberra) and the Northern Territory. Only Queensland
has a uni-cameral parliament.
12 Includes the Parliament of Australia Act (No. 142 of 1985) and the Parliament Act of the
United Kingdom c.2 1986) see
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=1330183
13 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp), 63 & 64 Victoria, c 12 (Imp.)
(1900). (AU)
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authors thought that the Parliamentary system would sufficiently protect any
such issues addressed by the US Bill of Rights.
In 2004, the Australian Capital Territory passed the first Human Rights Act.
Section twelve of the Act declares that “Everyone has the right, (a) not to have
his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence interfered with unlawfully
or arbitrarily; and (b) not to have his or her reputation unlawfully attacked.”14
In 2006, the State of Victoria passed the Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities Act which is a Human Rights law. Section thirteen, Privacy
and Reputation, incorporates the language of the Australian Capital Territory
Act.15 The Australian Human Rights Commission was established by the
federal Parliament as an independent statutory organization that reports to the
Attorney-General. The Commission addresses human rights and related
discrimination issues.16
In 2009, at the request of the AU States, The Commonwealth government
passed The National Credit Protection Act. The Act was a federal recognition
that some personal information needs to be protected and regulated.17 The
Act replaced the state Uniform Consumer Credit Codes and it licenses credit
information services organizations, provides violation sanctions, increases
enforcement powers, and expands consumer protections.
14 Australian Capital Territory, Human Rights Act 2004. (2004, amended 2010), at
http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/2004-5/current/pdf/2004-5.pdf (last visited on 27
July 2012). (AU)
15 State of Victoria, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006. (2006, amended
2010), at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/cohrara2006433/ (last
visited on 27 July 2012). (AU)
16 Australian Human Rights Commission, About the Commission. (2010), at
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/index.html (last visited on 27 July 2012).
17 Australian Government, National Consumer Credit Protection Act. (2009), at
http://www.treasury.gov.au/consumercredit/content/legislation.asp (last visited on 26
July 2012). (AU) The actual code is at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/151D9CCDD6F2FAC1CA
25768E001B64CC?OpenDocument
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4.2 Australian Commonwealth Constitutional Declarations
The AU Constitution does not enumerate a clear privacy right. The document
does grant the Commonwealth powers to address DPSIP legal issues. The
parliament has the “power to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government.”18 DPSIP-related sections include trade and commerce,
telecommunications, intellectual property, external affairs, and property
acquisition.19
4.3 The Australian Commonwealth Legislation
The Australian Privacy Act of 198820 was the government’s compliance
response to Article 17 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.21 The legislators used concepts noted in international standards as a
guide.22 The Act failed to create a general right of privacy in AU law but does
protect personal information held by the Commonwealth, and it requires the
appointment of a Privacy Commissioner. Commercial information, other than
credit information, was excluded until the Act was amended.
The Privacy Act of 1998 was the first AU data privacy regulation. The Act
establishes eleven Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) but only applies to
18 Parliament of Australia, Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act as amended. (2003),
at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/general/constitution/par5cha1.htm (last visited on 7
January 2012). Chpt. 1, part V, § 51. (AU)
19 Ibid.
20 Privacy Act of 1988 (Cwlth) amend. Act No. 119 of 1988, Act No. 102 of 2009 (1988). (AU)
21 United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (ICCPR). Article 17.
(1966), at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (last visited on 20 August
2012). See Chapter 3 § 3.3.4 for additional information.
22 See OECD, Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data. (1980), at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(80)58 (last visited on 22
January 2012); United Nations, Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data
Files. Adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1990. (1990b), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/instruments/un_en.htm (last visited on 3
January 2012); Council of Europe, Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy
of individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the private sector. (1973), at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co%2Doperation/data_protection/documents/
international_legal_instruments/Resolution (73)22_EN.pdf (last visited on 20 January
2012).
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governmental offices as they relate to natural persons. The IPPs address
three general areas of concern. The first area relates to the government’s
collection, disclosure, storage, and use of personal information. The second
allows people access to governmental information about themselves. The
third area is a right for people to request changes in the information. The
principles include the following:
IPP 1: Manner and purpose of collection—The information must be
necessary for the agency's work, as well as collected fairly and
lawfully.
IPP 2: Collecting information directly from individuals—An agency must
take steps to tell individuals why they are collecting personal
information, what laws give them authority to collect it, and to
whom they usually disclose it.
IPP 3: Collecting information generally—An agency must take steps to
ensure the personal information it collects is relevant, up-to-
date, complete, and not collected in an unreasonably intrusive
way.
IPP 4: Storage and security—Personal information must be stored
securely to prevent its loss or misuse.
IPP 5: Information relating to records kept by record-keeper—Nature
and purpose of the records, class of people, period of time kept,
and access.
IPP 6: Access to records containing personal information—Except
when limited by law or authorized by the courts.
IPP 7: Alteration of records containing personal information—Records
should be accurate, not misleading, and held for the stated
purpose. Data can be amended or corrected if wrong.
IPP 8: Use only accurate, up-to-date, and complete information.
IPP 9: Use information for a relevant purpose.
IPP 10: Basic rules about using and disclosing—Consent must be
informed and free but may be implied or express.
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IPP 11: Disclosure—An agency may disclose personal information to
someone else but only in special circumstances, such as with
the individual's consent or for some health and safety or law
enforcement reasons.23
Over the next few years, the AU Commonwealth passed a number of sectoral
acts. The Data-Matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990 established
an office in the Office of the Privacy Commission to monitor the government’s
data-matching program.24 The Commission was given power to investigate,
evaluate, and supervise Privacy Act compliance. The Commission can also
issue reports on damages and losses related to breaches of privacy
principles.
The Credit Reporting Code of Conduct of 1991 extended DPSIP concerns to
the private sector. The Act established legal requirements for credit reports,
reporting credit worthiness, and legitimate processing activities. Credit
reporting agencies are bound to adhere to the privacy principles.25 The
principles relate to collection, use, disclosure, data quality, data security,
openness, access, correction, identifiers, anonymity, transborder data flows,
and sensitive information.26 Restricted criminal offenses can be charged for
false, misleading, or unauthorized access.
AU credit reports are limited to data related to credit worthiness. Data on
affiliations or beliefs related to political, religious, or social information are not
allowed. Collecting and reporting data on ethnic or national origin and race
classifications are prohibited. Data on sexual preferences or practices are
restricted. Criminal or medical history is not recorded or shared. Physical
handicaps are not allowed to be noted. The law also prohibits the processing
23 Australian Office of the Federal Privacy Commission, Information Privacy Principles.
(2009), at http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/law/view/6892 (last visited on 27
December 2012).
24 Id. at http://www.privacy.gov.au/aboutprivacy/history
25 See the modifications in the Amendment Acts of 2000 noted in this section.
26 Id. at http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/infosheets/view/6583
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of information on character, lifestyle, or reputation.27 The AU approach is far
more protective than the standards in CA and the US.
Section 135AA of the National Health Act of 1991 and amendments
established that the Privacy Commissioner had oversight of health information
guidelines for data collected by the government through its Medicare and
Pharmaceutical Benefits schemes. Agencies were required to inform the
Commissioner of data collection activities; persons can file a grievance with
the Commission for alleged breaches. The guidelines establish that Medicare
and Pharmaceutical benefit data can not be stored together. The Act
provides for occasions when data from the programs can be linked or re-
linked.
The Commonwealth 1997 Telecommunication Act gives the Privacy
Commissioner power over disclosure of customer data held by
telecommunication carriers and service providers. Interception of
telecommunication system communications is prohibited. The Commissioner
must be consulted on all codes and standards related to privacy. The Act
allows the establishment of industry privacy codes and standards that can not
derogate from the 1988 Privacy Act.28
Under the guidelines, public interest can trump individual privacy concerns in
certain situations. The situations include “criminal matters, public health or
safety, consumer affairs/protection, matters of politics, government and public
administration, matters relating to the conduct of organizations, such as
corporations, businesses and trade unions, which impact on the public, and
seriously anti-social conduct which causes harm to others.”29
27 Australian Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Credit Reporting Fact Sheet 7:
Credit Reporting Databases (May 1996). (2009), at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/factsheets/view/6494 (last visited on 16
February 2012).
28 Id. at Sec. 116A at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ta1997214/s116a.html
29 Australian Communications and Media Authority, Privacy Guidelines for Broadcasters
(Australian Communications and Media Authority. 2005) at 3.
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Section eighteen of the Spam Act of 2003 addressed information privacy
concerns. The Act required an opt-in requirement for direct marketing and all
commercial electronic messages. However, the 1988 Privacy Act only
required an opt-out approach.30
The Market and Social Research Privacy Code of 2003 and 2007 clarified
industry-specific privacy standards. The purpose of the code was to protect
information privacy data subjects as well as enable accurate and quality data
processing standards for commercial, governmental, and not-for-profit
organizations. The code extended standards to operations not previously
covered by the 1988 Privacy Act. Under the code, research organizations can
collect information only for the stated purpose, data subjects can refuse to
participate, and the organizations’ actions must be fair, legal, and reasonable.
Informed consent is required. “A research organization must not use, disclose
or transfer identified information (including information received from another
organisation) for any purpose other than a research purpose.”31 The data must
be accurate, complete, and up-to-date. Data security standards are required
to protect the data from loss, misuse, unauthorized access, disclosure,
modification, and transfer.32 The organization’s standards must be transparent
and interested parties must be granted access. When information is retained,
provisions are required for access, destruction, deletion, and de-identification.
The Privacy Commissioner has the power to approve the Code.
The Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act of 2000 extended DPSIP
standards to private businesses. The Act reaffirmed the 11 privacy principles
of the 1988 Privacy Act and establishes ten National Privacy Principles
(NPPs) for the commercial sector. The Act addressed anonymity, disclosure,
management of personal data, offshore transmissions, and use. The purpose
30 Office of the Privacy Commissioner, SPAM Act 2003 Review (Office of the Privacy
Commissioner. 2006). For an analysis of the issue, see Chapter 2, Section 2.7.2
31 Commonwealth of Australia Law, Market and Social Research Privacy Code. (2003), at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/legislation/legislativeinstrument1.nsf/framelodgme
ntattachments/0671CDE24C557D58CA257309000A399E at 2.1. (last visited on 29
December 2012).
32 Id. at 4.3.
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is to establish a single comprehensive approach for collecting, correcting,
disclosing, holding, and transferring personal information that met
international DPSIP concerns. The Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act
of 2000 attempted to balance privacy issues, human rights, social interests,
and business objectives.33 Neo-Conservative special interests prevailed with
the business community advocating for a significant small-business
exemption from the Act.34 The exemption was adopted and covered ninety-
four percent of all AU businesses.35
The Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act of 2000 provided a definition of
sensitive information that warranted data protections. The list included
“information or an opinion about an individual’s racial or ethnic origin; or
political opinions; or membership of a political association; or religious beliefs
or affiliations; or philosophical beliefs; or membership of a professional or
trade association; or membership of a trade union; or sexual preferences or
practices; or criminal record; that is also personal information; or health
information about an individual.”36
Schedule 3 of the Act established ten NPPs. The Principles included the
following:
NPP 1. Collection—data collection must have a purpose, be legal, fair, not
unreasonably intrusive, and provide notice to the data subject.
NPP 2. Use and disclosure—organizations can only use or disclose personal
data for a stated purpose, must obtain consent, the data must not be
sensitive, must be lawful, reasonable, and provide written notice. The
organization must meet a standard of responsibility.
33 Commonwealth of Australia, Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000. Act -
C2004A00748. (2000), at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/3E8F716C0779E822CA25
6F72000B40F8?OpenDocument at § 3. (last visited on 29 December 2012).
34 This self-interest advocacy resulted in AU not being compliant with the EU data protection
directive.
35 Graham Greenleaf, Reps Committee Protects the ‘Privacy- Free Zone”, 7 Privacy Law and
Policy Reporter 1, 1 (2000).
36 Id. at § 27 (6.1).
Chapter Four: Australian Legal Standards 217
NPP 3. Data quality—organizations must take reasonable steps to insure that
the data is accurate, complete, and up-to-date.
NPP4. Data security—organizations must provide reasonable protection from
unauthorized access, modification, or disclosure, and destroy or de-
identify when no longer needed or used.
NPP 5. Openness—organizations must provide transparency related to
information held, collected, used, or disclosed.
NPP 6. Access and correction—individual access to personal data is required
except when the data is commercially sensitive, and individuals are
entitled to reasons for any denials.
NPP 7. Identifiers—organizations must not use agency or governmental
identification codes or disclose the same. Tax numbering systems
were exempt.
NPP 8. Anonymity—wherever it is legal and practicable, persons can refuse
to identify themselves when transacting business with the organization.
NPP 9. Transborder data flows—Organizations may not transfer data to other
countries unless they believe the recipient follows privacy principles,
the individual consents to transfer; the transfer is contractually
necessary, benefits the person, the notice or consent is impracticable
or assumes the person would consent if given the option, and the
transfer is reasonable.
NPP 10. Sensitive information—organizations can not collect data unless a
competent person consents; the data is required by law, prevents an
imminent threat to life or health, and unless the organization is non-
profit, and the data includes certain relevant health information. A non-
profit organization includes organizations that address only racial,
ethnic, political, religious, philosophical, professional, trade, or trade
union aims.37
37 Commonwealth of Australia, Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000. Act -
C2004A00748. (2000), at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/3E8F716C0779E822CA25
6F72000B40F8?OpenDocument (last visited on 29 December 2012). (AU)
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The Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act of 2000 also established a co-
regulatory process where businesses can institute different codes of practice
at will. The Act itself and its broad and unregulated exemptions do not meet
the EU standards for adequate protections.38 The issues are related to the
employee and small business exemptions, generally available exemptions,
lack of data export standards, no correction rights of persons in other
countries, business-oriented data sharing with no options, transparency
restrictions, and industry enforcement issues.39
The Act exempted all small businesses. A small business is defined as one
that has less than an annual turnover of $3 million AU dollars. The only
exceptions to the exemption are those that provide health services or
information, collect or disclose information from or to a third party, have a
service contract with the Commonwealth, or are regulated by other legislation.
Governmental archives, including libraries, media organizations, and political
parties are also exempt.40
The Act provided for obtaining consent of the data subject to collect and use
personal information. However, a major exemption to the law applied to direct
marketing activities and marketing organizations. Marketing companies can
essentially collect and use personal information as they want.
Complaints can be handled in two different ways. When no approved private
code appears with a resolution clause, the Privacy Commissioner can hear
the complaint and charge a service fee.41 The Commission can conciliate or
make determinations regarding damages, loss, or redress. The Federal Court
can re-hear the complaint on the merits. When a privacy code does exist, the
38 European Commission, Submission to the House of Representatives Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs Concerning its Inquiry into the Privacy Amendment (Private
Sector) Bill 2000. MARKT/E1//FB/fb D(2000). (2000), at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/Privacybill/sub113.pdf (last visited on
30 December 2012).
39 Ibid.
40 Id. at 6C, 6D-6EA, 7B(4) AD 7C.
41 The approach provides some income to support operational costs but raises some issues
related to governmental commitment to the issue. Self-funding raises issues around
the rule of law and the independence of the Privacy Commission.
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resolution is conducted by the body identified in the privacy code. If the
defendant does not comply, the Federal Court can hear the case de novo.
The privacy code can be developed by a specific industry sector, industry
body, or be developed by an individual or organization that seeks an activity
or information code.
The Privacy Commission has the power to conduct privacy audits.42 The
Commissioner can “conduct audits of records of personal information
maintained by agencies for the purpose of ascertaining whether the records
are maintained according to the Information Privacy Principles.”43 The power
includes entry into premises with permission or a court-ordered warrant.44
The Privacy Amendment Act of 2004 amended the 1988 Privacy Act. The
2004 Act extended privacy protections to non-AU citizens.45
Under AU law, when the Privacy Act does not apply, alternative legal
principles can be used to protect information privacy. The alternative
principles include violations of computer crime legislation, confidentiality,
contract law, conversion, corporation law, and defamation. Appropriate
actions can also be brought under intellectual property law when behavior
violates protected areas of the trade practices act, telecommunication
statutes, and even trespass laws.
On 19 October 2011, a change was made to the administrative function of
privacy and freedom of information policies. The Governor-General approved
an amendment transferring the functions from the office of the Prime Minister
and cabinet to the Attorney-Generals department. The function is now known
42 After the questionable act.
43 Privacy Act of 1988 (Cwlth) amend. Act No. 119 of 1988, Act No. 102 of 2009 (1988). (AU)
at § 27(1)(h).
44 The Commission does not have independent authority to act.
45 Commonwealth of Australia, Privacy Amendment Act of 2004. (2004), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/paa2004188/sch1.html (last visited
on 29 December 2012). The Act was necessary for AU to comply with §25 of the EU
Directive. (AU)
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as the Information Law and Policy Branch.46 Perhaps such a change may
reduce some political influences.
4.4 Australian Commonwealth Case Law
Before examining the national common or case law on DPSIP legal issues, it
is important to examine the power and reality constraints on the highest court
in the jurisdiction. AU courts have traditionally followed the British common
law tradition. A discussion without a common benchmark would be
meaningless. A legal declaration without exploring and understanding the de
facto influences is myopic. The US Supreme Count was selected as the
benchmark for this study because, in theory, it represents the international
standard in the rule of law, balance of powers, and political independence
analysis. Granted, there is evidence that the benchmark Court has been
inconsistent.
Table 4.0 Comparison of Australian and United States Supreme Court
Factor High Court of Australia47 US Supreme Court48
Established 1903 1789
Power of decisions Applies to all courts and
jurisdictions in the
country
Applies to all courts and
jurisdictions in the
country
Membership One Chief Justice and six
justices.
One Chief Justice and eight
associate justices
(currently)
Appointee
Background
Leading appellate courts
judges or lawyer.
Leading appellate courts
judges, politicians,
and law professors.
Term of Office Retire at the age of
seventy
Life or until retires.
46 Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Administrative
Arrangements, Australian Government (2012 October), at
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/privacy/causeofaction/ (last visited on 20 October 2012).
47 World Wide Legal Information Association, Legal Resources. (2010), at
http://www.wwlia.org/LegalResources.aspx (last visited on 4 July 2012). See also
High Court Of Australia, About the Court. (2010), at
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about.html (last visited on 5 July 2012).
48 Kermit L Hall, The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (Oxford
University Press 2nd. ed. 2005). See also Supreme Court of the United States,
About the Supreme Court. (2010), at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ (last visited on 5
July 2012).
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Jurisdiction Original and appellate Original and appellate
Role Error-correction Error-correction
Operations Hears oral arguments
but relies heavily
on arguments
presented in
written briefs
Hears oral arguments but
relies heavily on
arguments presented
in written briefs
Decisions Varies based on the
number of justices
hearing a case.
The majority
decision prevails.
A full court is two
or more justices. A
full bench is all
members.
Opinion of the majority,
written by one
justice, and
concurring and
dissenting opinions
of other justices.
Judicial Review Recent Historic since Marshall.
Appointment Governor-General of
Australia with
advice.
President nominates,
Senate confirms.
Representation Consultation with political
factors.
Recently more political
Opinions Reference cases - Can
render advisory
opinions
No advisory opinions
Case Assignment Court has discretion on
selected cases.
Court determines what
cases it will hear
based on writ of
certiorari. Since
1925, has
discretionary docket
control.
The AU federal courts have addressed DPSIP issues in a limited manner. In
Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor,49 the AU High
Court ruled that, in a public area, it is legal to photograph a person with or
without the person’s knowledge or permission. AU has no common law tort of
invasion of privacy. The court did suggest that contract law and tort
negligence standards could be used to protect information privacy rights.
49 Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor, HCA 45; ( 1937) 58 CLR 479,
(26 August 1937 ). at 496. (AU) Reaffirmed in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v
Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, (2001) HCA 63; 208 CLR 199; 185 ALR 1; 76 ALJR 1,
(15 November 2001). (AU)
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In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd.,50
Justice Callinan argues that an invasion of privacy tort should be considered
in AU; however, the effort should respect the role differences between the
court and legislature.51 While the Court did not reverse Victoria Park, no
member suggested that the finding eliminated a possible privacy tort. Chief
Justice Gleeson was concerned about definitional issues and a possible
tension between privacy and free speech.52 Justices Gummow and Hayne
agreed that the Victoria Park decision did not eliminate a privacy cause of
action.53 Justice Kirby argued that because one of the parties was a
corporation it was not reasonable to rule on a privacy issue.54 Privacy relates
to human individuals only.55 Justices Gaudron, Gummow, and Hayne
concurred.56 The AU courts have the opportunity to create a tort cause of
action or can re-define the breach of confidence principles.57
4.5 Australian State Constitutional Declarations
The Constitutions of the States of AU follow the general Federation principle
of providing an operational manual while trusting the parliament to protect civil
liberties, human rights, and DPSIP legal concerns. The Constitutions of New
South Wales,58 Queensland,59 South Australia,60 Tasmania,61 Victoria,62 and
50 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, (2001) HCA 63; 208
CLR 199; 185 ALR 1; 76 ALJR 1, (15 November 2001). (AU)
51 Ibid.
52 Id. at 325-326.
53 Id. at 248-249.
54 The argument addresses the schizoid position of the US granting corporation status as a
person deserving special treatment over natural persons. Yet, corporations have
more protections than natural persons politically and legally (i.e., trade secrets and
intellectual property protections).
55 Id. at 279.
56 Id. at 256-258.
57 See Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 189 CLR 520., (1997). (AU)
58 New South Wales, Constitution Act 1902, Act 32 of 1902. (1902), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca1902188/ (last visited on 16
February 2012). (AU)
59 Queensland, Constitution of Queensland 2001, Act No. 80 of 2001. (2001), at
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/2001/01AC080.pdf (last visited on
16 February 2012). (AU)
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Western Australia63 do not have a Bill of Rights or any guiding standards that
independently support DPSIP legal intervention.
4.6 Australian State Legislation
The States of AU have adopted different strategies related to DPSIP legal
approaches. Some states have adopted the international approach to data
protection whereas others have developed a more limited approach. The
approach of each state and territory is explored.
4.6.1 New South Wales (NSW)
The New South Wales (NSW) Privacy Committee Act of 1975 was enacted
prior to the establishment of the OECD and EU Directive guidelines. The Act
established a process for complaints resulting in investigations in both the
private and public sectors. The committee does not have enforcement or
regulatory powers. Members function as ombudsmen and serve on a part-
time basis. The Act was subsequently repealed and replaced with legislation
providing stronger protection.64 These Acts will b discussed below.
60 South Australia, Constitution Act 1934. (1934), at
http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/CONSTITUTION%20ACT%201934/CURRE
NT/1934.2151.UN.PDF (last visited on 16 February 2012). (AU)
61 Tasmania, Constitution Act 1934, Act 94 of 1934; Royal Assent 14 January 1935. (1934), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/tas/consol_act/ca1934188/ (last visited on 16
February 2012). (AU)
62 Victoria, Constitution Act 1975, No. 8750 of 1975. Version incorporating amendments as at
1 January 2010. (1975), at
http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubLawToday.nsf/a12f6f
60fbd56800ca256de500201e54/4C214C9ECF03BDFFCA257695000AFCAC/$FILE/7
5-8750a194.pdf (last visited on 16 February 2012). (AU)
63 Western Australia, Constitution Act 1889 (1889), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/ca1889188/ (last visited on 16
February 2012). (AU)
64 New South Wales, Privacy Committee Act of 1975. (1975), at
http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/PrivLRes/1995/3/51_2_1.html (last visited on 7
January 2012). See § 4.6.1.1 of this chapter. (AU)
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4.6.1.1 NSW Privacy and Personal Data Protection Act 1998
The NSW Privacy and Personal Data Protection Act 199865 replaced the
Privacy Committee Act of 1975 and established public sector regulations for
personal information and legally binding documents. Personal information is
defined as information or an opinion about a person whose identity is
apparent or can be reasonably ascertained including body samples,
fingerprints, genetic information, or retina prints of those who are alive or have
been dead for less than thirty years. Information that is in a publicly available
publication, is excluded.66
Under the Act, public agencies can collect personal data only when the
purpose is lawful and the data is “reasonably necessary for that purpose.”67
Before or after the data collection the person must be informed about the
following:
(a) the information that is being collected,
(b) the purposes for which the information is being collected,
(c) the intended recipients of the information,
(d) whether the supply of the information by the individual is required
by law or is voluntary, and any consequences for the individual if
the information (or any part of it) is not provided,
(e) the existence of any right of access to, and correction of, the
information,
(f) the name and address of the agency that is collecting the
information and the agency that is to hold the information.68
The data may not be kept for longer than necessary for the purpose, must be
disposed of securely, and be protected from improper access, disclosure,
65 New South Wales, Privacy and Personal Data Protection Act 1998 (1998), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/papipa1998464/ (last visited on 7
January 2012). (AU)
66 Id. at Part 1, 3(4).
67 Id. at Part 2, Division 1, 8(1).
68 Id. at Part 2, Division 1,10(a-f).
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misuse, modification, and use. Unauthorized use or disclosure is unlawful.69
Exemptions are allowed for law enforcement, investigative agencies and
authorized or specialized boards or commissions.
The NSW Privacy and Personal Data Protection Act 1998 creates an
appointed Privacy Commissioner and staff. The Commission functions, with
the right of a Tribunal appeal, to perform the following duties:
(a) promote the adoption of, and monitor compliance with, the
information protection principles,
(b) prepare and publish guidelines relating to the protection of personal
information and other privacy matters, and to promote the adoption
of such guidelines,
(c) initiate and recommend the making of privacy codes of practice,
(d) provide assistance to public sector agencies in adopting and
complying with the information protection principles and privacy
codes of practice,
(e) provide assistance to public sector agencies in preparing and
implementing privacy management plans in accordance with
section 33,
(f) conduct research as well as collect and collate information about
any matter relating to the protection of personal information and the
privacy of individuals,
(g) provide advice on matters relating to the protection of personal
information and the privacy of individuals,
(h) make public statements about any matter relating to the privacy of
individuals generally,
(i) conduct education programs and disseminate information for the
purpose of promoting the protection of the privacy of individuals,
(j) prepare and publish reports and recommendations about any matter
(including developments in technology) that concerns the need for
(or the desirability of) legislative, administrative, or other action in the
69 Id. at Part 2, Division 1, 12(a-d).
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interest of the privacy of individuals,
(k) receive, investigate, and conciliate complaints about privacy-related
matters (including conduct to which Part 5 applies),
(l) conduct such inquiries and make such investigations into privacy-
related matters as the Privacy Commissioner thinks appropriate.70
4.6.1.2 NSW Criminal Records Act of 1991
The NSW Criminal Records Act of 199171 establishes some privacy
protections regarding spent convictions (i.e. convictions that can be effectively
ignored after a specified amount of time under a country’s law).72 A person
with a spent conviction “is not required to disclose to any other person for any
purpose information concerning the spent conviction, and a question
concerning the person's criminal history is taken to refer only to any
convictions of the person which are not spent.”73 A “person’s character or
fitness is not to be interpreted as permitting or requiring account to be taken of
spent convictions.”74
The Criminal Records Act of 1991 makes it illegal for a person without lawful
authority to disclose any information related to spent convictions. Anyone
who dishonestly or fraudulently attempts to obtain or obtains information on a
spent conviction is guilty of an offense.75
70 Id. at Part 2, Division 2, 36(2)(a-l). The Commissioner is not totally independent from an
economic or political perspective.
71 New South Wales, Criminal Records Act of 1991 (NSW). (1991), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/cra1991167/ (last visited on 7
January 2012). (AU)
72 Id. at Part 2(7)(a-d) A spent conviction does not include a prison sentence of more than 6
months, sexual offenses, convictions against the bodies corporate or those
prescribed by regulation. The culture and history of AU respects its convict history but
also recognizes civil liberty, civil rights, and human rights issues.
73 New South Wales, Criminal Records Act of 1991 (NSW). (1991), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/cra1991167/ (last visited on 7
January 2012). at Div. 1, 12 (a-b). (AU)
74 Id. at (cii).
75 Id. at at Div. 1, 13-14. From a behavioral science and therapeutic jurisprudence perspective
such a position is warranted.
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4.6.1.3 NSW Health Records and Information Privacy Act of 2002
The Health Records and Information Privacy Act of 2002 establishes privacy
standards for NSW health information. The focus includes the state and local
government, health care providers, private persons, and organizations in
NSW. The Act establishes 15 health privacy principles (HPPs).76
The HPPs require that data collection must be lawful and directly related to its
purposes. The data must be accurate, relevant, not excessive, and up-to-
date. The data must be collected directly unless it is impracticable or
unreasonable. Informed consent principles apply. Data storage must be
secure, and data must be appropriately disposed of and may not be kept
longer than necessary. The data processing must be transparent, accessible,
correct, and accurate. Use of the data must be limited to the purpose for
which it was collected or directly related to that purpose. Disclosure is limited
to the purpose of the collection. Identification numbers can only be used
when reasonably necessary for the particular function. Health services data
can be provided anonymously when lawful and practicable. The Health
Records and Information Privacy Act of 2002 restricts the transfer of data
outside of NSW. Any linkage or transfer of data to other organizations must
include expressed consent.77 The Act does not apply to small businesses
excepted by the federal Privacy Act.
4.6.2 Northern Territory (NT)
The Information Act of 2002 (NT) integrates archive and record management
practices, the freedom of information, and privacy principles. The Act creates
the post of the Information Commissioner but only applies to public agencies.
This Act defines and establishes special standards for processing sensitive
76 New South Wales, Health Records and Information Privacy Act of 2002 (NSW). (2002), at
http://www.informationcommissioner.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/privacynsw/ll_pnsw.nsf/page
s/PNSW_03_hripact (last visited on 1 January 2012). (AU)
77 Ibid.
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personal information. Sensitive personal information is defined as data
concerning:
racial or ethnic origin; political opinions; membership of a political
association; religious beliefs or affiliations; philosophical beliefs;
membership of a professional or trade association; membership of a
trade union; sexual preferences or practices; a criminal record; or health
information.78
The Act does not create or give rise to a “cause or action or create a legally
enforceable right” and does not create “a criminal liability or make a person
liable to be prosecuted.”79 In essence, this Act is little more than a resolution
or statement of best practices.
When a conflict exists between established information privacy principles and
the Act, the Act will prevail. The actual schedule of the information privacy
principles are the same as the ten NPPs of the Commonwealth Acts
described previously.
The Criminal Record (Spent Conviction) Act of 1992 (NT)80 is very similar to
the NSW Criminal Records Act. One difference is the criminal record
definition. This Act defines the exception as “a sexual offence; an offence by
a body corporate; or a prescribed offence.”81 The Act provides the same
privacy protections as the NSW Criminal Records Act noted above.
78 Northern Territory of Australia, Information Act 2002 amend 2009 (NT). (2002), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/ia144.txt (last visited on 8 January
2012). at 8. (AU)
79 Id. at 11.
80 Northern Territory of Australia, Criminal Records spent Convictions) Act 1992 (NT). (1992),
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/crca368/ (last visited on 8 January
2012). (AU)
81 Id. at 6.
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In 2007, NT passed the Surveillance Devices Act,82 which prohibits the
communication and publication of private activities and conversations based
on direct or indirect use of unlawful devices. The Act even applies to police
officers who function without a valid warrant.
4.6.3 Queensland (Qld)
In 1971, the State of Queensland passed its first privacy law—the Invasion of
Privacy Act, which addresses issues related to credit reporting agencies and
listening devices that can simultaneously listen, monitor, overhear, or record
intended private conversations. This act prohibits the communication or
publishing of any data from a listening device. The information is inadmissible
in any civil or criminal proceeding. Advertising such devices is also illegal.
The Invasion of Privacy Act further makes it an offense to enter a dwelling
house unlawfully.83 Qld has recognized an invasion of privacy tort, at least on
a District level.84
The Information Privacy Act of 2009 (Qld) applies to personal information
handled by Qld governmental agencies and the majority of statutory
government-owned corporations. The Act incorporates the eleven IPPs and
the NPPs of the federal AU Privacy Act. The intention of this Qld act is to
provide “safeguards for the handling of personal information in the public
sector environment, and to allow access to and amendment of personal
information.”85
82 Surveillance Devices Act of 2007 (NT AU). (2007), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/sda2007210/ (last visited on 12
February 2012). (AU)
83 Queensland, Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld). (2002), at
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/I/InvasOfPrivA71.pdf (last
visited on 9 January 2012). (AU)
84 Id.
85 Queensland, Information Privacy Act of 2009 (Qld). (2009), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/qld/consol_act/ipa2009231.txt/cgi-
bin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/qld/consol_act/ipa2009231.txt (last visited on 9
January 2012). (AU)
Chapter Four: Australian Legal Standards 230
The Qld Information Privacy Act of 2009 allows for the appointment of a
privacy commissioner who is under the direction of an appointed information
commissioner. The term of office is at least five years and no more than ten
years.86 An individual may file a complaint; the resolution involves a mediation
process. The Qld Civil and Administrative Tribunal has the power to hear any
privacy-related cases.87
Qld has a spent conviction law similar to NSW and the NT.88 The exception is
that the Qld act includes records that relate to sexual crimes. The law
provides privacy protections through non-disclosure sections.89
4.6.4 South Australia (SA-AU)
The State of South Australia (SA-AU) made a policy decision against any
state-level privacy legislation. Instead, it chose to use administrative policy
standards by Cabinet Administrative Instruction.90 The instructions apply only
to state agencies with local government exclusions. The Department of
Health adopted the Federal NPPs for health information in a Code of Fair
Information Practices.91 SA-AU has also adopted a Code of Fair Information
Practices.
The IPPs adopted the Federal IPPs pattern, which establish a six-person
Privacy Committee of South Australia. The Committee functions in an
advisory role to the Minister, makes recommendations to the Government,
provides information to the public, and refers complaints to the authorities.92
86 The approach raises issues of true independence and protections from Neo-Conservative
political influences.
87 Id. at §§ 141, 146.
88 Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 (Qld) (1986). (AU)
89 Id. at §§ 5, 6.
90 First issued July 1989; re-issued on 30 July 1992.
91 Government of South Australia, Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) Instruction, and
Premier and Cabinet Circular 12, as amended by Cabinet 18 May 2009 (SA-AU). (1989),
at http://www.premcab.sa.gov.au/pdf/circulars/pc12_privacy.pdf (last visited on 9 January
2012).
92 Id. at § 2(1).
Chapter Four: Australian Legal Standards 231
The Listening Devices Act of 1972 evolved into the Listening and Surveillance
Devices Act 1972 as a result of repeated amendments.93 The Act makes it
illegal for a person to intentionally use a listening device to listen, monitor,
overhear, or record a private conversation. The conversation parties must
indicate expressed or implied consent to avoid a violation.94
4.6.5 Tasmania (Tas)
The Tasmania (Tas) Ombudsman has the operational authority of the 2004
Personal Information and Protection Act. The Act applies only to the state
and local public sector, the University of Tasmania, as well as statutory office
holders and bodies. The focus of this act is to regulate the government’s
collection, disclosure, maintenance, and use of personal information.95
The Personal Information and Protection Act96 defines a person as a living
person or one who has been dead for less than twenty-five years. The act is
in contrast to the less than thirty-year standard in the NSW legislation. Basic
personal information is limited to date of birth, gender, name, postal address,
and residential address.97 The Personal Information and Protection Act allows
the personal information custodian to exempt information that is related to the
courts and tribunals, public information, law enforcement information,
employee information, and unsolicited information.98 The ombudsman has the
power to process individual complaints and make appropriate referrals.99 The
Act adopts the Federal IPPs’ standards.
93 Amendments were made in 1974, 1989, and 2001.
94 Listening and Surveillance Devices Act (AU). (1972), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_act/lasda1972326/index.html (last visited
on 12 February 2012).
95 Tasmania Ombudsman, Personal Information Protection. (2009), at
http://www.ombudsman.tas.gov.au/personal_information_protection (last visited on 9
January 2012).
96 Tasmanian Legislation, Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas). (2004), at
http://www.thelaw.tas.gov.au/tocview/index.w3p;cond=;doc_id=46%2B%2B2004%2B
AT%40EN%2B20100110130000;histon=;prompt=;rec=;term= (last visited on 9
January 2012).
97 Id. at part 1 § 3.
98 Id. at Division 2 (7-11).
99 Id. at Part 4.
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The Listening Devices Act of 1991100 prohibits a person from using, causing to
use, or permitting the use of a listening device to listen or record a private
conversation. This act applies if a person is or is not a party to the
conversation.
4.6.6 Victoria (Vic)
Victoria has three major DPSIP legislative acts. The legislation includes the
Information Privacy Act, Health Records Act, and the Surveillance Devices
Act.
The Information Privacy Act of 2000 creates a privacy commissioner known
as Privacy Victoria.101 The commissioner reports to the Attorney General who
then reports to parliament.102 The Act establishes ten privacy rights similar to
the Commonwealth legislation. The Act applies to Vic state organizations,
local councils, and statutory organizations; however, it does not apply to non-
governmental organizations except when a business contracts with the state.
In such a case, a contractual obligation may apply. Violations of the Act can
result in a range of responses including an apology, change of a procedure,
correction of information, deletion of personal information, or a maximum fine
of $100,000 (AU dollars).103
Under the Information Privacy Act of 2000, personal information includes data
and information in a database that is apparent or can be ascertained.104 The
100 Listening Devices Act of 1991 (Tas AU). (1997), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/tas/consol_act/lda1991181/ (last visited on 11
February 2012). (AU)
101 Privacy Victoria, The Information Privacy Act Gives Victorians Privacy Rights. (2009), at
http://www.privacy.vic.gov.au/privacy/web.nsf/content/about+privacy+victoria (last
visited on 20 January 2012). (AU)
102 This approach keeps DPSIP issues as political concepts rather than principles subject to
the concept of the rule of law.
103 Information Privacy Act of 2000 (Vic-AU) amend. No. 98 of 2000 (2000). (AU)
104 Id. at Part 1, § 3. Reads “personal information means information or an opinion (including
information or an opinion forming part of a database), that is recorded in any form
and whether true or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can
reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion, but does not include
information of a kind to which the Health Records Act 2001 applies;”
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objectives of the Act are to balance free information processing with privacy
protections, establish and provide education on responsible practices, and
provide “responsible and transparent” public sector handling.105 This act does
not establish civil or criminal causes of action but does provide for
administrative fines.
Section eleven of the Information Privacy Act of 2000 allows for publically
available information. The exempt sources include a “generally available
publication,” data for exhibition, reference, or study in an art gallery, library, or
museum; or certain public records. This Act establishes ten IPPs based on
the Commonwealth legislation. The principles include collection, use and
disclosure, data quality, data security, openness access and correction,
unique identifiers, anonymity, transborder data flows, and sensitive
information.106 Violations of the Act are processed through a conciliation
approach by the Privacy Commissioner and may be originated by a person. If
the conciliation does not resolve the conflict, a Tribunal may adjudicate the
case.
In 2006, Vic passed the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act,
which applies to courts and tribunals, parliament, and public authorities.107
This legislation establishes that “a person has the right— (a) not to have his or
her privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered
with; and (b) not to have his or her reputation unlawfully attacked.”108 Under
section twenty-eight, every Member of Parliament must submit a statement of
compatibility with this Act for every proposed piece of legislation. The entire
Parliament must consider these rights when passing any legislation.109 The
Act is also binding on the Attorney General, the courts, and public
105 Id. at § 5.
106 Id. at Schedule1—The Information Privacy Principles.
107 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) amend. No. 43 of 2006
(2006). (AU)
108 Id. at Part 2, §13.
109 This innovative approach is a principle that SA and the other countries noted in this study
should consider. The provision attaches legislative accountability for DPSIP laws and
policies.
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authorities.110 Part four creates the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human
Rights Commission, which has the power to intervene in areas addressed in
the Act.
The Vic Health Records Act of 2001111 applies to private and public health
care providers and insurance corporations. The Act addresses the collection
and use of private health information and requires protection of personal
health information. The health privacy principles112 enacted apply to aged
care, disability, genetics, health issues, human tissue specimens, mental
health, palliative care, and disabling conditions. The principles apply to
holders of the data. There is no small business exemption.
The Surveillance Devices Act of 1999113 regulates the installation,
maintenance, and use of surveillance devices, restricts the release of private
conversations, requires warrants or authorization for installation or use, and
sets standards of data collection or use of information obtained. The Act
does not apply to optical surveillance devices. According to the Act, a private
activity does not apply to behavior outside a building or that might be
observed by another. A private conversation requires that the parties
reasonably expect privacy and not to be over heard.114 Under the Act, a court-
approved warrant is required.
4.6.7 Western Australia (WA)
The State of Western Australia (WA) has adopted the SA–AU strategic
approach to DPSIP legal issues. No privacy regime has been adopted. The
110 Id. at §§ 35-36, 38.
111 Health Records Act (HRA) 2001 (Vic) amend. No. 2 of 2001 (2001). (AU)
112 Id. at Schedule 1—The Health Privacy Principles, 93-116. The principles include The
principals include Collection, Use and Disclosure, Data Quality, Data Security and
Data Retention, Openness, Access and Correction Identifiers, Anonymity,
Transborder Data Flows, Transfer or closure of the practice of a health service
provider, and making information available to another health service provider.
113 Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) amend. Act No. 21/1999 (1999). (AU)
114 Id. at Section 3.
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State has passed a Freedom of Information Act of 1992,115 which addresses
some information privacy and confidentiality provisions. Under the Act, the
Supreme Court is required to preserve the confidentiality of any documents.116
A person who “knowingly deceives or misleads” to access personal
information regarding another or “information about the business,
professional, commercial or financial affairs of another person” commits a
crime under the statute.117
Under the WA Spent Conviction Act of 1988118 criminal information must be
secured and protected. The privacy protections in the statute provide a
distinction between a lesser and a more serious conviction record. Lesser
convictions are handled by the police service whereas serious convictions
require district court approval.119 As noted, a spent conviction is a conviction
that has been spent (or removed from a person’s public viewable police
record).120
In 1998, WA passed a Surveillance Devices Act,121 which prohibits the use of
listening, optical surveillance, or tracking devices without a warrant.
Information obtained by the use of such devices can not be communicated or
published. A person can not record a private activity without consent or share
such information known directly or indirectly.
115 Western Australia, Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA). (1992), at
http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/legislation/agency.nsf/foi_main_mrtitle_353_homepage.html
(last visited on 9 January 2012). (AU)
116 Id. at Division 6(91)(c).
117 Id. at 109(a-b).
118 Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA) (1988). (AU)
119 Acrod/Cofa Police Certificate Working Party, A Resource Manual for the Use of Police
Certificates. (2005), at
http://www.ideaswa.net/Resources/Other/documents/ACRODCOFAPoliceCertificateRe
sourceManualVersion2.pdf (last visited on 23 January 2012). The standard is under the
provisions of Section 7(1) of the Spent Convictions Act 1988 only 'lesser convictions'
can be spent by the WA Police Service, after a time period of 10 years plus any term of
imprisonment that may have been imposed. A lesser conviction is one for which
imprisonment of 12 months or less, or a fine of less than $15,000 is imposed. All other
convictions, such as 'serious convictions' applicable under Section 6 of the Spent
Convictions Act 1988 can be spent only by applying to the District Court.
120 Id. at 4.1.4.
121 Surveillance Devices Act of 1998 (WA AU). (1998), at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/sda1998210/ (last visited on 12
February 2012).
Chapter Four: Australian Legal Standards 236
4.7 Australian State Case Law
Some AU State Courts have ruled on cases that have DPSIP implications.
The States include the courts of NSW, Qld, and Vic.
4.7.1 New South Wales Case Law
The Supreme Court of NSW has not found a cause of action based on an
invasion of privacy tort.122 The Administrative Decision Tribunal has issued
judgments based on the NSW 1998 Privacy and Personal Information
Protection Act.
In PN v Department of Education and Training,123 the applicant, aka PN, was a
school teacher who was unemployed due to a disability. The school district
shared the teacher’s records with investigators and treatment providers,
including personal comments made by PN regarding plans to return to work.
The Administrative Decision Tribunal found that Sections one and two of the
Act were violated.
In SW v Forests NSW,124 the applicant’s position was not supported.
However, the tribunal issued an order that agencies should review and update
policies on a regular basis. Regulations should be clear, detailed, and cover a
broad range of possible privacy breaches.
Some agencies take advantage of legislative wording to avoid the spirit of the
law. The tribunal addressed the issue in HW v Director of Public
Prosecutions.125 Section ten and eleven of the PPIPA addresses the agency
responsibility when collecting information from an individual. Some agencies
used the terminology to avoid responsibility for code violations. The tribunal
122 NRMA v John Fairfax, NSWSC 563, (2002) (NSW AU).
123 PN v Department of Education and Training, NSWADT 122, (2006) (NSW-AU).
124 SW v Forests NSW, NSWADT 74, (2006) (NSW-AU).
125 HW v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2), NSWADT 73, (2004) (NSW-AU).
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suggests that the legislative language be changed or interpreted as
information about an individual. The change would cover situations where the
agencies obtain information from third parties.
The Administrative Decision Tribunal found that the NSW law does not apply
to private information shared with parties in another state. Section eleven of
the AU national Information Privacy Principles can be intentionally diverted by
sending the information to a third party and who then provides the information
to an intended party without penalty. The ruling allows for information
laundering.126
When a medical practitioner was subject to a Department of Health
investigation, the Department did not insure that the data collected was
accurate as required by IPP Section nine. The tribunal required that the
Department delete all inaccurate, irrelevant, misleading or out-of-date
information and communicate the same to any agencies that had been given
the information.127
In the SW v Forests NSW case,128 a community volunteer agreed to allow the
Forest Department to take photos of her while at a meeting in her professional
capacity. A senior officer later took a photo of her in her pajamas without her
permission and then shared the picture with others. The department did an
internal review and found no privacy violations. The tribunal found that the
photograph was personal information and a violation of the IPP Sections one,
three, four, nine, and eleven of the NSW Act. The agency was found liable for
the unauthorized actions of the senior officer. When an employee acts
outside the course of employment, the agency is not held liable.129
126 GQ v NSW Department of Education and Training (No 2) NSWADT 319, (2008) (NSW-
AU).
127 JD v Director General, NSW Department of Health (No 2) NSWADT 256, (2007) (NSW-
AU).
128 SW v Forests NSW, NSWADT 74, (2006) (NSW-AU).
129 Director General, Department of Education and Training v MT, NSWCA 270 (2006)
(NSW-AU).
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The Administrative Decision Tribunal maintained that, for employment
purposes, academic, and professional data is not personal information. The
tribunal declared that depending on the content and context of the
information, it could lead to a different conclusion.130 Some other exemptions
are also given deference. For example, the tribunal found that computerized
operational policing systems are exempt because the data is not an
administrative function.131
In Vice-Chancellor Macquarie University v FM,132 the NSW Court of Appeals
ruled on a case of a doctoral student who was dismissed from Macquarie
University for behavioral issues. The student applied to the University of New
South Wales and was accepted. Transcripts were provided. The Macquarie
staff shared additional information in subsequent telephone calls with staff
from the University of New South Wales. The court found that the additional
information was in the minds of the employees133 and thus was a breach of the
Statute.
Under the authority of the Medical Practices Act, the NSW Medical Board
inquired into the practices of a physician. The Board then released private
information to the Pharmaceutical Services Branch of the Department of
Health. The Medical Board was found to have contravened Sections 18(1)
and 19 of the Privacy Act. The NSW Administrative Decision Tribunal found
that personal information can be redacted when issuing reports. Agencies
must carefully evaluate what is “reasonably necessary” and can not blindly
claim an exception.134 Agencies also must check the accuracy of personal
information under IPP nine prior to using or disclosing any information even
when complying with other principles.135 The NSW privacy law differs from the
130 OD v Department of Education and Training, NSWADT 161, (2005) (NSW-AU).
131 OQ v Commissioner of Police, NSWADT 240, (2005) (NSW-AU).
132 Vice-Chancellor Macquarie University v FM, NSWCA 192, (2005) (NSW-AU).
133 A term of art meaning known by the employees.
134 JD v NSW Medical Board, NSWADT 247, (3 November 2005) (NSW-AU).
135 Director General, Department of Education and Training v MT (GD), NSWADTAP 77, (23
December 2005) (NSW-AU).
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federal statute in that the law does not allow for any type of injunctive relief or
means to change policy.136
A cancer patient received a psychiatric and psychological consultation and the
data was placed in a general medical record. The data was then shared with
two outside physicians without an informed consent. The hospital was found
to have violated Section ten—collection of information and Section nineteen—
disclosure of personal information under the Privacy Act. Agencies must be
clear, open, and obtain an informed consent. The standards apply to internal
and external disclosures.137
The NSW Appeals Panel addressed the issue of exceptions under the Privacy
Law. The panel maintains that its scope should be defined broadly; any
exceptions should be defined narrowly, and a plain reading standard should
apply.138 Data holders must not only safeguard personal information from a
policy and physical security perspective, wide-scale awareness and training
programs are also needed.139
4.7.2 Queensland Case Law
The District Court of Qld has found justification for an invasion of privacy
cause of action. The court awarded aggravated, compensatory, and
exemplary damages for the invasion. The defendant willed the act that
intruded on the privacy of the plaintiff.140 The case provides some common
law support for DPSIP legal principles.
136 ON v Marrickville Council, NSWADT 274, (2 December 2005) (NSW-AU).
137 KJ v Wentworth Area Health Service, NSWADT 84, (3 May 2004) (NSW-AU).
138 GA & Ors v Department of Education and Training and NSW Police (GD), NSWADTAP 18,
(25 May 2004) (NSW-AU).
139 MT v Director General, NSW Department of Education & Training, NSWADT 194, (3
September 2004) (NSW-AU).
140 Grosse v Purvis, QDC 151, (2003) at ¶ 442 (Qld AU).
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4.7.3 Victoria Case Law
The Supreme Court of Vic has also not found a cause of action based on an
invasion of privacy tort.141 However, the County Court of Vic has found a basis
for a privacy invasion tort. Senior Judge Skoien found that there is a “civil
action for damages based on the actionable right of an individual person to
privacy.”142
The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal adjudicates privacy issues in
Vic. The tribunal found that even when obvious identifying information is
redacted, the data can not be released because the identity of the person may
be directly or indirectly discovered.143 The case recognizes the impact of
modern data mining approaches.
In a case involving the release of two private letters related to an employment
dispute, the author of the letter claimed that the release of the letters to an
administrative agency was a violation of the Vic Information Privacy Act. The
tribunal found that IPP 2.1(f) provides for an exemption for releases
authorized by law. An administrative agency can release data when it is
reasonably obligated to perform an inquiry.144 The case reinforces the
importance of legislative exceptions.
When the Australian Domain Name Administrator withdrew Nicholas Bolton’s
company right to administer and sell domain names, he appealed to the Vic
Supreme Court. The Court upheld the Domain Name Administrator’s ruling.
Bolton’s company had done nothing when the personal data of 40,000 of the
total 60,000 customers was breached and 25,000 credit card holders’ data
was sold on the Internet. Bolton did not notify customers of the breach as
141 Gilleer v Procipets, VSC 113, (2004) (Vic AU).
142 Jane Doe v ABC, VCC 281, (2007) (Vic AU).
143 Beauchamp v Department of Education (General), VCAT 1653, (2006) (Vic-AU).
144 Dodd v Department of Education and Training, VCAT 2207, (21 October 2005) (Vic-AU).
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ordered. The legal basis of the dispute related to contractual obligations;
however, the finding does have DPSIP implications.145
4.8 Australian Standards and Remedies
In 2001, the AU Privacy Commissioner defined the nature of privacy. He
wrote the following:
Privacy is about protecting our sense of self – that is, who we are, what
we know, what we think, what we have done and what we want to do.
One important aspect of this is the extent of control we have over
personal information about us. Exercising choice about our own
information can also be an important aspect of retaining personal
dignity and humanity in a relationship with another party.146
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner addresses privacy in the workplace in
a specialized set of guidelines. The Commissioner found that access to
electronic records may be necessary at times; however, broad privacy policies
and interventions can be seen as “intrusive and oppressive and have a
negative impact on morale and productivity.”147 The managerial guideline
suggested:
1. The policy should … ensure that it is known and understood by
staff. Ideally the policy should be linked from a screen that the
user sees when they log on to the network.
2. The policy should be explicit as to what activities are permitted
and forbidden. … and refer to appropriate Commonwealth
legislation sections.
145 Australian Style Pty Ltd v .au Domain Administration Limited, VSC 422, (25 September
2009) (Vic SC-AU).
146 Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, Privacy and Public Key Infrastructure:
Guidelines for Agencies Using PKI to Communicate or Transact With Individuals
(Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner. 2001). at 12.
147 Australian Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Guidelines on Workplace E-
mail, Web Browsing and Privacy (Australian Government Office of the Privacy
Commissioner. 2000). at 1.
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3. The policy should clearly set out what information is logged and
who in the organization has rights to access the logs and
content of staff e-mail and browsing activities.
4. The policy should refer to the organization's computer security
policy. Improper use of e-mail may pose a threat to system
security, the privacy of staff and others, as well as the legal
liability of the organization.
5. The policy should outline, in plain English, how the organization
intends to monitor or audit staff compliance with its rules relating
to acceptable usage of e-mail and web browsing.
6. The policy should be reviewed on a regular basis to keep pace
with the accelerating development of the Internet and
Information Technology. The policy should be re-issued
whenever significant change is made.148
The guidelines do not have legal status but do establish a standard of care.
The standard also services as a public awareness function for workers at all
levels and corporations.
Under the Privacy Act of 1988, the Federal Court or Federal Magistrates
Court has the power to enforce a violation determination.149 The court can
make any order that it determines to be fair, including a declaration of right.
The court can issue an interim injunction.
The Privacy Commissioner can issue determinations that include a cease-
and-desist order, redress for loss and damages – including psychological
damages.150 The legislation does not set statutory damages.
148 Ibid.
149 See Privacy Act of 1988, Section 55A.
150 Id. at Section 52
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4.9 Australian Implementation System
The AU approach to DPSIP legal issues is evolving. The Commonwealth
government and most states have passed specific legislation with exceptions
that are troublesome. Several governmental agencies have privacy offices;
however, the power and independence does not meet the standards of CA
and the EU approach. The approach also does not meet the US standard of
independent regulatory agencies similar to the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC).
The common law of AU has not found a direct privacy right. Some DPSIP
principles can be argued based on breach of confidence, copyright,
defamation, nuisance, or trespass.151 The government is considering enacting
a Statutory Cause of Action for Serious Invasion of Privacy.152
The Vic Privacy Commission, similar to the CA Commissioners, provides
extensive consulting and educational materials. The Vic Commission issues
a Privacy Audit Manual that provides a structured method to conduct and
report on an audit.153
4.10 Australian Sociolegal Concerns
The AU Office of the Federal Privacy Commission conducted research on
public privacy concerns for a number of years. In 2001, the levels of privacy
concerns were higher than a similar 1997 study. In the 2001 study,154 ninety-
one percent of the sample thought that businesses should ask permission
prior to collecting personal data even if it cost companies inconvenience. The
151 Victoria Government, Privacy Regulation Across Australia. (2003), at
http://www.privacy.vic.gov.au/privacy/web.nsf/download/11344F7F3050AF9ECA256
D58000597A7/$FILE/03.03_Interstate.pdf (last visited on 27 March 2012).
152 Australian Government, Issues Paper: A Commonwealth Statutory Cause of Action for
Serious Invasion of Privacy,(Australian Government ed. 2011 September).
153 Privacy Victoria, Privacy Audit Manual (Author. 2007).
154 Australian Office of the Federal Privacy Commission, Privacy and the Community (Author
2001).
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sample reported that businesses that collected data should inform customers
regarding the uses of the data (eighty-nine percent). Over ninety-two percent
reported privacy violations including businesses transferring personal data
without permission and using the data for purposes other than that claimed at
the time of collection. The highest ranked concern in the survey was that
businesses ought to show ‘respect for, and protection of, my personal
information.’155 A third of those surveyed ranked respect higher than quality,
efficiency, price and convenience. The exception was age. Fifty-nine percent
of those eighteen to twenty-four reported that they would trade private
information for cost discounts. Those with lower household incomes and
lower education would do the same. Only forty-three percent knew that
federal privacy legislation existed. Fifty-two percent knew very little or nothing
about their privacy rights. The majority, sixty-six percent, thought that they
should control the use of their personal data. Seventy percent did not want
the government sharing collected data with businesses. Fifty-seven percent
thought that the data should be secure. Fifty-five percent reported concerns
about how companies obtained information to make unsolicited marketing
contacts. Based on the survey, examples of what would be a privacy violation
would include:
A business that you do not know gets hold of your personal information
– 95 percent. A business monitors your activities on the internet,
recording information on the sites you visit without your knowledge – 90
percent. You supply your information to a business for a specific
purpose and the business uses it for another purpose – 94 percent. A
business asks you for personal information that does not seem relevant
to the purpose of the transaction – 93 percent.156
In a related study of Australian business executives’ attitudes toward privacy
concerns, ninety-five percent reported that maintaining customer privacy was
important or very important. Eighty percent saw businesses being dependent
155 Id. at 4.
156 Id. at 39–40.
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on protecting customer privacy. Data protection breaches were seen as a
negative by ninety percent of the sample. Ninety-five percent reported
support for data protection laws including those that apply to businesses, yet
only forty percent had appointed company privacy officers.157
In 2004, an additional study158 showed that the level of awareness of federal
privacy laws increased to sixty percent from the prior forty-three percent.
Eighty-one percent reported that businesses transferred and sold personal
data without permission.
Sixty-one percent of the sample reported being angry or annoyed over
receiving unsolicited marketing materials. Sixty-two percent were concerned
about the security of their data, up from fifty-seven percent in the prior study.
Sixty-two percent were concerned about Internet personal data misuses.159
The 2007 study focused on a number of different issues; however, only some
of these issues were relevant to the focus of this thesis.160 Ninety percent
reported concerns regarding business use of personal data and transborder
transfers including sixty-three percent who were very concerned. Awareness
of federal legislation had increased to sixty-nine percent of the sample.
Internet monitoring was reported as a violation by ninety-four percent of the
sample reported that a privacy violation occurred when a business (eighty-
seven percent for a governmental agency) asked for information not relevant
to the transaction. The same percentage reported that businesses (eighty-six
percent for governmental agencies) should not collect data for one purpose
and then use it for another. Ninety-three percent of the sample reported that
being contacted by businesses and eighty-six percent for governmental
agencies you do not know or consent to interact with is a privacy violation.
157 Australian Office of The Federal Privacy Commission, Privacy and Business (2001, July),
http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/rbusiness.html (last visited on 5 January
2012).
158 Australian Office of The Federal Privacy Commission, Community Attitudes towards
Privacy 2004 (Author 2004).
159 Ibid.
160 Australian Office of The Federal Privacy Commission, Community Attitudes towards
Privacy 2007 (Author 2007).
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Seventy-three percent reported that governmental agencies with which they
had no dealings should not have access to personal data.161
The research showed that in AU, citizens and even business executives were
concerned about DPSIP issues and violations. Representative governments
should establish laws that reflect citizen concerns rather than those of special
interests.
Dr Mark Andrejevic and the University of Queensland162 reported on a
national study related to Australians’ 2012 attitudes related to DPSIP issues.
Ninety-seven percent wanted to be able to initiate legal action for serious
privacy breaches. Ninety percent supported governmental regulations that
allow them to control the capture and use of personal information. Seventy-
nine percent refused to provide personal information for access to web sites
or to use an application. Sixty-nine percent thought that applications and sites
requested too much information and refused to comply with such requests.
Seventy-five percent want to know and have some say in how companies
collect and use personal information. Sixty-four percent did not want filtered
news stories based on personal information. Sixty percent reported that they
never or rarely read privacy policies. Fifty-six percent did not approve of
targeted advertising based on personal information.
Politicians and jurists can and certainly do argue and maneuver around
DPSIP issues. Businesses and corporations can and do corrupt the
process.163 The above research shows that the majority of AU citizens want
strong DPSIP legislation and regulation.
161 Ibid.
162 University of Queensland Social Research Centre, Australians Concerned for Online
Privacy: Study. (2012), at http://www.uq.edu.au/news/?article=24504 (last visited on
15 March 2012).
163 See: Jeffrey D. Clements, Corporations Are Not People: Why They Have More Rights
Than You and What You Can Do About it (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc ed. 2012).
Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the
Theft of Human Rights (Rodale ed. 2002). Robert G. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money:
The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government,(Alfred A.
Knopf ed. 2009). Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress -
and a Plan to Stop It (Twelve - Hachette Hook Group ed. 2011).
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4.11 Australian Critique
Some basic principles of the AU federal privacy law are open to question.
The AU DPSIP standards are not considered adequate by the EU DPSIP
standards.164 The AU approach allows for significant exceptions for small
businesses. Employee records also have an exemption. Much like the US,
significant inconsistencies exist regarding how the government and
businesses deal with DPSIP issues. Under both systems there is no legal or
regulatory remedy for DPSIP violations, even when the violations are serious.
The Telecommunication Act of 1997 does not provide for a consistent
standard for addressing DPSIP standards. The AU government has
suggested that these issues be addressed. However, despite voiced
concerns, the government has not scheduled any projected date for
addressing these issues.165 The history of group decision-making reveals that
several ways exist to stop any proposals that might be made to address
DPSIP issues. The approaches include referring the issue to a committee,
passing but not funding resolutions, and not developing a timeline for
implementing resolutions.
The AU government proposed some legislative and regulatory changes to the
1998 Privacy Act to address other DPSIP deficiencies and complications in
2010. Perhaps the clearest change is to combine the NPPs’ and IPPs’
standards in the legislation into a clearer standard of Uniform Privacy
Principles (UPPs). The UPPs would apply to Commonwealth agencies and
private organizations. The proposal would clarify what is included in the
practices authorized by or under law as ”Commonwealth, State and Territory
164 Tim Wright, Cross-border data transfer - delusions of adequacy?(2012), at
http://www.sourcingspeak.com/2012/04/cross-border-data-transfer---delusions-of-
adequacy.html (last visited on 24 April 2012).
165 Lisa Vanderwal, Australia: Proposed Changes to the Privacy Act, and the Privacy Act in
Action: the Privacy Commissioner’s decisions in 2009 Privacy: Who cares? (2010,
March 15), at http://mondaq.com/australia/article.asp?articleid=95892 (last visited on
17 March 2012).
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Acts and delegated legislation, common law or equitable duties, an order of a
court or tribunal, or documents given the force of law by an Act.” In order to
prevent people from circumventing the UPPs by contracting out their
obligations under an Act, contracts are excluded under the new definition.166
The AU and NSW Law Reform Commission have recommended the
establishment of a statutory privacy tort. The UPPs’ recommendations
include eleven principles. The principles include the areas of anonymity and
pseudonymity; collection, notification, openness, use, disclosure, direct
marketing, data quality, data security, access, correction, identifiers, and
cross-border data flows.167 The purpose of the new principles is to establish
uniformity of all federal, state, and local privacy-related legislations. The
proposal suggests modification of some troublesome and out-of-date
language in the current legislation. The UPPs apply to all governmental
agencies and private organizations. The proposal eliminates the small
business exception in the current law. The proposal further suggests that the
government should establish a statutory Office of the Information
Commissioner. When the report was submitted, the Attorney General tabled
the proposal to give the government additional time to prepare a detailed
response.168
When an organization receives unsolicited personal information, it must
determine if the information is to be held. If not, the organization must
immediately destroy the data. If the information is to be held, the organization
must notify the person addressed and follow standards in the UPPs. The
change addresses some key regulatory discrepancies. Under the proposed
changes, when organizations share information with one another, and the
data is subsequently changed, the organizations must notify and request an
166 Id. at 5.
167 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Privacy Principles: Report 123 (New South
Wales Law Reform Commission. 2009, August).
168 Catherine Kelso, Australia: A Step Towards Harmony in the Regulation of Privacy and
Access to Government Information Legal Update, Mondaq: Government & Public
Sector. (2010 March 30), at
http://www.mondaq.com/australia/article.asp?articleid=97214&email_access=on (last
visited on 1 April 2012).
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update for all information provided. An interesting twist is that when a direct
marketing business makes unsolicited contacts with non-current customers, it
must reveal the source of the contact data. However, the person must first
ask for the data.169
The proposed changes ignore some significant data transfer issues. While
organizations are accountable for DPSIP transnational transfers, the
requirement for a contract that would be binding on the parties will be
eliminated. This change ignores the standards in CA and the EU but will still
be better than standards in other regions, including Asia, the US, and South
America, which have less stringent DPSIP regulation approaches.170
Consistent with the principle that all change is not progress, the proposed
changes prohibit credit reporting businesses from sharing credit data with
foreign credit reporters or data collectors and eliminate the need to store
foreign data. However, the changes include an expansion of what types of
data can be collected and shared.171 Perhaps the most unwise change relates
to health and life exemptions. The current law allows an exemption when a
person’s health or life is in imminent danger. The proposed change is to
lower the standard for exemption by eliminating the term “imminent”.
In general, AU law provides for an opt-in approach with consent being
required. The Australian Communications and Media Authority conducted a
compliance study and found that online businesses were not following the
legal standards. Businesses were found to have “sloppy or cavalier consent
practices.”172
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Munir Kotadia, ACMA Slams Retailers Over Spam Act Breaches, SC Magazine For IT
Security Professionals. (2009), at 6.
http://www.securecomputing.net.au/News/161769,acma-slams-retailers-over-spam-
act-breaches.aspx (last visited on 1 December 2012).
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The federal and state privacy law in AU has not followed the US state law
standard of requiring governmental and private business sites to provide a
notification when a breach occurs. The Australian Law Reform Commission
(ALRC) recommends that breach notification should be submitted to the
Privacy Commissioner and to all individuals affected. Cross-border data
transfers including outsourcing of data needs to be controlled and should
require informed consent of the individual. The standards should apply to all
governmental and business organizations. The ALRC further recommends
that all AU privacy laws be harmonized at all levels, and that the small
business exemption and the employee records exemption be removed. The
small business exemption is the main reason that the EU has not found AU
adequate.173 While exemption removal would involve increased business
costs, the costs could be limited by the Privacy Commissioner providing
consulting, education, materials, and compliance templates. The ALRC also
recommends that serious DPSIP violations should require a statutory cause of
action and increased civil penalties. The Privacy Commissioner must have
strengthened enforcement powers.174
The Government responded to some of the ALRC recommendations. The
first response was that it agreed to consider civil penalties for serious data
173 European Commission, Submission to the House of Representatives Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs Concerning its Inquiry into the Privacy Amendment (Private
Sector) Bill 2000. MARKT/E1//FB/fb D(2000). (2000), at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/Privacybill/sub113.pdf (last visited on
30 December 2012).
174 Australian Law Reform Commission, Australian Privacy Law and Practice
(Commonwealth of Australia. 2008); Richard Smith, Australia: ALRC Report On
Australian Privacy Laws. (2008), at
http://www.mondaq.com/australia/article.asp?articleid=64940 (last visited on 12
December 2012); Australian Office of the Federal Privacy Commission, Getting in on
the Act: The Review of the Private Sector Provisions of the Privacy Act 1988
(Author. 2005); Government Of Australia, Government Response to the Privacy
Commissioner’s Report - Getting in on the Act: The Review of the Private Sector
Provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 (2006).
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breaches.175 A 2009 study found that breaches cost an average of $2 million
dollars per incident. The average per record cost was $123.00 dollars.176
The government was not willing to make major changes, especially with
exemptions. The government announced thirteen new Australian Privacy
Principles. The first seven included open and transparent management of
personal information, anonymity and pseudonymity, collection of solicited
personal information, receiving unsolicited personal information, notification of
the collection of personal information, use or disclosure of personal
information, and direct marketing controls. The remaining six principles
included cross-border disclosure of personal information, adoption, use or
disclosure of government-related identifiers, quality of personal information,
security of personal information, access to personal information, and
correction of personal information standards.177
At the same time the Attorney General’s office was holding confidential
consultations with Internet industry leaders regarding a new data retention
plan. Under the plan, ISPs would be required to hold and release to police all
Internet activities in AU with no warrant.178 Rather than following the EU
175 Lisa Banks, Commissioner Launches Privacy Guide IDG News Service (2010), at
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/051110-commissioner-launches-
privacy.html (last visited on 11 May 2012).
176 Karen Dearne, Data Breach Costs $2m Per Incident Australian IT. (2010), at
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/australian-it/data-breach-costs-2m-per-
incident/story-e6frgakx-1225851401246?from=marketwatch_rss (last visited on 8
April 2012). See also Ponemon Institute, Australia 2009 Annual Study: Cost of a
Data Breach. (2010), at http://www.encryptionreports.com/costofdatabreach.html
(last visited on 22 June 2012).
177 Australian Government, Australian Privacy Principles: Companion Guide, Author. (2010
June), at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/fapa_ctte/priv_exp_drafts/Guide/companion
_guide.pdf (last visited on 26 June 2012). See also Australian Government,
Australian Privacy Principles: Exposure Draft. (2010), at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/fapa_ctte/priv_exp_drafts/Guide/exposure_
draft.pdf (last visited on 26 June 2012).
178 Asher Moses, Web Snooping Policy Shrouded in Secrecy Sydney Morning Herald.
(2010), at http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/web-snooping-policy-
shrouded-in-secrecy-20100617-yi1u.html (last visited on 17 June 2012).
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standard of six to twenty four-month retention, the AU approach would cover
five to ten years.179
During the last six months of 2009, the government made 155 requests that
Google release personal data of users. The government also made
seventeen requests to remove content so that citizens could not access the
sites. The sites did not include child pornography materials.180
The Privacy Commissioner did issue a recommended Privacy Impact
Assessment Guide (PIA Guide) for businesses involved in DPSIP issues.181
The guide was an educational tool rather than a regulatory guide. Starting in
1995, Roger Clarke182 and Tim Dixon183 have been writing about and
advocating for the use of privacy impact assessments (PIA) in AU DPSIP law
and regulation. Since then, recommendations have been made, self
regulation suggestions have been published, and little actual progress has
been established. None of the efforts have been more than recommendations;
no legally binding standards have been established in AU. Quality research
on-point has been suppressed. None of the states or the federal government
have substantially addressed or implemented measures to deal with
substantive PIA issues. The AU legal and political history on PIA issues can,
179 Ben Grubb, Govt Wants ISPs to Record Browsing History, ZDNet.com.au (2010), at
http://www.zdnet.com.au/govt-wants-isps-to-record-browsing-history-339303785.htm
(last visited on 12 June 2012).
180 Asher Moses, Google Exposes Government Takedown and Data Requests Sydney
Morning Herald. (2010), at http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-
news/google-exposes-government-takedown-and-data-requests-20100421-stas.html
(last visited on 22 April 2012). Google publishes a tally of different governmental
requests at http://www.google.com/governmentrequests/
181 Australian Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Privacy Impact Assessment
Guide (Revised May 2010). (2010), at http://www.privacy.gov.au/ (last visited on 20
June 2012).
182 See Roger V. Clarke, Privacy Impact Assessment. (2012), at
http://rogerclarke.com/DV/PIA.html (last visited on 8 March 2012) and Roger V.
Clarke, PIAs in Australia: A Work-In-Progress Report, in Privacy Impact Assessment
(Davide Wright & Paul De Hert ed.^eds., Springer 2012).
183 Tim Dixon, Communications Law Centre wants IPPs revised in line with Australian Privacy
Charter, 3 Privacy Law and Policy Reporter, 9, 171 (1997).
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at best, be seen as a flirtation. At best, the overall AU DPSIP approach can
be seen as a “very-soft-touch regulatory” approach.184
Roger Clarke, an AU privacy expert and professor, maintains that the public
sector law is weak and is made increasingly more ineffective by bureaucrats
establishing increased exceptions. The law addressing the private sector is
atrocious.185 A classic example includes McAffee’s release of personal
information on 1,408 security professionals that attended a security
conference. At first, the company argued that the breach was a human error.
The company asked recipients to delete any unwanted data; however, there
are no legal steps established for reasonable responses.186
In a 2009 study, sixty-nine percent of companies reported at least one breach,
which is up from fifty-six the year before. Of those reporting a breach, sixty-
five percent never informed the public.187
The AU government wanted to issue 16 digit identification numbers as part of
its E-health initiative. Opponents maintained that the number will become a
national ID number that has historically been rejected.188 The legislature
passed the enabling bill and $466.7 million was allocated over the next two
184 Roger V. Clarke, PIAs in Australia: A Work-In-Progress Report, in Privacy Impact
Assessment (David Wright & Paul De Hert ed., Springer 2012), p. 148.
185 Liz Tay, Privacy Must Be Addressed, For Innovation's Sake, IT News For Australian
Business. (2009), at http://www.itnews.com.au/News/163197,privacy-must-be-
addressed-for-innovations-sake.aspx (last visited on 18 December 2012).
186 Ben Grubb, McAfee Keeps Leaked Details to Itself: Biggest Companies in Australia on
List, IT New for Australian Business. (2009), at
http://www.itnews.com.au/News/151609,mcafee-keeps-leaked-details-to-itself.aspx
(last visited on 31 July 2012).
187 Brett Winterford, Two in three Australian companies leak data, SC Magazine For IT
Security Professionals. (2009), at
http://www.securecomputing.net.au/News/152610,two-in-three-australian-companies-
leak-data.aspx (last visited on 11 August 2012).
188 Suzanne Tindal, COAG Commits to Health IDs in 2010. (2009), at
http://www.zdnet.com.au/coag-commits-to-health-ids-in-2010-339299911.htm (last
visited on 8 December 2012).
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years.189 The action allowed the development of PositiveID RFID-implanted
microchips.190
Westfield, a large shopping center chain in the AU and US, has announced
that in addition to surveillance cameras, it wants to install facial recognition
software. Not only will customers be monitored for current behavior; they will
be identified and compared to other databases. The local police think that it is
a great idea. The Australian Privacy Foundation chair, Dr. Roger Clarke,
suggests that the move is “extremely dangerous” and has no controls;
therefore, everyone will be identified with no legal justification.191
The AU police, AU Securities & Investments Commission, Fair Work
Ombudsman, and AU Taxation Office want the power to share secret tax
records. Not only will the data be shared; it will be allowed to be introduced in
various trials.192
The AU government and businesses are sharing massive amounts of
personal data. A company called VicRoads sells data to 190 third-party
contracted organizations and covers millions of people. The data includes
comprehensive dossiers including data on personal address, age, banking
information, employment, financial information, health history, name, and tax
information. Such data can also be used for identity theft purposes.193
189 Josh Taylor, Healthcare Identifier Legislation Passes, ZDNet.com.au. (2010), at
http://www.zdnet.com.au/healthcare-identifier-legislation-passes-339304038.htm
(last visited on 25 June 2012).
190 Greg Nikolettos, Kevin Rudd's e-Health Bill Paves the way for PositiveID Human
Implantable RFID Microchips, OEN: OpEdNews. (2010), at
http://www.opednews.com/articles/Kevin-Rudd-s-e-Health-bill-by-Greg-Nikolettos-
100408-839.html (last visited on 26 June 2012).
191 Saffron Howden, No Place for Crooks to Hide, Sydney Morning Herald. (2009), at ¶ 10.
http://innovya.com/2009/12/10/no-place-for-crooks-to-hide/ (last visited on 9
December 2012).
192 Natasha Bita, Australian Police Get Access to Tax Data for Trials, The Australian. (2010),
at http://www.sott.net/articles/show/204287-Australian-Police-get-access-to-tax-data-
for-trials (last visited on 8 March 2012).
193 Ellen Whinnett, All Your Details at Click of a Mouse: Your Personal Details are Being
Spied on by Hundreds of Government and Private Agencies as New Technology
Sees Data-sharing Reach Record Levels Sunday Herald Sun. (2009), at
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/all-your-details-at-click-of-a-mouse/story-
e6frf7kx-1225759387740 (last visited on 9 August 2012).
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Governmental authorities and the ALRC are not exempt from the law of
unintended consequences and group think.194 Graham Greenleaf argues that
the latest recommendations on data export allow businesses to pass on data
misuse and privacy breaches. Security standards are relaxed so that AU is
subject to American spammers, Nigerian scammers, and the Russian mafia.
Data can be transferred to data protection-free countries with no consent or
regulation.195
Neo-Conservative legislators, governmental officials, and jurists resist DPSIP
legal efforts. Some business groups are opposed to regulation and the costs
of DPSIP standards. The AU experience shows that in practice the Neo-
Conservative concerns are not warranted. A study on the impact of AU
federal privacy legislation on businesses showed that seventy-three percent
of the business leaders reported the legislation as positive; only twelve
percent were somewhat negative. The minority negative responses
addressed were costs as well as the perception that businesses might be
restricted from doing whatever they want with the data. The majority positive
response noted that DPSIP laws increased company benefits, corporate
social responsibility, increased ethical behavior and honesty, customer
confidence, relationships, and satisfaction, and protects important data.196
4.12 Summary of Australian Literature and Issues Reviewed
The intent of this thesis is to conduct a comparative analysis of DPSIP
responses in five different nations. Part of the comparison uses a benchmark
approach of key issues. The issues include legal support of DPSIP
194 Group think is a decision-making effect found in cohesive groups of like minded persons.
Such groups then adopt a consensus that is devoid of analysis, critical thinking, and
evaluation.
195 Karen Dearne, Privacy Changes Put Data at Mercy of Scams The Australian. (2009), at
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/privacy-changes-put-data-at-mercy-of-
scams/story-e6frgal6-1225788524304 (last visited on 20 October 2012).
196 Australian Office of the Federal Privacy Commission, Privacy and Business. (2001, July),
at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/rbusiness.html (last visited on 5 January
2012).
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protections, legal support of corporate privacy and data protection standards,
information privacy data protection and security declarations, the use of
regulatory agencies, sectoral legislation, and data controllers. The
benchmark standards also include data processor requirements, rights of data
subjects, data security destruction, cross-border data flow regulations,
exemptions and exceptions, and the current stage of the approach based on
evolutionary stages. The following table presents the summary based on the
benchmark model.
Table 4.1 Comparative Model of Australian Legal Support of DPSIP
Models
ISSUE DESCRIPTION AU CURRENT RESPONSE
CM.1: Legal Support of DPSIP
Protections
Signatory, Adheres and/or
Complies with International Human
Rights Standards
(See Appendix A)
Signatory, Adheres and/or
Complies with EU DPSIP
Standards
Attempted, but not granted adequate
status.
Signatory, Adheres and/or
Complies with APEC DPSIP
Standards
AU helped to form the APCE
Federal Constitutional Law No
Federal Legislative Efforts Yes
Federal Common Law No
Province /State Constitutional Law No
Province / State Legislative Efforts Some
Province /State Common Law Some
CM.2: Legal Support of
Corporate Privacy and Data
Property Protection Issues
AU CURRENT RESPONSE
Copyright Protections Yes
Database Protection Yes
Patient Protections Yes
Service Mark Protections Yes
Trade Mark Protections Yes
Trade Secret Protections Yes
Privacy Impact Audit Required No
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Before Use
Privacy Impact Audit Required
Before Government
Protections Granted
Some
Checks and Balances on
Corporate Collection, Use,
and Transfer of Individual
DPSIP Data
Limited
CM.3: Information Privacy –
Data Protection and
Security Declarations
AU CURRENT RESPONSE
Definitions Provided Yes
Personal and Sensitive Data
Defined
Yes
Definitions Effectively Address
Advanced Data Mining
Technologies
No
All Holders and Users Held
Accountable
No
CM.4: Regulatory Agency AU CURRENT RESPONSE
Independent of Legislative and
Executive Branches
No
Administrative Power Yes
Investigative Power Limited
Regulatory Powers No
Education Function Yes
Enforcement Powers No
Structure Federal and State
Responsibilities Defined Prevent Harm and Punish Violators
Accountability Civil and Criminal
Governmental Chief Privacy Officer/
Commissioner Required
Yes
Governmental Privacy Audits
Required as Part of
Legislation Passage
Yes
Business Chief Privacy Officer/
Commissioner Required
No
Employees are Personally Liable for
Violations
Civil and Criminal
Business Privacy Audits Required No
Agency Educational Function Yes
CM.5: Sectoral DPSIP Legislation AU CURRENT RESPONSE
Credit Reporting Agencies Strong
Criminal Justice Record Strong
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Restrictions
Health Information Yes
Health Information Exceptions Yes
Electronic Medical/Health Record
Controls
Limited
CM.6: Data Controllers AU CURRENT RESPONSE
Notice Required Generally
Opt-In Limited
Opt-Out Generally
Must Be Lawful and Fair Yes
System Access Controls Yes
Data Quality And Integrity In theory
Accurate In theory
Complete In theory
Up to Date In theory
Limited to Needed Data In theory
Relevant In theory
Not Misleading In theory
Data Retention Limitation Not within current standards
Data Transfer Controls Limited
Openness on Information Held Limited
Breach Disclosures Required No
Breach Penalties No
CM.7: Data Processor
Requirements
AU CURRENT RESPONSE
Informed Consent Required Limited
Rationale Is Provided Yes
Fair Processing Yes
Legal Processing Yes
General Data Yes
Sensitive Data Yes
Accuracy Yes
Timely Yes
Duration of Record Keeping
Controls
Limited
CM.8: Data Subjects AU CURRENT RESPONSE
Ownership by the Subject Limited
Control Over Access No
Alter, Amend, Correct, and Delete
Errors
Yes
Notification Requirement Limited
CM.9: Data Security and
Destruction
AU CURRENT RESPONSE
Security Must be State-of-the-Art Generally
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Technology Use – Cost of
Implementation Not a Defense
Yes
Tracking Not once data is merged
Safeguards Required Adequate encryption
Protects from Alteration Yes
Protects Against Disclosure Yes
Protects Misuse Yes
Protects Against Unauthorized
Internal and External Access
Yes
Unauthorized Access Penalties Civil, criminal, cause of action
Timely Notice of Breaches Limited
Strong Remedies Provided Limited
CM.10: Cross-Border Data Flow AU CURRENT RESPONSE
Individual Informed Consent
Required
No
Transfer Source Is Accountable Generally
Outsource Service Controls Limited
CM.11: Exemptions and
Exceptions
AU CURRENT RESPONSE
Only Permitted Where There is a
Compelling Justification
No
Checks and Balances – Court
Order Required
Limited
Government Agencies Yes
Intelligence and Defense Yes
Police Actions Yes
Small Business Exemption Yes
CM.12 DPSIP Evolutional Stages
AU CURRENT RESPONSE
DPSIP.0 Limited DPSIP legal
Issues
Passed
DPSIP.1.0 Establishes PII; does not
fully address security issues;
focus on limited legal
consent and notice.
Yes
DPISP.2.0 Accepts PII standards;
does not fully address
security issues; focus on a
legally based harm based
analysis.
Limited
DPSIP.3.0 PII and non-PII data
fused; privacy, data
protection and security
issues are interrelated; legal
audits, checks, and balances
No
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needed for all personal
information stakeholders.
New technologies are
required to pass privacy
audits (example – RFID,
Internet of Things) and
require use of privacy
enhancing technologies in all
new IP approvals.
The selection of AU approaches to DPSIP legal issues is warranted in the
current study. The AU experience is best described by the children’s game of
two steps forward and one step back. The AU response is related to the
impact of EU principles that established international DPSIP legal standards.
The AU deference to small business exceptions and political pressures
resulted in an EU refusal to grant adequate status. In establishing DPSIP
laws, regulations, and standards, SA should not make the same errors in
judgement. By definition, special interests often ignore general interests.
On a state and federal level, the AU approach reveals problems related to a
lack of constitutional recognition of an information privacy right. This issue
applies to all of the countries studied with the exception of SA. The AU
example reveals problems related to establishing privacy commissioner
offices that are not independent. The establishment of different sectoral
privacy principles reveals some inherent problems.
The AU experience shows that DPSIP legal issues are too important to be left
solely to the common law. AU judges, like their UK counterparts, resist such
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actions. Some argue that the task should be left to the legislature whereas
others resist finding a general legal principle that applies.197
The AU approach does set a standard that should be recognized in SA and
internationally. The first is the approach to spent convictions. The second is
that under the Vic statute, every Member of Parliament—on every legislative
action—must affirm that any legislation does not violate DPSIP principles.
The Vic Statute also binds the attorney general, courts, and public authorities
to the same standard. This standard would prohibit the granting of intellectual
property protections status to technologies that can limit DPSIP protections.
The legal principle in Vic law reinforces the need for privacy audits at all
levels.
SA can learn from the AU experience in a number of ways. Attending to
immediate self-interest group pressures can result in faulty legal and long-
term goals. Cost versus benefit analysis can distort the legal and policy
issues. In a global economy, local political interests may be trumped by
international standards.
Chapter Five addresses the CA approaches to DPSIP legal issues. Both the
AU and CA are former colonies of the UK but have addressed DPSIP in
different ways. CA has been approved as adequate, whereas AU has not.
The CA approach is certainly relevant to how SA should address DPSIP legal
issues.
197 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199. See also Wainwright v Home Office (2004) 2
AC 406. (AU) Compare Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1.).
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CHAPTER FIVE: DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW:
CANADIAN LEGAL STANDARDS
The popularity of the Internet has created a new awareness of
threats to personal privacy. The collection and use of personal
data has evolved into a major industry, with companies willing to
pay thousands of dollars for consumer databases that provide
contact information and personal preference data. … The
growth of the personal information industry has left many
concerned about the loss of personal privacy. Michael Geist1
5.0 Overview
Of the countries addressed in the current study, CA is the only non-EU
country that has been evaluated by the EU as having adequate DPSIP
standards and systems. Starting in the 1980s, CA became aware of the
massive privacy threats posed by computers, the Internet, and information
business practices. The current approach includes regulation of DPSIP
threats from the private and public sectors.
The CA chapter begins with presenting background on the country. The
analysis continues with an examination of the CA federal constitutional
declarations. CA federal legislation and federal case law is examined. The
research then focuses on CA Provincial Constitutional declarations, Provincial
legislation, and case law. An analysis of the CA standards, remedies, and
implementation system are reviewed. CA sociolegal concerns are presented.
A critic of the CA approach is then addressed. A summary of the CA
literature and issues using the thesis comparative model of the current legal
support is then reviewed and presented.
1 Michael Geist, Internet Law in Canada. (Captus Press 3rd. ed. 2002), at 284.
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5.1 Background
Historically, the Canadian attitude toward data protection and information
privacy was based on the English Common Law. The British North American
Act of 1867 established CA as part of the British Empire.2 The British court
ruled that privacy issues should be left to the legislature.3 Richard Clayton
and Hugh Tomilson determined that “English law gives little clear
recognition of privacy rights outside the fields of misuse of
information…and intrusion.”4
CA, a former colony of the UK, is now a Federal State that consists of a
federal government, ten provinces, and three territories.5 Each unit has
special obligations and opportunities. All these provinces and territories were
former British colonies except Quebec. When formed, special provisions
were made to incorporate Quebec’s Roman Catholic religion, French
language, and civil law traditions. During the American Revolution, CA
maintained ties with England and maintained membership in the
Commonwealth of Nations. In 1867, in response to the US Civil War, a more
formal structure was required.
In 1867, the Constitution Act established governmental structure.6 In 1982,
CA became an independent nation; however, it remains one of the member
states of the Commonwealth of Nations.7
2 Statutes of Great Britain, The British North America Act. (1867), at
http://home.cc.umanitoba.ca/~sprague/bna.htm (last visited on 29 February 2012).
3 Kaye v. Robertson, FSR 62, (1991). (UK)
4 Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, Privacy and Freedom of Expression (Oxford University
Press. 2001), at 35.
5 Government of Canada, Government of Canada. (2010), at
http://www.canada.gc.ca/home.html (last visited on 5 August 2012). Site contains
reference data for this section.
6 Canadian Constitution Act, Constitution Acts from 1867 to 1982. (1867), at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/c1867_e.html (last visited on 2 August 2012).
7 Canadian Constitution Act, Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982. (UK) 1982, c. 11. (CA) at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/const/const1982.html (last
visited on 3 August 2012).
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The chief executive is the Prime Minister8 who is usually selected by the
majority party of the House of Commons. The cabinet is composed of
parliamentarians. The Prime Minister responds to questions from the House,
similar to the UK system. The Governor General is appointed by and serves
as the representative of the UK monarch; and is the Commander-in-Chief.
The parliament9 consists of 308 democratically elected members of the
House. The Senate has 105 members appointed by the Governor General
with the advice of the Prime Minister. The senate rarely opposes the House
of Commons.
The Supreme Court of Canada10 is the highest court in the country. A system
of appeals courts and specialty courts also functions. Each province has a
similar structure.
Civil liberty groups in CA are a recent development. In 1917, the first US civil
liberties organization, the National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB), was formed.
Three years later, the group was expanded into the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU). In contrast to the early development of such organizations in
the US, non-business and agricultural interest groups did not begin in CA until
two developments occurred in the 1960s; in 1962, the British Columbia Civil
Liberties Association was formed, and in 1964 the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association was formed. Subsequently, regional groups were
formed over the next twenty plus years. The groups focus on legislative
reform more than litigation.11
8 Government of Canada, Prime Minister of Canada. (2010), at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/index.asp
(last visited on 5 August 2012).
9 Government of Canada, Parliament of Canada. (2010), at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/index.asp?Language=E (last visited on 5 August
2012).
10 Government of Canada, Supreme Court of Canada. (2010), at http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/home-accueil/index-eng.asp (last visited on 5 August 2012).
11 Dominique Clément, Canada's Rights Movement: A History. (2010), at
http://www.historyofrights.com/ngo.html (last visited on 25 June 2012).
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Such groups advocate legal and regulatory changes including data
protection and information privacy. In the US, such groups support legal
appeals. In CA, such actions are supported by Provincial Legal Aid
programs that are controlled by the Provinces with some federal support.
The approach started in 1970 under the Trudeau government.12
Pierre Trudeau was the fifteenth Prime Minister of CA. He served from
20 April 1968 to 4 June 1979 and 3 March 1980 until 30 June 1984 as
one of the most charismatic leaders in CA history. Trudeau was a major
force in the enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was
longer and more detailed than the US Bill of Rights. The Charter includes
democratic rights, equality rights, fundamental freedoms, legal rights,
minority language educational rights, mobility rights, and official languages
of CA. Trudeau also appointed Chief Justice Laskin, Puisne Justice
Wishart Spence, and later Chief Justice Brian Dickson, all of whom
supported civil liberties.13
In 1960, the Canadian Parliament passed a statutory Bill of Rights that had
little impact on Supreme Court decisions. The 1982 passage of the
constitutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms had a different impact on court
decisions. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms changed principles in law
and attitudes, and allowed an opportunity for a fair hearing on human rights
based cases. The 1960s was a time of international awareness and concern
about civil and human rights. Time is needed for such concerns to reflect in
the law and in judicial decisions. The period of time between the 1960s and
1990s was an era of massive change for CA. The country became formally
independent from the UK, established a new flag, established judicial review
over parliament, and dealt with a number of mass movements (including
terrorism from French separatists) and political changes. Canada’s formal
independence started in 1931; however, it was not until 1949 that decisions of
12 Frederick H. Zemans, Legal Aid and Advice in Canada, 16 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 663
(1978).
13 Ian Bushnell, The Captive Court: A study of the Supreme Court of Canada. (McGill-Queen's
University Press. 1992).
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the Canadian Supreme Court could no longer be appealed to the Privy
Council for final determination.14
In 1970, the Government of CA suspended civil liberties under the War
Measurements Act because of bombings, mail box bombs, and kidnappings
by Quebec separatists.15 In the latter part of the year, civil liberty groups
mounted a major campaign against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP). The groups exposed a strong pattern of illegal break-ins,
intimidation, and wiretapping that resulted in Parliamentary hearings.16
An equality rights component was started in 1985 but was stopped in
1992 by the Mulroney government.
The CA federal government has passed consumer protection laws and
regulations. The major act is the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada
Act,17 which addresses banks, credit bureaus, collection agencies, and
financial institutions. This act regulates information businesses and protects
some personal information. Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New
Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island,
Quebec, and Saskatchewan have passed consumer information or consumer
protection laws. The laws address unfair practices, warranty, service contract
protections and remedies. Moreover, these laws can license agents and
companies.18
14 Peter H. Russell, The Growth of Canadian Judicial Review and the Commonwealth and
American Experiences, in Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (Donald W.
Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992); Francis Reginald Scott, The Consequences of
the Privy Council Decisions, 15 Canadian Bar Review, 485 (1937).
15 Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States
and Canada (C.D. Howe Institute. 1989).
16 A. Alan Borovoy, When Freedoms Collide: The Case for Our Civil Liberties (Lester and
Orpen Dennys. 1988).
17 Canadian Laws, Canadian Consumer Protection Laws. (2010), at
http://www.canadianlawsite.ca/consumer-protection.htm#g (last visited on 3 January
2012). (CA) See Canadian Marketing Association, Consumer Protection. (2010), at
http://www.the-cma.org/public/?WCE=C=47|K=224338 (last visited on 27 July 2012).
18 Id.
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On January 18, 1994, then Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien
announced a proposal for a Canadian strategy for the Information Highway. 19
The process started with the development of fifteen topics that the Industry
Canada Commission should address. Of the fifteen, one topic specifically
addressed DPSIP legal issues – “How can personal privacy and security of
information be protected? In April, the final report was released in a discussion
paper titled The Canadian Information Highway: Building Canada's Information
and Communications Infrastructure.”20 The commission accurately assessed
the DPSIP problems and the major players. The commission concluded that
“There is no question that the ability to access, repackage and resell
information can … raise concerns among the general public, the business
community, and government alike about privacy protection and the security of
sensitive information.”21
The Industry Canada Commission reported that in 1992, the Ekos Research
Associates study found that ninety-two percent of 3,000 Canadians studied
reported that privacy was important to them and sixty percent believed they
had less privacy than a decade before. Respondents wanted control over
their information and wanted governmental intervention. A 1994 Gallup CA
study found that eighty percent of Canadians reported that privacy was under
siege and showed concerns about maintaining privacy.22
The commission found that privacy involved “the right to exercise control over
one's personal information.”23 Individuals should be able to determine “when,
how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”24
A 1992 Equifax study of Canadians “found that 84 percent of the insurance,
financial and credit bureau executives surveyed believed that federal
19 Industry Canada, The Canadian Information Highway: Building Canada's Information and
Communications Infrastructure / Privacy. (1994), at
http://www.ifla.org/documents/infopol/canada/cihac003.txt (last visited on 1 August
2012).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1.
22 Id. at 2.
23 Id. at 1:2.
24 Id. at 1:3.
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legislation is required to set rules for the collection and circulation of
consumer information.”25
The commission further reported on the Canadian Standards Association
model privacy code, which was built on the OECD Guidelines. The standards
include accountability, accuracy, challenging compliance, consent (new),
identifying purposes, individual access, limiting collection, limiting use,
disclosure, retention, openness, and safeguards.26
The final Industry Canada Commission report declared that the rule of law
should be applied to the information highway. The commission also
recommended that federal legislation should protect information privacy and
data security – protection that applied to the private and governmental
sectors.
5.2 Canadian Federal Constitutional Declarations
In 1867, a Constitutional Act, formerly known as the British North American
Act, was passed.27 Much of the structure was not written in the traditional
sense. There was no formal Bill of Rights but the Act did establish a British-
style parliament with a Senate and a House of Commons, as well as a
judicature.
Section ninety-one provided for federal powers while Subsection twenty-nine
enumerated powers to the provinces. Using this clause, the Court28
considered that the regulation of Broadcasting was a provincial matter. The
constitution also provided the Federal government power related to issues
concerning treaties – similar to the US, CA, and Mexico broadcasting treaty
assigning frequencies. Thus, the Federal government had some control over
broadcasting.
25 Id. at 5:6.
26 Id. at Annexes B. ¶ 5.
27 Canadian Constitution Act, Constitution Acts from 1867 to 1982. (1867), at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/c1867_e.html (last visited on 2 August 2012). (CA)
28 A-G Canada v A-G Quebec, 2 D.L.R. 81 (JCPC), (1932) (CA).
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The CA Constitution Act of 186729 does not mention privacy. Section 92(13)
addresses property and civil rights. The section applies when personal
information is considered a form of personal rather than corporate property or
is a civil rights issue.
In 1982, CA passed the Constitution Act which identified fundamental
freedoms. The fundamental freedoms included “(a) freedom of conscience
and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication; (c) freedom of
peaceful assembly; and (d) freedom of association.”30 Part one establishes
the rule of law and the need for reasonable limits for a free and democratic
society.31 This charter, much like the US Bill of Rights, establishes a number
of fundamental freedoms that creates a zone of privacy and data protection,
even if only by inference.
The adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was not
without its critics.32 The charge was that such macro-legal principles detract
from the power of political majorities and resultant political institutions. W. A.
Bogart33 argued that such legislative and political documents give false hope
to the poor and disadvantaged because the law generally favors those with
power and resources. Others like David Beatty34 argued that establishment of
such legal principles opens the doors of Justice to previously excluded
groups, causes, and individuals. The charter does initiate a new role for the
Courts and legal support for issue of civil and human rights. Although it has
been proposed, the final charter has no provisions for the protection of
29 Canadian Constitution Act, Constitution Acts from 1867 to 1982. (1867), at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/c1867_e.html (last visited on 2 August 2012).
30 Id. at § 2.
31 Canadian Constitution Act, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. (1982), at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/ (last visited on 25 July 2012).
32 Rainer Knopff & F. L. Morton, Charter Politics (Nelson. 1992).
33 W. A. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of Litigation and the Social and Political Life
of Canada (Oxford University Press. 1994).
34 David Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production of Constitutional
Review (Carswell. 1990).
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property or property-related due process.35 In CA, the business community
was not as involved in policymaking and litigation as in AU and the US. The
only exception was the tobacco business interests and lobbyists.
Chris Schafer identified the major issue in constitutional rights, noting that the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms “has the potential to protect our
valuable freedoms from state intrusion and interference, but it is up to our
judges on the Supreme Court to defend them.”36
Schafer studied Canadian Supreme Court decisions from 1 January 2000
through 31 December 2006 on the basis of economic freedom, equality before
the law, and individual freedom.37 The court issued pro-freedom decisions
eighty-six percent of the time. Sixty percent of the justices were supporters of
economic freedom. Seventy percent of the justices supported a pro-equality
position.38 In contrast to the US judiciary, the Canadian judges are appointed
as long as there is good behavior.39 Judges must be members of the Bar,40
and they must retire at 75 years of age.41
5.3 Canadian Federal Legislation
In CA, legal issues related to DPSIP are, in part, addressed under the law of
confidential information and tort law. Confidential information law is a part of
intellectual property law. Private data is an asset with value. The connection
between data protection and information privacy with intellectual property law
makes sense. Personal information can be considered as a form of
intellectual and personal property. The connection makes even more sense
35 Alexander Alvaro, Why Property Rights Were Excluded from the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 24 Canadian Journal of Political Science, 309 (1991).
36 Chris Schafer, Judging the Judges: How Do Supreme Court Judges Rank?, Canadian
Constitution Foundation. (2007), at
http://www.canadianconstitutionfoundation.ca/files/pdf/News-Release-PDF-Judging-
the-Judges-10-April-2007.pdf (last visited on 25 July 2012), at 6.
37 Id. at 6.
38 Id. at 6-7.
39 Canadian Constitution Act, Constitution Acts from 1867 to 1982. (1867), at § 99.
40 Id. at § 97.
41 Id. at § 99.
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when one considers that intellectual property law can be used to insure that
privacy protections are built into all protected technology. The issue is one of
ownership. Does the persona who behaviorally creates the information own it
or does the corporation that collects it without consent own it?42
In 1982, parliament passed the first Privacy Act43 to regulate federal
government institutions’ collection and disclosure of personal information.44
The focus of the Act was very narrow.
Prior to the establishment of the European Union Directive of Privacy and
Data Protection, the Canadian protections were more advanced than those in
the UK. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms set the federal
standard. The provinces were more innovative. A statutory tort of invasion
of privacy was established by a number of Canadian Provinces including
British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan each of which
established similar standards.45 Such a standard was also found in Quebec’s
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, which established that “every person
has a right to respect for his private life” that is directly enforceable between
citizens.46
5.3.1 Canadian Criminal Code of 1985 - Part VI: Invasion of Privacy
The Canadian Criminal Code (1985) declares that:
Every one who, by means of any electro-magnetic, acoustic,
mechanical or other device, willfully intercepts a private communication
42 See Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press. 2008). Solove
traces the concept back to John Locke. See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws
of Cyberspace (Basic Books. 1999).
43 Canadian Federal Government, Canadian Privacy Act - R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21. (1982), at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/P-21/index.html (last visited on 7 November 2012). (CA)
44 Id.
45 John D. R. Craig, Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Common-Law Tort Awakens
42 McGill Law Journal, 355, footnote 2. (1997).
46 Province of Quebec, Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. (2006), at
http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/en/commun/docs/charter.pdf (last visited on 23 July 2012), at
§ 5.
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is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years.47
However, the code provides a number of exceptions. The principle does not
apply when one or the other party consented, is legally authorized, has quality
monitoring, or protects the system functions. A private communication is
defined as when “it is reasonable for the originator to expect that it will not be
intercepted” by another and it is set to prevent “intelligible reception” by
another not intended.48 The reasonable expectation clause can be
problematic. The definition ignores the principle of proportionality, a balancing
of interest measure, or why the interception would be done. The Canadian
Criminal Code does not require that the consent be informed.
5.3.2 The Federal Privacy Act of 1985
The purpose of the Canadian Federal Privacy Act of 1985 was to “extend the
present laws of Canada that protect the privacy of individuals with respect to
personal information about themselves held by a government institution and
that provide individuals with a right of access to that information.”49 This act
focused only on information held by the government.
The Canadian Federal Privacy Act of 1985 defines personal information as
identifiable information that is recorded in any form. The key elements include
protected classes; criminal, education, employment, or medical information;
identifying numbers; address; or physical markers.50 The Act proclaims a
number of general privacy law principles and limits implementation by listing a
number of exceptions and potential bases of non-compliance.
47 Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. (1985), at http://www.canlii.org/ca/sta/c-
46/sec184.html (last visited on 15 August 2012), at § 184, ¶ 1.
48 Id. at § 184, ¶ 6.
49 Canadian Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 (1985), at ¶ 2.
50 Id. at § 3:14. The section reads - “(a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic
origin, color, religion, age or marital status of the individual, (b) information relating to
the education or the medical, criminal or employment history of the individual or
information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved,
(c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual, (d)
the address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual.”
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Under Section Three Part J, personal information does not include information
about an individual who is or was an officer or employee of a government
institution that relates to the person’s government position or functions, such
as government business address and phone number, classification of
position, personal opinions on subjects in the course of government
employment, responsibilities, salary, titles, and written documents.51 The Act
allows the head of a governmental institution to release personal information
for any purpose. The head must only argue the release benefits the individual
or that the public interests supersede.52
Section Five of the Act provides key elements ignored in the US approach.
The code declares that collected information should be obtained directly from
the person except where the individual authorizes otherwise or where the
collection is acceptable under Subsection 8(2), which enumerates certain
circumstances where personal information may be collected and disclosed.53
The government must inform the person of the data collection and the
purpose of the record.54
The Act also adopts a significant structural approach ignored in the US. The
Act appoints a Privacy Commissioner of CA (PCC) who has wide powers
of investigation and the power to consider complaints. However, the
Commissioner, who reports to the Parliament, can be removed from
office for cause from the statutory seven year term at any time and
functions in an advisory and conciliatory function. The Commissioner
does not have the power to adjudicate cases or issue legally binding
opinions.55 The office is not an independent agency.
51 Id. at § 3:J.
52 Id. at § 8(2)(m).
53 Id. at § 5: ¶ 1.
54 Id. at § 5: ¶ 2.
55 Id. at § 53.
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5.3.3 The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document Act
(PIPEDA)
On April 13, 2000, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Document Act (PIPEDA) was enacted.56 The Act focuses on how personal
information is collected, secured, and shared within CA and with its trading
partners. Personal information is defined as “information about an identifiable
individual, but does not include the name, title or business address or
business telephone number of an employee of an organization.”57 A major
constraint is that PIPEDA applies only to conduct and transactions of a
commercial nature. The provinces could pass substantially similar legislation
and bypass the federal statue for intra–provincial actions. The federal
legislation would apply to all provinces, inter-provincial, and international
personal data collection, disclosure, and use. PIPEDA applies to all data
collection of personal information of all Canadians and all data collected in
CA.
PIPEDA was described as a new gold standard: “the first (Canadian)
determined effort to place a check upon, and ultimately to reverse, the
massive erosion of individual privacy rights brought about by the application of
computer and communications technology in the commercial world.”58
PIPEDA was implemented in three phases. On 1 January 2001, all
commercial functions that were subject to the Canadian Labor Code were
covered. On 1 January 2002, all data collection of personal health information
was covered. On 1 January 2004, the full impact of PIPEDA took effect. The
phased approach allowed the government time to inform the target
stakeholders, establish regulations, and enforce the standards. Business
56 Canadian Federal Government, Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document
Act. (2000), at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-8.6 (last visited on 1
November 2012). (CA)
57 Id. at Part 1, ¶.13.
58 Bruce Phillips, Foreword, in The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act: An Annotated Guide (Stephanie Perrin, et al. eds., 2001), at ix.
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organizations and all concerned parties were informed of the new policy so
the principle of predictability was met.
Under PIPEDA, notice and consent was required for the collection, disclosure,
or use of personal information in the course of commercial activities. The
principle of consent was also required whenever the information was used for
any secondary purpose.
Ten principles governed the collection and the use of data under PIPEDA.
Organizations were required to ensure that any parties that were involved in
the transfer of data follow the principles of accountability, accuracy, consent,
identifying purpose, individual access, limited collection, limited use,
disclosure and retention, openness, and safeguards.59
PIPEDA regulated the collection, disclosure, storage, and use of
personal data by businesses. In 2001, the Act applied to federally
regulated organizations including airlines, banks, broadcasting, and
59 Canadian Federal Government, Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document
Act. (2000), at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-8.6 (last visited on 1
November 2012), at Schedule 1. The terms are defined as: Accountability:
Organizations have to appoint a compliance officer within the organization. The
officer and the organization are responsible for all personal information collected,
disclosed, used, or transferred. Accuracy: All personal information must be accurate,
complete, and current. The sensitivity of the information and purpose of holding the
data impacts the risks. Consent: With a few exceptions, individuals must actively
know and consent. Consent applies to the collection, disclosure, transfer, or use of
one’s personal information. One can also withdraw consent at any time. Identifying
purpose: Organizations must identify all purposes for handling personal information.
The purpose communication must be done before or at the time of the collection.
Individual access: Individuals, upon request, must be given access to held
information. The disclosure, existence, and use of the information must be divulged.
The individual has the right to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the data.
The individual can have the organization amend the data as appropriate. Complaints
related to access denial must be filed with the PCC within six months of the refusal.
Limiting collection: The collection of personal information must be limited to the
necessary identifying purpose. Legal collection policies also apply. Limiting use,
disclosure, and retention: Use or disclosure of personal information can be used
only for the purpose for which it was collected. Legal standards and individual
consent can override the limitation. The data can only be retained as long as
necessary determined by its purpose. Openness: Information practices and
organizational privacy policies must be available. Individuals can make requests
related to how the information is managed. Safeguards: Organizations must
establish and maintain security safeguards. The more sensitive the data, the higher
the safeguards must be.
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telecommunications companies in all ten provinces and all three
territories. The Act included individual health information the next year.
In 2004, all Canadian businesses were expected to comply with the Act or
equivalent provincial regulation and all inter-provincial and international
personally identifiable information. In 2002, the European Union
classified the Canadian approach as equivalent to the 1995 Data
Protection Directive. The action allowed free data flow between EU
countries and CA.
With privacy legislation and court decisions, the issue of effectiveness of
DPSIP protection is usually found in the exemptions. The PIPEDA provisions
provide some common but troublesome exemptions that allow information to
be collected and shared.
Given the current fervor related to terrorism, perhaps the most emotional and
easiest exception in the standard can occur when an organization or person
“suspects that the information relates to national security, the defence of
Canada or the conduct of international affairs.”60 A secondary standard is
when an organization or person “has reasonable grounds to believe that the
information relates to a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws
of Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction that has been, is being or is
about to be committed.”61 The person or organization making the judgment
determines if it is reasonable. No checks or balances are required.
The CA government can ignore the provisions of informational privacy
provisions when “required by law” or “it is specified by the regulations” or the
“disclosure is requested for the purpose of administering or enforcing any law
of Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction.”62 Both of the standards are of
course determined by the government itself. Governmental administrations
have violated the spirit and letter of the principles of the Rule of Law; both CA
and the US have violated civil liberties and human rights.
60 Id. at §1 (3)(i), 8.
61 Id. at (d)(i), 8.
62 Id. at (c.1) (iii), 8.
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The governmental exemption includes whenever “it suspects that the
information relates to national security, the defence of Canada or the conduct
of international affairs;”63 or the government is “carrying out an investigation
relating to the enforcement of any such law or gathering intelligence for the
purpose of enforcing any such law.”64 Privacy can also be violated whenever
the government determines that the “the disclosure is requested for the
purpose of administering any law of Canada or a province” or “made by an
investigative body and the disclosure is reasonable for purposes related to
investigating a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws of
Canada or a province.”65 Organizations may also claim an exemption. The
major factor required is that the organization has reasonable grounds to
believe that the information could be useful in investigating or contravening
possible unlawful activities.66 Organizations also have a further exemption.
Organizations can take the initiative to “an investigative body, a government
institution or a part of a government institution and the organization.”67
Some exemptions include court action. Two provisions are noted. The first is
that the release is “required to comply with a subpoena or warrant issued or
an order made by a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the
production of information, or to comply with rules of court relating to the
production of records.”68 The second applies when a request is “made to a
government institution or part of a government institution that has made a
request for the information and identified its lawful authority to obtain the
information.”69 When the information is publicly available, a general exemption
from PIPEDA applies. The problem may be that the legislation does not
require that the public information meet legal standards. Private information
that is “publicly available and is specified by the regulations” is exempt.70 The
63 Id. at (c.1) (i), 7.
64 Id. at (c.1) (ii), 7.
65 Id. at (h) (2), 9.
66 Id. at (3)(a), 6.
67 Id. at (3)(c), 6.
68 Id. at (3)(c), 7.
69 Id. at (3)(c.1), 7.
70 Id. at (7)(d), 7.
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exemption even applies when the information is unlawfully released to the
public.
The law makes exceptions for public policy reasons. No knowledge or
consent is required when the private information is collected “solely for
journalistic, artistic or literary purposes.”71 A further exemption covers when
the “collection is made for the purpose of making a disclosure”72 as in whistle
blowing. Debt collection efforts are an exception when the individual owes a
debt to the organization. An exemption also covers data made available “to
an institution whose functions include the conservation of records of historic or
archival importance, and the disclosure is made for the purpose of such
conservation.”73
A confidentiality principle applies when relevant and needed data is used for
research, scholarly study, or statistical analysis. In such situations, notice
must be provided to the Privacy Commissioner prior to any use. A typical but
potential area of abuse of an exception relates to legal investigations.
PIPEDA exempts privacy protections when the organization reasonably
expects that obtaining consent would compromise the data accuracy or there
might be an agreement breach or would be unlawful.74
Section Four, Principle Four, specifies limitations on the collection of data
protection and information privacy information. The code specifies that “The
collection of personal information shall be limited to that which is necessary
for the purposes identified by the organization. Information shall be collected
by fair and lawful means.”75 PIPEDA further declares that data can not be
indiscriminately collected and must be used for identified purposes. The
openness principle requires that the organization specify purposes and
71 Id. at (7)(c), 7.
72 Id. at (7)(e), 7.
73 Id. at (3)(g), 8.
74 Id. at (7)(1)(g),6.
75 Id. at (4.4) (4), 36.
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policies.76 Data collection must be fair and lawful rather than deceitful and
misleading.77
Under Section Four, Part Three, consent is required except in situations
involving legal, medical, or security issues. The problem incorporates the fact
that charity and direct marketing are also included. The two principles serve
very different purposes. PIPEDA specifies that “Consent is required for the
collection of personal information and the subsequent use or disclosure of this
information.”78 The organization must provide knowledge to the individual
about the purpose of the information collection, disclosure, and use. The
attempt need only be reasonable.79 Consent can not be a condition to receive
products, services, or supplies.80 Price or other inducements can be used.
The Act does not require a standard informed consent formula. Consent
provisions are contradictory and can delude the spirit of the principle.
Provisions allow for express or implied consent depending on circumstance,
types of data, or sensitivity based on the organization’s position.81
Section Four, Part Five, Principle Five limits the disclosure, use, and retention
of DPSIP data. PIPEDA requires that data can only be held for as long as the
purpose requires. Unless the individual consents, the data can be used for
the stated purpose only. If the data is used for a new purpose, the
organization needs only to document the change.82
Organizations are required to develop and follow minimum and maximum
retention periods.83 Organizations must also develop and follow guidelines to
guarantee that “personal information that is no longer required to fulfill the
76 Id. at (§4.8) (4.4.1), 36.
77 Id. at (§ 4.4.21), 36.
78 Id. at (¶ 4.3.1), 34.
79 Id. at (¶ 4.3.2), 35.
80 Id. at (¶ 4.3.3), 35.
81 Id. at (¶ 4.3.6), 35.
82 Id. at (§ 4.5.1), 36.
83 Id. at (§ 4.5.2), 37.
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identified purposes should be destroyed, erased, or made anonymous unless
a new purpose is documented.”84
Section Four, Principle Six, establishes a standard of accuracy. “Personal
information shall be as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for
the purposes for which it is to be used.” When information is used on an on-
going basis, the data must still be accurate and up-to-date.85
A set of potentially ambiguous and subjective exceptions was also written into
PIPEDA. Collection of personal information may occur when it “is clearly in
the interests of the individual and consent cannot be obtained in a timely
way.”86 A further potential abuse may occur when the information is “used for
the purpose of acting in respect of an emergency that threatens the life, health
or security of an individual.”87 The person must be alive; if collected without
the individual’s knowledge or consent, the organization must provide written
notice to the person “without delay.”
A reasonable timeline for exemptions includes a twenty year protection that
tolls after the death of the person. Another standard may exempt data for
one hundred years after the information record was created. The later
standard may be similar to the continuing closure of the John F. Kennedy
secret files related to his assassination. Rather than protecting informational
privacy of the person, the goal may be related to political purposes.
5.3.4 The Canadian Anti-Spam Act
The CA Anti-Spam Act (CA-ASA)88 was passed in 2010 and in 2012 began to
be enforced. CA-ASA has considerable DPSIP implications. The Act
establishes a standard of expressed or implied consent for processing of
84 Id. at (§ 4.5.3), 37.
85 Id. at (§ 4.6.3), 37.
86 Id. at (¶ 7.1.a), 6.
87 Id. at (¶ 2.b), 7.
88 Statutes of Canada 2010; Chapter 23: Anti-Spam amend. Third Session, Fortieth
Parliament, 59 Elizabeth II, 2010 § (2010). (CA)
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individual information. Consent is required for all malware and spyware
programs. CA-ASA requires a clear unsubscribe mechanism. The Act
allows for a private cause of action. The maximum penalty for an individual is
$1 million CAD and $10 million CAD for a corporation.89 CA-ASA establishes
that business interests are not above checks and balances constraints.
5.4 Canadian Federal Case Law
The CA and US court structure and system are similar. While CA is more
closely connected to British common law tradition than the US, comparing the
two structures and powers provides insights into how DPSIP case law
decisions are processed.
Table 5.0 Comparison of Canadian and United States Supreme Court
Factor Canadian Supreme
Court90
US Supreme Court91
Established 1875 1789
Power of decisions Applies to all courts and
jurisdictions in the
country
Applies to all courts and
jurisdictions in the
country
Membership One Chief Justice and
eight puisne
justices.
One Chief Justice and eight
associate justices
(currently)
Appointee
Background
Leading appellate courts
judges, politicians,
and law professors.
Leading appellate courts
judges, politicians,
and law professors.
Term of Office Retire at 75 years old Life or until retires
Jurisdiction Original and appellate Original and appellate
Role Law-clarification Error-correction
Operations Hears oral arguments
but relies heavily
on arguments
presented in
written briefs
Hears oral arguments but
relies heavily on
arguments presented
in written briefs
89 Ibid.
90 World Wide Legal Information Association, Legal Resources. (2010), at
http://www.wwlia.org/LegalResources.aspx (last visited on 4 July 2012). See also
Supreme Court of Canada, About the Court. (2010), at http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/court-cour/index-eng.asp (last visited on 5 July 2012).
91 Kermit L Hall, The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (Oxford
University Press 2nd. ed. 2005). See also Supreme Court of the United States, About
the Supreme Court. (2010), at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ (last visited on 5 July
2012).
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Decisions Opinion of the majority,
written by one
justice, and
concurring and
dissenting opinions
of other justices.
Opinion of the majority,
written by one
justice, and
concurring and
dissenting opinions
of other justices.
Judicial Review Recent - 1970 Historic since Marshall.
Appointment Prime Minister directly
appoints justices;
no Parliament
confirmation.
President nominates,
Senate confirms.
Representation Generally regional Recently more political
Opinions Reference cases - Can
render advisory
opinions
No advisory opinions
Case Assignment Since 1975, Court has
discretion on
selected cases.
Court determines what
cases it will hear
based on writ of
certiorari. Since
1925, has
discretionary docket
control.
Canadian jurists accept British common law traditions. The UK case of
Morison v. Moat92 verified an obligation to not violate confidence. The case
involved a confidential media formula that was shared with a business
partner. The partner then shared the formula with his son who used the
information to set up another company. The court found that the son had
breached the faith of confidentiality or privacy. Dispersion of information was
a breach of faith and an obligation of confidence. The Vice-Chancellor wrote,
“[that] the Court has exercised jurisdiction in cases of this nature does not, I
think, admit of any question.”93
In 1970, The Canadian Supreme Court, for the first and only time, ruled that
an act of Parliament was a violation of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights. The
Act was Section 94(b) of the Indian Act that made it illegal for Indians to be
92 Morison v. Moat, 68 Eng. Rep. 492, 9 HARE 241, (1851), 498 (U.K.).
93 Id.
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intoxicated when off the reserve.94 The Court ruled that the section violated
Section 1(b) of the Bill of Rights.95
Starting in 1974 through 1984, the Canadian Supreme Court established new
criterion for standing. Three major cases, the standing trilogy, included
Thorson v. A. G. of Canada, 96 Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil,97 and
Minister of Justice of Canada v Borowski.98 In Minister of Justice of Canada v
Borowski, Justice Martland summarized the new standing factor. The
plaintiff must show that he is affected directly, has a genuine interest, or
that “there is no other reasonable and effective manner in which the
issue may be brought before the Court.”99
In Finlay v. Minister of Finance of Canada,100 the Canadian court allowed
for standing in non-constitutional cases. Standing is an essential factor
in DPSIP law.
The Canadian Supreme Court rulings on privacy protections in criminal
cases mirrored similar rights found by the US Warren Court findings. The
rights included protections against unreasonable search or seizure.101
Three members of the Court helped to establish an agenda of civil liberties
during the pre-1982 statutory period. Bora Laskin (Chief Justice, 1973 to
1984 and puisne justice 1970 to 1973), Emmett Hall (Puisne Justice, 1962 to
1973), and Ivan Rand (puisne justice, 1943 to 1959) led the movement.102
94 The more politically correct term is now native peoples See Daphine A. Dukelow & Betsy
Nuse, The Dictionary of Canadian Law (Carswell 2 ed. 1995).
95 R. v. Drybones, S.C.R. 282, 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473, 3 C.C.C. 355, 10 C.R.N.S. 334, 71 W.W.R.
161, (1970). (CA)
96 Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, 1 S. C.R. 138, (1975). (CA)
97 Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, 2 S.C.R. 265, (1976). (CA)
98 Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borowski, 2 S.C.R. 575, (1981). (CA)
99 Id. at 598.
100 Finlay v. Minister of Finance of Canada, 2 S.C.R. 607, (1986). (CA)
101 Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, Different Drummers: The Supreme Court of Canada,
American Jurisprudence and the Continuing Revision of Criminal Law Under the
Charter, 24 Ottawa Law Review, 39 (1992).
102 James G. Snell & Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the
Institution (University of Toronto Press. 1985).
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The 1982 Constitution Act established a base for establishing a right to
privacy. Justice Dickson103 in Hunter v. Southam Inc ruled that Section Eight
of the Constitution Act protected the right of people to be left alone by others.
Four years later, the Canadian Supreme Court declared that “privacy is at the
heart of liberty in a modern state, (and) grounded in a man's physical and
moral autonomy, privacy is essential for the well-being of the individual.”104
The court ruled that there were three zones of privacy including territorial or
spatial, physical space, and informational privacy. Under Section Eight of the
Constitution Act, informational privacy was more important than physical
privacy.
Hunter v Southam105 also interpreted Section Eight on the issue of
“unreasonable search or seizure.” The Court determined that the
Constitution Act protects an “individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy.” Chief Justice Dickson declared that “an assessment must be
made as to whether in a particular situation the public's interest in
being left alone by the government must give way to the government's
interest in intruding on the individual's privacy in order to advance its
goals.”106
Justice La Forest also found three zones of privacy in Canadian law. In R. v.
Dyment,107 La Forest found informational, personal, and territorial privacy
zones. He argued that the law should “identify[ing] those situations where we
should be most alert to privacy considerations … Grounded in a man's
physical and moral autonomy, privacy is essential for the wellbeing of the
individual. For this reason alone, it is worthy of constitutional protection." The
Justice determined that information privacy was essential to the democracy
and the individual person.108
103 Hunter v. Southam Inc, 2 S.C.R. 145, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 41 C.R. (3d) 97, (1984). (CA)
104 R. v. Dyment, 2 S.C.R. 417 at 427-428, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 503, 66 C.R. (3d) 348, (1988), at
427-428. (CA)
105 Hunter v Southam, 2 S.C.R. 145, (1984), 159-160. (CA)
106 Id.
107 R. v. Dyment, 2 S.C.R. 417 at 427-428, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 503, 66 C.R. (3d) 348, (1988), 427.
(CA)
108 Id.
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Under Canadian law, information privacy is based on the principle that “all
information about a person is in a fundamental way his own, for him to
communicate or retain for himself as he sees fit."109 The Dyment court ruled
the following:
[I]n modern society, especially, retention of information about oneself is
extremely important. We may, for one reason or another, wish or be
compelled to reveal such information, but situations abound
where the reasonable expectations of the individual that the
information shall remain confidential to the persons to whom, and
restricted to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be protected.110
Matthew Englander purchased unlisted residential telephone service from
Telus Communications. Telus imposed an initial set-up cost and charged
monthly fees. Englander objected because he had not been given informed
consent, which was a violation of PIPEDA on the ground of collection,
disclosure, and use of personal data.
In Englander v. Telus Communications, Inc,111 the Federal Court of Appeals
found that Telus did not provide informed consent and in fact, sold the listing
information. Telus was found in violation of Section Five of PIPEDA in “not
informing its first-time customers, at the time of enrollment, of the primary and
secondary purposes for which their personal information was collected and in
not informing them at the time of availability.”112 The justices suggested that
common sense, flexibility, and pragmatism should be applied to DPSIP legal
decision-making. Organizations must fully inform persons regarding all of the
purposes of the collected information at or before collection and before use.
New uses must be communicated to data subjects, unless the use is
109 Information Canada, Privacy and Computers (A Report of a Task Force Established Jointly
by Department of Communications/Department of Justice) (Author. 1972), 13.
110 Id. at 429-430.
111 Englander v. Telus Communications, Inc., 2004 FCA 387 (Federal Court of Appeal 2004),
§, 89. (CA)
112 Id.
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mandated by law. Consent is not informed if the person is not aware of opt-
out options at the time of giving the consent.
Elizabeth Paton-Simpson argued that public privacy furthers the common
good. Privacy protection is connected to “freedom, individual self-
fulfillment, autonomy, independent thought, and human dignity.”113 The
issue of public privacy is related to DPSIP law and policy. The argument that
computer and Internet activities are public is flawed. If accepted, there can be
no expectation of privacy. The principle is logically challenged and
diminished.
In X. v. Accusearch Inc., dba Abika.com et al, 114 the Canadian Federal Court
ruled that the Privacy Commissioner’s Officer had jurisdiction over US
companies operating in CA. The issue was related to transborder flow of
personal information.115 The decision also has implications for outsourcing
data functions.
Telus Communications instituted a voice recognition security system. The
employees filed a complaint. The Federal Appeals Court found that voice
prints are personal information, but the company has a reasonable right to
have a security system. Employees consented116 to the system by sharing the
data; the company told the employees of the consequences if they refused.117
In R. v. Plant,118 Justice McLachlin declared:
Computers may and should be private places, where information they contain
is subject to the legal protection arising from a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Computers may contain a wealth of personal information. Depending
113 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of
Privacy in Public Places, 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 3, 305-346 (2000),
305.
114 X. v. Accusearch Inc., dba Abika.com et al. Federal Court File No. T–2228–05, (2007).
(CA)
115 Id.
116 Is it really informed consent when pressure is applied?
117 X. v. Telus Communications Inc. Federal Court of Appeal File No. A–639–05, (2007). (CA)
118 R. v. Plant, 3 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.), (1993), at 303-304. (CA)
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on its character, that information may be as private as any found in a
dwelling house or hotel room.119
The Supreme Court found that when confidential or personal information is
involved, the government needs prior authorization to search or seize the data
from data bases. No authorization is needed when the information is not
confidential or personal.
The case of Dr. Jeffrey Wyndowe120 was decided by the Federal Court of
Appeals. The case involved a patient who wanted access to medical records
that were obtained during an insurance company’s independent medical
examination (IME). The Court found the notes were subject to PIPEDA
because the data was obtained during a commercial activity and clearly
contained personal information. The patient has legal access rights and the
right to correct any errors. The Court also found that the notes had personal
information related to the IME and that the review should be mediated.121
The principle of informed consent is, in part, based on Section Seven of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The section reads: “Everyone has
a right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”122 The
concept was validated in Rodriguez v. British Columbia.123
In Marcoux v. Bouchard, 124 the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that no one can
interfere with the integrity of another except with one’s free and enlightened consent
or legal authorization. Persons, procedures, and purpose must be protected.125
119 Id.
120 Dr. Jeffrey Wyndowe (Psychiatric Assessment Services Inc.) v. X. Federal Court of Appeal
File No. A–551–06, (2008). (CA)
121 Dr. Jeffrey Wyndowe (Psychiatric Assessment Services Inc.) v. X. Federal Court of Appeal
File No. A–551–06, (2008). (CA)
122 Canadian Constitution Act, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. (1982), at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/ (last visited on 25 July 2012), § 7.
123 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney-General) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342 (SC.C.), (1993).
(CA)
124 Marcoux v. Bouchard, 204 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [S.C.C.], per Heureux-Dube, Gonthier,
Bastarache, Arbour and LeBel JJ. (decided on September 13, 2001). (CA)
125 Id.
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Under the 1996 Ontario Health Care Consent Act,126 a pivotal special tribunal
was established to intercede in consent issues. The tribunal functions as an
arbitration body but with legal powers. Such a function may be needed in
data protection and information privacy cases. The Courts tend to give
deference to its decisions. Personal autonomy and best interests are a major
focus that is fully recognized.
In R. v O’Connor,127 the Supreme Court addressed privacy of confidential
medical records and the accused’s ability to mount a defense.128 The case
involves a charge of sexual assault. The accused requested copies of the
complainant’s counseling and medical records held by third parties. The
DPSIP legal issue is the complainants’ privacy interest in confidential records
and the accused’s right to answer the charges. The Court wanted to balance
the interests. Lamer and Sopinka wrote that given that the complainant
shared the records with the Crown, there is no expectation of privacy. Part of
the balancing test also includes the impact on one’s dignity, privacy, and
security. L'Heureux-Dubé dissented, with La Forest and Gonthier concurring.
Privacy is a right protected by the right to liberty. While privacy is not
absolute, it is equal in balancing other rights or interests. The majority of the
Court agreed.
In partial response to the O’Connor decision, the Parliament amended the
Criminal Code, which is different from the Court’s prior ruling. The R. v Mills129
case found that the legislative adjustment was constitutional. The majority of
the Court found that Section Eight of the Constitution Act protects the right to
privacy. The court determined that in information privacy situations, Sections
Seven and Eight of the Constitution Act may apply.
126 Ontario Health Care Consent Act amend. c. 10, Sched. R, s. 14 (1996). (CA)
127 R. v O'Connor, 1995 CarswellBC 1098, [1996] 2 W.W.R. 153, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 44
C.R. (4th) 1, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 235, 191 N.R. 1, 68 B.C.A.C. 1, 112
W.A.C. 1, 33 C.R.R. (2d) 1, (14 December 1995). (CA)
128 Id.
129 R. v Mills, 1999 CarswellAlta 1055, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 248 N.R. 101, 28 C.R. (5th) 207,
[2000] 2 W.W.R. 180, 244 A.R. 201, 209 W.A.C. 201, 75 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, 180 D.L.R.
(4th) 1, 69 C.R.R. (2d) 1, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 1999 CarswellAlta 1056, [1999] S.C.J.
No. 68, (19 January 1999). (CA)
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In a long history of Ruby v Canada130 litigation, Ruby challenged provisions of
the Privacy Act.131 Ruby wanted complete access to his personal information
held by three governmental agencies and argued that Section fifty-one of the
Privacy Act was invalid under the Constitution Act. Ruby argued freedom of
speech, security, and access issues. The Court found that privacy is the
heart of liberty and that it includes information privacy. The Court found that
Section fifty-one of the Privacy Act was only a procedural provision. A
challenge of Section Seven of the Constitution Act was rejected.
After Mills, the court has found that the right to privacy includes control of
personal information. In R v Wise,132 the Supreme Court found that Section
Eight of the Charter provides some privacy rights. The section protects
against unreasonable search and seizure. When there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy, the section is not engaged. Where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy, broad and general rights protect one from
unreasonable searches.
An interesting and related test case involved a number of people who donated
blood and provided personal information for that purpose to the Canadian Red
Cross. About ten years later, the Red Cross tested some of the frozen
donations for AIDS. The organization reported the names of those that tested
positive to public health officials as required under the Health Protection and
Promotion Act.133 The Canadian AIDS Society filed suit alleging violation of an
expectation of privacy and no consent for future release was given. The
Supreme Court found that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy that
was violated. The Court also found that there is a lower standard of
130 Ruby v Canada (Solicitor General) 2000 CarswellNat 1106, 256 N.R. 278, 184 F.T.R. 159
(note), 6 C.P.R. (4th) 289, [2000] 3 F.C. 589, 2000 CarswellNat 3423, 187 D.L.R.
(4th) 675, 3 F.C. 589, 2000 F.C.J. No. 779, 42 Admin. L.R. (3d) 214). (CA)
131 Id.
132 R. v. Wise, 1992 CarswellOnt 71, 11 C.R. (4th) 253, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 70 C.C.C. (3d)
193, 133 N.R. 161, 8 C.R.R. (2d) 53, 51 O.A.C. 351, (27 February 1992). (CA)
133 Health Protection and Promotion Act amend. R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER H.7
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reasonableness when there is a legitimate public health state interest. In this
case, the public interest outweighs the information privacy right.134
A further clarification of Canadian DPSIP protections arose when the Treasury
Board of Canada Secretariat issued Privacy Impact Assessment Guidelines.135
The guidelines require a privacy impact assessment on the government’s
adoption of initiatives, information systems, proposed policies and programs,
and new technologies. The guidelines help organizations comply with the
federal DPSIP law and establish a gold standard for compliance. The Court
ruled that the standards are not binding but do help in interpretation of the
legislation.136
In another important case, a newspaper reporter requested access to audited
financial records that included public grant and distribution data. The
Supreme Court found that access to membership records of small groups can
include protected personal information.137 The decision has implications for
data mining situations.
134 Canadian AIDS Society v. Ontario (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 1720, 25 O.R. (3d) 388 (Ont.
Gen. Div.); affirmed Canadian AIDS Society v. Ontario (1996), [1996] O.J. No. 4184,
39 C.R.R. (2d) 236, 31 O.R. (3d) 798, 1996 CarswellOnt 4604 (Ont. C.A.); leave to
appeal refused Canadian AIDS Society v. Ontario (1997), [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 33,
(sub nom. Canadian Aids Society v. Ontario) 107 O.A.C. 80 (note), 216 N.R. 159
(note), 43 C.R.R. (2d) 188 (note) (S.C.C.), (1997). (CA)
135 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Privacy Impact Assessment Guidelines: A
Framework to Manage Privacy Risks. (2002), at http://www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/ciopubs/pia-pefr/paipg-pefrld2-eng.asp (last visited on 20 July
2012).
136 Canada Post Corp. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works) (1995), [1995] F.C.J. No. 241, 60
C.P.R. (3d) 441, 91 F.T.R. 320 (note), (sub nom. Societe Canadienne des postes v.
Canada) [1995] 2 F.C. 110, 179 N.R. 350, 30 Admin. L.R. (2d) 242, 1995 CarswellNat
688, 1995 CarswellNat 652 (Fed. C.A.), (10 February 1995). (CA) See also Canada
(Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2002
CarswellNat 1476, 2002 FCA 270, 291 N.R. 236, 228 F.T.R. 319 (note), [2003] 1 F.C.
219, 21 C.P.R. (4th) 30, 1 Admin. L.R. (4th) 270, (21 June 2002). (CA)
137 Montana Band of Indians v. Canada (Minister of Indian & Northern Affairs) (1988), 1988
CarswellNat 723, 26 C.P.R. (3d) 68, [1989] 1 F.C. 143, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 306, [1988] 5
W.W.R. 151, 31 Admin. L.R. 241, 18 F.T.R. 15, 59 Alta. L.R. (2d) 353, [1988] 4
C.N.L.R. 69, 1988 CarswellNat 1202 (Fed. T.D.), (15 April 1988). (CA)
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In Rousseau v. Wyndowe,138 a disability claimant wanted full release of the
notes written by an independent medical examiner. The notes included
personal and non-personal information. The claimant had obtained a copy of
the report but wanted total access to the physician’s records on the case. The
Supreme Court ruled that the information is personal information and personal
health information. The claimant could only have access to notes directly
related to him.
Under the common law tradition, the Federal Courts help to define and refine
DPSIP legal standards. In CA, the Office of the Privacy Commission of
Canada also has power to establish regulatory findings. The Commissioner
publishes relevant findings.139
5.5 Canadian Provincial Constitutional Declarations
Most modern countries have a set written constitution. The pattern usually
applies to subunits like states or provinces. CA uses a Constitution Act at the
Federal and Provincial level. The governmental levels also have a range of
conventions and unwritten laws. All of these documents have the force of
law.140 The Federal and Provincial Acts do not directly grant any constitutional
DPSIP legal standards. Specific provincial legislation does address such
issues; however, not at a constitutional level.
5.6 Canadian Provincial Legislation
The various Canadian provinces have enacted privacy-related legislation.
Most provinces have enacted laws that basically apply to governmental or
public entities.
138 Rousseau v. Wyndowe A-551-06, 2008 FCA 39, (2008) 2 F.C.R. D-12, (1 February 2008).
(CA)
139 See Office of the Privacy Commission of Canada, Commissioner's Findings -
http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/index_e.cfm (last visited on 25 July 2012).
140 Canadian Constitutional Documents, A Legal History. (2004), at
http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/ (last visited on 6 July 2012). The
source includes federal and provincial documents.
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The strongest provincial declaration of privacy is Section Five of Quebec's
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.141 The section declares that “Every
person has a right to respect for his private life.”142 British
Columbia,143 Manitoba,144 Newfoundland,145 and Saskatchewan146 have
enacted tort legislation for invasion of privacy. The laws provide for a
balancing–proportionality test. Expressed or implied consent and
actions to protect a legal right are legitimate exceptions. David H.
Flaherty maintains that provincial tort privacy laws have “rarely been used,
they have not been very successful, and they really do not address,
successfully, the four privacy torts that Dean William Prosser identified.”147
Three provinces, Alberta, British Columbia, and Quebec have enacted DPSIP
legislation. Some CA provinces have also enacted some sectoral laws
related to privacy concerns.
5.6.1 Alberta Personal Information Privacy Act
In 2003, the Province of Alberta passed the Personal Information Protection
Act. Section Three explains the purpose as protecting individual rights related
to the “collection, use and disclosure of personal information by organizations
… that recognizes both the right of an individual to have his or her personal
information protected and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose
personal information for purposes that are reasonable.”148
141 Province of Quebec, 2006, § 5.
142 Id.
143 Province of British Columbia, 2005, §1,4.
144 Province of Manitoba, 1998, § 2,3,5.
145 Province of Newfoundland, 2002, § 3,4.
146 Province of Saskatchewan, 2006, § 2,4,6.
147 David H. Flaherty, Some Reflections on Privacy and Technology, 26 Manitoba Law
Journal 2, 219 (1999), at 219. Also take note of Flaherty Protecting Privacy in
Surveillance Societies (1989)
148 Province of Alberta, 2003, § 3.
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The legislation defines personal information as “information about an
identifiable individual.”149 The legislation applies to all organizations that have
or use personal information in the province.150
In 2009, the Act was updated by amendment.151 On 19 January 2010, the
provisions went into effect. The amendments require that the Commissioner
be notified when there is a privacy breach that causes a significant harm. No
penalties are required for failure to comply. The individual does not always
have to be notified. When information is transferred to a service provider
outside of CA, the individual must be notified. Record destruction and
retention standards applied to personal data are refined by the Act. The
amendment protects whistleblower employees and requires employee
consent for the collection, use, and/or disclosure of employee personal data.
The Federal government has not enacted any breach notification standards.
Research conducted by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
found that more businesses are collecting personal information. Of the
businesses surveyed, sixty-eight percent reported personal data, which is an
increase of five percent in the 2007 study. Forty-two percent of the
businesses reported that they have no security breach concerns.152
149 Id. at ¶ 2. This includes a person’s name, address, telephone number, gender, ID
numbers, income, blood type, credit records, loan records, and other information. It
also includes sensitive personal information such as a person’s health or medical
history, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union
membership, and financial information.
150 Ibid.
151 Government of Alberta, Personal Information Protection Amendment Act, 2009. (2009), at
http://www.qp.alberta.ca/546.cfm?page=CH50_09.CFM&leg_type=fall (last visited on
8 July 2012). See also Province of Alberta, PIPA Compared. (2010), at
http://servicealberta.ca/pipa/documents/PIPAcompared.pdf (last visited on 19 March
2012).
152 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Poll: Canadian Businesses Unconcerned
About Privacy Breach Risk. (2010), at http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2010/nr-
c_100527_e.cfm (last visited on 27 May 2012).
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5.6.2 British Columbia Personal Information Privacy Act
The Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner in British Columbia is
independent from the government and has governmental powers. The office
is an independent federal agency. Under the British Columbia Personal
Information Protection Act, personal information is defined as “information
about an identifiable individual … (and) includes sensitive personal
information.”153 The Act does not provide special attention for non-profit
organizations or professional regulatory organizations.
Section Two of the Act defines the purpose of the legislation, which is to
govern organizations that collect, disclose, and use personal information.
This section also uses a reasonable personal standard of care to determine
appropriateness.154
The law in British Columbia establishes that individuals own their own
information and have a right to information privacy. Individuals do not have
total control over the information, but they are major stakeholders. The
Privacy Commission has the power to make binding orders, which can be
reviewed by the provincial Supreme Court.
5.6.3 New Brunswick Protection of Personal Information Act
The province established DPSIP enabling legislation in the passage of the
Protection of Personal Information Act155. The Act is administered by the
provincial Ombudsman,156 and is similar to the Federal legislation.
153 Provence of British Columbia, 2004, ¶, 2.
154 Ibid.
155 Province of New Brunswick, Protection of Personal Information Act. (1998), at
http://www.gnb.ca/acts/acts/p-19-1.htm (last visited on 25 September 2012).
156 Id.
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5.6.4 Quebec Privacy Protections
The Civil Code of Quebec identified key DPSIP legal issues. “Every person
has the right to the respect of his reputation and privacy. No one may invade
the privacy of a person without the consent of the person or his heirs unless
authorized by law.”157
Quebec passed the 2000 Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act.158 The purpose of the act was to protect personal information
to promote and support electronic commerce.159
Section Two defines personal information as “information about an identifiable
individual, but does not include the name, title or business address or
telephone number of an employee of an organization.”160 The aim of the act
was to protect an individual’s right to privacy and organizations in the
information industry.161 The act applies to every organization that involves
personal information.162
In 2010, the Province of Quebec established the Act Respecting the
Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector.163 The function of the
Act was to make Provincial standards conform to the Federal standards.
The Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms164 established privacy of
personal data as a priority. The preamble declared, amongst other
statements the following:
157 Civil Code of Quebec amend. 1991, c. 64, a. 35; 2002, c. 19, s. 2. (1991).
158 Province of Quebec, 2000. ¶ 1.
159 Id.
160 Id. at § 2.
161 Id. at § 3.
162 Id. at § 4.
163 Province of Quebec, An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the
Private Sector, R.S.Q. c. P-39.1. (2010), at http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/rsq-c-
p-39.1/latest/rsq-c-p-39.1.html (last visited on 26 July 2012). (CA)
164 Ibid.
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[E]very human being possesses intrinsic rights and freedoms designed
to ensure his protection and development; all human beings are equal
in worth and dignity, and are entitled to equal protection of the law; …
[and] the rights and freedoms of the human person are inseparable
from the rights and freedoms of others and from the common well-
being.165
The chapter on fundamental freedoms and rights, paragraph five, declared
that “Every person has a right to respect for his private life.” Section Six
declared that “Every person has a right to the peaceful enjoyment and free
disposition of his property, except to the extent provided by law.” Section
Eight stated that “No one may enter upon the property of another or take
anything therefrom without his express or implied consent.” Section Nine set
the standards that “Every person has a right to non-disclosure of confidential
information.”166
5.6.5 Sectoral Legislation
CA provinces have passed some sectoral legal approaches related to
information. Two significant areas include freedom of information acts, with
some privacy protections and health privacy acts. The approach is in sharp
contrast to the US sectoral approach to all DPSIP legal issues.
5.6.5.1 Provincial Freedom of Information Acts
The provinces have passed model freedom of information acts that addressed
some privacy concerns. These acts apply only to governmental agencies; the
major focus is on freedom of information requests on records held by
governmental agencies. The acts do not address key DPSIP legal issues,
and their administration is not consistent. The acts define personal
165 Province of Quebec, Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. (2006), at
http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/en/commun/docs/charter.pdf (last visited on 23 July 2012), at
2. (CA)
166 Ibid.
Chapter Five: Canadian Legal Standards 297
information and personal health information held by governmental agencies
and contractors. The function of the freedom of information acts is to allow
persons to request information and allow the government justifications for not
complying. Individuals do have a right to request correction of data held.
The Alberta Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act167 is
administered by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.168 The British
Columbia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act169 is also
administered by the provincial Information and Privacy Commissioner.170 The
government wants to change the Act so that it can collect and share more
personal data, without consent, and store it outside of Canada.171 The
Manitoba Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act172 is
administered by the provincial Ombudsman.173 The New Brunswick Right174 to
Information Act is administered through the various governmental Ministers.175
In 2002, the Newfoundland Freedom of Information Act176 was replaced by the
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act.177 The Act is
administered by the Department of Justice178 rather than an independent
agency. The Northwest Territories Access to Information and Protection of
167 Province of Alberta, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. (2006), at
http://foip.gov.ab.ca/ (last visited on 24 September 2012). (CA)
168 Id.
169 Province of British Columbia, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
(1996), at http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/F/96165_00.htm (last visited on 24
September 2012). (CA)
170 Id.
171 Andrew Macleod, Sweeping New Powers Would Threaten Privacy: Watchdog, The Tyee.
(2010), at http://thetyee.ca/News/2010/03/25/NewPowers/ (last visited on 25 March
2012).
172 Province of Manitoba, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. (1998), at
http://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/f175e.php (last visited on 20 September
2012). (CA)
173 Id.
174 New Brunswick, Right to Information Act Chapter R-10.3. (1978), at
http://www.gnb.ca/0062/PDF-acts/r-10-3.pdf (last visited on 8 July 2012). (CA)
175 Id.
176 Province of Newfoundland, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. (2002), at
http://www.hoa.gov.nl.ca/hoa/chapters/2002/A01-1.c02.htm (last visited on 25
September 2012). (CA)
177 Id.
178 Id.
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Privacy Act179 is administered by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.180
The Nova Scotia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act181 is
administered by the Freedom of Information and Privacy Review Officer.182
Ontario has enacted a Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act183
that is administered by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.184 The
province also enacted the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, 185 which is also administered by the Information and Privacy
Commissioner.186
The Prince Edward Island Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act187 is administered by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.188
Quebec enacted the Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies
and the Protection of Personal Information Act,189 which is administered by the
Commission d'accès à l'information.190
179 Government of The Northwest Territories, Access to Information Protection of Privacy Act.
(1996), at http://www.justice.gov.nt.ca/pdf/ACTS/Access_to_Information.pdf (last
visited on 24 September 2012).
180 Id.
181 Province of Nova Scotia, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. (1993), at
http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/legc/statutes/freedom.htm (last visited on 22
September 2012). (CA)
182 Id.
183 Province of Ontario, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. (1990a), at
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90f31_e.htm (last
visited on 21 September 2012). (CA)
184 Id.
185 Province of Ontario, Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
(1990b), at http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90m56_e.htm (last visited on 21
September 2012). (CA)
186 Id.
187 Province of Prince Edward Island, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
(2006), at http://www.gov.pe.ca/law/statutes/pdf/f-15_01.pdf (last visited on 26
September 2012). (CA)
188 Id.
189 Province of Quebec, An Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and
the Protection of Personal Information. (2007), at
http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2
&file=//A_2_1/A2_1_A.htm (last visited on 19 September 2012). (CA)
190 Id.
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The Saskatchewan Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act191
and the Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act192 are both administered by the Freedom of Information and Privacy
Commissioner. The Yukon Access to Information & Protection of Privacy
Act193 is administered by the Ombudsman and Information and Privacy
Commissioner.194
5.6.5.2 Provincial Health Privacy Acts
The Alberta Health Information Act195 is administered by the Information and
Privacy Commissioner.196 This act seeks to protect personal health
information while enabling the use of electronic health or medical records.
Traditional DPSIP legal standards are applied. A personal right to access and
correction is established. The Act requires an informed consent; moreover,
the consent may be withdrawn in writing.
The Manitoba Personal Health Information Act197 is administered by the
Ombudsman.198 The act provides a legal regulatory scheme for electronic
health records and attempts to provide some limited DPSIP legal constraints.
The Act provides for an expressed or implied consent. The person may place
conditions on the consent and withdraw the consent by notifying the health
trustee. The Act does allow name and address sharing with fundraising
191 Province of Saskatchewan, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. (2006a),
at http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/documents/English/Statutes/Statutes/F22-01.pdf (last
visited on 23 September 2012). (CA)
192 Province of Saskatchewan, Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act. (2006b), at
http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/documents/English/Statutes/Statutes/L27-1.pdf (last visited
on 23 September 2012). (CA)
193 Government of Yukon, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. (2002), at
http://www.gov.yk.ca/legislation/acts/atipp.pdf (last visited on 19 September 2012).
(CA)
194 Id.
195 Province of Alberta, Health Information Act. (2000), at
http://www.qp.gov.ab.ca/Documents/acts/H05.CFM (last visited on 22 September
2012). (CA)
196 Id.
197 Province of Manitoba, Personal Health Information Act. (1997), at
http://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/p033-5e.php (last visited on 21 September
2012). (CA)
198 Id.
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bodies. The province waited until 1 May 2008 (eleven years) to hire its first
privacy chief.
Newfoundland and Labrador is the latest province to pass health privacy laws
in the form of the Personal Health Information Act.199 This act was passed in
2008 with a 2010 effective date. The Act allows for readiness audits. The
purpose of this act is similar to other provincial health privacy acts. Under the
law, informed consent is required for the collection, disclosure, and use of
personal health data. The consent may be expressed or implied. The
consent may also be withdrawn. Violation complaints may be filed with the
Commissioner, who can seek informal resolution, investigate, review, and
make recommendations. Appeals can be made to the courts.
After years of work, the Ontario government passed the Personal Health
Information Protection Act of 2004200 to protect personal health data.201 The
Act establishes rules for collection, disclosure, and use; provides a right to
access and correction; reviews, and legal remedies. The Act requires a form
of informed consent, but the consent may be expressed or implied.
Expressed consent is required if the data is given to a non-healthcare
custodian. A person may withdraw an expressed or implied consent by filing
a notice with the custodian. The Act addresses the issue of capacity to
consent and allows for substitute decision makers.202 Violation complaints are
filed with the Information and Privacy Commissioner. The Commission can
inspect, review, and request a mediation process. Appeals can be made to
the Courts, which can impose financial fines for violations.
199 St. John's Newfoundland and Labrador, Personal Health Information Act. SNL2008. c. P-
7.01. (2010), at http://www.assembly.nl.ca/legislation/sr/statutes/p07-01.htm (last
visited on 17 July 2012). (CA)
200 Service Ontario, Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004. S.O. 2004, c. 3. (2010),
at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_04p03_e.htm
(last visited on 17 July 2012). (CA)
201 Id.
202 Id. at 22, 23, 24, 26.
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The Saskatchewan Health Information Protection Act203 is administered by the
Freedom of Information and Privacy Commissioner.204 The Act attempts to
protect personal information while enabling the use of electronic health or
medical data bases. This act requires an informed expressed or implied
consent with a revocation right. Amendments to the act allow hospitals to
release patient information for fundraising purposes without the patient’s
consent. Business interests trump privacy rights under the change.205 Under
this Saskatchewan statute, it is impossible to terminate an employee’s
employment for violating a patient’s privacy.206
The CA provincial acts set some informed consent requirements; however,
the acts provide a number of exceptions and no clear definitions. Consent is
not required for all personal health collections, disclosures, or uses. The acts
define what a record means as well as establish accuracy standards,
safeguards, openness, and individual access. If a case reaches the courts,
fines range from 50,000 CA dollars up to 500,000 CA dollars depending on
the province and if the offending party is a natural person or a corporation.
A significant failure of all these provincial Health Privacy Acts is that there is
no clear, consistent, or understandable legal standard that establishes
requirements for identifiable and non-identifiable health information. The
distinction may, in fact, be irrelevant considering data mining and sharing
programs. These acts ignore proclaimed aggregated, anonymized, and de-
identified data; they do not require minimum training requirements for
employees; they do require disposal and retention requirements, but they do
not establish a clear standard.
203 Province of Saskatchewan, Health Information Protection Act. (2003), at
http://www.health.gov.sk.ca/adx/aspx/adxGetMedia.aspx?DocID=272,94,88,Docume
nts&MediaID=122&Filename=health-info-overview-update.pdf (last visited on 23
September 2012). (CA)
204 Id.
205 CBC News, Sask. Patient Privacy Rule Changes Slammed. (2010), at
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/saskatchewan/story/2010/05/03/sask-privacy-dickson-
heath-information.html (last visited on 3 May 2012)
206 CBC News, Sask. Needs Privacy Upgrade: Report. (2010), at
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/saskatchewan/story/2010/06/30/sk-dickson-privacy-
upgrade.html?ref=rss (last visited on 30 June 2012).
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5.7 Canadian Provincial Case Law
Some provincial courts have ruled on DPSIP cases related to provincial laws
and conflicts. The provinces include Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest
Territories, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec. Those
provinces that have privacy commissioners or other officials that have
investigative powers often do note regulatory decisions.207
5.7.1 Alberta Case Law
In Stubicar v Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner), 208 the Alberta Court of
Appeals found that the courts should defer to privacy commissions’ determinations,
especially when there are mixed fact and legal issues. The court further found that
a reasonable expectation of privacy standard is appropriate.209 Later, the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench ruled in Lycka v Alberta (Information & Privacy
Commissioner).210 The case established that when procedural fairness is an issue,
a standard of correct expectation can be appropriate.211 The Court further found
that the term person incorporates the term custodian in the text of the law.212 Thus
a custodian is a person under the law.
207 Alberta: Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, Orders and Reports -
http://www.oipc.ab.ca/pages/OIP/description.aspx; British Columbia: Office of the
Information & Privacy Commissioner, Orders, Investigations, and Decisions -
http://www.oipc.bc.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81&Itemid=8;
Manitoba: Ombudsman Manitoba, Selected Case Studies -
http://www.ombudsman.mb.ca/casesummaries.htm; Newfoundland and Labrador:
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, Investigative Results & Analysis
- http://www.oipc.nl.ca/investigation.htm; Ontario: Information and Privacy
Commissioner, Decisions and Resolutions - http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/decisions-
and-resolutions/; Prince Edward Island: Office of the Information and Privacy
Commissioner Orders, Orders -
http://www.assembly.pe.ca/index.php3?number=1021416; Quebec: Commission of
Access and Information, CAI decisions - http://www.cai.gouv.qc.ca/index-en.html (last
visited on 25 July 2012).
208 Stubicar v Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner, 2008 CarswellAlta 1625, 2008
ABCA 357 (Alta. C. A.) (CA - Alberta).
209 Id.
210 Lycka v Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner), 2009 CarswellAlta 588, 2009
ABQB 245 (Alta. Q. B.) ¶¶ 21-27. (CA - Alberta).
211 Id.
212 Id. at ¶ 95.
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5.7.2 British Columbia Case Law
The British Columbia Government and Services Employees' Union sued the
Minister of Health Services for British Columbia.213 The issue related to the
release of medical billing and related medical data being a violation of
Sections Seven and Eight of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The data was government collected records processed by a private company.
The Court found a reasonable privacy expectation and that Sections seven
and eight of the charter protect the information.
The provincial privacy commissioner challenged Royal Canadian Mounted
Police practices in the courts. The Supreme Court of British Columbia ruled
that the commissioner does not have the power to sue in any capacity. The
Privacy Commissioner can only appear in court to present evidence of a
review of a decision or apply exemptions.214
In Hung v Gardiner,215 the plaintiff was an attorney and certified public
accountant. The government investigated the plaintiff’s supervisor and the
processing of data regarding the plaintiff. After the investigation regarding the
supervisor was concluded, the agency submitted the plaintiff’s information to
accounting and legal organizations. The plaintiff argued that the release was
a violation of privacy law. The Court found for the plaintiff and concluded that
once the supervisor’s investigation was concluded, the release violated the
original purpose of the collection.
213 B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Minister of Health Services), 2005 CarswellBC 672, 2005
BCSC 446, 27 Admin. L.R. (4th) 125, 129 C.R.R. (2d) 301, (25 March 2005) (CA-
BCSC).
214 Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), [2003] B.C.J. No.
1344, 14 B.C.L.R. (4th) 359, [2003] 9 W.W.R. 242, 2003 BCSC 862, 2003
CarswellBC 1394 (B.C. S.C.), (5 June 2003). (CA)
215 Hung v. Gardiner (2002), 2002 CarswellBC 1953, 2002 BCSC 1234, [2002] B.C.J. No.
1918, 45 Admin. L.R. (3d) 243 (B.C. S.C.); additional reasons at Hung v. Gardiner
(2003), 2003 CarswellBC 509, 2003 BCSC 285, [2003] B.C.J. No. 499 (B.C. S.C.);
affirmed Hung v. Gardiner (2003), [2003] B.C.J. No. 1048, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 298, 32
C.P.C. (5th) 1, 302 W.A.C. 4, 184 B.C.A.C. 4, 1 Admin. L.R. (4th) 152, 227 D.L.R.
(4th) 282, 2003 CarswellBC 1060, 2003 BCCA 257 (B.C. C.A.), (21 August 2002).
(CA)
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5.7.3 Northwest Territories Case Law
The Northwest Territories Supreme Court addressed the issue of access to
personal information. The Court found that the information must be personal,
as defined by the statute. The question was raised whether there was a
presumption that release would be unreasonable. The court held that there
was such a presumption and that this presumption can be rebutted only by a
strict application of the statute. All relevant circumstance must be
addressed.216
5.7.4 Nova Scotia Case Law
The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia established the standard for determining if
personal information could be released. The judicial task includes assessing
if the personal information met the criteria as determined by the Act. The next
task is to determine if the release of the data would be an unreasonable
invasion of personal privacy. The final judicial task is to balance all relevant
circumstances related to the decision to disclose or not.217
The Nova Scotia Privacy Coordinator refused to release information to Lee
Keating, a former employee of Shelburne School for Boys (a provincial
reformatory institution), related to charges made against him in a case that
was resolved in an alternative dispute resolution process. In Keating v. Nova
Scotia (Attorney General),218 the provincial Supreme Court ruled that Keating
had the right to know the information and should have an opportunity to
correct the record. The Court ruled that the release of the data was not an
unreasonable invasion of privacy. The Court followed the standard set in
216 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v Northwest Territories (Minister of Finance), 2006
CarswellNWT 41, 2006 NWTSC 33 (N.W.T. S.C.). (6 July 2006). (CA)
217 Dickie v. Nova Scotia (Department of Health) (1999), (sub nom. Dickie v. Nova Scotia
(Minister of Health)), 538 A.P.R. 333, 176 N.S.R. (2d) 333, 173 D.L.R. (4th) 656,
[1999] N.S.J. No. 116, 1999 CarswellNS 97 (N.S. C.A.), (4 February 1999). (CA)
218 Keating v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (2001), 2001 CarswellNS 206, 2001 NSSC 85,
[2001] N.S.J. No. 227, 606 A.P.R. 290, 194 N.S.R. (2d) 290, 42 Admin. L.R. (3d) 66
(N.S. S.C.); additional reasons at Keating v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (2001),
621 A.P.R. 110, 198 N.S.R. (2d) 110, 2001 CarswellNS 371, 2001 NSSC 150 (N.S.
S.C.), (13 June 2001). (CA)
Chapter Five: Canadian Legal Standards 305
Dickie.219
5.7.5 Ontario Case Law
In Somwar v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd., 220 the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice found for the plaintiff. Somar worked as a manager for
McDonald’s restaurant. The employer ran a credit check on him without his
permission. The court found McDonald’s behavior unlawful under credit
reporting statutes and that it was also considered a violation of Somwar’s
privacy rights.221
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice also decided two cases related to police
officers requesting personal information when the person is not facing criminal
charges. In R. v Harris,222 a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic
violation was asked for a name, address, and date of birth. In R. v E. (M),223 a
youth fell asleep at a computer at an Internet Café. The police demanded the
youth provide name, address, date of birth, and any outstanding criminal
charges. In both cases, the Court found that there was an expectation of
privacy and a right to control the information. Having such information can
open databases that can be mined for additional intimate data.
Sandra Jones was a customer of a bank for which she also worked. Winnie
Tsige was a co-worker at the bank; however, they did not know one another.
Tsige had established a relationship with Jones’ ex-husband. As a bank
employee, Tsige accessed Jones’ banking records at least 174 times over
219 Dickie v. Nova Scotia (Department of Health) (1999), (sub nom. Dickie v. Nova Scotia
(Minister of Health)), 538 A.P.R. 333, 176 N.S.R. (2d) 333, 173 D.L.R. (4th) 656,
[1999] N.S.J. No. 116, 1999 CarswellNS 97 (N.S. C.A.), (4 February 1999) (CA).
220 Somwar v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd. (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 172 • (2006), 263
D.L.R. (4th) 752, (2006). (CA)
221 Id.
222 R. v. Harris (2006), [2006] O.J. No. 1321, 2006 CarswellOnt 2015, 2006 ONCJ 106 (Ont.
C.J.); reversed R. v. Harris (2007), 87 O.R. (3d) 214, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 49 C.R.
(6th) 220, 51 M.V.R. (5th) 172, 2007 CarswellOnt 5279, 2007 ONCA 574, 163 C.R.R.
(2d) 176, 225 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 228 O.A.C. 241 (Ont. C.A.), (24 August 2007) (CA).
223 R. v. E. (M.) (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 2482, 2006 ONCJ 146, [2006] O.J. No. 1657 (Ont.
C.J.), (8 March 2006). (CA)
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four years. When her actions were confronted, Tsige confessed, apologized,
and was disciplined by the bank. Jones sought judicial relief.
In Jones v. Tsige224 the Ontario Court of Appeals recognized an “intrusion
upon seclusion” or invasion of privacy cause of action. The court found that
modern information technology poses a real threat to the right of privacy that
is critical to the political and social order. In an action under an “intrusion
upon seclusion,” the plaintiff must establish three factors. There was an
invasion of the plaintiff’s private affairs or concerns without lawful justification.
The invasion was deliberate, intentional, reckless, or significant. A
reasonable person would consider the invasion as highly offensive. The
plaintiff does not have to establish economic damages. Damages may be
symbolic based on infringement or to vindicate rights. If established, the
defendant would be liable for the crime and pay up to $20,000 CA dollars
plus the costs of aggravating damages. A defendant’s defense may be a
claim of freedom of expression or of the press.
5.7.6 Prince Edward Island Case Law
The Supreme Court upheld the Privacy Commissioner’s right to refuse the
release of names and salaries of employees of a governmental board. The
Court established an analysis standard for determining when data can be
released.225 The standard is the same as that determined in the Dickie v.
Nova Scotia case. The Prince Edward Island Supreme Court found that
employment history is personal information.
5.7.7 Quebec Case Law
For years, the Canadian courts followed the American view that a person
does not have an expectation of privacy in public places. Both legal systems
224 Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, (18 January 2012). (CA)
225 MacNeill v. Prince Edward Island (Information & Privacy Commissioner) (2004), 22 Admin.
L.R. (4th) 144, 2004 PESCTD 69, 2004 CarswellPEI 88, [2004] P.E.I.J. No. 86, 719
A.P.R. 231, 242 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 231 (P.E.I. T.D.), (23 November 2004). (CA)
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have modified this simplistic view. In Aubry v. Editions Vice-Versa Inc.,226 the
Quebec court found a privacy cause of action for a seventeen year-old girl
sitting on a building door step when a photographer took her picture without
her consent. When the photographs were published, the girl sued for privacy
violation. The court agreed in a unanimous decision. The photographer had
violated her privacy by not obtaining her consent and had in fact, appropriated
her image. The court determined that the girl had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the street.227
The informed consent or informed choice principle developed through the
British Common Law tradition. The Canadian courts accept the reasonable
person standard that requires an adequate disclosure of the process, risks,
and whether the lack of disclosure could cause damage.228
5.8 Canadian Standards and Remedies
Starting in the early 1990s, CA began to address Internet-based personal
information privacy issues. In 1996, Industry Canada published a number of
DPSIP options that covered a wide range of options.
CA can consider following the Netherlands model that sets norms of
acceptable behavior and compliance but with no administrative, legislative, or
oversight supervision. CA can follow the Registration and Licensing System
that requires users to report activities in a public registry and meet DPSIP
legal standards. CA can follow the Privacy Data Commissioner Model that
establishes a single person or commission to use persuasion to meet
standards.229 CA chose to follow the data commissioner model after reviewing
the other options.
226 Aubry v. Editions Vice-Versa Inc, 1 S.C.R. 591, (1998), 591. (CA)
227 Id.
228 Nichols v. Young O.J. No. 4367, per McMurtry C.J.0., Weiler and Sharpe D.A. (Ontario
Court of Appeal) (2003). (CA)
229 Industry Canada, Privacy and the Information Highway Regulatory Options for Canada
(Author. 1996).
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A number of regulatory issues must be considered. The privacy law can add
powers to existing offices to cover new privacy related sectors. Cyber
regulations can focus on the computer and computer systems rather than the
persons using the system. The law can extend the power of the Privacy
Commission of Canada to regulate the private sector. The law can coerce the
private sector to meet public sector standards. The law can establish DPSIP
standards and make violations an offense. The law can also address specific
industry regulation that would address large and politically specific sectors.230
The counter position is for the law to embrace voluntarism. In such a case
DPSIP issues would involve no governmental regulation. The government
could establish an assistance standard that would allow for compliance. In
this case rule-making would be shifted to the private sector. The final option
would accept private sector rules with the government having ultimate
coercive powers.231
The DPSIP standard in CA is the PIPEDA, which was enacted in response to
the EU data protection directive. The provinces have adopted similar
standards and laws. A federal privacy commissioner and several provincial
commissioners work together on consultation, educational, enforcement,
inquiry, and policy recommendation projects. Business organizations are
encouraged to appoint chief privacy officers and abide by legal standards.
Governmental agencies are required to perform a privacy impact assessment
on new programs that assess privacy impacts on proposals and programs,
including delivery methods. The approach may be used on current programs
and systems; however, the assessment is required if the program is re-
designed. The standard has not been applied to business organizations
including those business organizations that turn to the government for
protections when wanted or needed.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
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The current CA approach includes a focus on privacy enhancing technologies.
A recent study by London Economics232 reveals some key relevant data. The
subjects of the study included business associations, consumer advocacy
groups, and data protection authorities. All of the subjects found that the risks
to privacy are serious and growing with new electronic personal data
processing. Consumers generally rate the risk as low but this is partly due to
consumer ignorance. However, the political–policy debate continues. DPSIP
authorities are confronted with the argument that DPSIP regulation should
stop because costs are an impediment. Businesses argue that there is no
political imperative or encouragement and that the government is to blame for
the most notorious cases of loss of data. Businesses further argue that since
consumers refuse to pay a business tax for data protection, businesses
should be allowed to do whatever they want.
CA privacy law provides for statutory remedies that are subject to court
review. As noted previously, the system of imposing fines for violations has
not been very effective. The issuing of fines has been rare and the costs
have been low. The courts can order correction of violating practices, publish
notices, and award damages.233
5.9 Canadian Implementation System
The CA implementation system involves two alternative approaches. The first
is the industry attempt to establish self-regulatory model codes to prevent the
industry from being accountable to the government. The second approach
involves governmental regulations for both the private and public sectors.
232 London Economics, Study on the Economic Benefits of Privacy Enhancing Technologies
(PETs): Final Report to The European Commission DG Justice, Freedom and
Security. (2010), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/studies/final_report_pets_16_07_10
_en.pdf (last visited on 30 July 2012).
233 See PIPEDA Division 2, Section 16 a-c. (CA)
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5.9.1 Self-Regulation Approaches
The Canadian Standards Association (CSA) is a business-oriented, not-for-
profit membership organization. CSA established a voluntary model code for
protecting personal information.234 The code is based on the OECD
guidelines and advocated that a flexible governmental legislative process be
instituted that allows industry sectors to establish their own private codes
based on the CSA model code.235 The CSA model code established ten
DPSIP principles: accountability; identifying purposes; consent; limiting
collection; limiting use, disclosure, and retention; accuracy; safeguards;
openness; individual access; and challenging compliance.236
Communications Canada established comprehensive telecommunication
privacy policies. The policies recognized the fact that Canadians value their
information privacy. The policies noted that people must know the privacy
implications of using telecommunications. People should not have to pay
extra for privacy protections. Expressed and informed consent should be
required except when there is a clear public interest. A balance test should
be applied to protect the right to be left alone. Privacy expectations may
change and must be periodically reviewed.237
234 Canadian Standards Association, Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information.
(1996), at http://www.csa.ca/standards/privacy/code/Default.asp?language=English
(last visited on 15 June 2012).
235 Information Highway Advisory Council (IHAC), Connection, Community, and Content: the
Challenge of the Information Highway (Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
1995), 141.
236 Media Awareness Network, Your Guide to the CSA's Privacy Code. (2010), at
http://www.media-
awareness.ca/english/resources/educational/handouts/privacy/csa_privacy_code_gui
de.cfm (last visited on 5 July 2012).
237 Communications Canada, Telecommunications Privacy Principles (Supply and Services
Canada. 1992) 6-8.
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5.9.2 Privacy Commissioner Approaches
The Canadian Privacy Commissioner238 Office issues periodic reports on its
activities, findings, and the related and laws. This office consults and
investigates issues related to PIPEDA and the Privacy Act. The consultations
include reviewing legislation for privacy issues and preparing legal opinions.
Complaints are received, investigated, closed, settled, and litigated. The
office also provides considerable public information services to Canadians
and the world as well as an excellent online self-assessment tool to help
organizations determine how well the organization is in compliance with
DPSIP standards.239 The office also provides mediation services in
appropriate cases. The Canadian Privacy Commissioner Office and the Act
itself are reviewed every five years to make sure that the system is current.
The following table reveals the major areas of complaints and resolutions
during the 2007 through the 2009 fiscal years.240 The information provides
insight into the key issues faced and how the areas of concern have changed
over the years.
Table 5.1 Complaints Received and Closed between January 1, 2007 and
December 31, 2009
Type 2007
Complaint
Percentage
2008
Complaint
Percentage
2009
Complaint
Percentage
Access 19% 17% 28%
Accountability 2% 2% 4%
238 Canadian Privacy Commissioner, Privacy by the Numbers in 2007. (2007), at
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/ar/200708/2007_pipeda_e.asp (last visited on
4 September 2012), § 8.
239 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, PIPEDA Self-Assessment Tool: Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. (2008. August 8), at
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/pub/ar-vr/pipeda_sa_tool_200807_e.asp (last
visited on 10 August 2012).
240 Canadian Privacy Commissioner, 2007, § 10 and Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, Annual Report to Parliament 2009: Report on the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act. (2010), at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/ar/200910/2009_pipeda_e.pdf (last visited on 8 July
2012).
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Accuracy 2% 2% 4%
Challenging
Compliance
n/a <1% 0%
Collection 19% 22% 14%
Consent 5% 6% 10%
Correction/Notation <.1% 1% <1%
Fee <.1% <1% 0%
Openness 1% <1% 2%
Retention 2% 0% 1%
Safeguards 10% 7% 10%
Time Limits 4% 3% 1%
Use and
Disclosure
34% 38% 26%
Other 0% <1% 0%
Total 350 422 231
Based on the available data, the top-tier concerns related to use and
disclosure, collection, access, and safeguards. The second-tier concerns are
related to consent, time limits, accountability, accuracy, and retention. Some
concerns were expressed related to openness, correction and notation, fees,
and retaliation. While each area of complaint is important to the parties
involved, the data also provides information useful in assessing the scope of
privacy commissioner practices. The total number of complaints is currently
the lowest reported in this comparative data. The data suggests that the
Canadian Privacy Commissioner is making some progress in educational and
enforcement efforts.
To make sense of the data and the operations of the commission, the reports
provide some key definitions. The Canadian Privacy Commissioner defines
unusual terms such as “not well-founded”, “well-founded”, and “resolved” to
report the findings of investigations.241
241 Canadian Privacy Commissioner, 2007, Appendix 1. The definitions include Not well-
founded. The investigation uncovered no or insufficient evidence to conclude that an
organization violated the complainant’s rights under PIPEDA. Resolved. The
investigation substantiated the allegations; however, prior to the conclusion of the
investigation, the organization took or committed to take corrective action to remedy
the situation, to the satisfaction of the OPC. Well-founded and resolved. At the
conclusion of the investigation, the Commissioner believed that the allegations were
likely supported by the evidence. Before a finding occurred, the Commissioner made
a recommendation to the organization for corrective action to remedy the situation,
which the organization took or committed to take. Well-founded. An organization
failed to respect a provision of PIPEDA.
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The Privacy Commissioner’s Report declares that privacy law must be
periodically updated based on changes in the environment, technology, and
related challenges. The current major issues as reported are information
technology changes including the increased amount of data being collected
and stored, as well as web-based mapping technology including Google’s
Street View. The commoditization of personal information and identity
management is another area of concern. The misuse of or false national
security claims must be balanced against the individuals’ right to privacy. The
practice of the government deputizing private corporations and professionals
to aid the government in violating privacy rights must be controlled. The
increased use of genetic information collection and use must be addressed in
terms of data protection and information privacy concerns.242 As new
technology and information business interests evolve, new privacy challenges
are created and must be considered. Cloud computing, Facebook,243 Internet
retailers, Linked In, My Space, online dating services,244 RFID, smart grids,245
242 Ibid. See also Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Guardians Warn Multinationals to Respect Laws,
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. (2010), at http://priv.gc.ca/media/nr-
c/2010/nr-c_100420_e.cfm (last visited on 20 April 2012). See also Diane Bartz,
Analysis: Google's Private Data Grab Means Big Legal Trouble, Reuters. (2010), at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6604YG20100701 (last visited on 1 July
2012).
243 Kate Raynes–Goldie, Aliases, Creeping, and Wall Cleaning: Understand Privacy in the
Age of Facebook, First Monday, 1-4, (2010). The research shows that users are
concerned about their privacy but have a different definition. Misty Harris, The New
Social Suicide: Facebook Users Jump Ship Over Privacy Concerns, Canwest News
Service. (2010), at
http://www.vancouversun.com/socialsuicideFacebookusersjumpshipoverprivacyconce
rns/3024192/story.html (last visited on 9 July 2012) shows that millions are stopping
the service. Jacquie Mcnish and Omar El Akkad, Facebook Users Risk Blackmail,
Privacy Czar Warns Globe and Mail (2010), at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/facebook-users-risk-blackmail-
privacy-czar-warns/article1545444/ (last visited on 26 April 2012) for PCC’s analysis.
The PCC told the company that it was in violation of CA law. See also Erin Power,
Rethinking Privacy on the “Digital Street,” Troy Media. (2009), at
http://www.troymedia.com/?p=2185 (last visited on 13 July 2012).
244 Meagan Fitzpatrick, Privacy Watchdog Probes Dating Site, Canwest News Service.
(2010), at
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/life/Privacy+watchdog+probes+dating+site/3223965/sto
ry.html (last visited on 1 July 2012).
245 Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, Commissioner Cavoukian to Unveil Best
Practices for Smart Grid Privacy Protection at Toronto Summit, June 16. (2010), at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/2010-06-14-Smart-Grid-Paper-Media-
Advisory.pdf (last visited on 14 June 2012).
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and social networking sites in general246 and practices are all current
concerns.247
The Ontario CA Privacy Commissioner was the leader in the country and the
world in establishing sound DPSIP principles. The Commissioner was the
first to establish a dialogue on requiring privacy by design (PbD).248 The
approach requires that technology developers and providers must provide
technology that protects DPSIP standards within the design of all systems.
The CA Commissioner was an early advocate to propose that there should be
a legal right to be forgotten in the information age. Subjects’ data should not
exist forever in the power of DPSIP organizations. Data retention should be
time limited.
Ann Cavoukian,249 the Ontario CA Privacy Commissioner maintains that
personal information is the oil of the Internet. She described how the
Personal Data Ecosystem (PDE) will make personal information protections
more than best practices, laws, and regulations. The aim is to change the
relationship between individuals and organizations to protect information
privacy concerns. Individuals must have control over how personal
information is collected, disclosed, and used. Individuals must become the
point of data integration. Individuals must have control over their own privacy
246 Sarah Schmidt, Canadians Wary of Online Privacy Promises, National Post. (2010), at
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2482724 (last visited on 24 January
2012). Seventy-nine percent of the population does not trust such sites while six
percent does trust these sites.
247 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report to Parliament 2009: Report
on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. (2010), at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/ar/200910/2009_pipeda_e.pdf (last visited on 8 July
2012).
248 See Ann Cavoukian, What is Privacy by Design?, Information & Privacy Commissioner
Ontario. (2010), at http://www.privacybydesign.ca/ (last visited on 6 July 2012); Ann
Cavoukian, Privacy by Design and the Emerging Personal Data Ecosyste. (2012), at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/Resources/Discussion-Papers/Discussion-Papers-
Summary/?id=1244 (last visited on 31 October 2012).
249 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design and the Emerging Personal Data Ecosyste. (2012), at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/Resources/Discussion-Papers/Discussion-Papers-
Summary/?id=1244 (last visited on 31 October 2012).
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settings. The approach involves the creation of a Personal Data Vault
(PDV)250 that the individual person controls.
5.10 Canadian Sociolegal Concerns
As early as 1992, Ekos251 survey of 3,000 Canadians reveled that ninety-two
percent expressed moderate to high levels of DPSIP concern. Financial,
medical, and purchasing information was especially high. The study identified
a list of major industries that had violated information privacy principles. The
list included banks, cable companies, credit bureaus, doctors and hospitals
(the lowest), employers, governments, insurance companies, police, retail
stores, survey companies (the highest), and telephone companies
The Federation Nationale des Associations de Consommateurs du
Quebec/Public Interest Advocacy Centre252 surveyed 2,000 Canadians in
Ontario and Quebec. Over fifty percent reported privacy violations of concern
and high information privacy concerns. The research of Smith, Milberg, and
Burke253 showed that the major privacy concerns were improper access and
unauthorized secondary use.
The work of Milberg, Burke, Smith, and Kaltman254 compared culture as a
variable in information privacy concerns. The study indicated that Thailand
showed the lowest level of concerns and CA the highest in the study. The
Canadians also showed the highest rank order of unauthorized secondary
use, improper access, collection issues, and errors. Unauthorized
secondary use was the highest in seven of the nine countries studied
250 AKA as a Personal Data Locker, Personal Cloud, Personal Data Service. And Personal
Data Store.
251 Ekos Research Associates, Privacy Revealed: The Canadian Privacy Survey (Ekos
Research Associates 1993).
252 Federation Nationale Des Associations De Consommateurs Du Quebec/Public Interest
Advocacy Centre, Surveying Boundaries: Canadians and their Personal Information
(Author 1995).
253 H. Jeff Smith, et al., Information Privacy: Measuring Individuals' Concerns About
Organizational Practices, 20 Management Information Systems 2 167 (1996, June).
254 Sandra. J. Milberg, et al., Values, Personal Information Privacy Concerns, and Regulatory
Approaches, 38 Communications ACM 12, 65 (1995).
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and the second highest in the other two. The samples’ rank order was
consistent. Irwin Altman reasoned that the legal regulation of privacy
was universal and was documented in all societies.255
Paul Tolchinsky, Michael McCuddy, Jerome Adams, Daniel Ganster, and
Howard Fromkin studied the importance of information and perceptions of
privacy. Data analysis included rankings from high to low. The data
measured the importance based on “(1) disclosure permission, (2) disclosure
location, (3) disclosure consequences, and (4) type of information
disclosed.”256 The Graham Smith study257 quantified that informed consent on
the collection and use of the data was a major information privacy standard
and that the employee’s perception of the data’s sensitivity determined
corporate privacy protection standards.
Another study of 7,088 adults, by Ipsos/Queen's University258 found that sixty-
nine percent of Canadians were concerned about the protection of personal
information. The table below demonstrated that the business response to
privacy concerns were very different in CA and the US.259
Table 5.2 Privacy Concerns
Issue CA US
"Good privacy practices" were tied to customer
trust and brand loyalty
61% 17%
Had dedicated privacy officers, resources, and
training programs.
82% 50%
Had privacy awareness for new employees 71% 43%
Company assigned a senior executive as their
privacy officer
75% 50%
Customers' privacy preferences captured and 79% 53%
255 Irwin Altman, Privacy: A Conceptual Analysis, 8 Environment and Behavior, 7 (1976), at
26.
256 Paul D. Tolchinsky, et al., Employee Perceptions of Invasion of Privacy: A Field
Experiment, 66 Journal of Applied Psychology 3, 308 (1981).
257 L. Graham Smith, Impact Assessment and Sustainable Resource Management (Longman
Scientific and Technical 1993).
258 Ipsos / Queen's University, Interviews with 7,088 Adults in Brazil, Canada, France,
Hungary, Mexico, Spain and the United States (2006), http://www.angus-
reid.com/polls/view/13849 (last visited on 3 March 2012).
259 Nikki Swartz, U.S., Canadian Firms Have Different Views of Privacy (2004, September 1),
http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/221693-1.html (last visited on 17 March 2012).
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followed
Companies had a policy regarding surveillance
and computer monitoring in the workplace
70% 13%
In 2009, the Canadian Office of the Privacy Commissioner conducted a public
research project. The data showed that eighty-seven percent of Canadians
distrusted businesses in the protection of their private information, especially
during hard economic times. The Commissioner reported that some
businesses were complying with data protection principles because they
thought that it was a source of competitive advantage. Sixty-six percent of the
sample did not know which institutions or resources were available for privacy
concerns. A majority – sixty-two percent claimed that privacy was one of the
most important issues for the next ten years. Seventy-one percent of the
sample favored stronger privacy protection laws. The vast majority eighty-
three percent - were concerned about genetic privacy.260
As noted previously, politicians and jurists can and certainly do argue and
maneuver around DPSIP issues. Businesses and corporations can and do
corrupt the process.261 Notwithstanding the behavior of politicians, courts, and
industry, the research cited above shows that the majority of CA citizens want
strong DPSIP legislation and regulation.
260 Office of the Privacy Commissioner Of Canada, Canadians Concerned Corporate Cost
Cutting Could Affect their Privacy: Poll (2009, April 27),
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/survey/2009/ekos_2009_01_e.cfm (last visited on
28 April 2012).
261 See: Jeffrey D. Clements, Corporations Are Not People: Why They Have More Rights
Than You and What You Can Do About it (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc ed. 2012).
Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the
Theft of Human Rights (Rodale ed. 2002). Robert G. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money:
The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government,(Alfred A.
Knopf ed. 2009). Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress -
and a Plan to Stop It (Twelve - Hachette Hook Group ed. 2011).
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5.11 Canadian Critique
The Canadian approach to DPSIP law is certainly superior to the system in
AU, US, and SA; however, DPSIP law and system in CA does have some
weaknesses.
The CA legal and regulatory system does not include Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) as holders of information. The Canadian Internet Policy and
Public Interest Clinic at the University of Ottawa has called upon the Federal
Privacy Commissioner to address this issue. The use of behavioral targeting
is widespread in the UK and the US, but the Canadian Internet Policy and
Public Interest Clinic maintains that the practice violates Canadian standards.
ISPs do not provide adequate informed consent, adequate notice, or means
of personal control. The issue is also being raised in the US but with a self-
regulation approach.262 These issues are a critique of the legislation and
regulatory scheme. The issues also show that the CA system provides for a
means to share issues with those stakeholders that are responsible for
privacy.
The power of the Privacy Commissioner’s office is limited in terms of rule
making. The Privacy Commission has attempted to persuade the Parliament
to update the Canadian Privacy Act for some time. The Canadian Bar
Association confirms that the Act is out of date and needs modernization. The
Bar has recommended that the Act be changed to insure that “personal
information of Canadians is collected only when demonstrably necessary and
once collected is subject to stringent safeguards and accountability
requirements, including a breach notification requirement; and not shared
within or beyond Canada's borders unless those safeguards and requirements
262 Terry Pedwell, Academics Ask Privacy Watchdog to Probe Online Profiling Practices,
Canadian Press. (2008, July 28), at
http://www.cbc.ca/cp/technology/080728/z072825A.html (last visited on 29 July
2012).
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can be guaranteed.”263 The Canadian Bar Association wants the government
to provide clear and articulated goals and breach notification standards. The
Chief Privacy Officer and its department must be able to do more than
advocate and act as an ombudsman. To guard personal information, the
Privacy Office must be able to write and enforce regulations subject to judicial
review.
The legal and regulatory system in CA has some major flaws. For example,
the auditor general for Alberta reports that, “Because information security in
the government is not consistently enforced, all information assets are
exposed to unacceptable risk.”264 The department studied 400 computer
systems but the review stopped after sixty-nine were evaluated and found
faulty. Contrary to DPSIP legal standards in CA, the government is
considering radio frequency identification (RFID) Enhanced Driver's Licenses
(EDL).265
Business interests can subvert the law through manipulation. Insurance
companies, in one documented case, increased rates up to thirty-two percent
for subscribers refusing to release credit data. New Brunswick is the only
province that has banned the practice in all insurance concerns. Alberta and
Ontario have banned the practice for auto insurance.266
Willingness to comply with DPSIP laws and regulations is a key factor to
establishing the effectiveness of such regulation. CA established a do-not-call
program where people can reject unwanted marketing calls. More than seven
263 Canadian Bar Association, Comprehensive Revision of Privacy Act: Resolution 08-06a.
(2008, September 26), at http://www.cba.org/cba/resolutions/pdf/08-06-a-pdf.pdf (last
visited on 26 September 2012), 2.
264 Jim Macdonald, Alberta Data Hacked: Health, Drivers 'Licence Records Not Well
Protected: Top Auditor. (2008, October 3), at
http://www.edmontonsun.com/News/Alberta/2008/10/03/pf-6962041.html (last visited
on 4 October 2012), ¶ 5.
265 Antonella Artuso, New ID Card Threatens our Privacy: Commissioner Raises Concerns.
(2008, October 21), at http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2008/10/21/7151421-
sun.html (last visited on 22 October 2012).
266 CBC News, Credit Scores Can Hike Home Insurance Rates: Insurance Companies Say
Credit Scores are a Good Indicator of Risk. (2010), at
http://www.cbc.ca/consumer/story/2010/04/08/consumer-insurance-credit-score.html
(last visited on 6 July 2012).
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million citizens have registered for the service. Over 300,000 complaints for
violations have resulted in 73,000 CA dollar fines. The problem is that the
Commission has only collected 250 CA dollars in fines. An additional set of
problems occurs with the exemptions in the law. Charities, businesses that
have a prior customer relationship, newspapers, and political parties need not
comply. The data shows that the DPSIP law must be revamped and
enforcement methods must be revised.267
In Jennifer Stoddart’s report268 to parliament, she noted some similar concerns
related to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.
Under Canadian law, banks, insurance firms and securities dealers, as well as
others are to monitor and report certain financial transactions. The problem is
that no checks or balances are tied to privacy standards. According to the
report, the financial institutions are collecting and using information that they
do not actually use, need, or have legal authority to collect. A sound DPSIP
legal approach must extend to all in the government and private sector.
Even if sound DPSIP legislation is passed and regulatory bodies are
established, the battle is not over. Partisan parliamentarians supported by
contrary business supporters and information business special interest
groups, can prevail. One standard approach is to refrain from funding the
activities at a level needed to be effective.269
The Federal Privacy Commissioner of Canada is an ombudsman who can
investigate complaints and advocate for privacy issues. The Privacy
267 Canadian Press, Do-Not-Call Fines Total $73,000; Only $250 Collected, Metro News.
(2010), at http://www.metronews.ca/toronto/local/article/572775--do-not-call-fines-
total-73-000-only-250-collected--page0 (last visited on 8 July 2012).
268 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report to Parliament 2009: Report
on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. (2010), at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/ar/200910/2009_pipeda_e.pdf (last visited on 8 July
2012). For a brief news report, see Alexandre Deslongchamps, Canada Banks,
Agency, May Violate Clients’ Privacy, Report Says Bloomberg Press. (2009), at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aT_A.1ec0oKY (last
visited on 17 November 2012).
269 The Starphoenix, Citizens Deserve Adequate Funding for Privacy Office. (2010), at
http://www.thestarphoenix.com/citizensdeserveadequatefundingprivacyoffice/271073
0/story.html (last visited on 22 March 2012).
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Commission can make recommendations but does not have the power to
issue orders or efforts to stop a privacy-violating practice. Enforcement is
dependent on the relevant party’s cooperation or on seeking judicial
intervention. Yet, in 2002, the EU determined that the Canadian law and
DPSIP system provided an adequate level of protection.270
Once established, DPSIP law can be thwarted by opponents and political
forces. Saskatchewan is a classic example. The number of reviews and
complaints are up 113 percent in a year. Reviews are taking up to three
years. When the commission asked for 129,000 CA dollars to help remedy
the needs, the government refused. Therefore, services are being cut back.271
For DPSIP laws to be effective, the courts, legislature, governmental officials,
and businesses that are committed to corporate social responsibility must
help build a culture of privacy.
Given that the CA system for the DPSIP legal approach has been determined
by the EU Data Protection Working Party as EU “adequate” in terms of
section 25 of the EU Directive and is more advanced that the AU, SA, and the
US approaches, the lack of independence and enforcement powers takes its
toll. For example, the Landlord's Source Centre, a Toronto company, collects
data on potential renters for profit. The data base provides names,
addresses, social insurance numbers, medical and mental health history,
family member history, educational data, renting dispute information, criminal
records, and credit information. The company sells access to the information
while denying that the database exists. When confronted by the privacy
commissioner, it took four years for the Centre to drop some services. The
270 See Commission Decision (EC) 2002/2 of 20 December 2001 pursuant to Dir (EC) 95/46
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal
data provided by the Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act (2002) OJ L2/13.
271 Jennifer Graham, Saskatchewan Privacy Commissioner Cuts Services Citing Lack of
Resources, The Canadian Press. (2010), at
http://www.chroniclejournal.com/includes/datafiles/CP_print.php?id=245484&title=Sa
skatchewanprivacycommissionercutsservicescitinglackofresources (last visited on 22
February 2012).
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data practices were illegal; however, there were no legal remedies.272 The
federal law fails to provide order-making powers.
The CA courts tend to support business interest agreements, even without
informed consent. The judicial response is often myopic. The reality is that
seventy percent of companies will reveal personal information, including in
non-emergency situations, to the RCMP without a warrant. There is no court
oversight.273
CA has tried to reach a middle ground in DPSIP legal issues. Whereas the
EU approach is more detailed and regulatory in nature, the US approach is
market oriented in most situations and therefore supports self-regulation. CA
on the other hand, has some regulatory powers and establishes privacy
commissioners. The CA approach does provide market flexibility.274 A major
problem is that privacy legislation has not allowed responsive parties to deal
with technological environmental changes. To deal with changes, regulatory
bodies may be more responsive than parliamentarians.275
The CA approach has taken an international lead in addressing DPSIP
issues. The privacy commissions have established an exceptional
educational system through their own websites and publications.276
Commissioners focus on showing that complying with privacy standards
equals good business practices.277
272 John Goddard, Tenants' Private Data Available on Internet, The Star. (2009), at
http://www.thestar.com/article/596808 (last visited on 5 March 2012).
273 Michael Geist, Canadian Privacy Rights Buried in the Fine Print. (2009), at
http://www.thestar.com/article/602772 (last visited on 16 March 2012).
274 Michael Geist, Standing on Guard for Privacy - Before Facebook. (2009), at
http://www.thestar.com/article/695147 (last visited on 14 September 2012).
275 David H. Flaherty, Reflections on Reform of the Federal Privacy Act. (2008), at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/pa_ref_df_e.cfm (last visited on 29 June 2012).
276 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, PIPEDA: Processing Personal Data
Across Borders Guidelines, Author. (2009), at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2009/gl_dab_090127_e.pdf (last visited on 2
July 2012).
277 Jennifer Stoddart, Canada Celebrates Privacy Awareness Week by Helping Businesses
Improve Privacy Practices CNW Telbec. (2009), at
http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/August2008/27/c7355.html (last visited
on 31 December 2012). See also Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
PIPEDA Self-Assessment Tool: Personal Information Protection and Electronic
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The Commissioners are taking a lead in advocating for building-in
technological standards as a means to protect DPSIP issues from becoming a
problem278 by requiring that new technology that may impact DPSIP legal
issues should have built-in protection methods. Such technology producers
must conduct a privacy impact assessment (PIA) prior to adoption of
government protections and subsequent periodic audits.
CA was one of the first and is the most influential country in the world
advocating the use of PIAs. The government requires some form of PIA
process under national and provincial governmental DPSIP law. The laws,
however, only apply to public agencies. The private sector is relieved of any
PIA actions except as a voluntary good business practices standard and as a
strategic business advantage. No independent DPSIP audits are required
under CA law or self-regulation standards. To be effective, PIA and audit
efforts must involve a serious analysis of the issues rather than merely
completing a standard form. CA PIAs have become common, however, there
are not always conducted adequately.279
For DPSIP efforts to be effective, the traditional reactive policy approach
needs to also establish more proactive approaches.280 Basic standards and
Documents Act. (2008. August 8), at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/pub/ar-
vr/pipeda_sa_tool_200807_e.asp (last visited on 10 August 2012). See Government
of Canada, Privacy and Your Business (2010), at
http://www.canadabusiness.ca/eng/guide/2338/ (last visited on 19 July 2012).
278 Ann Cavoukian, et al., SmartPrivacy for the Smart Grid: Embedding Privacy into the
Design of Electricity Conservation (Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Ontario and The Future of Privacy Forum. 2009). See also Information and Privacy
Commissioner/Ontario, The New Federated Privacy Impact Assessment (F-PIA):
Building Privacy and Trust-enabled Federation, Author. (2009), at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/Resources/Discussion-Papers/Discussion-Papers-
Summary/?id=836 (last visited on 2 March 2012). Ann Cavoukian, What is Privacy by
Design? Information & Privacy Commissioner Ontario. (2010), at
http://www.privacybydesign.ca/ (last visited on 6 July 2012). Process examples
include Anonymizers, Anonymous payment methods, Privacy icons, Privacy labels,
and Pseudonymizers.
279 Robin M. Bayley & Colin J. Bennett, Privacy Impact Assessments in Canada, in Privacy
Impact Assessment (David Wright & Paul De Hert ed.^eds., Springer 2012).
280 Jennifer Stoddart, The Future of Privacy Regulation: Remarks at the 11th Annual Privacy
and Security Conference, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. (2010), at
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privacy audits must be established.281 Technology is constantly evolving;
however, the legal issues do not change. Business innovation and its global
implications need to be considered. Regulatory—not just legislative efforts—
need to be able to address cultural and technological changes. Governments
must reject Intellectual Property protections that have not addressed DPSIP
concerns by sound privacy audit protections. DPSIP authorities must have
strong independent investigatory, enforcement, and order-making powers.
Traditional nation states and innovative DPSIP global approaches are
needed. SA has the opportunity to take the lead in implementing such
approaches.
5.12 Summary of Canadian Literature and Issues Reviewed
The intent of this thesis is to conduct a comparative analysis of DPSIP
responses in five different nations. Part of the comparison uses a benchmark
approach of key issues. The issues include legal support of DPSIP
protections, legal support of corporate privacy and data protection standards,
information privacy data protection and security declarations, the use of
regulatory agencies, sectoral legislation, and data controllers. The
benchmark standards also include data processor requirements, data
subjects, data security destruction, cross-border data flow, exemptions and
exceptions, and the current stage of the approach based on evolutionary
stages. The following table presents the summary based on the benchmark
model.
http://www.priv.gc.ca/speech/2010/sp-d_20100210_e.cfm (last visited on 11
February 2012).
281 Ann Cavoukian & Tyler J. Hamilton, The Privacy Payoff: How Successful Businesses Build
Customer Trust (McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd. 2002). See also Information and Privacy
Commissioner/Ontario, The New Federated Privacy Impact Assessment (F-PIA):
Building Privacy and Trust-enabled Federation, Author. (2009), at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/Resources/Discussion-Papers/Discussion-Papers-
Summary/?id=836 (last visited on 2 March 2012). “A privacy risk assessment should
become an integral part of the design stage of any initiative. Once the risk to privacy
is identified, then the necessary protections can be built in to minimize or ideally
eliminate the risks.” (p. 290).
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Table 5.3 Comparative Model of Canadian Legal Support of DPSIP
Models
ISSUE DESCRIPTION CA CURRENT RESPONSE
CM.1: Legal Support of DPSIP
Protections
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with International
Human Rights Standards
(See Appendix A.)
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with EU DPSIP
Standards
Yes
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with APEC DPSIP
Standards
Yes
Federal Constitutional Law No
Federal Legislative Efforts Yes
Federal Common Law Mixed
Province /State Constitutional Law No
Province / State Legislative Efforts Varies
Province / State Common Law Some
CM.2: Legal Support of
Corporate Privacy and Data
Property Protection Issues
CA CURRENT RESPONSE
Copyright Protections Yes
Database Protection Yes
Patient Protections Yes
Service Mark Protections Yes
Trade Mark Protections Yes
Trade Secret Protections Yes
Privacy Impact Audit Required
Before Use
No
Privacy Impact Audit Required
Before Government
Protections Granted
No
Checks and Balances on
Corporate Collection, Use,
and Transfer of Individual
DPSIP Data
Yes
CM.3: Information Privacy –
Data Protection and
Security Declarations
CA CURRENT RESPONSE
Definitions Provided Yes
Personal and Sensitive Data
Defined
Yes
Definitions Effectively Address No
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Advanced Data Mining
Technologies
All Holders and Users Held
Accountable
No
CM.4: Regulatory Agency CA CURRENT RESPONSE
Independent of Legislative and
Executive Branches
No
Administrative Power Yes
Investigative Power Yes
Regulatory Powers Some
Education Function Yes
Enforcement Powers Some
Structure Yes
Responsibilities Defined Yes
Accountability Yes
Governmental Chief Privacy Officer/
Commissioner Required
Yes
Governmental Privacy Audits
Required as Part of
Legislation Passage
No
Business Chief Privacy Officer/
Commissioner Required
Suggested
Employees are Personally Liable
for Violations
No
Business Privacy Audits Required No
Agency Educational Function Yes
CM.5: Sectoral DPSIP Legislation CA CURRENT RESPONSE
Credit Reporting Agencies Yes
Criminal Justice Record
Restrictions
No
Health Information Some
Health Information Exceptions Some
Electronic Medical/Health Record
Controls
Limited
CM.6: Data Controllers CA CURRENT RESPONSE
Notice Required In theory
Opt-In Limited
Opt-Out Generally
Must Be Lawful and Fair Yes
System Access Controls Yes
Data Quality and Integrity Yes
Accurate Yes
Complete Yes
Up to Date Yes
Limited to Needed Data In theory
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Relevant In theory
Not Misleading In theory
Data Retention Limitation Not with current standards
Data Transfer Controls Limited
Openness on Information Held Limited
Breach Disclosures Required Considering
Breach Penalties No
CM.7: Data Processor
Requirements
CA CURRENT RESPONSE
Informed Consent Required Limited
Rationale Is Provided Yes
Fair Processing Yes
Legal Processing Yes
General Data Yes
Sensitive Data Yes
Accuracy Yes
Timely Limited
Duration of Record-Keeping
Controls
Limited
CM.8: Data Subjects CA CURRENT RESPONSE
Ownership by the Subject Limited
Control Over Access No
Alter, Amend, Correct, and Delete
Errors
Yes
Notification Requirement Limited
CM.9: Data Security and
Destruction
CA CURRENT RESPONSE
Security Must Be State of the Art Generally
Technology Use – Cost of
Implementation Not a Defense
Yes
Tracking Not once merged
Safeguards Required Adequate encryption
Protects From Alteration Yes
Protects Against Disclosure Yes
Protects Misuse Yes
Protects Against Unauthorized
Internal and External Access
Yes
Unauthorized Access Penalties Based on cause of action
Timely Notice of Breaches Limited
Strong Remedies Provided Limited
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CM.10: Cross-Border Data Flow CA CURRENT RESPONSE
Individual Informed Consent
Required
In theory
Transfer Source Is Accountable Generally
Outsource Service Controls Limited
CM.11: Exemptions and
Exceptions
CA CURRENT RESPONSE
Only Permitted Where There Is a
Compelling Justification
Yes
Checks and Balances – Court
Order Required
Limited
Government Agencies Yes
Intelligence and Defense Yes
Police Actions Yes
Small Business Exemption Yes
CM.12 DPSIP Evolutional Stages CA CURRENT RESPONSE
DPSIP.0 Limited DPSIP legal
Issues
Yes
DPSIP.1.0 Establishes PII; does
not fully address security
issues; focus on limited legal
consent and notice.
Yes
DPISP.2.0 Accepts PII standards;
does not fully address security
issues; focus on a legally
based harm based analysis.
Yes
DPSIP.3.0 PII and non-PII data
fused; privacy, data protection
and security issues are
interrelated; legal audits,
checks, and balances needed
for all personal information
stakeholders. New
technologies are required to
pass privacy audits (example
– RFID, Internet of Things)
and require use of privacy
enhancing technologies in all
new IP approvals.
Exploring
Chapter Six addresses the actual approach and potential options in the SA
approach to DPSIP legal issues. From a logical and alphabetical perspective,
the next chapter should address SA concerns. SA must address a classic
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strategic planning analysis. First, SA can conform to the historic model of
catching up with the standards established of other countries and regions to
conform. The secondary strategy is to meet and raise or leap frog the existing
responses to the issues. SA can either catch up or take the lead. The
author’s analysis is that SA should take the lead. Recent actions suggest that
SA will take the catch up approach.
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CHAPTER SIX: DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW:
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL STANDARDS
There is a worldwide concern growing regarding the increasing
potential threats to the personal privacy of individuals caused by
technologies and governments. The international response of
governments has been to draught comprehensive privacy
legislation in order to protect their citizen's personal information
and to enable their citizens to have control over their personal
information. In South Africa, the right to privacy is protected by
both Section 14 of the Constitution and the provisions of the
Common Law. Hano N. Olinger, Johannes J. Britz, & Martin M.
Oliciwe1
6.0 Overview
At the time of this writing, SA is in the process of establishing DPSIP
legislation and regulatory processes. The SA Constitution establishes a
privacy right for natural persons that the other countries in the study have not
clearly established. The Constitution also establishes constitutional
protections for juristic persons,2 which may have unintended consequences;
such consequences are evidenced in the political power shift in AU, the UK,
and certainly in the US.3 The SA Constitution and case law clearly establish a
right to identity and privacy. However, these traditional legal principles do not
translate into adequate DPSIP principles.4 Sufficient DPSIP legal protection
1 Hano N. Olinger, et al., Western Privacy and/or Ubuntu? Some Critical Comments on the
Influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill in South Africa, 39 The International
Information & Library Review 1, 31 (2007), at 31.
2 Companies and corporations
3 See Chapters 2, 4, 7, and 8 of the current work.
4 For a detailed analysis see J Neethling, et al., Neethling's Law of Personality (Butterworths
1st ed. 1996); J Neethling, et al., Neethling's Law of Personality (LexisNexis 2nd ed.
2005); and Anneliese Roos, The Law of Data (Privacy) Protection: A Comparative
and Theoretical Study (2003) (LL.D. thesis, UNISA).
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requires a legislative act, with all of the foibles such an approach seems to
require. SA must establish state-of-the-art DPSIP legislation to protect its
citizens from data- and security-related abuses and provide checks and
balances on business and government activities. SA must join the DPSIP
community of countries, especially its major trading partners.
Hanno Olinger, Johannes Britz, and Martin Olivier argue that the Ubuntu
belief system opposes adopting a Western focus on individual privacy
protection needs.5 SA must make the principles consistent with its values and
worldview. The country generally accepts the principle of Ubuntu, which
requires consideration of the community rather than just an individual when
making ethical decisions.6 The underlying concept is that a person is defined
in terms of others within a family or quality community. The value is based on
caring, compassion, happiness, humanness, interdependence, respect, and
universal brotherhood. However, none of these values directly conflict with
the intention of DPSIP legislation and standards. The concepts of the dignity
of the person and the community are certainly consistent with DPSIP
legislation and standards. Sound DPSIP laws and regulations protect the
individual as well as the community from abuses.
SA uses the term “data protection” to address information privacy concerns.
Information privacy is defined as follows:
[A]n individual condition of life characterized by seclusion from the
public and publicity. This condition embraces all those personal facts
which the person concerned has himself determined to be excluded
5 Hanno N. Olinger, et al., Western Privacy and Ubuntu - Influences in the Forthcoming Data
Privacy Bill in Ethics of New Information Technology - Proceedings of the Sixth
International Conference of Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE2005), P
Brey, F Grodzinsky and L Introna (eds.), Enschede, The Netherlands, 291-306, July
2005 (Philip Brey, et al. eds., 2005).
6 Nkonko M. Kwamwangamalu, Ubuntu in South Africa: a Sociolinguistic Perspective to a
Pan-African Concept 13 Critical Arts Journal 2, 24 (1999). See also Johann Broodryk,
Ubuntu: Life lessons from Africa (Ubuntu School of Philosophy 2nd ed. 2002).
Chapter Six: South African Legal Standards 332
from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he has the will
that they be kept private.7
This definition has been accepted in a number of SA court decisions.8 The
majority of SA legal scholars believe it is critical and urgent to enact data
protection legislation.9
The SA chapter begins with presenting background on the country. The
analysis continues with an examination of the SA Constitutional declarations.
SA national legislation and case law is examined. The research then focuses
on the background and provisions of the SA Protection of Personal
Information Bill. SA standards, remedies, and implementation system are
reviewed. SA sociolegal concerns are presented. A critique of the SA
approach is then addressed. A summary of the SA literature and issues,
using the thesis comparative model of the current legal support, is then
reviewed and presented.
6.1 Background
SA is a constitutional parliamentary democratic republic.10 The government
includes the national government and nine provinces.11 The executive branch
consists of the President who is the Head of Government and Head of State.12
The President serves a fixed term and is elected from Parliament. The
executive also includes the Deputy President, as well as ministers who are
7 J Neethling, et al., Neethling's Law of Personality at 32. (LexisNexis 2nd ed. 2005).
8 Id. at fn 335.
9 Ibid.
10 South Africa Government, South Africa Government Online. (2010), at http://www.gov.za/
(last visited on 5 August 2012). Site contains reference data for this section.
11 The provinces include Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo,
Mpumalanga, North West, Northern Cape, and Western Cape.
12 South Africa Government, Executive Authority. (2010), at
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/exec.htm (last visited on 5 August 2012).
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members of parliament. The legislature13 is made up of the National Council
of Provinces14 and the National Assembly.15
The SA judiciary16 functions within the Roman-Dutch common law tradition
while accepting some English common law legal traditions.17 The
Constitutional Court18 is the highest court of appeals for constitutional issues.
The Supreme Court is the highest court for non-constitutional issues. The
High Court19 addresses civil and criminal cases and appeals from Magistrate
courts.
DPSIP legislation in SA can be based on the concept that identity and privacy
are personality interests that are indivisible from the individual and are
protected under the law of delict.
Personality rights are characterized by the fact that they cannot be
transferred to others, cannot be inherited, are incapable of being
relinquished, cannot be attached and that they come into existence
with the birth and are terminated by the death of a human being.20
13 South Africa Government, National Legislature - Parliament. (2010), at
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/parliament/index.htm (last visited on 5 August
2012).
14 The National Council of Provinces includes the Premier and nine members selected by the
provincial legislatures based on actual proportional elected officials in the nine
provinces, including fifty–four permanent members and thirty-six special delegates.
15 The National Assembly has between 350 to 400 members democratically elected including
200 elected from the provinces and 200 elected from a national roster.
16 South Africa Government, Justice System. (2010), at
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/justice/courts.htm (last visited on 5 August 2012).
17 English common law as applied to constitutional or statutory law, criminal, corporate and
mercantile law procedures. Roman-Dutch law predominates in private law including
law of persons, property, succession, and the law of sale and lease. See Alan Watson,
Law Out of Context, (University of Georgia Press ed. 2000).
18 The court consists of eleven members including a Chief Justice and ten Deputy Chief
Justices. Each serves a twelve-year term and is appointed by the President, Chief
Justice, and National Assembly political leaders.
19 The High Court has general jurisdiction and is headed by a Judge President.
20 Anneliese Roos, The Law of Data (Privacy) Protection: A Comparative and Theoretical
Study (2003) 545 (LL.D. thesis, UNISA). See also J Neethling, et al., Neethling's Law
of Personality (LexisNexis 2nd ed. 2005); J Neethling, et al., Neethling's Law of
Personality (Butterworths 1st ed. 1996).
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6.2 Republic of South Africa Constitutional Declarations
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa21 is the supreme law of the
land and the standard for all national laws and governmental actions. Unlike
the US, the constitution provides for clear privacy rights. Chapter 2 covers the
Bill of Rights. The SA Bill of Rights applies to private and state actors while
the US Bill of Rights generally applies to governmental actions.22
Cass Sunstein conducted a comparative study of international constitutions.
He determined that the Constitution of SA “is the world’s leading example of a
transformative constitution.”23 Sunstein found that the Constitution is “the
most admirable constitution in the history of the world.”24 The framers
analyzed international documents and various national constitutions.25
Unlike the preservative traditions in the UK and US, the SA Constitution
provides for interpretation rules. Section thirty-nine requires that all courts or
tribunals must advance the values of the Constitution while considering
foreign and international law.26
Section fourteen addresses privacy rights. The text clearly states, “Everyone
has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have (a) their person or
21 Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the RSA. (1996), at
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/index.htm (last visited on 19 June
2012). (SA)
22 Mark S. Kende, Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States,
(Cambridge University Press ed. 2009).
23 Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do, (Oxford University Press
ed. 2001). p. 224. A transformative Constitution “points(s) toward an ideal future” p.
58. For an analysis of preservative and transformative Constitutions see Lawrence
Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, (Basic Books ed. 1999). pp. 213-214.
24 Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do. (Oxford University Press
ed. 2001). p. 261.
25 Jeremy Sarkin, The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of South Africa's Bill
of Rights and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions, 1 University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law 2, 176 (2008). The framers drew from the Canadian
Constitution (which is part of this study) and the German Constitution (which is not a
part of this comparison).
26 Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the RSA. (1996), at
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/index.htm (last visited on 24
January 2012). (SA)
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home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.”27
Section thirty-two provides for a freedom of information provision for access to
any “information held by the government.” The section also applies to “any
information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise
or protection of any rights” that could be misused. The section declares that
“National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may
provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial
burden on the state.”28
Section thirty-six provides for some limitations on the right to privacy. The
section declares as follows:
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including
(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the
limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation
between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to
achieve the purpose. Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any
other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.29
The SA Constitutional Court has interpreted the constitutional privacy
provisions over the years. In S v. Jordan30 the court, under the 1993 interim
Constitution, believed that privacy rights are based on the principles of human
dignity. The case affirmed the criminalization of prostitution law and that the
law did not violate human dignity or economic rights. The full court ruled that
27 Id. at ¶ 14.
28 Id. at ¶ 32.
29 Id. at ¶ 36.
30 S v. Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC); 2002 (11) B.C.L.R. 1117; 2002 (6) SA 642, at 81. (SA)
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although it may be argued that the right to privacy is limited by the Act, the
limitation is reasonable and justifiable under section 36(1) of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court adopted the U.S. reasonable actual or subjective
expectation of privacy rule. In Bernstein v. Bester31 Bernstein argued for a
privacy right to not produce books, papers, or other records under the
Company Act. Justice Ackermann wrote as follows:
[I]t seems to be a sensible approach to say that the scope of a person’s
privacy extends a fortiori only to those aspects in regard to which a
legitimate expectation of privacy can be harbored … A ‘legitimate
expectation of privacy’ has two components a subjective expectation of
privacy and that the society has recognized that expectation objectively
reasonable.32
The South African Law Reform Commission addressed the issues of Privacy
and Data Protection. The Commission found that “A person’s right to privacy
entails that such a person should have control over his or her personal
information and should be able to conduct his or her personal affairs relatively
free from unwanted intrusions.”33
Some DPSIP advocates in SA take the position that information privacy is not
an absolute right. They argue that a number of factors must be considered.
The commercial interests, including banking, direct marketing, health care,
insurance, pharmaceuticals, and travel sectors want special DPSIP
considerations. The problem is that many of these commercial sectors are
the worst offenders of information privacy principle violations. AU, CA, the
UK, and the US have found privacy violations in these sectors.34 These same
commercial advocates argue that consideration must be taken to protect their
interests, freedoms, and rights. The classic argument of maintaining law and
31 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); 1996 (4) BCLR 449. (SA)
32 Id. at 75-76. (emphasis added)
33 SA Law Reform Commission, Issue Paper on Privacy and Data Protection. (2003), at
http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/ipapers.htm (last visited on 6 March 2012), ¶ 1.2.1.
34 See Chapter 1.4 and Chapter 2.4 of the current work.
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order and even governing national social programs is made against
acceptance of DPSIP standards.35 Such issues are not a zero-sum game; nor
does the legal principle of proportionality always apply. Clearly written and
monitored exceptions can be instituted.
6.3 South African Legislation
At the time of this writing, SA does not have comprehensive DPSIP
legislation,36 although the legislature has enacted some related efforts.
Perhaps part of the problem is an unintended consequence of the Constitution
granting heightened legal protections to corporations. The experience of AU,
CA, and the US certainly shows negative consequences of such a policy.
Corporations perceive themselves as above the law, especially when
multinational organizations are involved.37
In most of the countries involved in the study, there was a time that the Courts
and common law were a force for reasoned or enlightened change. Over the
past few decades, this pattern has changed. Court decisions are not always
impartial and are subject to economic, personal, and political biases. A
classic study supporting this view was conducted by Sunstein.38 Thus, if SA is
to join the community of DPSIP nations, legislation is the only alternative.
Political interests and power politics must be examined. The most reasoned
approach is to benchmark the effort with other countries. SA has the strategic
35 SA Law Reform Commission, Media Statement by the South African Law Reform
Commission: Project 124: Privacy and Data Protection. (2005), at
http://www.nqf.org.za/download_files/nqf-
support/Privacy%20and%20Data%20protection%20Paper%2024%20Project%20124.
pdf (last visited on 2 May 2012).
36 A Protection of Personal Information bill has been proposed and is being evaluated at the
time of this writing. Analysis of the bill is found in § 6.6 in this chapter.
37 See Don Tapscott & David Ticoll, The Naked Corporation: How the Age of Transparency
Will Revolutionize Business (Free Press. 2003); Wade Rowland, Greed, Inc: Why
Corporations Rule Our World (Arcade Publishing. 2006); Lee Drutman & Charlie
Cray, The People's Business: Controlling Corporations and Restoring Democracy
(Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 2004); Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The
Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Free Press. 2004); Katherine Albrecht & Liz
Mcintyre, Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track Your
Every Move with RFID (Nelson Current. 2005).
38 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Harvard University Press. 2003).
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potential to advance the cause rather than play catch-up. By proposing
DPSIP legislation, SA has started to move to be aligned with international
standards. SA must only be true to itself.
The Open Democracy Bill39 was an early attempt at data protection legislation.
The full bill never passed; however, some provisions been incorporated in
other legislation. The original bill grants a person the right to have access to
one’s personal data held by governmental or private bodies. The person may
request correction of inaccurate information by amending, deleting, or
supplementing the data.40 When the request is approved, the organization
must inform governmental bodies and third parties that had previously
received faulty data.41 If the request is rejected, a note showing the decision
is entered into the file. The Bill establishes some basic fair information
practices like consent and disclosure.42 The Bill also establishes some
standard exceptions, as noted in other such legislation in AU, CA, the UK, and
the US.43 Thus, the Bill suffers from the same data protection gaps. The data
collection provisions of the Bill apply only to governmental agencies. This
same error was found in early CA legislation.44
In 2000, the Promotion of Access to Information Act45 was enacted. The
statute provides that individuals have a legal right to review computer and
manual records that contain information regarding a person. The law is
similar to provisions found in the laws of the other countries in this study. The
law applies to accessing personal data held by governmental agencies and
private organizations.46 The law applies to data held by public and private
39 Open Democracy Bill B 67-98 (1999). (SA) at
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=71512 (last visited on 21 April
2012).
40 Id. at B 67-98 ¶¶ 51, 52.
41 Id. at B 67-98 ¶¶ 51(7), 52(9).
42 Id. at B 67-98 ¶ 57.
43 See chapters 4.3, 5.3, 7.3, 8.3 of this work.
44 See chapter 4 of this work.
45 Promotion of Access to Information Act. Act 2 of 2000 (2000). (SA) at
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68186 (last visited on 20 April
2012).
46 Act 2 of 2000 ss (11) and (50).
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bodies.47 The Act is basically a Freedom of Information Act rather than DPSIP
legislation.
The law recognizes the SA Constitutional access to information and privacy
rights; however, it actually limits many of these rights.48 One of the objectives
of the Act is to provide reasonable privacy protections and balance the Bill of
Rights protections.49 Chapter Three of the Act does, with restrictions, allow
personal access to one’s own data and the right to ask for corrections.
Consistent with the Constitution, the Act applies to juristic and natural
persons.50 The government has the power to deny a request for information
based on its own priorities. A party may apply for an internal review of a
governmental agency51 for an adverse decision, or apply to the courts52 for
review.
The public or private data holder must refuse access to requested data when
the release would unreasonably reveal data regarding a third party or a
deceased person.53 Release of data is granted when the person has
consented,54 when the data is publically available,55 even when the
government has or will release the data,56 when the release is in the best
interest of a child,57 and when a next of kin for a deceased person consents in
writing.58 The Act is monitored by the South African Human Rights
Commission.
47 Id. at ¶ 12.
48 Many legislators or parliamentarians have a pattern of writing access or DPSIP legislation
using key words; however, the actual Act limits the rights in question.
49 Act 2 of 2000 ¶¶ 9(b)(i)(ii).
50 Generally, juristic persons have more economic and political powers than natural persons.
51 Act 2 of 2000 ¶ 75.
52 Act 2 of 2000 ¶¶ 78 (1)(2).
53 Id. at ¶¶ 34 and 63.
54 Id. at ¶¶ 34(2)(a), 63(2)(a).
55 Id. at ¶¶ 34(2)(b), 63(2)(b).
56 Id. at ¶¶ 34(2)(c), 63(2)(c).
57 Id. at ¶¶ 34(2)(d), 63(2)(d).
58 Id. at ¶¶ 34(2)(e), 63(2)(e).
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In 2002, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act was enacted.59
Chapter One of the law offers some general definitions of personal
information.60 The law provides for voluntary compliance of data controllers
when they electronically collect personal data. Both the data controller and
data subject must agree to the terms.61 The aim is to address public concerns
regarding privacy and electronic processing of personal data. The Act applies
only to natural persons whose data is electronically processed after the Act
was passed. The Act calls for voluntary compliance with all of the stated
guidelines; however, the provisions are not legally binding on all data
controllers. The Act establishes nine rather common data processing
principles.62 The major impact of the Act is in the credit reporting and
59 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act. Act 25 of 2002 (2002). (SA) at
http://www.internet.org.za/ect_act.html (last visited on 21 April 2012). (SA)
60 Id. at Chapter 1. The section reads "personal information" means information about an
identifiable individual, including, but not limited to(a) information relating to the race,
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual
orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience,
belief, culture, language and birth of the individual; (b) information relating to the
education or the medical, criminal or employment history of the individual or
information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved;
(c) any identifying number, symbol, or other particular assigned to the individual; (d)
the address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual; (e) the personal opinions,
views or preferences of the individual, except where they are about another individual
or about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to another individual;
(f) correspondence sent by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or
confidential nature or further correspondence that would reveal the contents of the
original correspondence; (g) the views or opinions of another individual about the
individual; (h) the views or opinions of another individual about a proposal for a grant,
an award or a prize to be made to the individual, but excluding the name of the other
individual where it appears with the views or opinions of the other individual; and (i)
the name of the individual where it appears with other personal information relating to
the individual or where the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information
about the individual, but excludes information about an individual who has been dead
for more than 20 years.
61 Id. at Chapter 8, ¶¶ 50-51.
62 Chapter 8, ¶ 51 defines the principles that include “(1) A data controller must have the
express written permission of the data subject for the collection, collation, processing
or disclosure of any personal information on that data subject unless he or she is
permitted or required to do so by law.
(2) A data controller may not electronically request, collect, collate, process or store
personal information on a data subject which is not necessary for the lawful purpose
for which the personal information is required.
(3) The data controller must disclose in writing to the data subject the specific
purpose for which any personal information is being requested, collected, collated,
processed or stored.
(4) The data controller may not use the personal information for any other purpose
than the disclosed purpose without the express written permission of the data subject,
unless he or she is permitted or required to do so by law.
(5) The data controller must, for as long as the personal information is used and for a
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customer relations sectors. In contrast to the private domain registration
processes used in the other countries in the current study, the Act shifts the
function to a government operated Domain Name Authority. The
governmental agency has direct control over domain name registration and
related private information. In other countries in the study, this data is
accessible only through secondary sources. The government is given the
power to declare that some data bases maintain critical data and must be
registered with and held accountable to the Minister.63 However, the
operational standards the government applies to determine what qualifies as
“critical data bases” are unclear.
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of
Communication-related Information Act64 establishes duties, exceptions, and
prohibitions for nearly all forms of personal and technological
communications. The act declares: “no person may intentionally intercept or
attempt to intercept, or authorize or procure any other person to intercept or to
attempt to intercept, at any place in the Republic, any communication in the
course of its occurrence or transmission.”65 The act provides for a number of
exceptions,66 some of which make practical sense. These include to prevent
bodily harm,67 emergency locations,68 and exceptions authorized by other
period of at least one year thereafter, keep a record of the personal information and
the specific purpose for which the personal information was collected.
(6) A data controller may not disclose any of the personal information held by it to a
third party, unless required or permitted by law or specifically authorized to do so in
writing by the data subject.
(7) The data controller must, for as long as the personal information is used and for a
period of at least one year thereafter, keep a record of any third party to whom the
personal information was disclosed and of the date on which and the purpose for
which it was disclosed.
(8) The data controller must delete or destroy all personal information which has
become obsolete.
(9) A party controlling personal information may use that personal information to
compile profiles for statistical purposes and may freely trade with such profiles and
statistical data, as long as the profiles or statistical data cannot be linked to any
specific data subject by a third party.”
63 Id. at Chapter IX.
64 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related
Information Act amend. No. 70 of 2002 (2002). (SA)
65 Id. at Chapter 2, part 1.
66 Id. at Chapter 1, part 1.
67 Id. at ¶ 7.
68 Id. at ¶ 8.
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acts.69 Other exceptions allow the application of questionable standards
including interception directions,70 one of the parties intercepts,71 one of the
parties’ consents,72 and selected business indirect communications.73 A set of
law enforcement exception are also included.74
Only identified officials may apply for a warrant; moreover, one must show
reasonable grounds for access. The grounds are rather expansive and
include a serious offense that is actual, potential, or probable. The threat can
be related to a wide range of poorly defined issues, including the economic
interests of SA, national security, public health, and/or public safety. The data
subject does not need to be informed of the monitoring.75
The Act has little to do with actual information privacy or data security. The
provisions of the Act appear to contradict section fourteen of the Bill of Rights.
In contrast to similar UK and US statutes, the SA approach requires a judicial
decision to intercept any violations.
The passage of a massive surveillance act prior to establishing sound DPSIP
legislation suggests that SA has decided that monitoring is more important
than privacy.76 However, the Act is consistent with the Council of Europe
Convention on Cyber crime.77
The National Credit Act78 is similar to credit bureau regulation in some other
countries. The Act is not as data protective as the AU approach.79 The
provisions establish a confidentiality standard for those who have access to
69 Id. at ¶ 9.
70 Id. at ¶ 3.
71 Id. at ¶ 4.
72 Id. at ¶ 5.
73 Id. at ¶ 6.
74 Id. at ¶¶ 4(2), 5(2), 7, 8, 9.
75 Id. at Chapter 3.
76 Caroline B. Ncube, Watching the Watcher: Recent Developments in Privacy Regulation and
Cyber-Surveillance in South Africa, 3 SCRIPTed - A Journal of Law, Technology &
Society 4, 344 (2006).
77 CA, SA, and the US are signatories to the Convention.
78 National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (2005). (SA)
79 See Chapter 4 of this work.
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personal credit information. The data must be accurate and maintained for
set periods of time. Data that is not allowed to be stored must be eliminated.
The Consumer Protection Act80 establishes an accessible, efficient, fair,
responsible, and sustainable legal framework for consumer markets. The
purpose of the Act is to help establish fair business practices related to
consumer issues. The Act addresses deceptive, fraudulent, improper,
misleading, unfair, unjust, and/or unreasonable business conduct and trade
practices.81 The Act establishes a moderate no-fault liability standard for
damages related to death, economic losses, injury, and physical damages
caused by defective or unsafe products.82 The provisions apply to all business
transactions including franchises, manufacturers, municipalities, non-
governmental organizations, professional service providers, retailers, and
trade unions.83 Key principles of the Act must be transferred to any DPSIP
legislation.
The Act is intended to enable informed consumer choice and empowerment
through awareness and information. The Act establishes a non-adversarial
function to resolve consumer transaction disputes by establishing a balance of
power for persons who are in a weaker bargaining position. The consensual
approach is intended to establish an accessible, consistent, effective, efficient,
and harmonized approach to establishing redress for consumer complaints.84
Although the Act is not a specific DPSIP legislation, the Act does establish a
principle of informed consent and the need to protect consumers. Moreover,
the Act does establish a consumer’s right to privacy and a strict liability
standard.85 The National Consumer Commission is responsible for
80 Consumer Protection Act 68 0f 2008 (2008). (SA) The Act came into effect on 1 April 2012
and will be implemented during the next 18 months.
81 Id. at Chapter 2.
82 Id. at ¶ 61.
83 Id. at ¶ 5.
84 Id. at ¶ 69.
85 Id. at Part B ¶ 11(1). The right of every person to privacy includes the right to (a) refuse to
accept; (b) require another person to discontinue; or (c) in the case of an approach
other than in person, to preemptively block, any approach or communication to that
person, if the approach or communication is primarily for the purpose of direct
marketing.
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administering, applying, and enforcing the Act. Members of the Commission
are appointed by the Ministry.86
The Act is reasonably consistent with similar consumer protection laws in AU,
CA, the UK, and US.87 As with DPSIP legal and regulatory acts, the business
community resisted passage of the Act; instead, businesses labeled the Act
as draconian and proclaimed that it would limit business opportunity.88 As
with almost all such claims, the predictions failed to develop and are basically
fear-based propaganda.
The Protection of State Information Bill89 is a controversial effort to provide for
the free flow of information and protect national security. Critics maintain that
the Bill is a modern form of censorship. The Bill actually imposes information
restrictions and provides for a maximum criminal penalty of twenty-five years
in prison.90 Critics claim that the Bill represents an abuse of power and is
opaque rather than transparent.91 Opponents claim that the Bill will restrict
whistleblower options and allow officials to legally raid houses and offices to
search for data without judicial permission or review.92
The Bill addresses a number of data security measures.93 The problem is that
the standards are applicable to all governmental agencies and only some
86 Id. at ¶¶ 86, 87.
87 Id. at ¶¶¶¶ 4.3, 5.3, 7.3, 8.3 of this work.
88 Bizcommunity.Com, Consumer Protection Act Made Easy (2010, March 15), at
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/307/45701.html (last visited on 24 April
2012).
89 Protection of Information Bill B6 of 2010 (2010). (SA)
90 Id. at ¶ 32.
91 Lynley Donnelly, The Right to Demand Answers, Mail and Guardian. (2011), at
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-04-29-the-right-to-demand-answers (last visited on 4 May
2012).
92 Freedom Information, POIB Protestors March in Cape Town; Hearing Set, Freedom
Information. (2010), at http://www.freedominfo.org/2010/10/poib-protestors-march-in-
cape-town/ (last visited on 14 October 2012). On 22 November 2011, the Parliament
passed the bill. Several steps re needed for the bill to become law.
93 Protection of Information Bill B6 of 2010 (2010). (SA) s 1 information security includes (a)
document security measures; (b) physical security measures for the protection of
information; (c) information and communication technology security measures; (d)
personnel security measures; (e) continuity planning; (f) security screening; (g)
technical surveillance counter-measures; (h) dealing with and reporting of
information security breaches; (i) investigations into information security breaches;
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juristic and natural persons. While proclaiming that the free flow of
information is critical to human rights and democracy, the government has the
power to control the exchange of valuable information.94 Furthermore, the
definitions have little operational clarity. National interests include such
concepts as democracy, economic growth, free trade, justice, security, sound
international relations, a stable monetary system, and survival.95 From an
operational perspective, such concepts have little meaning. Commercial
information is more protected than personal information. Few checks and
balances are provided for review of governmental classification systems
except for an internal ten-year review. When the government declassifies
certain information, it may be released to the public. Criminal standards can
be enforced for espionage, harboring or concealing of persons, hostile
activity, as well as interception or interference with classified information.96
The SA parliamentary committee responsible for the Bill has asked for an
extension of time to review controversial provisions.97
None of the successful SA legislative actions to date focus on generally
acceptable DPSIP standards. No privacy assessments or audits are required.
Limited legal attention has been paid to the threat of data mining. There is no
requirement for establishing a Chief Information or Security Officer within the
government or in the business sector.
An argument can be made that a person’s information privacy rights are
covered, by analogy, with the moral rights principle in intellectual property law
because the data subject creates the data. Section 20 of the Copyright Act
and (j) administration and organisation of the security function at organs of state to
ensure that information is adequately protected.
94 Id.at ¶ 1 valuable information includes (a) the information that should be retained for later
use or reference; and (b) that the alteration, loss or destruction of such information is
likely to—(i) impede or frustrate the State in the conduct of its functions; and (ii) deny
the public or individuals of a service or benefit to which they are entitled.
95 Id. at ¶ 11.
96 Id. at Chapter 11.
97 Freedom Information, South African Committee to Seek Extension of Time, Freedom
Information. (2011), at http://www.freedominfo.org/2011/01/south-african-committee-
to-seek-extension-of-time/ (last visited on 28 January 2012).
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sets forth some fundamental principles.98 The data subject “shall be deemed
to be the owner of the copyright in question.”99 The data subject “shall have a
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation
or other modification of it, where such action is or would be prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of the author.”100 A key issue in this scenario involves
informed consent.
6.4 South African Case Law
Before examining the common or case law determinations on DPSIP legal
issues, it is important to examine the power and reality constraints on the
highest court in the jurisdiction. A discussion without a common benchmark
would be meaningless. A legal declaration without exploring and
understanding the de facto influences is narrow-minded. The US Supreme
Count was selected as the benchmark for this study because, in theory, it
represents the international standard in the rule of law, balance of powers,
and political independence analysis. Granted, evidence exists that the
benchmark Court has been inconsistent. The SA Court has been influenced
by a number of historical lessons; the common law tradition is different from
the English common law of the other nations in this analysis.
Table 6.0 Comparison of South African and United States Supreme
Court
Factor South Africa
Constitutional Court101
US Supreme Court102
Established 1994 1789
98 Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (1978). (SA)
99 Id. at ¶ 20(2).
100 Id. at ¶ 20(1).
101 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Constitutional Court of South Africa. (2011), at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/home.htm (last visited on 29 May 2012).
102 Kermit L Hall, The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (Oxford
University Press 2nd. ed. 2005). See also Supreme Court of the United States,
About the Supreme Court. (2010), at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ (last visited on 5
July 2012).
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Power of decisions Applies to all
governmental
functions.
Applies to all courts and
jurisdictions in the
country.
Membership One Chief Justice, one
Deputy Chief
Justice, and nine
Justices.
One Chief Justice and eight
associate justices
(currently).
Appointee
Background
Leading legal
professionals.
Leading appellate courts
judges, politicians,
and law professors.
Term of Office Serves non-renewable
12- to 15-year term
depending on age at
appointment.
Life or until retires.
Jurisdiction Original and appellate on
issues related to
Constitutional
matters. Can
respond to a request
based on a
parliamentary bill.
Original and appellate.
Role Error correction, support
the Constitution and
consider
international human
rights standards of
rulings of other
courts in democratic
nations.
Error correction.
Operations Relies on written
submissions except
in situations when
oral evidence is
required to clarify
issues.
Hears oral arguments but
relies heavily on
arguments presented
in written briefs.
Decisions Opinion of the majority,
written by each
justice showing the
rationale and
decision.
Concurring and
dissenting opinions
are also published.
Opinion of the majority,
written by one
justice, and
concurring and
dissenting opinions
of other justices.
Judicial Review Can declare acts of
parliament and the
President as null
and void.
Historic since Marshall.
Appointment President appoints, based
on a Judicial Service
Commission report,
President nominates,
Senate confirms.
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in conjunction with
the Chief Justice
and Assembly
political leaders.
Representation Justices can not be
members of the
government or
political parties.
Recently more political.
Opinions No advisory opinions. No advisory opinions.
Case Assignment Court has discretionary
control except when
a previously
constitutional
invalidation must be
confirmed.
Court determines what
cases it will hear
based on writ of
certiorari. Since
1925, has
discretionary docket
control.
The SA Constitutional Court seeks to make decisions based on a consensus
to ensure a high-quality decision. Several meetings may be conducted. The
US Supreme Court only meets once and assigns opinions based on the
majority with dissenting opinions. The Constitutional Court does not limit the
time of oral arguments and does not make a transcript, whereas the US
Supreme Court only hears oral arguments for a limited time and does make a
transcript.103
Unlike the other countries in this study, the SA common law is based on
Roman-Dutch legal traditions. The SA common law also includes modern SA
law and some principles from UK common law. Thus, SA common law
recognizes negligence based on foreseeability by a reasonable person and
that a causal nexus is essential. The standard is raised when a duty of care
exists. Roman law had the means to protect privacy; however, there was no
perceived need to address the issue formally.104
South African case law does recognize a duty to care and to not act in a
negligent manner. While the specific issues of legal concern differ from a
DPSIP perspective, a number of cases establish the principle that one can be
103 Mark S. Kende, Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States,
(Cambridge University Press ed. 2009).
104 M. D. Blecher, Aspects of Privacy in the Civil Law, 43 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis,
279 (1975).
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held liable for not using standard precautions.105 The principle is extended to
those that borrow, deposit, hire, or lease the property of another.106
The law accepts that a breach of trust or confidence is unlawful. Under
copyright law, a person has the right to communicate, limit, publish, or restrict
what one has prepared or written.107 A similar case can be made for private
facts.108 A person’s privacy rights must be protected from unlawful invasion or
unlawful publication.109
At times, the SA Court is similar to the current activist conservative court in
the US in its ability to practice selective attention. For centuries, in most parts
of the world, a medical practitioner110 has had a duty to protect patient data.
The standard is near sacrosanct. When one practitioner refused to supply the
government with some requested confidential data, he was criminally charged
for violating a statistics act. While he claimed a privacy right, the court found
that the statistics act held a higher priority.111 The court found that there was a
higher benefit to the community.112 Such a finding is counter to thousands of
years of medical practice and confidentiality law.
O’Keefe v. Argus Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd113 establishes that, although
much depends on the totality of circumstances in a given case, a person has
a legal right to privacy. The case also addresses the importance of requiring
consent114 prior to another using one’s information. In this case, a picture was
used for commercial purposes. Damages are based on the content, extent of
publication, and nature of the publication. All of these standards are outside
105 Van Tonder v. Alexander, 1906 E.D.L.D. 186, (1906). (SA) Also see Hendy v. Oomkens
abd Shallies, 1924 T.P.D. 165, (1924). (SA)
106 Madallie & Schieff v. Roux, 1920 (20) S.C. 438, (1920). (SA)
107 See Jeffreys v Boosey, 1854 (4) HLC 815 862, (1854). (SA)
108 National Media Ltd v Jooste, 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 271-272, (1996). (SA) See also
O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd, 1954 (3) SA 244 (1954). (SA)
109 Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd v Janit, 1994 (3) SA 56 (W) 60, (1994). (SA)
110 A medical doctor in the US and CA.
111 S v Bailey, 1981 4 SA 187 (N). (SA)
112 Such a rationale recalls Dr. Samuel Johnson’s April 7, 1775 statement that
“Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.”
113 O’Keefe v. Argus Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (CPD). (SA)
114 See Waring & Gillow Ltd v Sherborne, TS 340, 344 (1904). (SA)
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of the control of the data subject. Under the decision, an apology can be
considered a mitigating factor in determining damages.115
The court modernized relevant Roman law principles by determining that the
right to privacy is an independent personality rights. The principle was
reaffirmed in Mhlongo v Bailey,116 Gosschalk v Rossouw,117 S v A,118
Rhodesian Printing and Publishing v Duggan,119 and La Grange v
Schoeman.120
The Supreme Court of Appeals121 has also recognized a right to privacy under
SA law. The right is considered a personality right.122 In National Media Ltd v
Jooste123 the Court accepted that privacy is an interest of personality.124 The
legal protection applies only to “ordinary or reasonable sensibilities and not to
hypersensitiveness.”125 Information privacy protections are not extended to
those who are distressed beyond ordinary feelings and intelligence.126 The
Court also found that eavesdropping on conversations intended to be private
is a privacy violation.127 The individual person has the right to determine what
data is private and what is not. However, if the person does not show such a
desire to keep information private, the privacy is lacking. Such a standard
115 Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers LTD, 1957 (3) SA 461 (W) at 468. (SA)
116 Mhlongo v Bailey, 1958 (1) SA 370 (C). (SA)
117 Gosschalk v Rossouw, 1966 (2) SA 476, 492 (C). (SA)
118 S v A, 1971 (2) SA 293 (T). (SA)
119 Rhodesian Printing and Publishing v Duggan 1975 (1) SA 590 (R). (SA)
120 La Grange v Schoeman, 1980 (1) SA 885 (E) (SA). See also Financial Mail v Sage
Holdings 1993 (2) SA 451 (A )(SA); Janit v Motor Industry Fund Administrators 1995
(4) SA 293 (A) (SA); Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A )(SA); and
National Media v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A). (SA).
121 Formerly known as the Appellate Division.
122 Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger, 1993 (4) SA 842 (A) (SA); National Media Ltd v Jooste, 1996
(3) SA 262 (A) (SA); Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd, 1993 (2) SA 451
(A) (SA); and Janit v Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd, 1995 (4) SA 293
(A). (SA)
123 National Media Ltd v Jooste,1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 271-272 (1996) (SA). The Court defined
the right to privacy as “The right to privacy encompasses the right to determine the
destiny of private facts, which includes the right to decide when and under what
conditions private facts may be made public” at 271.
124 For an explanation of the concept see J Neethling, et al., Neethling's Law of Personality
(LexisNexis 2nd ed. 2005).
125 National Media. Ibid., at 271.
126 Financial Mail (Ply) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd, 1993 2 SA 451 (A). (SA) Such a
determination certainly calls for expert psychiatric and/or psychological evidence.
127 S v A, 1971 (2) SA 293 (T). (SA)
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places a heavy responsibility on the person to make informed decisions when
essential data is absent.
The Court has also determined that one has an interest against unauthorized
misuse of personal information.128 The SA Court has accepted the legal
doctrine of increasing protections when there is an expectation of privacy.129
In Case v Minister of Safety and Security, the Court offered a further definition
of information privacy.130
SA common law recognizes the importance of consent for release of personal
information as a legally protected privacy right. However, the consent must
be informed. The person must know the benefits and potential harms or risks
involved. The person must appreciate, realize, and understand the potential
of infringement, the nature of the consent, and the intended purpose of the
data. The consent must be voluntary and revocable. The consent must be
consistent with public policy.131
In Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa,132 the
Constitutional Court ruled that information privacy could be limited. The
limitations include intimate information that was collected in an intrusive manner
or was used for a purpose that was not collected for that purpose. Further
limitations include when the personal information is given to the press or general
public or to persons the applicant could reasonable expect privacy.133
128 Grutter v Lombard, 2007 (4) SA 89 (SCA). (SA)
129 See Bernstein v Bester, RSA 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); 4 BCLR 449 (1996) (SA); Protea
Technology v Wainer [1997] 3 All SA 594 (W) 608; 1997 9 BCLR 1225 (W) 1241).
(SA)
130 Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) (SA). The Court found that
“The right to privacy includes the right to be free from intrusions and interference by
the state and others in one’s personal life and freedom from unauthorized disclosures
of information about one’s personal life.”
131 C v Minister of Correctional Services, 1996 (4) SA 292, 300-304 (T) (SA); Castell v De
Greef 1994 (4) SA 408, 420-421 425-426 (T). (SA)
132 Ministry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa, 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC). (SA)
133 Id. at 1151-1156.
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In 2001, the Constitutional Court recognized the need for the common law to
be developed to comply with standards required by the Bill of Rights.134 The
Court has been slow to actually respond; instead, the Court preferred to turn
the issue over to the legislature. In theory, in most constitutional
governments, the obligation rests with all three branches of government. The
issue is to address the spirit and the letter of the law.
The Constitutional Court has accepted a reasonableness standard in
determining an informational privacy right. The reasonable expectation of
privacy can decrease as the sense of personal space is lowered.135 The Court
later determined that the person must have the ability to determine if facts
should be made publically available.136 A right to privacy exists even in
automobiles, on personal mobile phones, and in corporate offices.
The SA courts have accepted the principle that juristic persons have
information privacy rights. In Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd,137
the court recognized that corporations can not have feelings such as being
offended or outraged. However, legal protections can be imposed in the
absence of injured feelings.138 Corporations have a right to protect
confidential oral or written information between stakeholders.139 Reasonable
minds prevailed in recognizing privacy rights for juristic persons. The court
found that natural persons have a heightened right to protect human dignity.140
Under this decision, the interests of juristic persons may vary depending on
the nature of the organizations. The level of needed protections of
134 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies
Intervening), 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). (SA)
135 Bernstein v Bester, RSA 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); 4 BCLR 449 (1996). (SA)
136 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Ply)
Ltd 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC). (SA)
137 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd, 1993 (2) SA 451 (A). (SA)
138 This reasoning runs counter to the standard established in National Media Ltd v Jooste.
Why are the standards different for natural persons and corporations?
139 Janit v Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Ply) Ltd, 1995 (4) SA 293 (A). (SA) The Court
found that the theft of confidential business meeting recordings and offering the tapes
to a third party was a privacy violation. However, the court has denied the same
standard to natural persons.
140 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty)
Ltd 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC). (SA)
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membership organizations, including fraternal, political, religious, or trade
unions are different from large for-profit corporations.
6.5 Protection of Personal Information Bill Background
Since 2000,141 the SA government has been in the process of writing and
passing a Protection of Personal Information Bill. The proposed Bill is built on
the successes and failures of prior data protection and information privacy
laws and regulations in different countries.
In 2000, the South African Law Reform Commission began working on critical
DPSIP issues. In 2003, the first discussion paper was issued. A draft bill was
circulated in 2005 and 2006; however, it essentially died. Some sources
claimed that the Bill could be enacted in 2011; however, progress is slow.
The Bill is not without its critics. Business interests’ opposition and some
governmental resistance are evident. Opponents claim that the approach will
cost too much money, opens litigation options for violations, is unrealistic, and
will result in poor compliance.142 Industry groups that are calling for
implementation delays include the Banking Association of SA, Business Unity
SA, and South African Insurance Association.
The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and South African History
Archive have submitted comments of caution related to the Bill.143 The
organizations are concerned that DPSIP legislation in SA will negatively
141 Depending on the standard to be applied, this is a long-term period. After the 9/11 attacks
on the World Trade Center, the US Congress took only a few days to pass the
previously written Patriot Act to grab unprecedented governmental power. However,
health care reform in the US started during the Truman administration and has still to
be fully realized, which suggests a comparatively short-term period.
142 See Audra Mahlong, High Costs of Privacy Bill: Government will Spend R35 Million to Pilot
Systems, But No Further Funding has been Secured, IT Web Business 3 November
2009. When benchmarked with the experience in other countries, such claims create
a state of fear mongering.
143 See Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Comments Concerning the South Africa
Privacy and Data Protection Bill. (2006), at
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/international/laws_papers/southaf
rica/south_africa_privacy_bill_submission_feb06.pdf (last visited on 27 February
2012).
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impact the force of the Promotion of Access to Information Act. The Archive
is also concerned with the right to be forgotten. Critics want private and public
sector information to be held to different standards. The proposal is that a
regulatory agency be established; however, the agency should report to
Parliament. Such an approach questions the independence of the regulators.
The Human Rights Initiative is concerned that DPSIP legislation will protect
the accountability of public officials. Concerns have also been raised about
the public’s right to know; however, no safeguards are proposed.
When proper checks and balances are established and enforced, certain
organizations have a legitimate need to collect, process, and even store
personal information regarding data subjects. Such organizations provide
services for the direct benefit of the data subject and the community at large.
Given these constraints, the list includes legally established and monitored
governmental agencies. Private organizations that also have a regulated
need for data subject information include banks, credit reporting agencies,144
financial institutions, health care providers,145 insurance companies and
regulators, and medical professionals. However, each of these examples
includes a standard of duty to care, data subject review, confidentiality, and
informed consent.
Although direct marketing companies claim they have a legitimate need to
collect and use personal data, and that they meet the exemption provided to
those who provide services that benefit the individual and the community,
direct marketing per se does not meet the above lawful constraints. Almost
everyone in developed countries is aware of spam e-mail, junk mail, cookies,
and advanced cookie technologies. The direct marketing industry functions
for the purpose of greed and company profits. The political problem is that
business organizations can join forces to protect the capital interests of all
businesses to create a parade of horrible consequences for all. The political
power problem in SA is enhanced by the decision to include juristic
144 AU has the most advanced credit reporting law. See Chapter 4 above.
145 The US HIPAA legislation is certainly strong. See Chapter 8 below.
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organizations as having protections under the Bill of Rights. Such
organizations make false arguments regarding costs, expenses, and
limitations on free markets, which of course are proposed as a public good.146
Beginning in 2000, the South African Law Reform Commission147 has taken on
the herculean task of supporting the enactment of enabling legislation that
meets SA Constitutional mandates, reflects the will of the SA people,148 and
helps SA enter into the world of diverse DPSIP nations.
Attempting to review the special interest group responses is similar to the old
English warnings of trying to herd domestic cats and watching sausage being
made. Special interests groups often want exceptions based on whose ox is
being gored.149 Some groups wanted all household and personal data to be
excluded. The Financial Board wanted the legislation to be very broad. IMS
Health wanted a distinction between personal and professional data
exclusions. Self-interest–based objections were voiced on a number of
issues.150 A consensus was established that the legislation should apply to all
data regardless of forum, image, media, sound, or technology format. The
definition certainly must cover all technological advances regardless of the
whether the data is called “household,” “personal,” “professional,” or
something else, and regardless of form or medium.
146 The reality is that modern businesses want to claim the power of the divine rights of Kings.
See Wade Rowland, Greed, Inc: Why Corporations Rule Our World (Arcade
Publishing. 2006) and Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit
and Power (Free Press. 2004).
147 All commission reports starting in 2000 have been reviewed and analyzed. The basis of
the current analysis relies on the most recent modifications. See South African Law
Reform Commission, Privacy and Data Protection Report: Project 124 (South African
Law Reform Commission. 2009).
148 See Chapter 2 of the current work.
149 Groups want their selfish interests protected over what others may need. For example,
the SABC did not want to cover the cost of insuring compliance on archival data due
to projected costs. Thus, all previously established information would be excluded.
150 The list includes anonymized/de-identified information (para 3.9); automatic and manual
files (para 3.2); critical information (para 3.6); household activity (para 3.8); natural v
juristic persons (para 3.4); professional information (including provider information)
(para 3.10); public v private sector information (para 3.5); sensitive information (para
3.7); and sound/image information (para 3.3). See South African Law Reform
Commission, Privacy and Data Protection Report: Project 124 (South African Law
Reform Commission. 2009) at Chapter 3, p. 2.
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Given that SA is embracing DPSIP legal responses relatively late, attention
must be focused on the developmental lessons of earlier stages. At first,
identifying and protecting critical and sensitive information was essential.
Advances in technology, including data mining and RFID, have made such
distinctions essentially meaningless.
The South African Law Reform Commission advocates a number of key
DPSIP principles. The processing of personal information should be
balanced, fair, freely given, lawful, open, and proportional to the aim.151 SA
can learn from the experience of other nations noted in the current study and
other national efforts. A basic approach to decisions includes establishing a
comprehensive legal approach similar to AU, CA, and the UK. A decision can
be made for using the less effective US sectoral approach when laws are
enacted to address the latest technology or industry sector problems. The
failed model of self-regulation found in the US (and in part in CA) describes
the current SA reality. Each organization or industry has the right to develop
voluntary standards. In developing a legal approach to DPSIP legal issues,
SA can follow the current CA advocacy for including technological solutions.152
Lee Bygrave and the UN approach suggest a need for a system of regulatory
agencies and officials in the private and public sector that is completely
impartial, independent, and technically competent.153
South Africa is more than an independent nation state. SA is economically
and politically an integral part of the interdependent international community
of nations. Given that there are DPSIP rogue states, some states (e.g., CA)
are EU adequate, and some are not (e.g., AU). SA has the options of
151 See Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits
(P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., Kluwer Law International. 2002).
152 A preliminary list includes anonymous and pseudonymous browsing, email, re-mailing
systems; biometric solutions readers, software etc; cookie managers; platform for
Privacy Preferences or P3P; privacy by design; privacy-enhancing technologies;
privacy policy generators; and smart cards/public key infrastructures.
153 Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits (P.
Bernt Hugenholtz ed., Kluwer Law International. 2002). This approach is even used
in some sector regulations in the US – the FTC and HIPAA. See Chapter 8 of the
current work.
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meeting current international standards or, like India, pushing the bar
higher.154
South Africa must make some important DPSIP legal decisions. Will SA
adopt a comprehensive legal structure with independent authorities for public
and private agencies? Will the law be written to avoid the fraud known as
self-regulation? Will the approach be technology neutral and allow for needed
adjustments as new technology or approaches are developed? Will the law
require the use of technology-based protections prior to granting intellectual
property protections? Will enforcement authorities have strong investigation
and enforcement powers? Will SA adopt the UK data controller registration
approach? Will a DPSIP privacy impact study be required for all related
legislation? Will the SA government establish informed consent and the
psychologically fairer opt-in standard? Is the SA government able and willing
to withstand powerful business and corporate opponents who argue
unsubstantiated cost predictions and the related parade-of-horrors? Is the SA
government able and willing to withstand current US efforts to eliminate
information privacy rights?155 Will the SA government provide for strict or
absolute liability standards for civil DPSIP violations and criminal
154 See Stephanie Overby, Offshoring: Preparing for India's Proposed Privacy Rules, PC
Advisor. (2011), at http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/news/security/3279814/offshoring-
preparing-for-indias-proposed-privacy-rules/ (last visited on 13 May 2012). The India-
proposed standard is stricter than the US or even the EU standards. Not surprisingly,
Google and some other US companies object to the entire law including the informed
consent clause. Google started a political campaign saying that the law is
“harassing,” “grossly harmful” or “ethnically objectionable.” See Rama Lakshmi, India
Data Privacy Rules May Be Too Strict for Some U.S. Companies, The Washington
Post. (2011), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/india-data-privacy-rules-
may-be-too-strict-for-some-us-companies/2011/05/18/AF9QJc8G_story.html (last
visited on 23 May 2012). Despite economic and political pressure from Google, the
law minister declared that “The right to privacy would include the right to
confidentiality of communication, confidentiality of private or family life, protection of
one’s honour and good name, protection from search, detention or exposure of lawful
communication between individuals, privacy from surveillance, confidentiality of
banking, financial, medical and legal information, protection from identity theft of
various kinds, protection of use of a person's photographs, fingerprints, DNA samples
and other samples taken at police stations and other places and protection of data
relating to individual.” Abantika Ghosh, Right to Privacy May Become Fundamental
Right, The Times of India. (2011), at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-
06-04/india/29620422_1_privacy-law-ministry-confidentiality (last visited on 4 June
2012) at ¶ 4.
155 The US refuses to follow EU privacy standards and thus attempts to undermine such
efforts. The US supports the less effective APEC approach.
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standards?156 Will the SA approach meet adequate level EU standards for
data transfers?
Reinhardt Buys declared that “[T]he longer the Bill's enactment is postponed,
the longer the gross violation of data privacy in South Africa will continue. SA
already has wholesale commercialization of personal information and
databases.”157
6.6 Protection of Personal Information Bill Provisions
The proposed Protection of Personal Information Bill158 defines personal
information159 and provides a response to national concerns, legal advocacy,
and the need to help SA meet international DPSIP standards. The Preamble
declares that “the State must respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in
the Bill of Rights.”160
The Protection of Personal Information Bill attempts to make the constitutional
privacy right effective operationally while balancing privacy with other rights.
Such rights include the right to access information and allow the free flow of
information. The Bill regulates the responsible processing of personal
156 See Anneliese Roos, The Law of Data (Privacy) Protection: A Comparative and
Theoretical Study (2003) (LL.D. thesis, UNISA). Chpt 7 ¶ 2.4.2.2.
157 Leon Englebrecht, Data Privacy Bill in Suspended Animation. (2008, February 20), at
http://www.itweb.co.za/sections/business/2008/0802201052.asp?S=Legal%20View&
A=LEG&O=FRGN (last visited on 21 February 2012), ¶¶ 9-10.
158 Protection of Personal Information Bill B 9 of 2009 (2009) .(SA)
159 Id. at ¶¶ 7 – 8. The definition includes: “information relating to an identifiable, living,
natural person, and where it is applicable, an identifiable, existing juristic person,
including, but not limited to (a) information relating to the race, gender, sex,
pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation,
age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language and birth of the person; (b) information relating to the education or
the medical, financial, criminal or employment history of the person; (c) any
identifying number, symbol, e-mail address, physical address, telephone number or
other particular assignment to the person; (d) the blood type or any other biometric
information of the person; (e) the personal opinions, views or preferences of the
person; (f) correspondence sent by the person that is implicitly or explicitly of a
private or confidential nature or further correspondence that would reveal the
contents of the original correspondence; (g) the views or opinions of another
individual about the person; and (h) the name of the person if it appears with other
personal information relating to the person or if the disclosure of the name itself would
reveal information about the person.
160 Id. at Preamble.
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information to meet EU and related international standards. Data subjects are
granted rights and remedies for violations of the data protection standards.
Minimum data protection standards are established. The Bill sets compulsory
and voluntary standards to enforce, fulfill, and promote DPSIP legal
requirements. The Bill establishes an information protection regulator.161
The Bill applies to the processing of personal information in SA through
automated and non-automated means by private and public bodies.162
Consistent with other DPSIP approaches noted in the current study, the SA
Bill provides for exclusions to the processing of personal information. Some
of the SA exclusions make legal and operational sense, like excluding
personal and household processing and judicial functions.163 Based on the
negative effect of exclusions in AU, CA, the UK, and the US, and modern
technology developments like data mining and RFID, the remaining
exclusions are potentially problematic.164 Checks and balances are needed to
discover, prevent, and provide remedies when the government and business
organizations abuse their power and manipulate the system.165
The Bill establishes eight personal privacy principles. The list includes
accountability, processing limitations, purpose specification, further
processing limitations, information quality, openness, security safeguards, and
data subject participation.166
161 Id. at Chapter 1, ¶ 2(1).
162 Id. at Chapter 2, ¶ 3.
163 Id. at Chapter 2, ¶ 4(a)(f).
164 Id. at Chapter 2 ¶ 4: (b) that has been de-identified to the extent that it cannot be re-
identified again; (c) by or on behalf of the State and—(i) which involves national
security, defence or public safety; or (ii) the purpose of which is the prevention,
investigation or proof of offences, the prosecution of offenders or the execution of
sentences or security measures, to the extent that adequate safeguards have been
established in specific legislation for the protection of such personal information; (d)
for exclusively journalistic purposes by responsible parties who are subject to, by
virtue of office, employment or profession, a code of ethics that provides adequate
safeguards for the protection of personal information; (e) by Cabinet and its
committees, the Executive Council of a province and a Municipal Council of a
municipality; (g) that has been exempted from the application of the information
protection principles in terms of section 34.
165 See Chapter 2 s 4 of the current thesis.
166 Id. at Chapter 3, part A.
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Principle 1: Accountability. All private and public organizations that process
personal information must have a responsible person who gives effect to the
Bill’s principles and certifies compliance.167
Principle 2: Processing limitations. Such a principle requires the processing
of personal information to be lawful and reasonable. Reasonable is defined
as adequate, not excessive, and relevant. Data subject consent and the right
to object are established.168 This section is silent on the issue of informed
consent or the opt-in or opt-out issues. The Bill allows for unknown parties to
override the consent requirement.169
Principle 3: Purpose specification. This principle provides a generally
accepted international standard. Data collection must be for a specific
167 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 7.
168 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶¶ 8, 9, 10 (1)(a).
169 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶¶ 10, 11. Consent, justification and objection 10. (1) Personal
information may only be processed if— (b) processing is necessary to carry out
actions for the conclusion or performance of a contract to which the data subject is
party; (c) processing complies with an obligation imposed by law on the responsible
party; (d) processing protects a legitimate interest of the data subject; (e) processing
is necessary for the proper performance of a public law duty by a public body; or (f)
processing is necessary for pursuing the legitimate interests of the responsible party
or of a third party to whom the information is supplied. (2) A data subject may object,
at any time, on reasonable grounds relating to his, her or its particular situation, in the
prescribed manner, to the processing of personal information in terms of subsection
(1)(d) to (f), unless otherwise provided for in national legislation. (3) If a data subject
has objected to the processing of personal information in terms of subsection (2), the
responsible party may no longer process the personal information. Collection directly
from data subject 11. (1) Personal information must be collected directly from the
data subject, except as otherwise provided for in subsection (2). (2) It is not
necessary to comply with subsection (1) if—(a) the information is contained in a
public record or has deliberately been made public by the data subject; (b) the data
subject has consented to the collection of the information from another source; (c)
collection of the information from another source would not prejudice a legitimate
interest of the data subject; (d) collection of the information from another source is
necessary—(i) to avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law by any public body,
including the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of
offences; (ii) to enforce a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; (iii) to enforce legislation
concerning the collection of revenue as defined in section 1 of the South African
Revenue Service Act, 1997 (Act No. 34 of 1997); (iv) for the conduct of proceedings
in any court or tribunal that have commenced or are reasonably contemplated; (v) in
the legitimate interests of national security; or (vi) to maintain the legitimate interests
of the responsible party or of a third party to whom the information is supplied; (e)
compliance would prejudice a lawful purpose of the collection; or (f) compliance is not
reasonably practicable in the circumstances of the particular case.
169 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 12.
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purpose that is legal as well as clearly defined and stated.170 The data can be
retained only for a limited time as defined by law, contract, or data subject’s
permission.171 The exact length of time is not clearly defined and is subject to
debate as noted in the US.172
Principle 4: Further Process Limitation. This principle defines the standards
by which the identified responsible person must consider and review data
process limitations.173 The provision also includes an undefined standard for
data subject consent, potentially troublesome problems related to public
records, public health, public safety, and research that is historical or
statistical.174 The relevant DPSIP issue is who makes such decisions and
what are the checks and balances against abuse.
Principle 5: Information Quality. This principle states that the responsible
person is obligated to insure that the personal information is accurate,
complete, not misleading, and updated.175 This principle is fairly consistent
with international standards. The Bill also provides some major DPSIP legal
loopholes. The standards only need to be met when they are necessary. The
reasonable person needs to take only the steps that are reasonably
practical.176 The standards do not operationally define key terms. While such
an approach may be a full employment act177 for attorneys and judges,
170 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 12.
171 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 14.
172 Sam Diaz, CNET: Justice Dept. to ask Congress for ISP Data Retention Law, ZDNet.
(2011), at http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/cnet-justice-dept-to-ask-congress-for-isp-
data-retention-law/43969 (last visited on 25 January 2012).
173 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, s 15 (2). (a) the relationship between the purpose of the intended
further processing and the purpose for which the information has been collected; (b)
the nature of the information concerned; (c) the consequences of the intended further
processing for the data subject; (d) the manner in which the information has been
collected; and (e) any contractual rights and obligations between the parties.
174 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 15 (3). See Chapter 2 § 4 of the current thesis.
175 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 16.
176 Ibid.
177 Such a law will probably create considerable paid work for attorneys and judges. Such a
law will create considerable litigation.
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business and governmental organizations can maximize the value of
manipulating the proposed DPSIP system.178
Principle 6: Openness. This principle addresses international standards of
transparency based on current—but not evolving—DPSIP standards.179 As
noted above, the efforts of the responsible person only need to be reasonable
and practical when notifying data subjects of the data processing.180 The
effort does not confront technological advances (e.g., data mining) that make
such standards obsolete.
Principle 7: Security Safeguards. This principle addresses current
international security standards. The proposed SA security principle is more
definite. A responsible person must take due regard and responsibility for the
integrity of data in its control or possession and must meet loss standards that
are appropriate, as well as organizationally and reasonably technologically
competent to prevent security breaches.181 The standard reinforces that
178 To be fair, from a political perspective such an approach may be a reasonable starting
point. A legislative strategy must be made. Sometimes, something is better than
nothing. One can always live to battle another day.
179 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 17 (2) (3). (a) the information being collected; (b) the name and
address of the responsible party; (c) the purpose for which the information is being
collected; (d) whether or not the supply of the information by that data subject is
voluntary or mandatory; (e) the consequences of failure to provide the information; (f)
any particular law authorising or requiring the collection of the information; and (g)
any further information, such as the—(i) recipient or category of recipients of the
information; (ii) nature or category of the information; and (iii) existence of the right of
access to and the right to rectify the information collected, which is necessary, having
regard to the specific circumstances in which the information is or is not to be
processed, to enable processing in respect of the data subject to be reasonable. (3)
The steps referred to in subsection (2) must be taken— (a) if the personal information
is collected directly from the data subject, before the information is collected, unless
the data subject is already aware of the information referred to in that subsection; or
(b) in any other case, before the information is collected or as soon as reasonably
practicable after it has been collected.
180 Ibid.
181 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 18. (a) loss of, damage to or unauthorised destruction of
personal information; and (b) unlawful access to or processing of personal
information. (2) In order to give effect to subsection (1), the responsible party must
take reasonable measures to— (a) identify all reasonably foreseeable internal and
external risks to personal information in its possession or under its control; (b)
establish and maintain appropriate safeguards against the risks identified; (c)
regularly verify that the safeguards are effectively implemented; and (d) ensure that
the safeguards are continually updated in response to new risks or deficiencies in
previously implemented safeguards. (3) The responsible party must have due regard
to generally accepted information security practices and procedures which may apply
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personal data is confidential and that any extensions must be defined by
contract principles. In keeping with the advancement of breach notification
principles started in California in the US, the Bill requires breach notification.182
Principle 8: Data subject participation. This principle addresses personal
information access and correction.183 With proper identification a data subject
can request verification from a responsible party to determine if the party has
relevant personal data about the subject. The processing of the request is
free. For a non-excessive fee, the data subject can discover the description
of any data subject information held by the responsible party. A fee can be
charged to determine if any third party or category of parties has or has had
access to the information. Requests must be made within a reasonable time;
this requirement may be problematic because a data subject may not have
had reasonable notice. The responsible party must release the data in a
reasonable format and manner that is generally understandable. Such
access is subject to some restraints noted in Chapter 4 of the Bill.184 Under
the current Bill, a data subject may contact the responsible party and request
a correction or deletion of personal information held by or under the control of
the responsible party that is excessive, inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant,
misleading, no longer authorized under the Bill, obtained unlawfully, or is out
of date.185 When the request is determined as valid, the responsible person
must correct, delete, or destroy the information. The data subject must be
informed and given credible evidence of any actions taken in response to the
request. In such a situation, the responsible party must contact any third
parties that were provided the information, when reasonable and practical.
No operational criteria are provided by the Bill.
Early international DPSIP legislative efforts identified personal information that
was considered sensitive. The principles are still part of the laws in the other
to it generally or be required in terms of specific industry or professional rules and
regulations.
182 See Chapter 8 of the current thesis and Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 21.
183 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶¶ 22 & 23.
184 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 22.
185 Id. at Chapter 3, part A, ¶ 23.
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countries noted in this study. Current efforts in CA and the EU have
advanced the focus, given more recent technological advances like data
mining.186 The SA Bill prohibits processing of data subject information related
to children without parental consent, criminal behavior, ethnic origin, health,
philosophical beliefs, political opinions, race, religious beliefs, sexual lifestyle,
or trade union membership. An exception is provided for governmental
agencies or organizations that maintain that they have a lawful purpose to
have such data.187
The SA Bill follows the pattern of DPSIP laws in the other study countries by
allowing protection exceptions. In SA, the Regulator has the power to grant
such exceptions.188 A set of balancing standards is established that involves a
substantial public interest over data subject interests. Such an argument has
been made by press organizations in a number of countries. A second
standard involves a proclaimed clear benefit to the data subject or a third
party that provides a substantial interest that interferes with the privacy of
another. Exceptions are allowed for historical, research, or statistical efforts.
Under the exceptions, the public interest trumps the protection principles of
the Bill. The public interest can reasonably include the criminal justice
system, with proper checks and balances, for preventing, detecting, and
prosecuting offenses. Exceptions are also allowed for interests that are open
to abuse including state security interests and the economic and financial
interests of a public body or the State.189
The Bill provides a supervision process that is more advanced than the ones
in the other countries in the study.190 A juristic Information Protection
Regulator is established.191 The jurisdiction, independence, and performance
186 See Chapters 3 and 5 of the current study.
187 Id. at Chapter 3, part B, ¶¶ 25-32.
188 Id. at Chapter 4, ¶¶ 33-34.
189 Id. at Chapter 4, ¶ 34.
190 The one exception is the standards of the US sectoral HIPAA legislation in the US. See
Chapter 8 of this work.
191 Id. at Chapter 5, part A ¶ 35.
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standards are clearly defined.192 The regulator does have two masters to
serve: the Protection of Personal Information Bill and the Promotion of Access
to Information Act. These purposes may have competing goals and
standards. The regulation office includes a full-time chairperson and four
part-time ordinary members.193 The SA President has appointment powers
that can be used to stack the regulator; the Parliament can request removal of
any of the regulator officers for illness or misconduct.194 Such powers, without
checks and balances, can violate the principle of independence. The
Regulator must provide informational reports to Parliament on all investigated
matters and present an annual report to the Minister of the Department of
Justice and Constitutional Development.195 The government’s Minister is also
granted additional powers over the Regulator.196 Such provisions can impair
the stated principle of independence.
The Bill declares a list of regulator duties and powers197 that is based on
problems found in other counties including those in this study. The Bill
requires that the regulator must establish and maintain a strategic focus and
must respond to changes in DPSIP principles; the regulator must also
address potential conflicts with other stakeholder interests, international
obligations, and technological changes.198 However, the provisions require
that the regulator must always consider the business and government’s
interest in the free flow of information.
The Bill requires the appointment of information protection officers in private
and public bodies. Specific duties and responsibilities for the officers are
192 Ibid, (a) has jurisdiction throughout the Republic; (b) is independent and is subject only to
the Constitution and to the law and must be impartial and perform its functions and
exercise its powers without fear, favour or prejudice; and (c) must perform its
functions and exercise its powers in accordance with this Act and the Promotion of
Access to Information Act.
193 Id. at ¶ 36.
194 Ibid.
195 Id. at ¶ 46.
196 Id. at Chapter 12, ¶ 102. (a) any matter which this Act requires or permits to be prescribed;
(b) the monitoring of this Act and the establishment of the Regulator; and (c) any
other matter which may be necessary for the application of this Act
197 Id. at ¶ 43.
198 Id. at ¶ 44 (1) (2) (3).
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defined.199 The regulator has the power to issue codes of conduct related to
information, classes of information, and practices. The codes can apply to
activities in a range of callings, industries, and professions. The regulator has
the power to review proposed codes of conduct.200
The Bill addresses additional DPSIP principles including unsolicited electronic
communications, directories, and automated decision making.201 The
provisions for transnational transfer of personal information require consent or
contractual obligation.202 The transfer standards do not provide any
restrictions on where the data is transferred; moreover, the standards do not
establish quality control on the processing, and they do not provide any
recourse or remedies when violations occur.
In the instant case, the Protection of Personal Information Bill, as proposed,
addresses a number of problematic DPSIP issues. The Bill does not address
issues related to social networking web sites and the sale of personal
information. Companies and individuals who fail to protect data will be legally
liable. The original proposal was to include a breach notification requirement
and criminal fines, punitive damages, and up to 10 years in prison.203 The
current Bill ignores some key DPSIP protections including privacy by design
and independent authority.
6.7 South African Standards and Remedies
To date, the SA judiciary and parliament have failed to respond to established
DPSIP legal issues. Sound constitutional protections on privacy have not
been operationally established or implemented. Despite decades of
international advancements on such issues, SA has struggled with internal
199 Id. at Chapter 5, part B ¶¶ 48-49.
200 Id. at Chapter 7, ¶ 57.
201 Id. at Chapter 8.
202 Id. at Chapter 9.
203 Siyabonga Africa, Privacy Bill Promises Protection. (2008, October 8), at
http://www.itweb.co.za/sections/internet/2008/0810081040.asp?O=F&A=TELECOMS
(last visited on 9 October 2012).
Chapter Six: South African Legal Standards 367
decision-making processes. At present, SA and business interests allow free
access to personal information for economic gain and governmental control.
Free access to information is the mantra of the power elite. Calls for DPSIP
protections have been essentially ignored from a political and judicial
perspective.
6.8 South African Implementation System
The SA government has established efforts to help the population become
more information technology literate. The government is aware that not all
citizens have personal access to computers or the Internet and it has trained
community development workers to help assist people with getting acquainted
with the Internet. Access for some data purposes is available at multi-
purpose community centers and post offices country wide.204
None of the DPSIP efforts have been extended to protect the rights of SA
citizens under international law. At present, remedy efforts are being
explored; however, SA citizens are being exploited without notice or remedy.
6.10 South African Sociolegal Concerns
SA is the most Internet connected country on the African continent. The
country is facing the same information privacy, data protection, and security
legal problems and issues as AU, CA (one of the ten most connected), EU,
UK (one of the ten most connected), and the US (the dominant Internet
country).205
204 The Center for Democracy and Technology, Preliminary e-Government Policy, Law and
Regulation Survey Report: South Africa (The Center for Democracy and Technology.
2006).
205 Caroline B Ncube, Watching the Watcher: Recent Developments in Privacy Regulation
and Cyber-Surveillance in South Africa 3 SCRIPTed – A Journal of Law, Technology
& Society 4, 344 (2006), http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/ncube.asp
(last visited on 23 April 2012).
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Research on public concerns regarding data protection and security concerns
in SA has occurred over time. A survey conducted in SA revealed that
seventy-three percent of those sampled reported concerns about the loss of
control over their personal information.206
Data protection and security concerns in SA showed that organizational
leaders in SA ranked amongst the world’s most informed about the need for
DPSIP protection and security. Sixty-seven percent reported that such
concerns were critical, yet twenty-four percent expressed concerns about the
effectiveness of current efforts. The majority noted that governmental policy
was motivated by business interests. Forty-two percent of SA respondents
reported that initiatives were directed by senior management, compared with
twenty percent for the global respondents. Seventy percent of the boards of
directors of SA corporations did not receive quarterly reports on DPSIP issues
from senior management.207
A 2004 survey showed that of the top 100 South African websites, a total of
ninety-six percent collected personal information. The same percentage
collected personal identifying information, while eighty-four percent reported
non-identifying data. The percentages were in line with international
standards. Only sixty-eight percent of SA websites posted any type of privacy
policy, while ninety-eight percent of the international sites did. Of the few
sites that offered some type of user choice, seventeen percent used opt-in
while eighty-three percent took the more invasive opt-out option. Fifty-eight
percent of the international sample used opt-out options. Of the sites that
206 Jaco Van Der Walt, Trust and Privacy are the Cornerstones of Successful Relationships
between Consumers and Business. (2003, March 13),
http://www.ey.com/GLOBAL/content.nsf/South_Africa/15_May_03_Trust_And_
Privacy (last visited on 5 June 2012).
207 Ernst & Young, South African CEOs are Getting More Hands-On with Information Security
Issues, Tech News (2004, November),
http://cbr.co.za/article.aspx?pklArticleId=3290&pklCategoryId=378 (last visited on 22
March 2012).
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collected personal information, the security procedures in place on those sites
were less than international standards.208
Table 6.1 Security Claims
Security Claim South Africa International
Sites claimed to provide transmission data
security from user to the site
43% 60%
Sites claimed to offer site security once data is
collected
31% 72%
The research conducted in SA revealed that the majority of people wanted
DPSIP legal protections. The data also showed the business organizations in
the country were behaving below international standards. The lack of
governmental DPSIP laws and regulatory agencies compounded the problem.
Politicians and jurists can and certainly do argue and maneuver around
DPSIP issues. Businesses and corporations can and do corrupt the
process.209 The above research shows that the majority of SA citizens want
strong DPSIP legislation and regulation.
6.10 South African Critique
Chapter two of the SA Constitution210 establishes a privacy right that no other
Constitution in the study provides. The extension of such rights to juristic
persons (corporations) is potentially troublesome given the immense power of
national and global corporations. The US has been classified as a corporate
208 Ibid.
209 See: Jeffrey D. Clements, Corporations Are Not People: Why They Have More Rights
Than You and What You Can Do About it (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc ed. 2012).
Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the
Theft of Human Rights (Rodale ed. 2002). Robert G. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money:
The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government,(Alfred A.
Knopf ed. 2009). Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress -
and a Plan to Stop It (Twelve - Hachette Hook Group ed. 2011).
210 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1966 ¶ 2 (1996). (SA)
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republic.211 Corporations can sue for defamation, with no actual damages and
privacy violations. The same protections are not often allowed for natural
persons. The SA provisions counter the political theory that governments are
formed to protect the rights of men and women.
Studies in SA have shown that considerable citizen concerns exist regarding
DPSIP issues.212 The government has done little to execute the will of the
people or protect its citizens from the unintended consequences of not
properly addressing DPSIP issues. After years of study and review, SA
remains the only country in the study that has officially failed to legally
respond to DPSIP concerns that its citizens have raised. The US, which has
a rather schizoid approach, has at least provided some limited response. To
date, the SA approach fails to meet the standards set by AU, CA, UK, and the
EU. Despite the recalcitrance of the SA judiciary to establish common law
protections and remedies consistent with its international legal peers, despite
the resistance of the business community – especially powerful international
corporations to any checks and balances on their unlimited greed to make
profit on everything – and despite a population that is preoccupied with
resolving historic power issues and building a sound modern democracy, a
group of dedicated, educated, and socially responsible citizens and
professionals has made considerable and somewhat effective efforts to
address one of the major issues of the day.
6.11 Summary of South African Literature and Issues Reviewed
The intent of this thesis is to conduct a comparative analysis of DPSIP
responses in five different nations. Part of the comparison uses a benchmark
approach of key issues. The issues include legal support of DPSIP
protections, legal support of corporate privacy and data protection standards,
information privacy data protection and security declarations, the use of
211 James K. Galbraith, Our New Corporate Republic, Boston Globe. (2001), at
http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0107-01.htm (last visited on 20 February
2012).
212 See Chapter 2 of this work.
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regulatory agencies, sectoral legislation, and data controllers. The
benchmark standards also include data processor requirements, data
subjects, data security destruction, cross-border data flow, exemptions and
exceptions, and the current stage of the approach based on evolutionary
stages. The following table presents the summary based on the benchmark
model.
Table 6.2 Comparative Model of South African Legal Support of DPSIP
Models
ISSUE DESCRIPTION SA CURRENT RESPONSE
CM.1: Legal Support of DPSIP
Protections
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with International Human
Rights Standards
(See Appendix A)
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with EU DPSIP
Standards
No
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with APEC DPSIP
Standards
No
Constitutional Law Yes
Legislative Efforts Proposed
Common Law Limited
Province /State Constitutional Law No
Province / State Legislative Efforts No
Province /State Common Law No
CM.2: Legal Support of
Corporate Privacy and Data
Property Protection Issues
SA CURRENT RESPONSE
Copyright Protections Yes
Database Protection Yes
Patient Protections Yes
Service Mark Protections Yes
Trade Mark Protections Yes
Trade Secret Protections Yes
Privacy Impact Audit Required
Before Use
No
Privacy Impact Audit Required
Before Government Protections
Granted
No
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Checks and Balances on
Corporate Collection, Use, and
Transfer of Individual DPSIP Data
No
CM.3: Information Privacy –
Data Protection and Security
Declarations
SA CURRENT PROPOSED
RESPONSE
Definitions Provided Yes
Personal and Sensitive Data
Defined
Yes
Definitions Effectively Address
Advanced Data Mining
Technologies
No
All Holders and Users Held
Accountable
No
CM.4: Regulatory Agency SA CURRENT PROPOSED RESPONSE
Independent of Legislative and
Executive Branches
Questionable – approach is open to
abuse with no checks or balances
Administrative Power Yes
Investigative Power Yes
Regulatory Powers Yes
Education Function Yes
Enforcement Powers Yes
Structure Yes
Responsibilities Defined Yes
Accountability Yes
Governmental Chief Privacy
Officer/ Commissioner Required
Yes
Governmental Privacy Audits
Required as Part of Legislation
Passage
Yes
Business Chief Privacy Officer/
Commissioner Required
Yes
Employees are Personally Liable
for Violations
No
Business Privacy Audits Required No
Agency Educational Function Yes
CM.5: Sectoral DPSIP
Legislation
SA CURRENT PROPOSED
RESPONSE
Credit Reporting Agencies Yes
Criminal Justice Record
Restrictions
Yes
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Health Information Yes
Health Information Exceptions Yes
Electronic Medical/Health Record
Controls
Unclear
CM.6: Data Controllers SA CURRENT PROPOSED
RESPONSE
Notice Required Yes
Opt-in Unclear
Opt-Out Unclear
Must Be Lawful and Fair Yes
System Access Controls Yes
Data Quality and Integrity Yes
Accurate Yes
Complete Yes
Up to Date Yes
Limited to Needed Data In theory
Relevant Yes
Not Misleading Yes
Data Retention Limitation Limited
Data Transfer Controls Limited
Openness on Information Held Limited
Breach Disclosures Required No
Breach Penalties No
CM.7: Data Processor
Requirements
SA CURRENT PROPOSED
RESPONSE
Informed Consent Required Unclear
Rationale is Provided No
Fair Processing No
Legal Processing Yes
General Data No
Sensitive Data Yes
Accuracy Yes
Timely Yes
Duration of Record Keeping
Controls
No
CM.8: Data Subjects SA CURRENT PROPOSED
RESPONSE
Ownership by the Subject No
Control Over Access Limited
Alter, Amend, Correct, and Delete
Errors
Yes
Notification Requirement No
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CM.9: Data Security and
Destruction
SA CURRENT PROPOSED
RESPONSE
Security Must be State of the Art No
Technology Use – Cost of
Implementation Not a Defense
No
Tracking No
Safeguards Required No
Protects from Alteration No
Protects Against Disclosure No
Protects Misuse No
Protects Against Unauthorized
Internal and External Access
No
Unauthorized Access Penalties No
Timely Notice of Breaches No
Strong Remedies Provided No
CM.10: Cross-Border Data Flow SA CURRENT PROPOSED
RESPONSE
Individual Informed Consent
Required
Yes
Transfer Source Is Accountable No
Outsource Service Controls No
CM.11: Exemptions and
Exceptions
SA CURRENT PROPOSED
RESPONSE
Only Permitted Where There Is a
Compelling Justification
No
Checks and Balances – Court
Order Required
No
Government Agencies Yes
Intelligence and Defense Yes
Police Actions Yes
Small Business Exemption No
CM.12 DPSIP Evolutional Stages SA CURRENT PROPOSED
RESPONSE
DPSIP.0 Limited DPSIP legal
Issues
Yes
DPSIP.1.0 Establishes PII; does not
fully address security issues; focus
on limited legal consent and notice.
Yes
DPISP.2.0 Accepts PII standards;
does not fully address security
issues; focus on a legally based
harm-based analysis.
No
DPSIP.3.0 PII and non-PII data No
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fused; privacy, data protection and
security issues are interrelated;
legal audits, checks, and balances
needed for all personal information
stakeholders. New technologies
are required to pass privacy audits
(e.g., RFID, Internet of Things) and
require use of privacy enhancing
technologies in all new IP
approvals.
SA has established an advanced constitutional privacy protection clause;
however, enabling legislation has yet to be established.213 The courts have
been resistant to establishing DPSIP standards within its Roman-Dutch
common law tradition. The focus on establishing DPSIP protections has been
left to the legislature. Some sector legislation has been enacted that involves
selective DPSIP issues. For more than a decade, the legislative process has
been involved in attempting the establishment of a comprehensive DPSIP
legal policy, which is needed to meet the data protection demands of the
public and the DPSIP legal demands of its major trading partners.
Chapter Seven explores the UK approach to DPSIP legal issues. As a
member of the EU, it is accountable to the EU data protection standards. The
courts and parliament have established some DPSIP principles; however, the
standards do not fully embrace the EU standards. Although some practices
have been established, there are actual and potential complications in the UK
approach.
213 A similar legislative problem exists in the US. Some legislators follow the Constitution and
the basic principles of human rights and the rule of law. Other legislators follow the
dictates and money of the corporate republic.
Chapter Seven: United Kingdom Legal Standards 377
CHAPTER SEVEN: DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW:
UNITED KINGDOM LEGAL STANDARDS
Parliament has seldom been prepared to legislate specifically to
ensure rights to privacy, leaving it to the courts to develop
common law and equitable principles. The courts, whilst not
altogether shirking this responsibility, have proceeded with
extreme, and some would say undue, caution. David Bainbridge
and Graham Pearce1
7.0 Overview
The UK is a party to the Council of Europe and a member of the EU. Of the
nations addressed in the current study, the UK is the only one that has an
obligation to pass legislation conforming with the EU approach to DPSIP legal
standards. The UK has instituted some innovative DPSIP approaches. In
specified circumstances, EU laws can take precedence over conflicting UK
laws.2 As of August 1, 2010, the EU instructed the UK to strengthen DPSIP
laws or face European Court of Justice action.3 The government has never
fully committed to protecting data. Nonetheless, the UK has one of the largest
DNA databases in the world. The data base includes eight percent of the
entire population of the country. As of 2009, Jill Lawless4 reported that data
from over five million people has been collected. This collection includes DNA
from everyone arrested for any reason; moreover, the data is retained no
1 David Bainbridge & Graham Pearce, Tilting at Windmills - Has the New Data Protection Law
Failed to Make a Significant Contribution to Rights of Privacy, 2000 Journal of
Information, Law and Technology 2, (2000).
2 See European Communities Act 1972 (c. 68) (1972). (UK)
3 Chris Priestly, United Kingdom: UK Told to Get Tougher on Data Protection Law Mondaq:
Intellectual Property. (2010), at
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=106238&email_access=on (last visited
on 2 August 2012).
4 Jill Lawless, Does DNA Database Unfairly Brand the Innocent?, San Francisco
Chronicle(2009), at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/09/12/MNDK19L6BK.DTL.
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matter the result of the arrest (e.g., if the charges are eventually dropped or
the person is acquitted). When the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
ruled that this blanket policy was indiscriminate and should be stopped, the
UK, in a passive-aggressive response, deleted some records; however, as
Lawless5 reported, the UK also stated that it would keep the records of those
cleared of serious crimes for up to twelve years. Alec Jeffreys, the British
scientist that discovered the DNA identification factor, criticized the UK
response as non-compliant with the spirit of the law.6
The UK chapter begins with presenting background on the country. The
analysis continues with an examination of the UK Constitutional declarations,
UK legislation, and UK case law. The research then focuses on UK
constituent governmental declarations, legislation, and case law. An analysis
of the UK standards, remedies, and implementation system is reviewed. UK
sociolegal concerns are presented. A critique of the UK approach is then
addressed. A summary of the UK literature and issues, using the thesis
comparative model of the current legal support, is then reviewed and
presented.
7.1 Background
The UK is a multi-cultural nation that has historically headed the
Commonwealth nations.7 The majority of the population is of Anglo-Saxon
descent, including British, Irish, and Scottish. Based on historic rights to
commonwealth nations, additional ethnic groups include West Indians and
South Asians.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 United Kingdom Government, Government, Citizens and Rights. (2010), at
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/index.htm (last visited on 5
August 2012). Site contains reference data for this section.
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The official name of the UK is the United Kingdom of Great Britain8 and
Northern Ireland.9 The country is a constitutional monarchy with an unwritten
constitution based on common law, practices, statutes, and traditional rights.
The UK has the third-largest population in the EU. The executive branch
includes the head of state (ie, the monarch) and the head of government (i.e.,
the prime minister).10
The UK legislative structure11 includes the Parliament of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain12 and Northern Ireland.13 The Parliament includes the House
of Lords,14 House of Commons,15 and the monarch. The Scotland Act of
199816 created the current Scottish Parliament. This body is democratically
elected.17 In 945, the King of Wales codified Welch law. The current National
Assembly of Wales has sixty members18 elected to four year terms. The
8 Includes England, Scotland, and Wales. England has been a country since the 10th Century
of the common era. In 1707, Scotland formally joined with England and Wales.
Starting in 1284 and ending in 1536, Wales joined with England.
9 The union with Ireland occurred in 1801; the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 partitioned six
Northern Counties into North Ireland.
10 United Kingdom Government, The Official Site of the Prime Minister's Office. (2010), at
http://www.number10.gov.uk/ (last visited on 5 August 2012).
11 This is not a traditional national legislature; however, it can obligate the courts to follow its
statutes. The body includes the House of Commons (651 members) and the House of
Lords (26 Bishops, 92 hereditary peers, and 574 life peers). The Sovereign functions
as the third part of the legislature. United Kingdom Government, Parliament. (2010),
at http://www.parliament.uk/ (last visited on 5 August 2012). See
12 Also known as British or Westminster Parliament.
13The devolved Northern Irish Assembly is unicameral. The 108 Members of the Legislative
Assembly are elected in democratic elections. The assembly was created by a 1997
referendum; it was established in 1999.
14 Members are appointed by the monarch with advice from the Prime Minister. The House of
Lords includes twenty-six senior bishops of the Church of England and 669 Lords
Temporal.
15 Composed of 659 members of Parliament who are democratically elected by
constituencies. England has 529 members, Scotland has seventy-two, Northern
Ireland has eighteen, and Wales has forty members.
16 The 129 members are democratically elected and are referred to as Members of the
Scottish Parliament. The Parliament is unicameral and was created by a 1997
referendum; it was established in 1999. See Scotland Act 1998 Chapter 46 (1998).
(UK)
17 Seventy-three are elected by plurality based on districts and fifty-six by eight regions.
18 Includes forty members elected by plurality and twenty representing five regional sectors.
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Government of Wales Act of 200619 granted additional powers to the
Assembly. Acts can be vetoed by the Parliament of the UK.
DPSIP law in the UK is based on statutory enactments, English common law
(judicial decisions), EU legislation,20 and international treaties. The common
law tradition builds on Roman law and current EU actions.
Historically, the highest court of appeal was the House of Lords. The
monarch appointed the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary for life. Under the
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, a Supreme Court was established. In
October of 2009, the UK opened the Supreme Court21 with the sitting Law
Lords becoming the Court’s Justices and the Senior Law Lord becoming the
first President. England and Wales have a combined judicial system.
Scotland22 and Northern Ireland23 each have their own judicial systems
based on a common law tradition.
The UK has established a range of civil liberty, civil rights, human rights, and
consumer protection standards that relate to DPSIP legal standards. Some
standards are proactive, whereas others react to EU standards.
The history of any current constitutional democracy reveals pendulum shifts
from supporting civil liberty, civil rights, and human rights priorities to
periodically suppressing them in a cyclical pattern. The UK is no exception.
The signing of the 1215 Magna Carta remains one of the most important
documents in human history. In 1998, the UK government passed a Human
19 Government of Wales Act 2006 Chapter 32 (2006). (UK)
20 Includes decisions, directives, and regulations.
21 United Kingdom Government, The Supreme Court. (2010), at
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/index.html (last visited on 5 August 2012).
22 Includes the Scotland's Court of Session and Court of the Justiciary.
23 The supreme courts of England, Northern Ireland, and Wales include Courts of Appeal, the
High Courts of Justice, and the Crown Courts.
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Rights Act24 that recognizes rights and freedoms, liberty and security, fair
trials, and privacy. The UK is also a European Convention on Human Rights
signatory.25
The UK has established a number of consumer protection acts.26 As a
member of the EU, the UK is mandated to comply with a range of consumer
protection directives27 and determinations of the European Commissioner for
Consumer Protection.
7.2 United Kingdom Constitutional Declarations
Given that the UK does not have a written constitution, no clearly established
constitutional declaration exists. However, in the UK legal tradition, laws and
cases does illustrate a declaration of basic constitutional standards.
7.3 United Kingdom Legislation
The UK DPSIP legal standards are heavily influenced by the findings of the
Younger Committee on privacy. The report explains that new electronic,
technical, and visual technology is creating imminent and increasing privacy
threats. A range of organizations and people, for diverse purposes, are
creating “new and menacing” privacy threats.28
24 United Kingdom, Human Rights Act 1998: 1998 Chapter 42. (1998a), at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980042_en_1 (last visited on 5 June
2012). (UK)
25 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. (2009), at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last
visited on 5 August 2012).
26 The list includes the Misrepresentations Act of 1967, Consumer Credit Act of 1974, Unfair
Contract Terms Act of 1977, Sale of Goods Act of 1979, Consumer Protection Act of
1987, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1999, Consumer
Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations of 2000, and Electronic Commerce
Regulations of 2002. The Act establishes a strict liability standard for liability. (UK)
27 Includes the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and Directives on Unfair Contract
Terms (93/13/EC).
28 Kenneth Younger, Report of the Committee on Privacy, Chairman: The Right Hon Kenneth
Younger (Home Office. 1972, July). at 8.
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Traditionally, no general privacy right existed in the legal history of the UK.
However, in 1984, the government passed the first UK Data Protection Act.
The Act regulated the processing of personal information/data, including both
sensitive and non-sensitive data. The Act identified some data that was
considered sensitive data at the time. While data mining and technological
advancements have superseded the approach, the issues remain relevant.29
With time, the pattern changed to wider applications of DPSIP principles.
Examples include the enactment of the Human Rights Act of 1998
(HRA),30 the Data Protection Act of 1998 (DPA),31 and the 2000
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA).32
7.3.1 Human Rights Act of 1998
On 2 October 2000, the Human Rights Act went into effect. The Act
was in response to the European Convention on Human Rights; in
fact, the legislation integrated the majority of the European Convention
on Human Rights into UK law. Part One, Article Eight addresses the
“Right to respect for private and family life and correspondence.”33 The Act
29 United Kingdom Government, The UK Data Protection Act of 1998. (1998) (UK), at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1984/1984035.htm (last visited on 17 May 2012). The
scheme included alleged or actual offense commission, criminal proceedings, ethnic or
racial identity, membership in a trade union, mental or physical condition or health,
political opinions, religious or other beliefs, and sexual lifestyle.
30Human Rights Act 1998: 1998 Chapter 42. (1998a), at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980042_en_1 (last visited on 5 June
2012). (UK)
31 Data Protection Act 1998: 1998 Chapter 29. (1998b), at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980029_en_1 (last visited on 5 June
2012). (UK)
32 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: 2000 Chapter 23. (2000), at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_1.htm (last visited on 5
June 2012). (UK)
33Human Rights Act 1998. § 8. (UK) Sect 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2 There shall be no interference by
a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
Chapter Seven: United Kingdom Legal Standards 383
prohibits the government from interfering with these rights; however, it
includes some exceptions.
As with almost all legislation in the area of DPSIP, the Act provided
exceptions which can be very broad, subject to interpretation, and open to
questionable judgments. In particular, the meaning of security, safety,
economic well being, crime prevention, health, morals, and the rights of others
in any given circumstance is broad and open to interpretation. Depending on
the interpretation of the exceptions, the stated privacy rights can be voided.
The exception clause was consistent with a proportionality test. The Act was
limited to actions by public authorities – “It is unlawful for a public authority to
act in a way which is incompatible with an EU Convention right.”34 The Act
did not apply to business organizations and did not prohibit government from
supporting business violations. Thus, the government can use businesses to
manage data that would be illegal if the government performed the same task.
The Act required that UK courts and tribunals read and full give effect to the
European Convention on Human Rights to all primary and subordinate
legislation. The Courts could not render decisions that would violate
Convention principles. Courts and tribunals were included in the definition of
public authorities and thus must apply the principles of the Act in all legal
actions, including interpreting the common law.35
7.3.2 Data Protection Act of 1998
The UK addressed data protection issues reluctantly. The first data protection
law was passed in 1970 in the German state of Hesse. In the same decade,
data controllers in Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden were also
licensed. In 1981, the Council of Europe passed a convention requiring
34 Id. at § 6.1.
35 Id. at § 6(3)(a).
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member state compliance.36 In response, the UK passed the 1984 Data
Protection Act, which minimally met the Council standards. The 1998 law
built on and repealed the 1984 Data Protection Act, which addressed
some automated data processing of personal data by any data
controller. The focus in this Act shifted from repairing the damages
caused by data processing violations to preventing data processing
violations.37
The 1998 Data Protection Act applies to public and private organizations and
includes data controllers, data processors, and data subjects. The Act is
intended to comply with the Council of Europe mutual assistance provisions.38
The Act required the establishment of a Data Protection
Commissioner, which later became the Information Commissioner’s Office
(ICO).39 Although the act requires explicit data subject consent, such
consent need not be informed,40 and it does not require breach
notification. Moreover, such consent has a number of exemptions
including data related to employment, ethnic monitoring, legal
proceedings, medical purposes, vital interests, and data in the public
domain.41 The ICO must seek court42 approval to enter and inspect
premises for data-relevant purposes. The ICO has the power to issue
enforcement notices, provide educational resources, and encourage
the development of codes of best practices. The act further
establishes a Data Protection Tribunal to hear appeals of ICO Rulings.
36 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data: Strasbourg, 28.I.1981. (1981), at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/108.htm (last visited on 15 January
2012).
37 The Act provides a framework with the expectation that statutory instruments would follow.
The Act consists of seventy-five sections and sixteen schedules.
38 Signatory states must cooperate with one another in relevant laws and judicial actions.
39 The 1984 act used the term Data Protection Registrar. The current term is Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO).
40 See Art 2(h) and § 3, ¶ 1.
41 See §§ 3, ¶¶ 2(1), 3(a), 4, 7, 8(1), 9(1).
42 Circuit judge or a sheriff if the issue is in Scotland.
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An independent agency is in a better position to address DPSIP
standards and innovation than the US approach of placing the
responsibility on the individual and industry self-regulations.43
Section One, Part One of the 1998 Data Protection Act defines
processing of data as "obtaining, recording, or holding the
information or data or carrying out any operation or set of operations
on the information or data."44 Personal data refers to data that could
identify any living person. The law defines the nature of sensitive
data as racial or ethnic, political, religious, concerning union
membership, medical conditions, sexual life, legal offense or
allegations, or court proceedings.45
Part Two of the act provided for legal access to personal data, a right for data
corrections, prevention of processing, compensation for failure to comply with
certain provisions of the act, and rectification of inaccurate data.46 Under the
Act, individuals have a legal right to personal data that is held about them.
Individuals could legally block, erase, and rectify inaccurate data. Individuals
could also legally block the processing of certain types of data.
Part Three required that organizations that collect, hold, or transfer data must
have a data controller; this controller registers data-processing activities with
the ICO.47 Section Four, Part Four clearly requires that data controllers
enforce and follow all data protection and information privacy principles48 in
the Act in a fair and lawful manner.
43 See Chapter 8 § 8.1
44 Data Protection Act 1998, § 1.1 (UK) 1 March 2000, was the effective date.
45 See Part 1 §2.
46 See Part 2 §§7-15.
47 See Part 3 §§17-26. The latest version of the SA POPI rejected this standard.
48 The eight privacy principles include the following: “personal data being processed fairly
and lawfully; shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes,
and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or
those purposes; shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purpose or purposes for which they are processed; shall be accurate and, where
necessary, kept up to date; data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be
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For data processing to be lawful, the data subject must give consent freely. In
contrast, under Canadian law, Article Two Section H consent was defined as
“any freely given specific and informed indication of (the data
subject's) wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to
personal data relating to him being processed.”49
In 2008, the House of Lords passed an amendment that made
negligent and deliberate loss of data a criminal offense, subject to a
punishment of up to two years in jail. Lord Erroll stated that “Data
controllers need to wake up to the importance of personal data, whether in the
public or the private sector.”50
The 2008 amendment, which covered most non-governmental data
processors, required processors to pay a ₤ 35 annual notification filing costs 
to the ICO. This Act requires that the data controller post notice of several
factors.51
kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes; shall be
processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under this Act; appropriate
technical and organizational measures shall be taken against unauthorized or
unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or
damage to, personal data; shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the
European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level
of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing
of personal data.” United Kingdom, Data Protection Act 1998: 1998 Chapter 29.
(1998), Schedule 1, Part 1, at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980029_en_1 (last visited on 5 June
2012).
49 Canadian Federal Government, Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document
Act. (2000), at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-8.6 (last visited on 1
November 2012), Art. 2, Sec. H. The notice must include “his name and address,
nominated representative, description of the personal data being or to be processed,
categories of data subject, description of the purpose(s) of the processing, any
recipients for disclosure, and names any non-European Economic Area (EEA)
involved in any transfer.”
50 Tom Young, Lose Data and You Go To Jail. (2008, May 8), at
http://www.computing.co.uk/computing/news/2216073/lose-jail-3989942 (last visited
on 10 May 2012), at 4.
51 United Kingdom Government, The UK Data Protection Act of 1998. ch. 29. Part III § 16
(1998), at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1984/1984035.htm (last visited on 17
May 2012).
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The importance of DPSIP legislation was further enhanced with the
passage of the EU Directive 95/46/EC – the Data Protection
Directive.52 The Directive requires that the UK comply with basic
principles through legislation. However, the UK continues a pattern of
minimal compliance with the spirit and letter of the Directive. At the
time of this writing, the EU is issuing charges of UK non-compliance.
7.3.3 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000
The Act was passed to update UK telecommunications laws to account for
technological developments and the EU Directive 97/66/EC. Part One,
Chapter One criminalized the interception of communications in public
and private postal and telecommunication systems. The law made
allowance for consent waivers and criminal warrants. “The Act
effectively establishes a free standing privacy right by creating a tort of
unlawful interception.”53 Section Two, Part Nine allowed for traffic data
monitoring; therefore, the impact on e-mail was open to interpretation.
Morris54 argued that in workplace situations, consent waivers must be
interpreted as extremely limited. Neo-Conservative regulators interpreted the
provisions of the law to balance toward business facilitation. The fear card
that the businesses might leave the country was played by business special
interests groups. Such groups financially supported legislators, and DPSIP
legal interests were curtailed.
Whatever the legislative and case law in the UK, the approach is not working
well. The Ministry of Defense reports that data on 1.5 million bits of
information on 100,000 employees and 600,000 service applicants were
52 European Union Directives, The 95/46/EC Directive. (1995), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML (last
visited on 4 January 2012).
53 Tas Voutourides, Privacy Protected by Interception Legalities. Law Society Gazette. (2000,
November 13), at http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/privacy-protected-interception-
legalities (last visited on 15 May 20aa), at 11.
54 Gillian S. Morris, Fundamental Rights: Exclusion by Agreement? 30 Industrial Law Journal
1, 49 (2001).
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violated. The numbers did not include the loss of 658 laptops and twenty-six
memory sticks containing classified information.55
7.4 United Kingdom Case Law
Before examining the UK common or case law determinations on DPSIP legal
issues, it is important to examine the power and reality constraints on the
highest court in the jurisdiction. A discussion without a common benchmark
would be meaningless. A legal declaration without exploring and
understanding the de facto influences is myopic. The US Supreme Court was
selected as the benchmark for this study because, in theory, it represents the
international standard in the rule of law, balance of powers, and political
independence analysis. Granted, evidence does exist that the benchmark
Court has been inconsistent.56
Table 7.0 Comparison of United Kingdom and United States Supreme
Court
Factor UK Supreme Court57 US Supreme Court58
Established 2005 1789
Power of decisions Applies to all courts and
jurisdictions in
England, Northern
Ireland, and
Scotland. The High
Court of Justiciary
addresses criminal
issues in Scotland.
Applies to all courts and
jurisdictions in the
country.
Membership President of the Court,
Deputy President,
One Chief Justice and eight
associate justices
55 Elizabeth Stewart, MoD Loses Hard Drive Holding Military Personnel Data: Portable Drive
Holding Private Details of 100,000 Army, Navy and RAF Personnel Belonged to MoD
IT Contractor, EDS. (2008, October 10), at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/oct/10/military-defence (last visited on 11 October
2012).
56 See Chapter 8 of the current work.
57 The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, The Supreme Court. (2010), at
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/ (last visited on 30 December 2012).
58 Kermit L Hall, The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (Oxford
University Press 2nd. ed. 2005). See also Supreme Court of the United States, About
the Supreme Court. (2010), at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ (last visited on 5 July
2012).
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and ten puisne
justices. All do not
hear the same
cases. The
president can
appoint acting
judges.
(currently).
Appointee
Background
Leading appellate courts
judges and former
Law Lords.
Leading appellate courts
judges, politicians,
and law professors.
Term of Office Retire at 70 years old if
appointed before
1995 or 75 if
appointed after.
Life or until retires.
Jurisdiction Appellate. Can not
overturn primary
legislation.
However, it can
overturn secondary
legislation.
Original and appellate.
Role Law—clarification. Error—correction
Operations Hears oral arguments
and reviews
documents.
Hears oral arguments but
relies heavily on
arguments presented
in written briefs.
Decisions Opinion of the majority,
written by one
justice, and
concurring and
dissenting opinions
of other justices.
Most cases heard
by five-person
panel.
Opinion of the majority,
written by one
justice, and
concurring and
dissenting opinions
of other justices.
Judicial Review Recent. Historic since Marshall.
Appointment Selection commission
consisting of
President and
Deputy President
of the court, and a
member of the
Judicial
Appointments
Commission for
England and
Wales, Northern
Ireland, and
Scotland.
President nominates,
Senate confirms.
Representation Tied to the old Law
Justice system.
Recently more political.
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Opinions Reference cases - Can
render advisory
opinions
No advisory opinions.
Case Assignment Court has discretion on
selected cases. The
court is responsible
for EU and Human
Rights cases.
Court determines what
cases it will hear
based on writ of
certiorari. Since
1925, has
discretionary docket
control.
UK federal case law is tied to the EU case law reviews and its own common
law tradition. The Appellate Committee of the British House of Lords has
a long history of being legally conservative. Since 1876, the Committee
had been Britain's Supreme Court in civil matters. Starting in 1960, the
Committee became the Supreme Court in criminal matters except for
Scotland. As noted earlier, the UK has somewhat reluctantly addressed
DPSIP legal issues, but it must also be noted that a number of
significant UK court decisions have supported individuals’ rights to
personal information privacy.
The first case on point was Pope v. Curl (1741). The English House of Lords
(the highest court at the time) found that an author of a letter had an
ownership interest in the letter and that another could not publish it without the
author’s consent. In essence, the court found that an individual had a
property right in maintaining the privacy of personal information to the extent
that another could not publish certain letters.59
Prince Albert sought an injunction against the publication of a list of
etchings and works owned by Queen Victoria. In Prince Albert v. Strange,
the court granted the injunction. The court found that “The jurisdiction in
confidence is based not so much on property or on contract as on a duty of
59 Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 324, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (1741), 324. (UK)
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good faith.” 60 Lord Cottenham declared that in this instance "privacy is the
right invaded." The holder of the confidential information has a duty of care
and nothing should be done without clear consent.61
In Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd.,62 the
Court ruled in a case where an agent for the plaintiff delivered materials to the
defendant to fill an order with an implied condition of confidence. The
defendant violated the confidence for its own gain. The Court ruled that the
obligation to protect confidential information does not require a contract
between the parties. The confidential information cannot be public knowledge
or in the public domain. However, the information does not need to be an
absolute secret.
The Data Protection Act of 1984 applied only to electronic records. In Gaskin
v. United Kingdom,63 Gaskin wanted access to records related to his
treatment care when he was a child. The government stated that it would
release the records, provided that all case work writers consented. However,
not all case writers could be contacted so the UK refused. The European
Court of Human Rights found that the government’s actions violated Article 8
of the Convention on Protection of Fundamental Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Data holders had a “positive obligation” to provide a means of
access to the personal data. The Court found no violation under Section
Ten.64
A tension exists between DPSIP principles and free speech. In 1983, the
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary established a right to free speech in
60 Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 H & Tw 1; 2 De G & SM 293; (1849) 1 Mac & G 25; [1849]
EWHC Ch J20, (1849), 293. (UK)
61 Id.
62 Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd. 65 R.P.C. 203, (1948).
(UK)
63 Gaskin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10454/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36, (1989). (UK)
64 Section 10 addresses freedom of expression concerns.
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Derbyshire County Council v the Times Newspapers Ltd. and Others.65
The case was a defamation charge brought by a county council. The
next year, the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, struck down sections of a
Parliamentary Act for violating EU human rights law in R v Secretary of
State for Employment ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission.66 The
decision was consistent with the Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex
parte Factortame.67
In R v Brown68 Lord Hoffmann wrote that the right of privacy is under
technological threat. Massive amounts of intimate data are capable of
instantaneous transmission with no notice. A further analysis of the threat is
found in Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s pronouncement in Marcel v Metropolitan
Police Commissioner.69 The judge determined that the currently massive
amounts of personal data and data-mining abilities threaten individual
freedom. According to the court, such a “dossier of private information is the
badge of the totalitarian state.”70
The Court of Appeals addressed the issue of a person being capable of
gaining access to data held by a business under Sections 7 and 8 of the Data
Protection Act. In Durant v. Financial Services Authority,71 the court limited
the amount of data that must be released. The rationale was that Durant was
not the subject of the data. In 1993, Durant had sued Barclay Bank and lost.
He wanted to obtain Barclay’s records to attempt to re-open his litigation.
Since the Financial Services Authority was the financial privacy regulator, he
requested data from the Authority. The agency provided computer data about
65 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others, [1993] AC 534, [1993] 1
All ER 1011, [1993] 2 WLR 449, 91 LGR 179 House of Lords, (1993). (UK)
66 R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission, 2 WLR
409, 1994). (UK)
67 Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603,
(1991). (UK)
68 Regina v. Brown, 1 ALL ER 545 at 555-556, (24 July 1997). (UK)
69 Marcel v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ch. 225 at 240, (1992). (UK)
70 Ibid.
71 Durant v. Financial Services Authority, EWCA Civ 1746, (2003). (UK)
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him but redacted data about others. The Authority refused to provide all of
the information and in the format Durant requested. The court ruled that
“Mere mention of the data subject in a document held by a data controller
does not necessarily amount to his personal data.”72 The court established a
very restricted definition of a “relevant filing system.” The definition required
that the system must be able to verify that specific personal data can be found
and where the file or search criteria can be located. The focus of the data
must affect the person’s privacy.73
Unauthorized photographs taken at the wedding of film stars Michael Douglas
and Catherine Zeta-Jones appeared in magazines published in the UK and
Europe. The Douglas’ sought injunctive relief to no avail. After publication,
the Douglas’ sought damages under UK legal standards and the Data
Protection Act. In Douglas & Ors v. Hello! Ltd & Ors, the High Court of Justice
(Chancery Division) found for the Douglas’ and determined nominal Data
Protection Act violations and liability under the law of confidence.74
The High Court addressed the issue of a person’s right to access data held by
a data user. In Alan Lord v. The Secretary of State for the Home
Department,75 the court addressed the standards for access denial on the
basis that the release would likely be prejudicial to larger interests. The court
found that the term “likely” means a significant probability. A risk that the
release would be prejudicial—even a real risk—is not enough. A more
significant and weighty standard must be applied. According to the court,
“The test of necessity is a strict one.”76 The use of a general non-disclosure
policy does not satisfy this legal standard. In a victory for individual access to
72 Id. at ¶ 28.
73 Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.
74 Douglas & Ors v. Hello! Ltd & Ors [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch) (11 April 2003) [2003] 3 All ER
996, [2003] EMLR 31, [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), (2003). (UK)
75 Alan Lord v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, EWHC 2073, (1 September
2003). (UK)
76 Id. at ¶¶ 99-100.
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personal data, which a cornerstone DPSIP issue, the court ordered a “full and
un-redacted” disclosure.
In 2004, the Financial Services Authority issued an order against the
Nationwide Building Society. The case was litigated. The Financial Services
Authority77 issued a final judgment on the Nationwide Building Society. Under
Section 206 of the 2000 Financial Services and Markets Act, the largest
building society in the country was fined £980,000 because of the theft of a
laptop computer that contained massive amounts of customer data.78
In Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd.79 the majority of the UK House
of Lords decided that even a well-known supermodel had some privacy rights
about the publication of personal information. On February 1, 2001, The
Mirror published an article related to model Naomi Campbell’s drug and
counseling treatment. After the publication of this information, the model
sought legal relief. The magazine went on the attack and published further
private information. The majority of the judges determined that the magazine
had gone too far.80
The case of X v. British Broadcasting Corporation & Anor81 addressed privacy
issues in a situation where the BBC was producing a film documentary on the
Scottish criminal justice system. Miss X wanted all pictures and references
77 Financial Services Authority, Financial Services Authority v. Nationwide Building Society.
(2007, February 14), at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/nbs.pdf (last visited on 8
September 2012).
78 Id. at 2. Nationwide had “failed adequately to assess the risks in relation to the security of
its customer information, in relation to information security which failed adequately
and effectively to manage the risks … to implement adequate controls to mitigate
information security risks… failed to have appropriate procedures in place to deal with
an incident involving the loss of customer information.
79 Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 (6 May 2004) [2004] UKHRR 648, [2004] 2 AC 457,
[2004] EMLR 15, [2004] UKHL 22, 16 BHRC 500, [2004] 2 WLR 1232, [2004] HRLR
24, [2004] 2 All ER 995, (2004). (UK)
80 Id.
81 X v. British Broadcasting Corporation & Anor [2005] ScotCS CSOH_80 (22 June 2005), ¶
60. (UK) The court issued an “interim interdict against the first defenders to restrain
broadcast of those parts of the documentary video relating to the pursuer whether
showing her directly or showing others referring to the pursuer thereby identifying her
and disclosing personal information about her.”
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about her deleted. Although Miss X signed a release, she had dyslexia and
did not understand the legal document or its implications. Moreover, the
producer had orally promised Miss X final approval rights. The court found for
the plaintiff.82 The decision was based on privacy provisions in the European
Convention on Human Rights83 and the 1998 Human Rights Act.84
The High Court of Justice decision in Ash & Anor v. McKennitt & Ors85 was
appealed to the Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal (Civil Division).
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the lower court ruling. The case
involved a successful musician who argued that her privacy was being
violated by the publication of private facts in a book. Despite her fame, she
had a long history of keeping her personal life private. The lower court had
enjoined the publication of parts of the book on the basis of privacy concerns.
In the case of Regina v. Jacqueline Mary Rooney,86 the Court of Criminal
Appeals reduced the Recovery of Defense Costs Order because of economic
hardship. The defendant was a human resource employee of the Stafford
Police department who unlawfully accessed personnel records for personal
reasons and without consent. The court found that the “unlawful use of the
information contained in personal data” is serious.87
82 Id.
83 European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, European
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. (1950), at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited on 24
September 2012), § 8, 10.
84 European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, European
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. (1950), at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited on 24
September 2012), § 12.
85 Ash & Anor v. McKennitt & Ors. [2006] EWCA Civ 1714 (14 December 2006) [2007] 3
WLR 194, [2007] EMLR 4, [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73, [2006] EMLR 178,
(2006). (UK)
86 Regina v. Jacqueline Mary Rooney. EWCA Criminal 1841 (12 July 2006), ¶ 16. (UK) The
court found that “the police are entitled to regard unlawful use of the information
contained in personal data on police computers as a serious matter. Based on the
verdict of the jury it would appear, sadly, that the appellant did abuse her position and
then lied about it both in an interview and in the witness box.”
87 Id.
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On December 17, 2007, Norwick Union Life was fined £1.26 million by the
Financial Services Authority.88 The company failed to develop and implement
effective control, risk management, and security processes as required by the
Data Protection law. Personal information on 6.8 million customers in the UK
was made available. The court found Norwick Union Life liable.
On 13 March 2007, the Information Commissioner’s Office for the UK
announced the settlement of a Data Protection Act case for improper disposal
of customer data. Eleven banks, other financial institutions, and the
Immigration Advisory Service were found to be disposing of private data in
street trash bins. The Deputy Commissioner declared: “It is unacceptable for
banks and other organizations to carelessly discard their customers’
information.”89
Orange Personal Communication Services v. ICO90 reinforced the principle
that data holders must have secure digital access controls. The case followed
an ICO investigation of Orange Personal Communication Services. The
agency found that employees were sharing names and passwords to access
the databases. The ruling was based on the seventh principle of Schedule 1,
Part 1 of the Data Protection Act. The principle is that “The sharing of user
names and passwords by Customer Service Representatives, to access
computer systems, shall not be allowed under any circumstances.”91
88 Financial Services Authority, Financial Services Authority v. Norwich Union Life aka CGNU
Life Assurance Limited, Commercial Union Life Assurance Company Limited,
Norwich Union Annuity Limited, Norwich Union Life and Pensions Limited, and
Norwich Union Life Services Limited. (2007, December 17), at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/Norwich_Union_Life.pdf (last visited on 8 September
2012).
89 Information Commissioner’s Office, Banks in Unacceptable Data Protection Breach. (2007,
March 13), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pressreleases/2007/banks_in_unacceptable
_data_protection_breach.pdf (last visited on 17 June 2012), 1.
90 Information Commissioner's Office, Orange Personal Communication Services v. ICO UK.
(2007 March 21), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/notices/orange_unde
rtaking.pdf (last visited on 30 September 2012), 2.
91 Ibid.
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Despite these rulings in favor of individual rights to information privacy, the UK
courts are not very supportive of the spirit of DPSIP legislation. A case on
point is Johnson v. Medical Defense Union.92 The case addressed the issue
of fair processing. Johnson was a consultant orthopedic surgeon. Although a
number of complaints were lodged against him, no negligence claims had
been made. Medical Defense Union claimed that the number of complaints
potentially indicated some risk, and terminated Johnson’s membership in their
organization. Johnson filed suit that Medical Defense Union unfairly
processed his personal data. The court found that because the Medical
Defense Union had manually selected the data, it did not constitute an
automated processing of the data. Although Johnson argued that the manual
selection was unfair because his views and explanations were not taken into
account, the Court found that no processing of the data occurred, even
though the data was maintained in a computer data base.
From March 2007 through September 2008, the ICO issued a number of court
approved enforcement notes of Data Protection Act violations.93 The list
includes business organizations, financial institutions, governmental agencies,
and police organizations.94 At the time of this writing, retailer Marks &
Spencer, was appealing the ICO enforcement notice. The charge was that
92 Johnson v. Medical Defense Union, EWCA Civ 262, (28 March 2007). (UK)
93 Information Commissioner’s Office, Enforcement Notices. (2008), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover/data_protection/enforcement.aspx (last visited
on 29 September 2012), 1. The ICO certainly had more breadth and depth of
authority than any agency in the US.
94 Ibid. The Business Organizations included Alliance & Leicester, Carphone Warehouse,
Cash Generators, Littlewoods Shop Direct Home Shopping Ltd., Marks & Spencer,
Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd., Phones4U, Post Office Limited,
Royal British Legion Club, and TalkTalk. The Financial Institutions included
Barclays Bank, Clydesdale Bank, Co-operative Bank, HBOS, FC Bank, Loans.co.uk,
Nationwide Building Society, Natwest, Royal Bank of Scotland, Scarborough Building
Society, Skipton Financial Services, and United National Bank. The Governmental
Agencies included the Commonwealth Office, Department of Communities and Local
Government, Department of Health, Foreign Office, HM Revenue and Customs, and
Ministry of Defence. The Police Institutions included the Greater Manchester Police,
Humberside Police, Northumbria Police, Staffordshire Police, and West Midlands
Police.
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the company had lost an unencrypted laptop computer with the pension data
on 26,000 persons.95
The case of Murray v. Big Pictures (UK) Ltd96 was really a misnomer. The
parties were better known as J. K. Rowling (the author of the Harry Potter
books) and her husband, who is a dentist. Pictures had been taken of their
infant without permission. As parents, they sought relief under the privacy
protections of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the
1998 Data Protection Act. The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) referred the case back to the trial court for a
full trial of the privacy concerns. The Supreme Court decision suggests the
importance of a full trial of privacy concerns. Key issues need to be
examined. Do public figures have a right to privacy protections? Can privacy
concerns take precedence over press rights? Does a person have a right to
limit an invasion of privacy? The case suggests that UK courts are becoming
more aware of DPSIP legal issues.
7.4.1 Information Tribunal
The UK Information Tribunal97 has issued a few relevant DPSIP decisions
that favored personal privacy; however, as is often the case, upheld
exceptions based on broad and somewhat questionable criteria. The
Community Charge Registration Officer of Rhondda Borough Council v Data
Protection Registrar98 case involved the collection of date of birth information
on a community canvas that the Registrar refused to certify. The Tribunal
ruled that the additional data was not necessary or proper. In a related
95 Information Commissioner’s Office, Marks & Spencer v. ICO. (2008, January 23), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/notices/m_and_s_sa
nitiseden.pdf (last visited on 29 September 2012). (UK)
96 Murray v. Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446 (7 May 2008). (UK)
97 Formally called the Data Protection Tribunal. See Information Tribunal, Tribunal Service:
Information Rights. (2010), at http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/aboutus.htm (last
visited on 14 August 2012).
98 The Community Charge Registration Officer of Rhondda Borough Council v Data
Protection Registrar, Data Protection Tribunal (Case DA/90 25/49/2). (UK)
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Community Charge Registration99 registrar refusal, the Tribunal confirmed
that property-type information was personal data. The Registrar argued that
the officers violated the fourth personal privacy principle.100 The Tribunal
agreed that a fourth principle violation occurred and that personal information
and property information were the same.
In Equifax Europe Limited v The Data Protection Registrar,101 Equifax argued
that referencing and processing addresses was not a personal identifier
violation. The Tribunal rejected the argument. According to the Tribunal,
although the interests of the credit reporting industry should be
acknowledged, the interests of the data subjects are critical. The case
acknowledges the impact of data mining and the limitation of the personal
identifier model.
Infolink Limited, a credit information business, collected data from public
records including court records. The Tribunal found that the extracting
process was open to unfair practices and revealed information regarding third
parties.102
In Innovations (Mail Order) Limited v Data Protection Registrar,103
Innovations operated a mail order business requiring the collection of some
personal information; however, the data was sold to list brokers with little or
late notification to the subject. The Tribunal supported the Registrar’s view
that the practice was a violation of the 1984 Act. Innovations argued that it
had complied with the industry code of practices; however, the court rejected
99 Community Charge Registration Officer of Runnymede Borough Council v Data Protection
Registrar (Case Da/90 24/49/3); Community Charge Registration Officer of South
Northamptonshire District Council v Data Protection Registrar (Case Da/90 24/49/4);
Community Charge Registration Officer of Harrow Borough Council v Data Protection
Registrar (Case Da/90 24/49/5). (UK)
100 Personal data shall be accurate and, when necessary, kept up to date.
101 Equifax Europe Limited v The Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection Tribunal (DA/90
25/49/7). (UK)
102 Infolink Limited v The Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection Tribunal (DA/90
25/49/6). (UK)
103 Innovations (Mail Order) Limited v Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection Tribunal
Case DA/92 31/49/1). (UK)
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the argument because the Registrar had qualified the acceptability of the
code.
The Linguaphone Institute Limited v Data Protection Registrar104 case
involves a similar fact pattern as the Innovation case. After the Registrar
noted the unlawful practice and before the case was appealed to the Tribunal,
the company added an opt-out tab in small print at the end of the order form.
The Tribunal found both practices violated the law.
Midlands Electricity used its customer database to send a marketing-oriented
magazine with advertisements from other companies to customers without the
consent of the customers. No effective opt-in or opt-out option was provided.
The Registrar and the Tribunal found that the practice represented unfair data
processing.105
In Norman Baker v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,106 the
Information Tribunal - National Security Appeals Panel addressed the power
of the national security data protection exemption. Baker, a Liberal Democrat
Member of Parliament, wanted access to his data held by the security
services. The service claimed that it had staff administration, building
security, and commercial agreements. However, any personal data is exempt
and is not accessible. The Tribunal found that while blanket exception
standards exist, the court must determine each exception on a case-by-case
basis. In the instant case, the security certificate was quashed. In
subsequent cases,107 the Tribunal found for an alternative appeal process;
however, the result was the same. The Tribunal supported the security
exception decision. The Tribunal appeal alternatives provide procedural relief
104 Linguaphone Institute Limited v Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection Tribunal
(Case DA/94 31/49/1). (UK)
105 Midlands Electricity PLC v. The Data Protection Registrar, Data Protection Registrar (DA/
99). (UK)
106 Norman Baker v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKHRR 1275, (2001).
(UK)
107 Peter Hitchens v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKHRR 1275, (10
December 2001) (UK). See also Tony Gosling v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, UKHRR 1275, (10 December 2001). (UK)
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but no substantive change. The UK approach appears to provide few checks
and balances on DPSIP exceptions. Exceptions provide a means to
circumvent the spirit of DPSIP laws. Such an approach supports an argument
that the end justifies the means.
7.5 European Union Case Law
The European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights
essentially function as the final appellate courts for member states.
The principle was certainly true in the UK, and generally these
European courts were more supportive of personal privacy than courts
in the UK and other member states. From 1959 to 1989, The Human
Rights Commission heard more cases from the UK than any other
signatory nation. The experience had a significant impact on the UK
focus, and by 2007, the number of UK cases was significantly reduced.
At that point in time, the largest percentage of cases focused on Turkey,
Russia, Poland, and the Ukraine, which accounted for forty-nine percent of all
judgments.108
The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary became more responsive to considering
Commission principles and language in responding to DPSIP issues.109 In
1966, the Lords ruled that it could overrule its own decisions.110 For
example, the Lords issued a reversal of its London Street Tramways v.
London County Council Case.111
108 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Surveys of Activity. (2008), at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Reports/Annual+su
rveys+of+activity/ (last visited on 24 August 2012).
109 N. Bratza, The Treatment and Interpretation of the European Convention on Human
Rights: Aspects of Incorporation, in European Convention on Human Rights: Aspects
of Incorporation (J. P. Gardner ed. 1992).
110 House of Lords, Practice Statement 119661 1, 58 Weekly Law Reports, 1234 (1966).
111 See UK: London Street Tramways v London County Council, [1898] AC 375, (1898).
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The 1992 case of Niemietz v. Germany112 contrasted the US position of
protecting privacy at home but not in the workplace. The European Court of
Human Rights declared that privacy is not directly tied to place. The
reasoning was that private life can not exclude business or professional
relationships or places.113
In 1998, the European Court ruled that individuals have a legal right to access
personal information relating to them. In Gaskin v. the United Kingdom,114
the court found that no procedures were available for the data subject to gain
access to the personal information held by the government. The Court ruled
that the UK had a positive obligation to protect private data and respect a
person’s right to access his or her data.115
On January 11, 2000, the European Commission started violation litigations
against Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. By 2001, every
country but the Netherlands were found to be noncompliant with the
Directive.116
In 2001, the UK was a party in a European Court of Human Rights case. The
case of Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom117 found “a positive duty on
the State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the
applicants’ rights under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention” on the Protection of
Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.118 The case involved
privacy rights of those living next to the Heathrow airport. The majority of the
Court found an Article 8 violation and an Article 13 violation of the EU
Convention. Article 13 declares that “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as
set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before
112 Niemietz v. Germany, E.C.H.R. 12/16/1992, (1992). (EU)
113 Id.
114 Gaskin v. the United Kingdom. July 7, 1989, Series A, No 160, (1998). (UK)
115 Id.
116 Joel R. Reidenberg, E-commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 Houston Law Review,
717-749 (2001-2002), at 733.
117 Hatton v. United Kingdom, ECHR 565, (2002) 34 EHRR 1, (2001), § 95. (EU)
118 Id.
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a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity.”119 On appeal, the Grand Chamber
reversed the decision on the violations. The Court refused to ignore the
dictum of a positive duty to protect.
In an earlier case, Leander v. Sweden,120 the Court found a privacy duty
under Article 8(1) of the Convention on the Protection of Fundamental Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms but did not find that Sweden had violated Section
8(2). The case involved the personnel records of Leander, who applied for
and was rejected for a high governmental position as a security risk. The
Court found an Article 8(1) breach. The breach was founded upon the fact
that “both the storing and release of such information… were coupled with a
refusal to allow Mr. Leander an opportunity to refute it.”121 A similar ruling
was found in Chavenee Jullien v. France.122 The petitioner wanted her name
removed from a list of people with psychiatric diagnoses. The Court found the
list retention was a violation of Article 8(1) but that the government had a
Section 8(2) justification.
In the case of Amann v. Switzerland,123 the court further found that storing
and retaining private information is an Article 8(1) violation. Business and
professional justifications do not trump the legal protection provided by the
law.124 The European Court of Human Rights found that rights, freedom, and
privacy apply to the identified or identifiable person.
119 Id. at § 108.
120 Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, 9 EHRR 433, (1987). (EU)
121 Id. at ¶ 48.
122 Chavenee Jullien v. France, Appl 14461/88, 71 DR 141, (1991). (EU)
123 Amann v. Switzerland, ECHR 27798/95, (2000),¶ 65 EU). The purpose is to secure in the
territory of each Party for every individual ... respect for his rights and fundamental
freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of
personal data relating to him” (Article 1), such personal data being defined as “any
information relating to an identified or identifiable individual (Article 2).
124 Id.
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The Court expanded on the legal principle in Rotaru v. Romania.125 The case
involved an applicant that wanted access to Romanian Secret Police records
to correct possible errors. The Court ruled that Article 8 was violated by
collection, storage, access refusal, non-disclosure, and confidentiality
standards. The Court found that state parties have both a negative and
positive obligation in protecting personal privacy. The negative obligation is
not to breach the existing legal rights. The positive obligation is to respect
that the rights exist.
In Peck v. The United Kingdom,126 the European Court of Human Rights
found for Peck, who was depressed and suicidal. The Brentwood Borough
Council’s closed-circuit television (CCTV) taped him while slitting his wrists
and then released the data to public television. Peck found no relief in the UK
courts. The EU Court unanimously found that the government violated
Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. The UK was required to pay 11,600 Euros in non-
pecuniary damages and 18,075 Euros, plus value-added taxes for costs and
expenses.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First
Instance Decisions)127 ruled on the Lindqvist (Approximation of Laws) case.
Mrs. Lindqvist set up a web page at home on her personal computer to post
information on parishioners who were preparing for confirmation. She
requested and was granted a link to the web site of the Swedish Churches.
125 Rotaru v. Romania ECHR 28341/95; 8 BHRC 449, (2000), ¶ 5). (EU) The Court noted
that “no provision of domestic law laid down any limits on the exercise of those
powers. Thus, for instance, domestic law did not define the kind of information that
could be recorded, the categories of people against whom surveillance measures
such as gathering and keeping information could be taken, the circumstances in
which such measures could be taken or the procedure to be followed. Similarly, the
Law did not lay down limits on the age of information held or the length of time for
which it could be kept (Article 8).”
126 Peck v. the United Kingdom (application no. 44647/98), (2003). (EU)
127 Court of Justice of The European Communities (Including Court Of First Instance
Decisions), Lindquist (Approximation of laws) [2003] EUECJ C-101/01 (06 November
2003) [2004] QB 1014, C-101/01, [2003] EUECJ C-101/01, [2004] All ER (EC) 561
((2004), at http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2003/C10101.html (last visited on
28 September 2012).
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The site included information on the webmaster and eighteen colleagues in
the parish. The data included full names, first names, jobs, telephone
numbers, and even medical conditions. The colleagues and the supervisory
data protection authorities were not told about the site. When the colleagues
formally complained and instituted legal recourse, she removed the web page.
The court ruled that the Internet page violated Article 3(1) of the Directive
95/46 of the European Parliament. The activities on the site amounted to a
processing of personal data, and there was not an Article 3(2) exemption
available. Article 8(1) was violated with the note that one colleague was
working part-time because of an injured foot - which amounted to the
processing of sensitive personal medical data. The court found that the
Directive 95/46 supports the freedoms and rights of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
In P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom,128 the European Court of Human Rights
distinguished the European and US judicial views on reasonable expectation
of privacy. The US courts considered the expectation as sacrosanct. The
European Court determined that the reasonable expectation principle may be
significant but not necessarily conclusive. The Court determined that it was
clear that a violation of one’s private life may occur even in a public place. A
private life includes but is not limited to gender identification, name, right of
personal development, right to develop interpersonal relationships, right to
identify, and right to choose a sexual lifestyle. The scope of private life may
include personal interactions, even in a public context.
The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights applied in the Case of Copland v. The United
Kingdom.129 The case involved management officials accessing the e-
mail and Internet usage of a colleague employee, without obtaining the
128 P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, E.C.H.R., 9/25/2001, (2001). (EU)
129 Case of Copland v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 62617/00 (3 April 2007) (ECHR,
(2007), ¶ 48. (EU)
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person’s consent. The Court declared the following: “The Court would not
exclude that the monitoring of an employee’s use of a telephone, e-mail or internet
at the place of work may be considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in
certain situations in pursuit of a legitimate aim.”130
The European Court of Justice, on January 29, 2008, issued a decision
in Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España
SA.131 The case involved Internet access providers. The providers were required
to keep data for a set period of time. A group of copyright holders wanted access to
determine if any intellectual property right violations had occurred. The Court
observed that “This case illustrates that the storage of data for specified
purposes creates the desire to use those data more extensively.”132 The
court found that EU members are not required to transfer or allow access to
personal information in a civil litigation related to copyright protections.
In 1999, The Spanish Data Protection Authority started investigating
Microsoft’s subsidiary in Spain for improperly handling and storing personal
data. This was the first time that an American company was brought to
account under the EU Data Privacy Directive. The company was found guilty
and fined fifty million pesetas; however, this amount was later reduced to 10
million pesetas ($250,000 to $50,000 USD).133 Gregory Shaffer noted that
the Europeans consider privacy as a human right—not an issue that can be
bargained away.134 Not even Microsoft could violate a privacy human right
for profit.
130 Id.
131 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU, Case C-
275/06, (2008), ¶ 1. (EU)
132 Id.
133 Christopher Kuner, Beyond Safe Harbor: European Data Protection Law and Electronic
Commerce, 35 International Lawyer 79 (2001)
134 Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 Yale Journal of
International Law 1 (2000).
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The European system encounters difficulties when the standards do not
match standards in other parts of the world. A case in point was the length of
time that search engines can store data. The European standard is six
months. The mega search engine, ixquic.com, follows the European standard
and even eliminates all traces of individual searches within 48 hours. The
practice may make the service operate at a small competitive disadvantage to
other firms. The firm has established a major marketing strategy for its
privacy compliance. The US firm Google kept data for 9 months while
Microsoft and Yahoo kept data for 13 months. EU data protection officials
were attempting enforcement compliance against non-compliant firms. The
effort met with considerable resistance. Officials were threatening anti-trust
actions if the three firms did not start to comply. French official Alex Türk
proclaimed, "If Google and others continue to ignore EU law and gain an
unfair advantage over companies based in the EU which follow the law, then
one could argue that that is a competition issue."135
The EU is the international gold standard for DPSIP legal concerns. The EU
is more dedicated to the Directives than UK legislators and jurists. The UK
has resisted following EU standards and has been called for improvements.
7.6 Constituent Government Constitutional Declarations
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales do not have separate written
constitutions. Each country must comply with UK legal standards. Each must
comply with all applicable delegation powers acts. The standards are also
with applicable EU directives. The system is similar in practice to the
relationships between state and federal law and treaties in the US.
135 Kevin J. O'Brien, European Standoff Over Search Engine Data. (2008, October 5), at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/05/business/privacy06.php?page=1 (last visited
on 6 November 2012), ¶ 3.
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7.7 Constituent Government Legislation
Northern Ireland and Wales do not have enabling DPSIP laws. Both are
subject to UK legislation.136 Scotland is also subject to UK and EU law
related to DPSIP issues. The Scottish Executive and Parliament has
endorsed the provisions of the 1998 Data Protection Act.137 A call has been
made for Scotland to pass a privacy law. The position is that it can not wait
for England and Wales to find a significant case to establish a common law
principle. The law could either mirror the UK approach or establish sound
differences.138
The Scottish Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act139 addresses some
privacy concerns. The Act addresses various surveillance issues, including
the appointment of a Chief Surveillance Commissioner and provides some
checks and balances for potential privacy violations.
England and Wales have proposed a new British bill of human rights.
Scotland and Northern Ireland have promised to veto the move. Northern
Ireland maintains that the move is a violation of the Good Friday peace
agreement. Scotland maintains that the issues are addressed under the
Scotland Act.140 UK efforts at addressing DPSIP legal concerns are
136 See § 7.3 United Kingdom Federal Legislation above.
137 Scottish Executive, Data Protection Act 1998 Explanatory Guidance. (1998), at
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1066/0006064.pdf (last visited on 19
August 2012). See also Scottish Parliament, The Data Protection Act 1998 and
Subject Access Requests. (1998), at
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/corporate/foi/sar/ (last visited on 19 August 2012).
138 Suzie May, A Picture's Worth a Thousand Words, The Journal Online: The Member's
Magazine of the Law Society of Scotland. (2010), at
http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/55-7/1008393.aspx (last visited on 19 July
2012).
139 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 asp 11 (2000). (UK)
140 Afua Hirsch, Scotland and N Ireland Could Reject Bill of Rights: Proposals to Change the
Human Rights Act Could Become a 'Legal and Political Nightmare,' Experts Have
Said, guardian.co.uk. (2010), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/feb/07/northern-
ireland-bill-of-rights (last visited on 10 August 2012).
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hampered by divisions within England and the rest of the country. Perhaps
the DPSIP effort needs to be removed from the UK views on human rights.
7.8 Constituent Government Case Law
The case law of Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales is generally subject to
UK and EU case law.141 Conflicting case decisions are subject to appeal to
the UK Supreme Court and the EU courts.
7.9 United Kingdom Standards and Remedies
DPSIP legal protections are evolving in the UK. The UK is not as advanced
as the standards in CA and in some ways AU. Barrington Moore argues that
historically there have been information privacy rights in England.142
Victorian England provided for political freedom and privacy. The view was
that the individual was the basic unit of society and that the interests of
businesses, groups of people, and the government are subservient.
7.10 United Kingdom Implementation System
The UK requires that data holders and processors register143 and pay an
operating fee144 that provides an added level of control and revenues. The
approach is similar to laws that regulate professionals whose practices involve
141 See § 7.4 United Kingdom Case Law and § 7.4.1 European Union Case law above.
142 Barrington Moore, Jr, Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (M.E. Sharpe,
Incorporated. 1984).
143 The registration is similar to a license under US law. One can not function if not
registered.
144 The fee ccurrently ranges from £35 a year to £500 for large organizations. See Chris
Williams, Data Watchdog Jacks Up Charges: Privacy Costs After All, The Register.
(2009), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/01/ico_charges/ (last visited on 5
October 2012). The process saves companies £15.5 million in losses. Operational
costs are about £53 million but the figure does not address revenue factors. See
Chris Greenwood, Data Protection Act Costs Country £53m Every Year, The
Independent. (2010), at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/data-
protection-act-costs-country-pound53m-every-year-2019747.html (last visited on 6
July 2012).
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consumer protection.145 Failure to register is a criminal offense and can be
punished by monetary fines. The potential loss of such a license provides an
incentive to comply with the DPSIP laws, or the organization could be forced
out of business. The approach also shifts the cost of DPSIP from potential
taxpayers; however, registration funding also limits the enforcement resources
that a tax payer approach could provide. Ian Lloyd146 argues that in the UK,
the approach is a governmental abdication of a DPSIP responsibility that
establishes an “outdated and bureaucratic system.”
Perhaps there is a better approach that involves a formal licensing
requirement with fees related to regulatory costs, as well as governmental
funding for an independent agency147 that protects the common good. Thus,
licensing and related fees increase the power of the DPSIP law and
regulators, and nudges compliance to relevant DPSIP laws. Compliance is
thus directly related to data protection and security. Given that DPSIP legal
issues are essential to protecting the social contract,148 a fully funded
independent regulatory agency relieves DPSIP legal regulation from
economic and political pressures. The approach would provide checks and
balances while protecting against special interests power plays.
This approach runs counter to a policy perspective that supports a corporate
republic. The corporate policy perspective is that one person one vote is
antiquated. Not only do corporations have human rights, they can use
unlimited funding to establish self serving policy agendas. Corporations want
to privatize profits while socializing risks. The view is that the ability of
companies to make profits should not be constrained. However, the
government and the people should cover any and all risks. The basic
145 Examples include attorneys, mental health professionals, and physicians. The list also
includes barbers, contractors, and even realtors.
146 Ian J. Lloyd, Information Technology Law, 33 (Oxford University Press 5th. ed. 2008).
147 An independent agency is one that does not have to report or be held accountable to
parliament or the executive. Examples include the Federal Trade Commission or the
Federal Reserve in the US.
148 Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Locke argued that individuals make an expressed or
implied agreement or contract for mutual protection. The protections include freedom
from abuses of power by corporations and the government.
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calculus is flawed. Profits and risks are interconnected, and all stakeholders’
interests must be protected. This perspective has negatively countered
DPSIP legal efforts in the UK, AU, and the US.
The UK does, at times, take heed of the findings of the EU Article 29 Working
Party. In addressing RFID technology and privacy concerns, the group
reinforced the need for clear consent of the person. The use of RFID
technology must adhere to standards of access to examining the data.
Controls are needed to identify the purpose of collection and any other uses
of the data. Any one of these factors can lead to a DPSIP finding when they
are used to identify, learn, or record individual data.149
The Advertising Standards Authority of Britain (ASAB)150 has the power to
monitor the majority of advertising practices. The authority addresses Internet
advertisements like banners and sponsored links. Recently the organization
announced that the standards also apply to blogs, non-traditional digital
marketing, mobile applications, organizational web sites, and social media.
The ASAB authority has an agreement with Google, which controls eighty
percent of the UK web searches, to block paid searches to offending
marketers. The agreement came after years of delaying any attempt to
address behavioral targeting activities or responses.151
Starting 6 April 2010, the ICO increased the agency’s powers to fine
organizations that experience a data breach. Previously, the maximum fine
was £ 5,000 pounds. A new fine limit of £ 500,000 pounds is possible for
149 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Data Protection Issues
Related to RFID Technology (10107/05/EN-WP 105). (2005), at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_en.pdf (last
visited on 29 August 2012).
150 A private self-regulatory organization that sets voluntary standards to avoid governmental
regulation.
151 Eric Pfanner, British Advertising Regulator Making Itself Felt Online, The New York
Times. (2010), at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/06/business/media/06cach.html
(last visited on 5 September 2012).
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serious breaches based on negligence. The new policy also provides for
compulsory audit notices.152
7.11 United Kingdom Sociolegal Concerns
In 2003, sixty percent of Europeans reported strong concerns related to
privacy protection. Seventy percent reported that awareness of violations was
low in their home country. Only forty-two percent were aware of data
protection laws and responsibilities. In 2007, sixty-four percent wanted
protection from breach violations.153
Almost seventy-five percent of Europeans reported that they were worried
about their lack of control of personal information. While more than fifty
percent trusted employers, financial institutions, local governments, medical
services, police, social security, and tax authorities to follow data protection
and security standards. Less than half trusted credit card agencies, credit
reference agencies, mail order companies, marketing companies, nonprofit
organizations, opinion research companies, and travel businesses. The loss
of personal data for 25 million persons by the UK Government was a strong
area of concern.154 The Angus Reid155 data showed that fifty-nine percent
were concerned about new technology being used to violate personal privacy
standards.
152 Information Commissioner Office, Information Commissioner’s Guidance About the Issue
of Monetary Penalties Prepared and Issued Under Section 55C (1) of the Data
Protection Act 1998, Author. (2010), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_g
uides/ico_guidance_monetary_penalties.pdf (last visited on 12 September 2012).
153 Wik-Consult/Rand Europe/Clip/Crid/Glocom, Comparison of Privacy and Trust Policies in
the Area of Electronic Communications: Final Report (Authors 2007).
154 Aoife White, EU Poll Shows Three Out of Four Europeans Worried about Personal Data
Online (22 January 2008), http://news.theage.com.au/technology/eu-poll-shows-
three-out-of-four-europeans-worried-about-personal-data-online-20080122-1nba.html
(last visited on 22 April 2012).
155 Angus Reid Global Monitor, Five Countries Review Privacy, Technology (2006),
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/11915 (last visited on 31 March 2012).
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A study by the European Commission found that eighty percent of the youths
studied were concerned about governments and businesses using their
personal data without permission and sharing it with third parties. The sample
also thought the governmental regulation was necessary and that few use
current protection technology.156
The issue of data security in business organizations was addressed in a study
of 107 international security officials from fifteen countries including the UK.
The study reinforced security concerns. Ninety-six percent argued for legal
regulation of breaches and fifty-nine percent supported compensation for
breach victims. Seventy-nine percent thought the data security pressure was
increasing. Chief Executive Officers and Boards of Directors were thought
responsible by ninety-five percent – up from seventy-four percent the year
before, and survey respondents thought the appropriate response should be
jail sentences. Seventy-six percent thought that business organizations were
being reactive to the issue.157
Politicians and jurists can and certainly do argue and maneuver around
DPSIP issues. Businesses and corporations can and do corrupt the
process.158 The above research shows that the majority of UK citizens want
strong DPSIP legislation and regulation.
156 Judith Crosbie, Commission Seeks External Advice on Internet Privacy (2009, April 28),
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/04/commission-seeks-external-advice-on-
internet-privacy/64717.aspx (last visited on 29 April 2012).
157 CSO The Source For Security Executives, e-Crime Congress Survey Reveals Jail
Sentence for CEO a Fitting Punishment for Data Breach (9 April 2009),
http://www.cso.com.au/article/211736/e-
crime_congress_survey_reveals_jail_sentence_ceo_fitting_punishment_data_breach
(last visited on 29 April 2012).
158 See: Jeffrey D. Clements, Corporations Are Not People: Why They Have More Rights
Than You and What You Can Do About it (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc ed. 2012).
Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the
Theft of Human Rights (Rodale ed. 2002). Robert G. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money:
The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government (Alfred A.
Knopf ed. 2009). Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress -
and a Plan to Stop It (Twelve - Hachette Hook Group ed. 2011).
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7.12 United Kingdom Critique
The legal system access structure in the UK is different from that in CA, AU,
and the US. The UK has a “loser pays” rule in trial and appellate cases.
Under this rule, the losing party pays the attorney’s fees for the side that wins.
Therefore, those parties that have limited resources were less likely to pursue
legal recourse against more powerful forces. Those with financial resources
are not discouraged from litigating for more power. The system raises the
cost of litigation for everyone.159 The UK system makes it much harder for
individuals to litigate for DPSIP rights.
The UK approach to DPSIP legal issues shares some strength of the EU
Directives. The UK law shares some basic operational definitions and
standards for dealing with sensitive information. The approach, despite some
parliamentary and judicial evasion, has improved awareness of DPSIP
concerns and interests in the UK. The approach provides a measure of
good—if not best—practices. The standards provide some flexibility and are
technologically neutral. In theory, the UK approach makes it easier to transfer
data within the EU community. International data transfers are limited by EU,
economic, and political factors outside of the UK powerbase.160 The
approach provides a registration income stream to help cover administrative
costs. The system provides for a strict liability standard for subject access.161
While the UK has passed some privacy and data protection legislation with
some regulatory controls, the population is concerned about the effectiveness
of the current system. The latest research data was compiled in 2008 by the
159 Barrington Moore, Jr, Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (M.E. Sharpe,
Incorporated. 1984); Herbert M. Kritzer, Loser Pays Doesn’t, Legal Affairs. (2005,
November), at
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/~kritzer/Research/Law_misc/LegalAffairs2005.pdf (last
visited on 20 August 2012).
160 Research approach support can be found at Neil Robinson, et al., Review of the
European Data Protection Directive, (Rand Europe ed. 2009).
161 See David Bainbridge & Graham Pearce, Tilting at Windmills - Has the New Data
Protection Law Failed to Make a Significant Contribution to Rights of Privacy, 2000
Journal of Information, Law and Technology 2, (2000).
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Information Commission Office.162 The data revealed a number of concerns
regarding how data is handled by governmental and private bodies. These
concerns will be illustrated by means of a table.
Table 7.1 Concern with Regard to Organizations using Personal
Information
Concerns 2005 2006163 2007 2008164
Passing or selling information on to
other organizations without your
permission
85% 95% 94% 95%
Not keeping the information
securely so it is at risk of being
stolen or getting into the wrong
hands
85% 94% 94% 96%
Passing your information on to
other countries without adequate
data protection
85% 93% 94% 95%
Not collecting information in a
secure way
83% 93% 94% 95%
Using information for purposes
other than that for which is intended
84% 92% n/a n/a
Requesting too much personal
information
77% 88% 88% 89%
Holding inaccurate or out-of-date
information
74% 88% 87% 89%
Requesting inappropriate
information that is not relevant
72% 83% 83% 83%
Holding information for longer than
is required
69% 83% 84% 84%
n/a = question not asked based on
regrettable researcher’s decision in
not addressing the issue in later
studies
162 Social and Market Strategic Research, Report on Information Commissioner’s Office
Annual Track, (Author ed. 2006). See also Peter Bradwell, Private Lives: A People’s
Inquiry Into Personal Information, Demos. (2010), at
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Private_Lives_-_web.pdf?1269213706 (last visited on 5
September 2012).
163 Id. at § 4.2.22, p. 17.
164 Social and Market Strategic Research, Report on Information Commissioner’s Office
Annual Track, (Author ed. 2008), 18.
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The above data, provided by an independent research organization funded by
the Information Commissioner’s Office, reveals two progressive trends and
interpretations. The first trend is that UK subjects are showing increased
DPSIP concerns. The second interpretation suggests that the current set of
UK laws and regulations is not meeting citizens’ expectations and concerns.
With the exception of “Requesting inappropriate information that is not
relevant,” which has held at eighty-three percent, all of the areas of concern
are increasing over time. Bruce Schneier, the British Telecom’s Chief
Security Technology Officer, clearly identified the risks of not addressing
DPSIP issues.165 The risks are related to the individual who is an
organizational stakeholder and included abuse of personal information,
damage, loss of data controls, and misuse. The organizational costs include
monetary costs due to compensation claims and regulator enforcement
actions. The organization can be seen as a privacy threat, experience a loss
of good will, and suffer economic losses.
The UK current privacy acts fail to adequately address the complex DPSIP
issues related to the media exception. To be fair, the Data Protection Act of
1998 was written prior to the widespread use of current computer technology;
the law has not kept pace with technology. However, the act does provide for
special exceptions for artistic, journalistic, and literary purposes. The
provisions make it difficult for data subjects to seek redress for violations. The
act provides a major difference between wider public interests and a mere
public interest story, the later is subject to more DPSIP controls. The law
allows data controllers to claim a special purpose, even when the claim has
no justification or merit. In Campbell v. MGN, Ltd.166 Lord Phillips referred to
Justice Moreland’s comment in finding for Campbell. Lord Phillips wrote, “He
(Morelad) described his path to this conclusion as weaving his way through a
165 Bruce Schneier, The Tech Lab: Bruce Schneier BBC News. (2009), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7897892.stm (last visited on 26 February 2012).
166 Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22 (6 May 2004) [2004] UKHRR 648, [2004] 2 AC
457, [2004] EMLR 15, [2004] UKHL 22, 16 BHRC 500, [2004] 2 WLR 1232, [2004]
HRLR 24, [2004] 2 All ER 995, (2004) at 72. (UK)
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thicket, and the Act is certainly a cumbersome and inelegant piece of
legislation.”167
The UK system is difficult to change and keep updated, even when other
nations are changing DPSIP legal standards and technology is advancing.
The UK system makes it difficult to reasonably address evolving issues like
breach notification, control of cookies, data mining, length of data retention,
and opt-out versus opt-in standards. The structure makes it difficult to
confront such issues. Industry codes of conduct are voluntary and are not
allowed to be used as a standard in litigations. The ICO has worked to
advance the concept of Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA). The office has
published a valuable handbook on the issues and the standards of processing
DPSIP issues.168 The standards include initial assessment, full-scale PIA,
small-scale PIA, privacy law compliance checks, and data protection checks.
As part of an education and compliance program the office has also published
privacy notice codes of practice.169
The UK adoption of PIA standards has been slow. Advocates are just starting
to suggest following the CA PIA advocacy along with CA privacy by design
efforts. The government and the private sector have chosen to ignore a
classic international study on PIA effectiveness.170 Few private or public PIA
reports have reached the public domain. The UK system does not require
any formal review by an independent source for private or public
organizations. The UK PIA system is inconsistent in technical process,
reporting, and result publications.171
167 Ibid.
168 Information Commissioner Office, Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook. (2009), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pia_handbook_html_v2/html/0-advice.html
(last visited on 6 October 2012).
169 Information Commissioner Office, Privacy Notices Code of Practice. (2009), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_g
uides/privacy_notices_cop_final.pdf (last visited on 6 July 2012).
170 Adam Warren, et al., Privacy Impact Assessments: International Experience as a Basis
for UK Guidance, 24 Computer Law & Security Report 3, 233 (2008).
171 Ibid.
Chapter Seven: United Kingdom Legal Standards 418
The UK government, much like the US federal government, has not been
compliant with international DPSIP standards. CA, many members of the EU,
and some states in the US are advancing DPSIP legal and regulatory
protection standards. The UK government did not establish an independent
regulatory body;172 therefore, it passively established the limited role and
reporting structure of the commission.
The UK government did not want to pay the cost for a DPSIP legal and
regulatory agency; therefore, it established a system of registration fees.
Some have criticized the approach as bureaucratic.173 The approach does
require those that are in the information industry and potential violators help to
pay regulatory costs. From an economic perspective, this makes some
sense; however, it is inconsistent with other areas of legal risk. For example,
intellectual property holders do not pay an ongoing fee to protect their rights.
Given that the commission has little enforcement powers, the approach is
limited. Those that refuse to register have few economic or legal
disincentives. The database of registered holders must be carefully protected
or the entire scheme becomes a major breach potential—similar to breaches
during WW II in Europe and the US.174
Provided that such an approach was truly independent and the commission
had true enforcement powers, the approach would create a valuable property
right in that it would require compliance to the Data Protection Act to maintain
the right to continue in the industry. A violation that would suspend the
required registration or proposed license would be an incentive to maintain
high-level practices and standards. From a social contract and corporate
social responsibility perspective, the approach makes sense. From an
economic checks and balances perspective, the approach makes sense.
From a legal perspective, since those that create an attractive nuisance or
172 The ICO is accountable to the Parliament and is subject to political control. Even if the
ICO is made accountable to the home office or attorney general, it would still be
subject to political pressures.
173 Ian J. Lloyd, Information Technology Law, 33 (Oxford University Press 5th. ed. 2008).
174 See Chapter 8 for a full an analysis.
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those that fail to comply with legal standards must cover the risk, it makes
sense. From an interdisciplinary behavioral, economic, and legal perspective,
the approach also makes sense.175
The UK government, like the US policy approach, prefers self-regulation and
industry codes of practice. When such systems fail, the government must
impose statutory standards. The legal policy problem is how long data is
stored and what form the standards will take. The issue of behavioral
advertising including opt-in or opt-out options continues to be an issue. The
All Party Parliamentary Communications Group has recommended an opt-in
approach.176 The group also advocates that the current laws are a
hodgepodge of complex and unclear directions. There is no clear, consistent,
and effective privacy protection standard.
Compliance standards are low in practice - even twelve high-ranking
ministers, including departmental secretaries, have been notified that they are
not complying with the Data Protection Act, and that they may be prosecuted
if the pattern of non-compliance does not cease.177 The Home Office has
also been found to have breached DPSIP laws. The incidence and costs of
such breaches is increasing in the public and private sectors.178 The UK law
does not require automatic breach notification to subjects even for significant
legal and regulatory reasons.
175 See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth, and Happiness (Yale University Press ed. 2008).
176 All Party Parliamentary Communications Group, Can we keep our hands off the net?
Report of an Inquiry by the All Party Parliamentary Communications Group. (2009), at
http://www.apcomms.org.uk/uploads/apComms_Final_Report.pdf (last visited on 19
October 2012). The group is an open and independent organization of MPs and Lords
from all political parties. The group encourages stakeholders to present evidence and
testimony on communication issues. The stakeholders include the Government,
Parliamentarians, industry, and consumer groups.
177 Information Commissioner’s Office, Ministers breach Data Protection Act, Contractor UK.
(2008), at http://www.contractoruk.com/news/004075.html (last visited on 18
November 2012).
178 Ponemon Institute, United Kingdom 2009 Annual Study: Cost of a Data Breach. (2010),
at www.encryptionreports.com/download/Ponemon_COB_2009_UK.pdf (last visited
on 7 February 2012).
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Under color of authority, police officers have illegally violated Section 53 of the
Data Protection Act for personal reasons. The fines ranged from £750 to
£1,200 for violations. Christopher Graham, the Information Commissioner,
argues that the low fines are not a deterrent. He argues for a two-year jail
term for such behavior. He maintains that the shift is critical “if the law is to
provide an effective deterrent against the illegal trade in personal data,” which
was “widespread and organized.”179
Historically, the UK has acquiesced to business pressure brought about by
special interest groups to establish and maintain opt-out provisions for DPSIP
legal issues. The All Party Group180 argument for a shift to an opt-in
approach has had some results. The historic opt-out provisions of the Article
5(3) of the e-Privacy Directive for cookies changed focus. On 19 December
2009, the provision was amended for a consent and opt-in provision.181 The
UK has not fully complied. The shift adds to the DPSIP debate. The shift is a
positive sign that the UK may start addressing current DPSIP concerns.
Retrospective analysis of innovative responses to DPSIP legal and
technological policies is inherently flawed. Legal, policy, social, and
technological changes do impact DPSIP approaches. While the past can not
be compared to the present, the data does provide insights into what is
working and what is not.
While the focus on personally identifiable information (PII) was once
innovative, the concept is now outdated, simplistic, and static. Many of the
179 Leo King, Call for Data Jail Sentences after Police Wrongly Hand Over Sensitive
Information: Information Commissioner Says Fines are not Effective as a Deterrent,
ComputerworldUK. (2009), at http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-
business/17776/call-for-data-jail-sentences-after-police-wrongly-hand-over-sensitive-
information/ (last visited on 30 November 2012).
180 The All Party Group is a UK group composed of all parties. See All Party Parliamentary
Communications Group, Can we keep our hands off the net? Report of an Inquiry by
the All Party Parliamentary Communications Group(2009), at
http://www.apcomms.org.uk/uploads/apComms_Final_Report.pdf.
181 Chris Pulham, United Kingdom: Prior Consent for Cookies - Amendments to the e-
Privacy Directive, Mondaq: IT and Telecoms. (2010), at
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=104548 (last visited on 5 July 2012).
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DPSIP legal standards are cumbersome, inconsistent, ineffective, and
outmoded. The proportionality of business and governmental interests on the
one hand versus consumer civil liberties - human rights and consumer
protection on the other hand remains unclear. The UK government’s
response to DPSIP issues refused to grant the Information Commissioner’s
Office accountability, enforcement, and independent powers.182 The
approach is based on a technologically antiquated view of the real DPSIP
issues. The ICO’s lack of power is a major issue in the disagreement with the
EU. EU pressure may force the UK to comply.
In contrast to CA, the UK is not taking an active role in business and
technology privacy by design policies. The UK does not require the use of
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET).183 Thus, organizations do not
purchase or use such technology. Since there is no clear market, developers
do not actively research and develop enhanced – state-of-the-art technology.
Large corporations (including Google, HP, Microsoft, and Oracle) lobby for
less DPSIP regulation. However, the HP research lab in the UK has
developed the HP Privacy Advisor software that encrypts cloud computing
data.184
In the public and private sectors, the UK does not require the appointment of
a Chief Privacy Officer. Where such an officer is appointed, the official does
not have statutory personal responsibility and criminal liability for DPSIP
violations. The abdication of such a responsibility strategy has no legal
viability. The lack of a responsible officer weakens a checks and balances
approach.
182 See Neil Robinson, et al., Review of the European Data Protection Directive, (Rand
Europe ed. 2009).
183 The PET approach involves shifting DPSIP issues to include the principles of privacy by
design.
184 Kevin J. O'Brien, Cloud Computing Hits Snag in Europe, The New York Times. (2010), at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/technology/20cloud.html?_r=1 (last visited on 19
September 2012).
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In determining the levy of DPSIP violation fines, the UK Financial Authority
uses a standard set of principles. The authority considers prior compliance
problems, disciplinary history, post-breach behavior, and the impact, nature,
and seriousness of the breach.185 The approach ignores the level of
egregiousness of the behavior, number of persons affected, and the costs to
stakeholders. The standards are not compressive, nor balanced.
Amy Barzdukas, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer and Consumer Security
Manager, reports that companies profit from consumer ignorance of privacy
concerns. Firms are not clear or honest about how the data will be used.
Business goals trump the law.186 The UK must implement stronger DPSIP
laws and implementation systems to address business behaviors. The UK
Internet Advertising Bureau has established a number of protective Good
Practices principles; however, the standards are self-regulating.187
The ICO is well aware of the above-noted problems. The Office issued an
online code of practice to address some of the issues.188 However, given the
systemic constraints on the Office, the document does not reflect robust
enforcement of laws or protections. The ICO reports that the Office is
hampered by a systemic lack of support by the courts and parliament. The
government rejects the concept of checks and balances by deferring to the
special interests of businesses and newspapers. The unintended
consequence is a reversal of historic legal protections and principles.189
185 UK Financial Services Authority, Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual Release 070
Section 6.2 (2007), at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/hb-releases/rel70/rel70depp.pdf
(last visited on 7 September 2012).
186 Phil Muncaster, IE boss calls for more honesty about privacy, V3.co.uk: All the latest UK
technology news, reviews and analysis. (2009), at
http://www.v3.co.uk/v3/news/2251656/ie-boss-calls-greater-honesty (last visited on
20 October 2012).
187 Internet Advertising Bureau, IAB UK Unveils Good Practice Principles for Online
Behavioural Advertising. (2009), at
http://www.iabuk.net/en/1/behaviouralbestpractice030309.html (last visited on 4
March 2012).
188 Information Commissioner’s Office, Personal Information Online: Code of Practice,
(Author ed. 2010).
189 Caroline Davies & James Robinson, Information Commissioner's Office 'Let Down' Over
Illegal Snooping, guardian.co.uk (2009), at
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The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust issued a report noting several key issues
with the DPSIP conditions in the UK.190 Several months later, the
government issued a response.191 The government rejected the Trust report
and argued that the current structure provides needed data protections and
informed consent. The ministry rejected a recommendation that ECHR
litigants should not have to pay court costs. The government maintains that
there is no need to review or perform audits on the protection system. The
ministry also rejected a recommendation for consent and database limitations.
The government claimed that the report was confusing. A right to anonymous
access to public services was seen as impractical. The ministry rejected a
recommendation that the Chief Information Officer should be a permanent
secretary reporting to the Chancellor of the Exchequer or Deputy Prime
Minister.
The Chief Information Officer reports that the limited fines for data breaches
currently in effect are insufficient. He cites police officers, private
investigators, and governmental agencies who commit severe violations and
receive low fines when detected. Commissioner Christopher Graham argues
that the standard should be a maximum of two years in jail for violations.192
The UK approach does not provide adequate consent requirements and
enforcement mechanisms. The national DPSIP authority is not legally and
politically independent. Rather than intervening with any unlawful
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/sep/02/information-commission-illegal-phone-
hacking (last visited on 2 September 2012).
190 Ross Anderson, et al., Database State: A Report Commissioned by the Joseph
Roundtree Reform Trust Ltd. (2009), at
http://www.jrrt.org.uk/uploads/Database%20State.pdf (last visited on 23 March 2012).
191 UK Ministry Of Justice, Government Response to the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust
Report: ‘Database State’. (2009), at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/government-response-rowntree-illegal-
databases-report.pdf (last visited on 9 December 2012).
192 Leo King, Call for Data Jail Sentences after Police Wrongly Hand Over Sensitive
Information: Information Commissioner Says Fines are Not Effective as a Deterrent,
Computerworld UK (2009), at http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/it-
business/17776/call-for-data-jail-sentences-after-police-wrongly-hand-over-sensitive-
information/ (last visited on 27 November 2012).
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interception, the UK approach only addresses intentional interceptions. The
consent requirement in the UK is not based on an informed, freely given
basis, and does not include a specific purpose standard.193
The ICO has attempted to increase enforcement with little results. Attempts
at increasing the deterrence effect of increased enforcement have been
ignored. Limited powers to audit private firms are ignored because there are
no consequences.194 The ICO published a Code of Practice but it is basically
advisory.195 When British Telecom was caught illegally using tracking
software without notice of the practice or clear consumer consent, there was
no consequence. The company said that it would stop the practice.196
Perhaps the European Court of Justice can force the UK into compliance.
The current approach can not effectively respond to threats to data that is
endlessly amended, collected, enriched, exchanged, and reused. The
approach ignores the reality that personal information is the currency and
focus in the information and Internet economy.197
The UK must strengthen its DPSIP approach. A privacy impact assessment
should be required for all legislation, legal protections, and technological
developments. Current legislation must be refined. Data subjects should
193 Pinsent Masons, Commission Takes UK to Court Over Alleged Privacy Law Failings, Out-
Law.com. (2010), at http://www.out-law.com/page-11409 (last visited on 30
September 2012). See also Europa, Digital Agenda: Commission Refers UK to Court
Over Privacy and Personal Data Protection. (2010), at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1215&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited on 30 September 2012).
194 Dan Worth, ICO Wants Power to Bang Up Data Protection Offenders: Privacy Watchdog
Also Wants Greater Authority to Investigate Company Procedures, V3.co.uk. (2010),
at http://www.v3.co.uk/v3/news/2271081/ico-outlines-desire-increased (last visited on
6 October 2012).
195 Information Commissioner’s Office, Personal Information Online: Code of Practice,
(Author ed. 2010).
196 Pinsent Masons, Commission Takes UK to Court Over Alleged Privacy Law Failings,
Out-Law.com. (2010), at http://www.out-law.com/page-11409 (last visited on 30
September 2012).
197 Angel Gurría, Closing Remarks by Angel Gurría, OECD Ministerial Meeting on the Future
of the Internet Economy. (2008), at
http://www.oecd.org/document/8/0,3343,en_2649_34487_40863240_1_1_1_1,00.ht
ml (last visited on 7 September 2012).
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have control over their personal data. Ownership should not automatically
transfer to others since such data is an extension of the data subjects.
People must know what personal data is held and used by commercial and
governmental sources. Data subjects should have remedies when data is
leaked, lost, or misused.198 Any damage, emotional distress, or loss of
reputation, or costs incurred by the data subject should be recoverable.199
The approach should follow the mandatory breach notification process
established by several states in the US.200
The UK approach to DPSIP legal issues is caught between the proverbial rock
and a hard place.201 The UK is being pressured, and a case has been
submitted to the European Court of Justice for non-compliance to EU
standards. On the other hand, a group of businesses wants profits and
complete control at any cost, and many parliamentarians do not want to
offend backers. The judiciary is recalcitrant and does not accept DPSIP legal
principles as a consumer and human right, despite international agreements.
The ICO is not independent and is essentially ineffectual; however, attempts
to meet international standards while dealing with antiquated and non-
compliant EU legal standards are laudable.
Although some may argue that language is a technicality, part of a legal
analysis does relate to language and definitions. At the time, bifurcating
sensitive and non-sensitive data made sense. The distinction is no longer
viable as having non-sensitive data can lead to sensitive data on almost any
data subject. Modern technology can address the letter of the law but not the
198 See Henry Porter, My Ideal Queen's Speech, guardian.co.uk. (2010), at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/henryporter/2010/may/05/ideal-queens-
speech-manifesto-club (last visited on 5 May 2012).
199 Warwick Ashford, Mandatory Data Breach Notifications: An Opportunity For Change,
Computer Weekly. (2010), at
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2010/07/21/242043/Mandatory-data-breach-
notifications-an-opportunity-for.htm (last visited on 20 July 2012).
200 California established the first breach notification law. The statute requires that when an
organization experiences a data breach, it must notify all stakeholders including data
subjects. Failure to comply is an infraction.
201 A slang term for being damned if you and damned if you do not. Both the rock and hard
place provide considerable pressure.
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spirit. Current data mining techniques can meet the legal standard and
subvert the spirit of the law. Personal data must be viewed in context. DPSIP
laws must not only address current technological practices but must also
protect against future developments and practices. The current definition of
personal data is inadequate and conflicts with EU standards. Case law and
technological developments make old definitions unhelpful and inefficient. A
lack of clarity creates a burden for all stakeholders. The law must address
new forms of identification and technology-related behavior.202
The ICO filed a response to a request for evidence issued by the Ministry of
Justice. The report shows that the collection and use of personal information
is increasing faster than ever before; breaches and misuse are increasing;
DPSIP legislation and regulation are more needed and relevant than ever,
and more effective approaches are needed.203
The ICO’s recommendation is that a new approach must meet a number of
standards. The legal standards must be clear and address new forms of
identification; they must protect individual freedoms and rights; and individuals
must have clear, effective, and simple rights. The process must be cost-
effective with clearly defined and accessible procedures that provide
protection and vehicles of redress. The standards for processing must cover
the entire information life cycle ensuring accountability and responsibility.
Obligations must focus on risks rather than categories. Protections must
focus on direct and indirect identification methods. Consent standards must
be improved. Exceptions need checks and balances. The government must
establish privacy by design principles for manufacturers and service providers
that are enforced. Governments should not grant intellectual property
protections for goods and services that are inherently privacy violations. The
202 Pinsent Masons, ICO Urges Clarity on Definition of Personal Data, OUT-LAW News.
(2010), at http://out-law.com/page-11422 (last visited on 6 October 2012).
203 Information Commissioner Office, The Information Commissioner’s Response to the
Ministry of Justice’s Call for Evidence on the Current Data Protection Legislative
Framework. (2010), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/notices/response_to_
moj_dpframework.pdf (last visited on 6 October 2012).
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historic distinction between data controllers and data processors fails to
address current collaborative efforts. The current journalism and artistic
exception cannot relate to individual Internet behavior. DPSIP legislation and
regulation must address potential adverse effects, damages, discrimination
based on data, and distress risks. Privacy protections are needed for
behavioral advertising and electronic health records violations. Contrary to
some claims, DPSIP laws and regulations are not in place to burden
business. Only seven percent of businesses studied adopted a contrary
view.204
The concept of consent and informed consent must be clear and include a
description of the lawful and specified purpose of data collection with a
contractual guarantee that the purposes are adequate, not excessive, and
relevant. The Act needs to support the DPSIP principle of informational self-
determination.
7.13 Summary of United Kingdom Literature and Issues Reviewed
The intent of this thesis is to conduct a comparative analysis of DPSIP
responses in five different nations. Part of the comparison uses a benchmark
approach of key issues. The issues include legal support of DPSIP
protections, legal support of corporate privacy and data protection standards,
information privacy data protection and security declarations, the use of
regulatory agencies, sectoral legislation, and data controllers. The
benchmark standards also include data processor requirements, data
subjects, data security destruction, cross-border data flow, exemptions and
exceptions, and the current stage of the approach based on evolutionary
stages. The following table presents the summary based on the benchmark
model.
204 Ibid.
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Table 7.2 Comparative Model of United Kingdom Legal Support of DPSIP
Models
ISSUE DESCRIPTION UK CURRENT RESPONSE
CM.1: Legal Support of DPSIP
Protections
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with International Human
Rights Standards
(See Appendix A)
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with EU DPSIP
Standards
Yes
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with APEC DPSIP
Standards
No
Federal Constitutional Law No
Federal Legislative Efforts Yes
Federal Common Law Limited
Province / State Constitutional Law No
Province / State Legislative Efforts Limited
Province /State Common Law Some
CM.2: Legal Support of
Corporate Privacy and Data
Property Protection Issues
UK CURRENT RESPONSE
Copyright Protections Yes
Database Protection Yes
Patient Protections Yes
Service Mark Protections Yes
Trade Mark Protections Yes
Trade Secret Protections Yes
Privacy Impact Audit Required
Before Use
No
Privacy Impact Audit Required
Before Government Protections
Granted
No
Checks and Balances on
Corporate Collection, Use, and
Transfer of Individual DPSIP Data
Yes
CM.3: Information Privacy –
Data Protection and Security
Declarations
UK CURRENT RESPONSE
Definitions Provided Yes
Personal and Sensitive Data Yes
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Defined
Definitions Effectively Address
Advanced Data Mining
Technologies
No
All Holders and Users Held
Accountable
No
CM.4: Regulatory Agency UK CURRENT RESPONSE
Independent of Legislative and
Executive Branches
No
Administrative Power Yes
Investigative Power Limited
Regulatory Powers Limited
Education Function Yes
Enforcement Powers Limited
Structure Yes
Responsibilities Defined Yes
Accountability Yes
Governmental Chief Privacy
Officer/ Commissioner Required
Yes
Governmental Privacy Audits
Required as Part of Legislation
Passage
Limited
Business Chief Privacy Officer/
Commissioner Required
Suggested
Employees are Personally Liable
for Violations
Limited
Business Privacy Audits Required No
Agency Educational Function Yes
CM.5: Sectoral DPSIP
Legislation
UK CURRENT RESPONSE
Credit Reporting Agencies Yes
Criminal Justice Record
Restrictions
No
Health Information Some
Health Information Exceptions Some
Electronic Medical/Health Record
Controls
Some
CM.6: Data Controllers UK CURRENT RESPONSE
Notice Required Limited
Opt-in No
Opt-Out Generally
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Must Be Lawful and Fair In theory
System Access Controls In theory
Data Quality and Integrity In theory
Accurate In theory
Complete In theory
Up to Date In theory
Limited to Needed Data In theory
Relevant In theory
Not Misleading In theory
Data Retention Limitation Limited
Data Transfer Controls Yes
Openness on Information Held Limited
Breach Disclosures Required No
Breach Penalties Limited
CM.7: Data Processor
Requirements
UK CURRENT RESPONSE
Informed Consent Required In theory
Rationale is Provided Yes
Fair Processing Yes
Legal Processing Yes
General Data Yes
Sensitive Data Yes
Accuracy Yes
Timely Yes
Duration of Record Keeping
Controls
Limited
CM.8: Data Subjects UK CURRENT RESPONSE
Ownership by the Subject Limited
Control Over Access Limited
Alter, Amend, Correct, and Delete
Errors
Limited
Notification Requirement Limited
CM.9: Data Security and
Destruction
UK CURRENT RESPONSE
Security Must be State of the Art Generally
Technology Use – Cost of
Implementation Not a Defense
No
Tracking Not once merged
Safeguards Required Adequate encryption
Protects From Alteration Yes
Protects Against Disclosure Yes
Protects Misuse Yes
Protects Against Unauthorized Yes
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Internal and External Access
Unauthorized Access Penalties Yes
Timely Notice of Breaches Limited
Strong Remedies Provided Limited
CM.10: Cross-Border Data Flow UK CURRENT RESPONSE
Individual Informed Consent
Required
Yes
Transfer Source Is Accountable Limited
Outsource Service Controls Limited
CM.11: Exemptions and
Exceptions
UK CURRENT RESPONSE
Only Permitted Where Compelling
Justification Exists
Yes
Checks and Balances – Court
Order Required
Limited
Government Agencies Yes
Intelligence and Defense Yes
Police Actions Yes
Small Business Exemption No
CM.12 DPSIP Evolutional Stages UK CURRENT RESPONSE
DPSIP.0 Limited DPSIP legal
Issues
Yes
DPSIP.1.0 Establishes PII; does not
fully address security issues; focus
on limited legal consent and notice.
Yes
DPISP.2.0 Accepts PII standards;
does not fully address security
issues; focus on a legally based
harm based analysis.
Yes
DPSIP.3.0 PII and non-PII data
fused; privacy, data protection and
security issues are interrelated;
legal audits, checks, and balances
needed for all personal information
stakeholders. New technologies
are required to pass privacy audits
(example – RFID, Internet of
Things) and require use of privacy
enhancing technologies in all new
IP approvals.
No
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Chapter Eight addresses the actual and potential US approach options to
DPSIP legal issues. The US has advanced some basic principles of DPSIP,
civil rights, and human rights; however, it has failed to raise these principles to
the current international level of concern. Although the US claims to be and is
often seen as a leader of the Western World (including in technology
development), in terms of DPSIP legal issues, it is a recalcitrant follower. The
approach in the US reflects its shift from a representative republic to a
corporate republic that favors business interests over individual interests
throughout a range of DPSIP legal issues. As of 2012, the US is considering
adopting more DPSIP protections that are closer to the EU approach. The
proposed shift has powerful critics.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LEGAL STANDARDS
The real danger is the gradual erosion of individual
liberties through the automation, integration, and
interconnection of many small, separate record-keeping
systems, each of which alone may seem innocuous,
even benevolent, and wholly justifiable. US Privacy
Protection Study Commission1
8.0 Overview
Legal protection of data security and informational privacy in the US is a
patchwork of administrative rules, laws, and cases. The culture highly values
privacy; however, it also values the free flow of information, freedom of
speech, independence, minimal laws and regulation, and transparency. More
recently, free market and security rhetoric has played a major role in how the
US is handling DPSIP legal issues.
Information privacy was not a significant issue during the early years of the
US and the agricultural era, because of open lands and a lack of potentially
intrusive information technology. Privacy was perceived as the right to protect
one’s home and land from searches and seizures. Privacy concerns
increased with industrialization and the urbanization of the country. The
amount of open spaces diminished and information privacy became a more
prominent concern. The advent of computer technology raised the
information privacy stakes higher. "Technological change precipitated a gap
1 United States Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information
Society (U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission. 1977), at 533.
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in existing laws,"2 and in the US, information privacy law developed in a
haphazard manner.
Due to the enactment of the Bill of Rights, the US has a long history of
protecting civil liberties. However, during some periods of fear and war, some
human rights principles have been ignored. More recently, the US Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has advocated for privacy rights under strong
consumer protection legislation. Despite the general push for consumer
advocacy, the business community has not always acquiesced and more
recently mounted a major political battle.
The US chapter begins with presenting background on the country. The
analysis continues with an examination of the US Constitutional declarations.
US federal legislation and case law is examined. The research then focuses
on US State Constitutional declarations, state legislation, and case law. An
analysis of the US standards and remedies, and implementation system is
reviewed. US sociolegal concerns are presented. A critique of the US
approach is then addressed. A summary of the US literature and issues,
using the thesis comparative model of the current legal support is then
reviewed and presented.
8.1 Background
The US is a constitutional republic.3 The governmental model includes the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The structure applies to the
federal government and the fifty state governments. The federal executive
branch is headed by the President, who is elected to a maximum of two terms
consisting of four years each. The President is the Head of State, top federal
government official, and commander-in-chief of the military. The President
and Vice President are elected by the Electoral College based on public
2 Priscilla M. Regan, Ideas or Interests: Privacy in Electronic Communications, 21 Policy
Studies Journal, 3, 450 (1993), at 450.
3 United States of America, Find Government Agencies. (2010), at http://www.usa.gov/ (last
visited on 5 August 2012). Site contains reference data for this section.
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elections. The chief executive for each state is publically elected as a
Governor. The executive branch includes a number of departments and
some independent agencies.4
The federal legislative branch includes the Senate5 and House of
Representatives.6 The Senate provides advice and consent for presidential
appointments and ratifies treaties. The House is responsible for revenue
issues. Senators are elected for a six-year term; members of the House are
elected for two-year terms. Once both bodies pass a bill, that piece of
legislation is then sent to the President for signature or veto. All states, with
the exception of Nebraska,7 have a similar structure.
The federal judiciary is headed by the Supreme Court,8 Federal Courts of
Appeal, and Federal District Courts. The states follow the same pattern. The
US Supreme Court is the highest court in the country. All federal judges are
appointed to a lifelong term. The US judiciary generally follows the British
common law tradition.
James Katz and Annette Tassone9 studied privacy protection concerns in the
US. The data showed that privacy was a strong cultural value; however,
some people shared data without considering the consequences. This finding
was consistent with psychological research on decision-making errors. The
data demonstrated a strong possibility that privacy would be a greater issue in
4 United States of America, The Executive Branch. (2010), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-
government/executive-branch (last visited on 5 August 2012).
5 United States of America, United States Senate. (2010), at http://www.senate.gov/ (last
visited on 5 August 2012). Senators are elected for staggered six-year terms with two
elected from each of the fifty states.
6 United States of America, United States House of Representatives. (2010), at
http://www.house.gov/ (last visited on 5 August 2012). The House has 435 members
who are elected for two-year terms. The number of members from each state is
based on the census. A state must have at least one representative.
7 Nebraska has a unicameral legislature. The bi-cameral states have a Senate and
Assembly.
8 United States of America, Supreme Court of the United States. (2010), at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/ (last visited on 5 August 2012).
9 James E. Katz & Annette R. Tassone, Public Opinion Trends: Privacy and Information
Technology, 54 Public Opinion Quarterly 1, 125 (1990).
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the future. Although some subjects provided data to the requesting sources,
they were often reluctant and not happy with the request or requirement.
Many of the subjects thought that privacy protection issues were ignored. The
data showed that eighteen percent of the subjects had been victims of privacy
invasions. These levels of concern were higher than the earlier Louis Harris
and Allen Westin10 reported concerns.
Leading advocates of privacy rights existed even in the colonial period.
Colonial courts established information privacy rights. The privacy-related
issues included limiting defamation communications, government searches
and seizures, and physical intrusions. The courts required hearings, protected
privileged communications, and outlawed trespass of person and property.11
While Benjamin Franklin was the Postmaster General, he established an
information privacy policy. All postmasters had to swear that they would not
“wittingly, willingly, or knowingly open or cause, procure, permit, or suffer to be
opened . . . any letter or letters which shall come into their hands.”12
John Adams, a signer of the Declaration of Independence and the second
president wrote about the need for privacy rights and duties in his diary. He
wrote that privacy must be maintained to “protect one from their enemies or
indiscreet friends to do so is only wise.”13
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and the future Justice Louis D. Brandeis,
published a major work on privacy in the US. They wrote that inventions and
business models invade “the sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”14
10 Louis Harris & Allen F. Westin, The Dimensions of Privacy (Sentry Insurance. 1979).
11 David H. Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England (University of Virginia Press. 1972),
248.
12 Id. at 121.
13 Id. at 5.
14 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review 5,
193 (1890) at 195.
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The authors argued that freedom of the press did not exist without
limitations.15
Warren and Brandeis also suggested remedies for right to privacy violations.
The remedies included “1. An action of tort for damages in all cases. Even in
the absence of special damages, substantial compensation could be allowed
for injury to feelings as in the action of slander and libel. 2. An injunction, in
perhaps a very limited class of cases.”16
Years later, President Gerald R. Ford presented himself as a strong DPSIP
leader. He was instrumental in enacting the 1974 Privacy Act which limited
sources of violations used during the Nixon years. However, President Ford
rejected the part of the original Act that established a national data-protection-
commission.17 Ford used a classic political move to kill the proposal by
getting Congress to agree to a Study Commission.18 In his October 9, 1974,
statement regarding the Privacy Act, he declared that executive and
legislative actions are needed to improve the levels of confidentiality and
privacy rights, especially related to criminal justice records, income tax
records, and other identified privacy concerns. However, the right to privacy
committee achieved minimal accomplishments.19
The DPSIP standards in the US are a complicated and often conflicting set of
various state and federal laws and related Court decisions. The standards,
much like anti-trust enforcement, depend on which administration and court
appointees are in power. Although public opinion polls in the US consistently
15 Id. at 196-197.
16 Id. at 197.
17 David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal Republic of
Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, and the United States (University of North
Carolina Press. 1989), 305.
18 Under Robert’s Rules of Order, if one wants to stop a legislative action, one refers it to a
committee for study.
19 Ford Library Museum, President Gerald R. Ford's Statement on Privacy Legislation.
(2001), at http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/740125.htm (last
visited on 31 July 2012), at 7.
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favor privacy protections, special interests groups20 have passed legislation in
favor of self-regulation. Generally, recent conservative governments wanted
to limit the enforcement of laws and regulations to increase corporate power.
Business interests wanted to be free to make more money, no matter what
legal and policy interests existed. Starting with President Clinton, the official
US privacy policy has been self-regulation. “Americans treasure privacy,
linking it to our concept of personal freedom and well-being.”21 The Clinton
administration wanted consumer-friendly fair information practices. However,
the Administration chose not to involve the government in the effort.22
8.2 United States of America Constitutional Declarations
The Constitution of the US23 does not specifically delineate a privacy right. At
the time of the original writing, privacy was taken for granted and was not a
major issue due to geography, population, and self-evident truths. The
constitutional basis for DPSIP concerns came in the twentieth century and
was based on a number of provisions of the Bill of Rights.
The First Amendment proclaims that the government cannot interfere with the
“right of the people peaceably to assemble.”24 In 1958, the US Supreme
Court identified the First Amendment as the basis of the relationship between
speech and privacy. Alabama wanted access to the private membership list
of the state NAACP organization. In NAACP v. Alabama,25 Justice Harlan
found that the Court "has recognized the vital relationship between
20 On both sides of the political spectrum – including conservatives to progressive.
21 William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. (1997,
July 1), at http://www.w3.org/TR/NOTE-framework-970706.html (last visited on 1
August 2012), § 5 ¶ 1.
22 Id. at ¶ 10.
23 United States Constitution, United States Constitution. (1788), at
http://www.kearney.net/~tclayton/The%20Constitution%20of%20the%20United%20St
ates.htm (last visited on 4 July 2012). (US)
24 Id. at amend. I.
25 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, (1958), 462.
(US)
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freedom to associate and privacy in one's association particularly where a
group espouses dissident beliefs."26
The Supreme Court then ruled as unconstitutional another state of
Alabama law on privacy grounds using the First Amendment. The law
required that all public school teachers release private information related
to group memberships and organizations that the teachers supported.27
These cases show the danger of individuals losing control over their personal
information and that the general public does not always have a right to know
or even have a realistic public interest.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,28 US Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas,
writing for the majority, found a constitutional right of privacy – a "penumbra"
of rights associated with the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. The case involved a statute that outlawed the use of
contraceptives. The Court ruled that the Amendments created a “zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”29
The Third Amendment prohibits the government from having soldiers
“quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner.”30 The Fourth
Amendment declares that “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.”31
In Olmstead v. United States, 32 Justice Brandeis argued in dissent, that “the
right to be let alone was the most comprehensive constitutional right.”33 In
26 Ibid.
27 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, (1960). (US)
28 Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 1 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, (1965). (US)
29 Id. at 500.
30 U.S. Const. amend III.
31 U.S. Const. amend IV.
32 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 S. Ct. 564. 66 ALR 376, 72 L.Ed. 944, (1928), 475-
478. (US)
33 Ibid.
Chapter Eight: US Legal Standards 440
Goldman v. United States,34 a case on telephonic privacy invasion, Justice
Murphy warned that modern technology had developed means of privacy
invasions not foreseen by the Constitution under the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Court thought so much of the need for privacy protection that it
found constitutional protections. In Mapp v. Ohio,35 the Supreme Court
established the exclusionary rule, which made unlawful searches
inadmissible. The Court determined that privacy cannot be an “empty
promise.”
The Fifth Amendment declares that no person shall be “deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”36 The Ninth Amendment
further declares that “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”37
In Griswold v. Connecticut,38 US Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, with
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joining and concurring argued that
privacy was an un-enumerated right under the Ninth Amendment. To
determine if such a right exists, Justice Goldberg argued that one “must look to
the tradition and conscience of our people . . .the totality of the constitutional
scheme under which we live."39
The Tenth Amendment, and last of the Bill of Rights, declares that legal
protections are not limited by the text. The Amendment declares that “The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”40
34 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 138, (1942), 138. (US)
35 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 644, (1961), 644. (US)
36 U.S. Const. amend V.
37 U.S. Const. amend IX.
38 Griswold v. Connecticut, 494. (US)
39 Ibid. (emphasis added)
40 U.S. Const. amend X.
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The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that the federal bill of rights
provisions applied to the states. The Amendment declares, “nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”41
The finding for a right to privacy in the Constitution was not always a partisan
effort. Republican President Richard Nixon appointed Chief Justice Warren
Burger in 1969. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,42 Chief Justice Burger
ruled that the Constitution does provide for privacy protections as unarticulated,
implicit, enumerated, and indispensably guaranteed.
While the US Constitution did not specifically identify a clearly defined DPSIP
legal right, the document did provide a legal basis for protections. The
Supreme Court has used the above Amendments as the basis for DPSIP
cases.
8.3 United States of America Federal Legislation43
Over the years, the Federal government enacted a number of Acts that
addressed selected DPSIP problems. Some state governments have
followed the same pattern. In some situations, the states have been more
innovative at privacy problem resolutions. This section reviews a number of
laws and some related court decisions. In general, the materials are in
chronological order in order to clarify the developmental aspects of the issues.
The US has a long history of passing legislation to meet immediate
challenges. When situations change, the legislation is then repealed,
changed, ignored, or not funded. DPSIP issues are no exception.
41 U.S. Const. amend XIV. (emphasis added)
42 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, (1980), 578. (US)
43 The legislation includes all of the sections noted in this 8.3 section.
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8.3.1 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914
The Federal Trade Commission Act, signed by President Woodrow Wilson,
established the trade commission and granted it power to investigate and
enforce actions against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”44 The commission was empowered to issue cease-and-desist
orders and levy fines for violating the Act. The power of the commission was
expanded to include commercial e-mail, competition, consumer protection, the
Internet, privacy, and spam. The FTC was slow to enforce the expansion.45
8.3.2 The Federal Wiretap Act of 1968
In 1968, the federal Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Street Act of 1968 (Wiretap Act).46 The Act applied only to contents
of telephone communications, hidden microphones, and did not control the
use of pen registers for tracking contacts. The statute did require law
enforcement to obtain a judge-issued warrant, based on probable cause, to
wiretap phone conversations. The Act set standards of probable cause for
issuing a warrant.47 The Act and subsequent court actions established three
principles of exception for telephone companies and their employees.
Telephone companies do not need subscriber’s consent to monitor.
Companies can monitor for measuring rendition of services and to protect
company rights and property.48 The Act allows for a private right of action
and allows for liquidated damages.49 The Act allows for criminal penalties,
44 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914), § 45(a)(1). (US)
45 See § 8.4.1 in this document.
46 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-350, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511-2520) (1968). (US) AKA Federal Wiretap
Act of 1968
47 Id. at § 1.
48 Id. at § 2511(2)(a).
49 A private right of action allows an individual to litigate. Statutes with liquidated damages
do not require proof of actual damages.
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punitive damages, and equitable remedies. The Act does not preempt state
laws.50
In United States v Auler,51 the Federal Court of Appeals found that a
telephone company was recording the content of conversations under the
pretense of investigating service theft issues. The issue before the Court
was one of monitoring content information. The Court determined that
restricted monitoring of non-content information, by the phone company,
might fit within the exception to the need to protect consumers’ right to
privacy.
In Deal v Spears,52 the Court of Appeals again ruled on the issue of consent
under the Act. Under the ruling, consent that is implied is not a legal violation
of the “reasonable expectation of privacy test (or) a test of constructive
consent.”53 In response, the states of California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, and Washington passed laws requiring that all parties must
formerly consent. The state laws voided the Deal ruling in these states.
8.3.3 The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970
Beginning during the Second World War, US merchants started collecting and
sharing data on consumers’ purchases and payments. Over the next twenty-
plus years, the data became valuable and had a major impact on individual
purchasing power.54 Part of the problem was that the data was often
incorrect. In 1970, the Fair Credit Reporting Act was enacted to require that
collected data should be accurate and accessible, and to provide data
50 Preemption in a federal statute requires all states to follow the same way. The principle is
used for the sake of uniformity and to limit state laws that might have a higher
standard.
51 United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1976). (US)
52 Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1992), 1153. (US)
53 Ibid.
54 Federal Trade Commission, The Fair Credit Reporting Act. (2004), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/031224fcra.pdf p. 3. (last visited on 11 June 2012).
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correction procedures. Business interest groups objected to passage of the
Act and even recent enhancements.55 The Act was to be administered by the
Federal Trade Commission and State Attorney Generals.56 The collected
personal data could be used only for the legally established permitted
purpose.57 When organizations violated the law, private rights of action were
also established by the Act. Civil and criminal penalties also applied.58 Over
and above actual damages, statutory damages also included fines for willful
violations.59
The Act covered all entities that compiled consumer credit reports and entities
that used these reports. Historically, a report included the consumers’ name,
address, social security number, credit worthiness, credit standing, credit
capacity, and payment records. The original purpose of credit reporting was
to serve consumers in establishing eligibility for credit. Over the past ten
years, reporting companies have added character, general reputation, mode
of living, and personal characteristics in investigative consumer reports. The
credit bureaus justified the change in focus for the purposes of employment,
insurance, or other business desires. The expansion was based on mutual
market demand; however, the Act does provide some limitations and
consumer recourse.60 The US approach is far less protective than that used
in AU.61
The Act required that when an adverse credit decision was made on the basis
of one of the reporting agencies’ data, the consumer must be informed. The
55 Emily Flitter, Consumer Protection Debate Pits Theory Against Record, American Banker.
(2009), at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/174_124/-383336-1.html (last
visited on 23 June 2012).
56 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Public Law No. 91-508. (1970), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/031224fcra.pdf (last visited on 3 July 2012). (US)
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid
60 Id. at § 1681.
61 See Chapter 4 § 4.3 of this study.
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responsibility for correction was placed on the consumer.62 Consumers had
the legal right to request correction of any errors or dispute any data.63 The
data collector had a legal standard, but not a per se requirement to insure that
the data collected was accurate, complete, and current. Business interests
found a legislative way to circumvent strong DPSIP legal principles.
8.3.4 The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA)64 was passed
during the Nixon Watergate period because Congress determined a need for
colleges and universities to maintain the privacy of student educational records.
Senator James L. Buckley proclaimed that “the protection of individual privacy is
essential to the continued existence of a free society. There has been clear
evidence of frequent, even systematic violations of the privacy.”65
The protected student records include personally identifying information,
transcripts, disciplinary, and complaint data.66 Prior to release of records, the
student or parent must provide written permission.67 The only exceptions include
legitimate educational interests, regulatory audits, financial aid issues, accrediting
agencies, judicial orders, lawful subpoenas, health or safety emergencies, and
some directories.68 The Act is enforced by potential withdrawal of all federal funds
to the educational institution.69 Campus law enforcement records were not
considered to be educational records. Campus data on criminal
62 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) at § 1681(g).
63 Ibid.
64 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) amend. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR
Part 99 (1974). (US)
65 James L. Buckley, Joint Statement in Explanation of Buckley/Pell Amendment, 120,
Congressional Record, Record 13991, December 13, 1974 (1974), 13991.
66 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) § 1232. (US)
67 Id. at § 1232g(b).
68 Id. at § 1232g(a).
69 Id. at § 1232g(f).
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activities must be publicly released on an annual basis.70 The act does
not allow a private right of action or criminal penalties.
The federal courts have ruled that student disciplinary records, that
include personally identifying information, were educational records and
could not be released. Student disciplinary proceedings were not seen
as criminal because the proceedings applied related only to students
and their educational institutions.71
An issue in any DPSIP law is the willingness to enforce the standards.
The FERPA standards are very clear; however, violations still occur. In
Manassas Virginia, the City of Manassas School Board, the City, and
the Police Department joined forces to use data mining programs and
openly shared the data.72 Although the Manassas decision was based
on discrimination rather than privacy standards, the case does establish
a concern regarding the use data mining procedures.
8.3.5 The Freedom of Information Act of 1974
The Freedom of Information Act73 was passed to require the release of
governmentally held information to private persons and organizations upon
filing a request. Although the focus of the Act was on governmental
transparency, the Act nevertheless provided for exceptions to accommodate
internationally established data privacy issues. Section Six protected the
release of medical, personnel, and related records. Section Seven protected
70 Higher Education Amendments of 1992 amend. Public Law No. 102-325, § 1555(a), 106
Stat. 448, 840 (1992), 840. (US)
71 United States v. Miami University, 91 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1147 (S.D. Ohio 2000), 1157. (US)
72 Brigid Schulte, Student Privacy Spotlighted in VA: Manassas School Board, City Pay in
Discrimination Suit; Policies Tightened. (2008, September 27), at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/26/AR2008092603641.html?sid=ST2008092700733&s_p
os= (last visited on 27 September 2012), B01.
73 Freedom of Information Act, amend. 5 U.S.C. sec. 552(b)(6)(7) (1974); see also U.S., The
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. (1966), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_guide07/text_foia.pdf (last visited on 1 July 2012); U.S.
Freedom of Information Act of 2005, 5 USC, 552 (2005). (US)
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the release of criminal history records. Section Four protected private
business information obtained through legal duties.
8.3.6 The Privacy Act of 1974
The US Privacy Act of 1974 was passed to protect individual private data from
governmental misuse. The impetus for its passage was the events that
occurred during the Nixon presidency.74 The preface to the act declares that
“the opportunities for an individual to secure employment, insurance, and
credit, and his right to due process, and other protections are endangered by
the misuse of certain information systems."75
The Privacy Act was classified as an “omnibus code of fair information
practices” and was tied to the 1966 Freedom of Information Act. At the time
of passage, considerable concerns existed related to governmental misuse of
citizen data in computerized databases during the Nixon years.76 The Act
applied to how the Federal Government, federal entities, and contractors deal
with information privacy issues.77 Under the Act, most individuals could seek
access to any federal agencies’ records related to themselves.78 The Act
stated that information must be “accurate, complete, relevant, and timely” and
allowed for accuracy challenges.79 The Act required that information
74 Nixon was the first US President to resign in lieu of impeachment. His resignation was
prompted by advice by the Republican senate members that he would be impeached
and found guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors. Nixon would have been found
guilty for using governmental powers to physically break in and steal private
information that today could be stolen by hacking; using the taxing authority to punish
so called enemies, establishing surveillance of a governmental hit list of enemies;
obstruction of justice, abuse of power; and contempt of Congress. All of the charges
violated DPSIP principles.
75 Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1974). (US)
76 The issues are fully documented in Frank Church, Senate Select Committee to Study
Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Congress, Final
Report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans (United State Printing
Office. 1976, April 26).
77 Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1974), (US)
78 Id. at § 552a(b).
79 Id. at § 552a(d)(2)(B).
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collected for one purpose could not be used for another.80 The Department of
Justice criticized the Act for “imprecise language, outdated regulatory
guidelines,” unpublished court decisions, and related unsettled issues.81
The Act required that governmental agencies and contractors could only
compile data that was relevant and necessary. Any new governmental
system of records must be publically announced. The right to individual data
access must be respected by the government. The law provided for a private
right of action.82 Civil and criminal penalties were applicable for federal
agencies and employees.83
During the political discussions between Congress and the newly appointed
president, Gerald Ford, who succeeded Nixon, the enforcement of the Act
was moved to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which was
under the Executive branch’s control. The intent of the Act was to report to
Congress on Executive privacy protection dysfunction. The OMB prepared
guidelines but never performed any enforcement actions.84 The Privacy
Protection Study Commission found that no agency or individual did anything
to enforce the Act on the part of anyone.85
Despite the lack of enforcement, the Act had some laudatory basic goals:
“(1) data is kept accurate, complete, up-to-date, and open to review
and correction by the people concerned;
80 Id. at § 552a(e)(3)(B).
81 See U.S. Department of Justice, Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974. (2010), at
http://www.justice.gov/opcl/1974intro.htm (last visited on 4 January 2012).; U.S.
Congress Joint Committee on Governmental Operations, Legislative History of the
Privacy Act of 1974: Source Book on Privacy. (1976), at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LH_privacy_act-1974.pdf (last visited on 2
January 2012).
82 Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1974), (US)
83 Id. at § 552a(g)(1)(D).
84 House Committee on Government Operations, Who Cares About Privacy? Congressional
Report Number 455 of the 98th Congress (Government Printing Office. 1983).
85 Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society. (1977),
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/ (last visited on 29 July 2012).
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(2) the uses of filed data must proceed according to rules of due
process that data subjects can know and, if necessary, invoke; and
(3) the organizations collecting and using personal data can do so
only as is necessary to attain their appropriate organizational
goals.”86
Unfortunately, under the Act, information privacy data collection and use
actually increased. The government instituted surveillance initiatives such as
Carnivore, Clipper Chip, and Echelon87 to circumvent the spirit and letter of
the Privacy Act law.
The conservatives in Congress and the administration furthered their attack
on information privacy with the rushed passage of the post 9/11, 2001 Patriot
Act.88 The Act essentially overturned all prior privacy legislation in the US.
The traditional rule of law principles of checks and balances were gone.
Sections 904 and 905 of the Patriot Act allowed US spy agencies and
executive police to do what they want with no accountability to Congress or the
courts.89
8.3.7 Privacy Protection Act of 1980
The Privacy Protection Act of 198090 protected computer information systems
and journalists from the police wanting to have access to any work-product,91
even before it was made public. The Act was passed in reaction to the
86 James Rule, et al., Preserving Individual Autonomy in an Information-Oriented Society, in
Computers, Ethics, and Social Values (Deborah G. Johnson & Helen Nissenbaum
eds., 1995), at 321.
87 Governmental policies and technology intended to create massive surveillance databases
and mine individual data rejected by the public when presented with transparency
options.
88 U.S. Patriot Act, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act: Public Law 107-56, 2001 H.R.
3162 (2001). (2001), at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200110/102401a.html (last
visited on 15 June 2012).
89 Id. at §§ 904-905.
90 Privacy Protection Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)(a) et seq (1980). (US)
91 Includes contact information, notes, research, and writings.
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Zurcher v. Stanford Daily92 case wherein the Burger Court ruled that the
police could search newspaper offices even if no one was suspected of a
crime.
The Act prohibited any search and seizure by law enforcement agencies of
any “work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to
have a purpose to disseminate to the public in a newspaper, book, broadcast,
or other similar form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce.”93 The exceptions included a probable cause to suspect
that the person has committed a crime or “there is reason to believe that the
immediate seizure of such materials is necessary to prevent the death of, or
serious bodily injury to, a human being.”94 The Act does allow for a private
right of action, allows for liquidated damages, and does not allow criminal
penalties.95 The Act preempts state statutes.96
8.3.8 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
The Electronic Communication Privacy Act97 expanded the Federal Wiretap
1968 statute to include interstate and stored electronic mail.98 The Act
established that when a person participates in online activities, such behavior
did not waive all privacy rights. The Act provided criminal penalties for
unauthorized electronic data access, including using the Internet. Section
2703 required that law enforcement must obtain a valid search warrant or
subpoena to access stored data. A major exception was that Act only applied
to intentional actions; however, accidental or unintentional acts were not
92 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. 436 U.S. 457, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525, (1978). (US)
93 Privacy Protection Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)(a) et seq (1980). (US)
94 Id. at § 2000(a)(2).
95 Id. at § 2000(aa)(6).
96 Id. at § 2000(aa)(6)(d).
97 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 amend. (ECPA Title I) 18 U.S.C.A. §§
2510-2521 (1986) (US). Note that in the US, any Act that uses Privacy in the tile
probably limits privacy rights.
98 Intra-state behaviour would be a state action.
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covered.99 System operators were limited to authorized business functions
and required not to disclose any information.100
In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v United States Secret Service,101 the Court
found for Jackson, an Internet Bulletin Board operator, and ordered the Secret
Service to pay $303,040 in damages plus attorney fees and costs for violating
the Electronic Communication Privacy Act. While the Secret Service had a
limited warrant, it took all of Jackson’s computers and kept them for several
months. The Court found that the Secret Service had exceeded its authority
under the warrant and that the computers contained Bulletin Board e-mails
and Jackson’s simulation games.
In McVeigh v. Cohen,102 the US Navy accessed a seventeen-year-old’s Naval
Veterans’ America Online ISP website with the help of the Internet Service
Provider. The Navy’s action was conducted by deceit and taken before
confronting McVeigh, obtaining a court order, subpoena, or warrant. McVeigh
sued under the 1986 Electronic Communication Privacy Act. The court found
for McVeigh and issued a preliminary injunction on any further Naval actions
against him. The court declared that McVeigh’s Internet Service Provider
broke the law with the encouragement of the Navy. The court held that
information privacy violations of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act
must be protected by a standard strictly observed.103
In Planned Parenthood v. ACLA,104 the Supreme Court determined that
information privacy cyber threats are the same as unlawful physical
threats.105 Some federal anti-spam laws even protected against unwanted
99 Id. at 2701(a).
100 Id. at 2510(5)(a).
101 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex.
1993), aff'd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). (US)
102 McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp 215 (D.D.C.)(1998). (US)
103 Id. at §, 1.
104 Planned Parenthood v. ACLA, 41 F.Supp 2d 1130, D. Or. 1999). Planned Parenthood v.
ACLA, (41 F.Supp 2d 1130, D. Or. 1999). (US)
105 Id.
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spam e-mail.106 The Court formally established privacy as information
privacy control in Kyllo v. United States.107 The case found that warrantless
searches, using modern technology, were a Fourth Amendment violation.
The Supreme Court was concerned about legal protections and new
technology that can “discern all human activities.”108
In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation109 the District Court focused on the
meaning of consent. Pharmatrak used cookies to collect data on its website.
The site collected names, addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, date
of birth, and other personal information. The corporation claimed that the
viewers had consented to the collection. The court ruled that consent must be
actual rather than constructive and cannot be inferred from the mere purchase
of an information service. A registration form is not consent to release
personal information. The court also ruled:
We think, at least for the consent exception under the ECPA in civil
cases, that it makes more sense to place the burden of showing
consent on the party seeking the benefit of the exception, and so hold.
That party is more likely to have evidence pertinent to the issue of
consent.110
A major problem with the Electronic Communication Privacy Act and related
restrictive legislation was found in re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation.111
Northwest Airlines disclosed passenger records to the National Aeronautical
and Space Agency (NASA) in violation of its privacy policy and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act and other similar Acts. The customer’s suit was
106 Jan Fernback & Zizi Papacharissi, Online Privacy as Legal Safeguard: The Relationship
Among Consumer, Online Portal, and Privacy Policies, 9 New Media & Society 5, 715
(2007).
107 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94, (2001). (US)
108 Ibid.
109 In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003), 19. (US)
110 Ibid.
111 In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10580 (D. Minn., 2004).
(US)
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dismissed because Northwest was not an electronic communications service
provider.112
Congress passed the Pen Register Act of 1984,113 which declared that “no
person may install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first
obtaining a court order.” Section (b) provided exceptions for providers that
include “operation, maintenance, and testing of a wire or electronic
communication service … protection of the rights or property of such provider,
or to the protection of users of that service from abuse of service or unlawful
use of service.”114 The Act did not require an informed consent from data
subjects.115 The Pen Register Act does not allow a private right of action;
however, it does provide for criminal penalties.116 The Act does not preempt
state statues.
8.3.9 Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988
The US Congress continued its concern about data collection, storage,
mining, and sharing. In 1988, Congress passed the Computer Matching and
Privacy Protection Act.117 In theory, the law limited sharing of computer
privacy data between federal agencies. The law did not pass the test of time
or governmental practices. US governmental standards changed with the
Bush administration and the 9/11 attacks.
112 Ibid.
113 Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device Use amend. 18 U.S.C. II, 206, § 3121, § a-b
(1984), (US)
114 Ibid.
115 Id. at § 3121(b)(3).
116 Id. at § 3123(d).
117 Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act amend. 5 USC 552a (1988). (US)
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8.3.10 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
The Federal government passed the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)118 to ease the transfer of health insurance
policies, to advance electronic acceptance of medical data, and to codify
some privacy principles. The Act was intended to protect the privacy of
patient data. Most of the privacy principles were not new; however, additional
administrative and legal penalties were established. Protected health
information (PHI) included all health data that was transmitted or maintained
in any form. All covered entities were restricted from using or disclosing any
protected health information except as permitted or required by the privacy
and security regulations of the Act. The Act does not preempt state statutes.
The Department of Health and Human Services is the regulatory agency
charged with enforcing HIPAA.119 Two departments monitor the self-
regulation of patient privacy. The Office of Civil Rights addresses privacy
issues while the Office of E-Health Standards and Services addresses
security issues. Each Office can impose civil penalties; however, the
Department of Justice has criminal oversight. The Department of Justice has
determined that organizations and selected individuals can be prosecuted for
violations of the law.120 The Department of Health and Human Services has
taken the position that the Act and its agencies should seek only voluntary
compliance and self-regulation. Through 2007, the Office of Civil Rights has
received over 20,000 complaints about violations; however, only one has
been referred for trial.121 The HIPAA case study shows that even when the
118 HIPAA. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 amend. 42 U.S.C. §
1320 (1996) (US).
119 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Information Policy, Author.
(2011), at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ (last visited on 14 July 2012).
120 American Medical Association (A.M.A.), HIPAA Violations and Enforcement, Author.
(2011), at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-
managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/hipaahealth-insurance-portability-
accountability-act/hipaa-violations-enforcement.page (last visited on 14 June 2012).
121 Sheera Rosenfeld, et al., Privacy, Security, and the Regional Health Information
Organization (California Health Care Foundation. 2007), 24.
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legislature passes clear laws, regulatory agencies that support self-regulation
will ignore the law and the self-regulation process will again fail.
The Attorney General’s Office in the various states also has enforcement
powers. The Act did not pre-empt any stronger state laws, but rather
functions as a privacy “floor” by establishing minimal standards. Many states
enacted stronger health care privacy laws than HIPAA.
The Department of Health and Human Services did not start enforcing 1996
HIPAA standards for some time. The first investigative action took place in
2007 and involved the Piedmont Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia.122 The action
involved the loss of 386,000 Providence patients’ data. The final agreement
was not reached until July 15, 2008, when an administrative resolution
agreement was signed. Providence paid $100,000 US Dollars (USD) in fines
and agreed to a corrective plan. The plan required that the organization
revise policies and procedures; train workers; do annual policy updates;
establish a risk assessment plan; and conduct reviews.123
Margret Amatayakul and Michael R. Cohen reported on a number of HIPAA
compliance studies.124 The Act has only a sixty percent compliance record.
From 500 to 600 privacy violation complaints are received per month. From
seventy to eighty-six percent of sample subjects voiced concerns about the
privacy of their personal medical records under the HIPAA act. HIPAA
enforcement has been less than acceptable. The non-response pattern is
related to violator resistance and the fact that the fines are less than the cost
of compliance. Federal regulators have followed a classic non-response
122 Amanda Sounart, CMS Hires PricewaterhouseCoopers to Monitor HIPAA Violations.
(2008), at http://www.amnhealthcare.com/News.aspx?ID=17342 (last visited on 5
June 2012).
123 Ibid.
124 Margret Amatayakul & Michael R. Cohen, Is HIPAA Now Spelled Apathy? (2008), at
http://health-care-it.advanceweb.com/editorial/content/editorial.aspx?CC=89534%20
(last visited on 24 July 2011), 3 & 6 .
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regulation pattern.125 The general lack of concern from the legal community
has resulted in little HIPAA enforcement.
The compliance situation became so bad that California enacted the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Implementation Act of 2001.126 The
new legislation used HIPAA standards as a floor rather than a ceiling for
privacy standards. The new California legislation increased fines, penalties,
and new breach-disclosure standards and created a new Office of Health
Information Integrity. The new legislation instituted fines up to $250,000 USD
for data release violations and a $100.00-a-day fine for non-disclosure of any
breaches.127
8.3.11 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998
In 1998, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)128 was
passed to regulate the collection and use of personal information related to
children under the age of thirteen years by commercial websites. In most
circumstances, verifiable parent consent is required before website operators
can collect such information.129 Children’s personal information that must be
protected includes name, physical address, e-mail address, telephone
number, social security number, any means to contact the child or parent, and
any identifiable information.130 Violators could be sued for damages.131 The
Act is enforced by the Federal Trade Commission and state attorney
generals. The Act does not provide for a private right of action or provide for
criminal penalties.
125 See Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (Harvard University Press. 1982).
126 California Health and Safety Code § 130200-130203 (US).
127 Ibid.
128 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(1998) (US).
129 Id. at § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i).
130 Id. at § 6501(8).
131 Id. at § 6504.
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In August 2012, the FTC proposed rules that would strengthen enforcement
standards for requiring parental consent for mobile phone apps and tablets.
Voice applications, location tracking, and behavioral advertising were
included.132 Direct marking associations and large service providers opposed
the change and effectively got the FTC to modify the rules. In December
2012, the FTC exempted app stores like Apple. The FTC also exempted
Facebook and Google.133
8.3.12 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
In 1999, the conservatives in the US Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act134 that was formally titled the Financial Services Modernization Act.
The Act effectively repealed most of the banking legislation established during
the Great Depression to combat significant banking industry abuses. Industry
leaders had long disliked the financial restrictions placed on them by
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.135 The Act covers
domestic financial institutions, meaning “any entity that significantly engages
in financial activities.”136 Under the Act, financial institutions can again
behave in a pre-depression pattern; however, the Act did establish a financial
sector standard for information privacy and data protection.
132 Natasha Singer, New Online Privacy Rules for Children. (2012), at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/technology/ftc-broadens-rules-for-online-privacy-
of-children.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1356472268-p+IWhdnIfSnfwJY3miX9tA
(last visited on 19 December 2012).
133 Anton Troianovski & Danny Yadron, U.S. Expands Child Online Privacy Law to Cover
Apps, Social Networks. Wall Street Journal. (2012), at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323777204578189430101877770.ht
ml (last visited on 19 December 2012).
134 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act aka Financial Services Modernization Act. Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338. (1999), at http://banking.senate.gov/conf/ (last visited on 22 June
2012) (US).
135 Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 North
Carolina Banking Institute, 1 (2000); Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking
and Insurance: Before and after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 Journal of
Corporation Law 4, 723 (2000).
136 Id. at § 103.
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The privacy provisions of the Act require that all covered financial institutions
must provide privacy and security practices-notices to consumers (yearly) and
customers (automatically) on an opt-out basis. The Act applies to all US
financial institutions and holders of personal financial information.137 In the
US, banks are regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).138 The Department of Commerce has no jurisdiction over FDIC-
regulated institutions. Thus, such institutions have no Safe Harbor
provisions.139 The Act requires that the FTC and the FDIC develop and
enforce privacy and safeguard rules.140 Some states (e.g., California) have
much stricter legislation.141 There is no private action right for violations;
however, criminal penalties can be applied.142
Under the Act, financial institutions must provide safeguard security
administration standards.143 The institution must always conduct due
diligence, do periodic risk assessments, maintain vendor oversight, manage
workforce risks, and provide employee training. The institution must provide
technical security over access controls, applications, computer systems, and
networks. Although acceptable encryption is not required, it is recommended;
moreover, proper disposal rules are set. The data must be “burned,
137 Gramm-Leach-Bliley § 6827 (4)(B). The list includes auto dealers, banks, credit card
companies, financial advisors, insurance firms, landlords, merchants that issue credit
cards, mortgage brokers, real estate agents, security firms, thrift shops, and
universities. See also Federal Trade Commission, FTC Consumer Alert. (2005,
June), at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/disposalalrt.shtm (last visited on
2 September 2012).
138 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC. (2007), at http://www.fdic.gov/ (last visited
on 30 August 2012).
139 See § 8.9.2 of this work.
140 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act at § 6822(a)(b).
141 See California Financial Information Privacy Act amend. California Finance Code §§
4050-4060 (2003) (US). The federal law does not pre-empt state laws with stronger
privacy protections. See 15 U.S.C. § 6807(b).
142 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act at Sec 523.
143 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act at Sec 501(b).
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pulverized, or shredded.” Electronic files or media must be fully “erased or
destroyed.” Due diligence is required to supervise the destruction process.144
8.3.13 Patriot Act of 2001
As early as 1988, twenty Deans and 590 law professors from 147 law schools
submitted a petition to Congress to stop governmental practices violating
privacy rights and the First Amendment. Over 120,000 citizens also signed
the petition.145 The government’s response was to intimidate and harass
those involved.146 Minimal corrective legislative actions followed until 2001,
when the concerns were rejected.147
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot) Act of 2001 was euphemistically
called the US Patriot Act. The Neo-Conservative forces in the US had been
trying but had failed for years to enact legislation for more police powers and
fewer civil liberties. The September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade
Center in New York City was the crisis that allowed passage. The bill had
already been written and was passed in record time; few legislators even read
the bill. Such actions are common in US history, followed by an awareness of
remorse and understanding that the action was folly.148 The Patriot Act
increased governmental and police surveillance powers and allowed
authorities to ignore prior privacy protections, including the Pen Registration
144 Federal Trade Commission, FTC Consumer Alert. (2005, June), at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/disposalalrt.shtm (last visited on 2
September 2012), ¶ 6.
145 David Cole & James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil
Liberties in the Name of National Security (The New Press 2nd ed. 2002), 189-201.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Frederic Block, Civil Liberties During National Emergencies: The Interactions Between
the Three Branches of Government in Coping with Past and Current Threats to the
Nation's Security, 29 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 3, 459
(2005).
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Act149 and protections regarding financial privacy; it also limited court review
of governmental privacy related actions.
The Act and the public relations efforts that helped to get the Act passed
certainly ignored Benjamin Franklin’s November 11, 1755, declaration that
“Those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary
safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”150 David Cole documented that the
Patriot Act was an example of a trade-off of safety for liberty. David Cole and
James Dempsey argued that the government used a double standard that is
constitutionally wrong, is normatively counterproductive, and is “likely to pave
the way for future incursions on citizens' rights.”151 The Act gave tremendous
power to government while ignoring constitutional powers. The law
essentially revoked the majority of prior DPSIP laws. Under the new
legislation, federal agents now had the authority to seize personal documents
(e.g., book store sales, business files, e-mails, library files, medical records,
phone bills, video rentals) and place wire-taps without court approval.152
The legal, professional, and scientific fields adopted a different view. David
Cole and James Dempsey153 showed that the Act was repeating prior
governmental crimes and mistakes. Christopher Raab154 showed that the Act
was overbroad and needed careful review. Stephen Schulhofer155 argued
149 Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device Use amend. 18 U.S.C. II, 206, § 3121, § a-b
(1984), (US).
150 Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor; Votes and
Proceedings of the House of Representatives, 1755-1756 (Pennsylvania Assembly.
1756), 19–21, ¶ 7.
151 David Cole & James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil
Liberties in the Name of National Security (The New Press 2nd ed. 2002).
152 Kevin Bankston & Megan E. Gray, Government Surveillance and Data Privacy Issues:
Foundations and Developments, 3 The Privacy & Information Law Reporter 8, 1
(2003).
153 David Cole & James X. Dempsey, 2002,
154 Christopher Patrick Raab, Fighting Terrorism in an Electronic Age: Does the Patriot Act
Unduly Compromise Our Civil Liberties? 2006 Duke Law and Technology Review 3,
26 (2006).
155 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking the Patriot Act: Keeping America Safe and Free (The
Century Foundation. 2005).
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that the Act provided little to no transparency. Schulhofer156 explored many
of the areas of lack of accountability within the Act. Moreover, the Act
contains no viable checks and balances. John Whitehead and Steven Aden
argued that the Act was fundamentally unconstitutional. The authors argued
that the attacks on the World Trade Center were not attacks on America as
much as an “Attack on America as America … If the American people accept
a form of police state in the name of a promise of personal security, that
would be the greatest defeat imaginable.”157 Su Herman clearly established
that the authors of the Act and the current administration ignored fundamental
checks and balances.158 Therefore, not only is DPSIP at stake; the basic rule
of law is under attack.
8.3.14 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
In December 2003, the Fair Credit Reporting Act159 was amended by the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transaction Act.160 The Act required that credit and
debit card receipts printed by machines could no longer display the expiration
date; moreover, only the last four numbers of the card could be displayed.
Plaintiffs could recover small actual damages and limited punitive
damages.161
A number of class action suits have been litigated under the credit and debit
card receipts provisions of the Act. One concern was that potential damages
might be more than the net worth of the defendant. In Safeco Insurance
156 Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 17 Stanford
Law & Policy Review 531, 538 (2006).
157 John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland
Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the U.S. PATRIOT Act and the Justice
Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 61 American University Law Review 6, 1081 -
1133 (2002), 1133.
158 Su.S. N N. Herman, The U.S. Patriot Act and the submajoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41
Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review 1, 67 (2006).
159 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Public Law No. 91-508. (1970), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/031224fcra.pdf (last visited on 3 July 2012) (US).
160 Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act, amend. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2003) (US).
161 Id. at §616, (a)(1)a).
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Company of America v. Burr,162 the Court established a principle of an
“objectively unreasonable” standard for such cases. The holding of this case
was that an insurance company may subjectively believe that its practices did
not violate the law or consumer rights. When the companies’ interpretation of
the law is highly unreasonable, the company should have known that the
practices were unacceptable. Thus, consumers do not need to establish that
the company had knowledge of its legal violations.
A Federal District Judge refused to certify class action litigation under the Act
because the damages to the company would be too high. The Seventh
Circuit ruled that the “district judge sought to curtail the aggregate damages
for violations he deemed trivial. Yet it is not appropriate to use procedural
devices to undermine laws of which a judge disapproves.”163 The courts
determined that a class action case should be certified and if necessary that
an analysis to determine if the behavior is constitutionally excessive be
applied. The US credit protections are far less stringent than the law in
AU.164
8.3.15 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Act of 2009
At least in terms of HIPAA standards, the Obama administration has taken a
more proactive stand on DPSIP issues. The Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (HITECH) strengthened
standards on the handling of PHI.165 The Act also provided economic
stimulation funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The
162 Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (June
4, 2007), b. (US).
163 Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation, 434 F. 3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006), 7. (US).
164 See Chapter 4 § 4.3 of the current work.
165 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final
Rule. (2009), at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/enforcementrule/hitechenforceme
ntifr.html (last visited on 27 December 2012).
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Act increased the violation penalties for HIPAA violations and provided funds
for health care agencies and professionals to adopt Electronic Medical Record
(EMR)166 technologies. The Act fails to address the DPSIP risks of EMR
practices.
The major change in the law is that HITECH standards for HIPAA compliance
was expanded to provider’s business associates and required data breach
notification to patients. The ACT does provide a patient’s right to restrict
information transfer to insurance companies for services directly paid by the
patient. Providers must provide an audit trail of all PHI transfers. Criminal
penalties apply to covered employees who access and disclose PHI. Civil
penalties for such violations can reach $1.5 million USD a year.167
8.4 United States of America Federal Cases
Before examining the federal case law determinations on DPSIP legal issues,
it is important to examine the power and reality constraints on the highest
court in the jurisdiction. At various times the Court has maintained its purpose
to be independent. At other times, the Court is blatantly political. Evidence
does exist that the Court has been inconsistent.168
166 Some agencies and authors use the term Electronic Health Records (EHR).
167 Ibid.
168 See John W. Dean, Broken Government: How Republican Rule Destroyed the
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches (Viking. 2007); Jay M. Feinman, Un-
Making Law: The Conservative Campaign to Roll Back the Common Law (Beacon
Press. 2004); Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court: The Inside Story of the
Struggle For Control of the United States Supreme Court (The Penguin Press.
2007); Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court: The Personalities and Rivalries that
Defined America (Times Books Henry Holt and Company. 2006); Cass R. Sunstein,
Why Societies Need Dissent (Harvard University Press. 2003); Cass R. Sunstein, et
al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Brookings
Institution Press. 2006).
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Table 8.0 United States Supreme Court
Factor US Supreme Court169
Established 1789
Power of decisions Applies to all courts and jurisdictions in the
country
Membership One Chief Justice and eight associate justices
(currently)
Appointee
Background
Leading appellate courts judges, politicians,
and law professors
Term of Office Life or until retirement
Jurisdiction Original and appellate
Role Error-correction
Operations Hears oral arguments but relies heavily on
arguments presented in written briefs
Decisions Opinion of the majority, written by one justice,
and concurring and dissenting opinions
of other justices
Judicial Review Historic since Justice Marshall established the
principle of judicial review in US law.
Appointment President nominates, Senate confirms
Representation Recently more political
Opinions No advisory opinions
Case Assignment Court determines what cases it will hear based
on writ of certiorari. Since 1925, the
Court has had discretionary docket
control.
The early American privacy law and the bill of rights were influenced by Pope
v. Curl.170 Pope was a UK case that found a property-based privacy right in
one’s own productions, writings, and letters.
The US federal case law includes decisions established by the Federal Trade
Commission rulings and successful litigations. The federal case law also
includes decisions made by the US federal court system.
169 Kermit L Hall, The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (Oxford
University Press 2nd. ed. 2005). See also Supreme Court of the United States,
About the Supreme Court. (2010), at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ (last visited on 5
July 2012).
170 Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 324, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (1741). (UK)
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8.4.1 United States Federal Trade Commission Case Law
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 created the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) as an independent regulatory agency. The FTC is not
under the direction of nor does it report to the Executive, Judicial, or
Legislative branches of government. Such a structure is unique when
compared to the AU, CA, SA, and UK regulatory systems. Appointments to
the commission are made by the Executive and approved by the Senate. The
commission is headed by five commissioners, each of whom serves a seven
year term. No more than three commissioners can be appointed from the
same political party.171 In theory, political interests can control appointments
and can essentially influence the commission’s focus. The FTC can self-
institute an investigation or respond to a complaint. The goal is to reach an
agreement of consent with penalties when warranted. When the parties can
not agree, the FTC can institute federal litigation to have the courts enforce
the FTC’s decision.
The Commission has jurisdiction over a number of information privacy and
data security related laws.172 The Commission investigates, negotiates,
litigates, and monitors compliance. Historically, fines have been small. The
typical violation required corrective actions and third party audits and periodic
reports. FTC case decisions have the force of case law. The sampled
decisions explored in the current study include cases related to how
businesses provide checks and controls on how information data is handled,
data security, and misrepresentation cases that involve privacy concerns. In
all of the following cases, corporations made promises to protect privacy
concerns, follow the applicable FTC related law, and were caught violating
their own promises and the FTC administered law. The analysis includes
some major US and international businesses. The selected FTC cases
address issues of checks and controls, data security, and misrepresentation
171 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914) (US).
172 Including the Children’s Online Privacy Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, Fair Credit
Reporting Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bililey Act.
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or false statement violations. In each case, the company was found to have
violated FTC controlled laws, fined, and required to submit to a third-party
monitoring of continuing practices.173
The Superior Mortgage Corporation was subject to the 2002 Gramm-Leach-
Bililey Act (GLBA) Safeguard Rule.174 The corporate websites had a privacy
and security statement that promised protections and security, including data
encryption.175 The truth was that data held by the corporation was not
encrypted.176 The FTC ruling was that the corporation had failed to establish
reasonable data security and failed to comply with the GLBA safeguard rules.
The corporation made false and misleading statements regarding its privacy
and security procedures. The corporation failed to assess data risks, institute
appropriate password policies, follow control access practices, protect
sensitive customer information, and deal with DPSIP risks in a timely fashion.
However, only monitored reporting was ordered.177
DSW, Inc. (Designer Shoe Warehouse) used an unprotected wireless
computer network in its stores to request and authorize check, credit card,
and debit card purchases. A breach compromised “approximately 1,438,281
credit and debit cards (but not the personal identification numbers associated
with the debit cards), along with 96,385 checking accounts and driver’s
license numbers.”178 The FTC found that the corporation failed in its DPSIP
legal responsibilities.179 The corporation was required to use state of the art
173 The author’s review of the cases reveals a progression from passive to more activist
enforcement.
174 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act aka Financial Services Modernization Act. Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338. (1999), at http://banking.senate.gov/conf/ (last visited on 22 June
2012) (US).
175 Federal Trade Commission, Superior Mortgage Corporation (Docket C-4153). (2005,
December 16), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523136/051216comp0523136.pdf
(last visited on 2 August 2012).
176 Id. at § 13.
177 Id. at § 6.
178 Federal Trade Commission, DSW, Inc. (DOCKET NO. C-4157). (2006, March 7), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523096/0523096c4157DSWComplaint.pdf (last
visited on 23 July 2012), 2. (US)
179 Ibid.
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security protections and submit to third party audits for twenty years. The
company was liable for up to $11,000 civil fines for each violation.
Choice Point, Inc. collected and sold consumer data and credit reports to
businesses, government agencies, legally established organizations, and
professionals for consumer reporting, risk management, and other purposes.
The corporation had privacy policies posted on its annual reports, contracts,
website, and other documents that promised that it allowed access only under
the rules of the Fair Reporting Credit Act.180 In early 2006, it was discovered
that the personal data of 163,000 consumers was disclosed to people who
had no permissible justification. The corporation, despite being alerted,
continued to authorize the release of data by failing to monitor and identify
unauthorized activity.181 Choice Point was fined $10 million plus an
additional $5 million set aside for consumer redress.182 Choice Point was the
first case that involved a significant economic sanction.
The Hershey Food Corporation operated over 30 websites aimed at age 13
and under children. Contests were run on the sites, and contest winners’
names and home states were published on the website with no parental
consent.183 The FTC found that sufficient notice was not given and the
disclosure practices were unlawful.184 The corporation was fined $85,000
and placed on a 20-year reporting regimen.185
Mrs. Fields' Original Cookies, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiaries offered
websites with a birthday club for children 12 years and under. The club
offered a birthday card and a cookie or pretzel coupon. Club members had to
180 Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Inc. (2006 December 6), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf (last visited on 1
August 2012). (US)
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Federal Trade Commission, Hersey Food Corporation. (2003, February 27a), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/02/hersheycmp.htm (last visited on 26 July 2012), at19.
(US)
184 Id. at 21.
185 Id. at 25-28.
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provide personal information. The corporation did not notify or obtain
verifiable parental consent nor was there a means for parents to delete or
review the information posted by the children. The corporations were fined
$100,000 for the COPPA violations.186
Bonzi Software developed utilities and a free desktop download aimed at
young children. Access to the programs required providing personal
information that included address, age, e-mail address, name, and stated
personal interests. No parental consent or notice was provided. The Bonzi
practices were a violation of the Children’s Online Privacy and Protection
Act187 and the Federal Trade Commission Act.188 The corporation was only
issued a $75,000 fine.189
Starting in 2004, Facebook, a social networking site, had grown to 900 million
members worldwide. In 2009, the annual income was 777.2 million USD.
Members set up pages that can include personal information, photos, and
other information. 190
Starting in November of 2009, Facebook established a Central Privacy Page.
Members could make the information public; restrict access to only friends, or
to friends of friends. The company failed to notify members that despite the
privacy settings, selected third parties could access the data. Starting in
December 2009, Facebook overrode members’ privacy settings and no notice
was posted. Facebook started including third party advertisements on the
186 Federal Trade Commission, Mrs. Fields Famous Brands, Inc., Mrs. Fields' Holding
Company, Inc., and Mrs. Fields' Original Cookies, Inc. (2003 February 27b), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/02/mrsfieldscmp.htm (last visited on 9 August 2012). (US)
187 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(1998) (US).
188 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914) (US).
189 Federal Trade Commission, Bonzi Software, Inc., A Corporation, and Joe Bonzi and Jay
Bonzi, Individually and as Officers of Said Corporation (DOCKET NO. C-4126).
(2004, October 13), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423016/041013cmp0423016.pdf (last visited on 25
July 2012). (US)
190 Federal Trade Commission, Facebook, Inc. (DOCKET NO. C-4365). (2012), at
http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/120810facebookcmpt.pdf (last visited on 10 August
2012). (US)
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members’ pages. The company promised that it would not share any
information with advertisers without the members’ permission. The claim was
false. The company claimed that if the members’ accounts were deactivated
or deleted, no one could access the information. However, Facebook
continued to share photos and videos when requested. Facebook self-
certified that it followed the US Safe Harbor program between the US and the
EU. In reality, Facebook did not always comply with the Safe Harbor
principles of notice and choice. On 10 August 2012, the FTC ordered that
Facebook be carefully monitored by an independent agent for twenty years to
correct the above violations.191
Google was a major international information technology and Internet service
corporation. Google offered e-mail, web search, and chat resources. The
corporation determined that it could profit from entering the social networking
market by establishing Google Buzz.192
Gmail users were given an opt-in or opt-out option to Buzz; however the opt
option was ignored. The default shared previously private information.
Google self-certified that it followed the US Safe Harbor program between the
US and the EU. In reality, Google did not always comply with the Safe Harbor
principles of notice and choice. Google had agreed to FTC compliance
orders; however, it failed to comply. Google used cookies to collect data on
searches and DPSIP data. Google failed to provide for effective opt-out
provisions for those using Apple computers. Google ignored Apple users that
used the op-out options.193
Google claimed that it subscribed to the self-regulatory principles of the
Network Advertising Initiative (NAI). The claim was false and further
established that the self regulation model was flawed. The federal court ruled
191 Ibid.
192 Federal Trade Commission, Google, Inc. (Docket C-4335). (2012), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c4336/120809googlecmptexhibits.pdf (last visited on 20
November 2012). (US)
193 Ibid.
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that Google had violated its compliance orders and the federal DPSIP law.
The court issued civil penalties of 22.5 million USD. This was the highest
damage award to date.194
The FTC cases reveal the need to address privacy and data security issues at
the same time. The cases show that many corporations believe that they are
above the law and that the violation fines are generally small. The cases
show that even when the FTC has direct regulatory authority, the US
approach to self-regulation prevails. The FTC and US law has not embraced
the importance of modern DPSIP legal standards.
8.4.2 United States of America Federal Case Law
At times, the US Supreme Court has been a powerful force and formed the
trajectory of legal analysis. Starting in 1938,195 the Court declared it
would shift focus from economic rights of businesses and the regulation
of property to attending to non-economic individual rights. This new
focus included "discrete and insular minorities." In United States v
Carotene Products Company196 Justice Harlan Stone wrote that a
presumption of constitutionality exists when the law is within the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Several Supreme Court cases helped to define privacy in proper context. As
noted above, in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,197 Justice Harlan declared, “This
Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and
194 Ibid.
195 The shift occurred during the midst of the Great Depression and prior to US entry into the
Second World War. Corporate control of the Republic was rejected due to its failure
to follow the social contract. From a long-term historic perspective, the shift was
relatively short. The current state in this country has returned to pre-depression
policies.
196 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), n4 (US).
197 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, (1958), 465
(US).
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privacy in one's associations.”198 In this case, Alabama required the release
of personally identifiable membership lists. The organization refused to
release such lists. The case established that individuals can share
information within an organization and not forfeit ownership of the information.
The organization is then expected to refrain from sharing the information with
others unless the person consented. Harlan was not concerned about the
action of Alabama; instead, he was concerned the information could be
released into private hands. Therefore, the individual could be exposed to
“economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility.”199 He wrote, “The crucial factor is the
interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial
exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action
takes hold.”200
In Gibson v Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,201 the court wrote
that “One man’s privacy may not be invaded because of another's
perversity…If the files …can be ransacked … then all walls of privacy are
broken down.”202 The facts of the Gibson and N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama cases
were similar. Gibson was president of the Miami branch of the NAACP and
was asked by the state of Florida’s Legislative Investigation Committee to
produce a membership list of his organization. He refused and was found in
contempt by the Committee, but the court exonerated him, saying no
"compelling and subordinating governmental interest"203 was at stake. Only
one exception existed: when the government had probable cause and a
warrant that the person was involved in a crime, the information could be
released.
198 Ibid.
199 Id. at 462.
200 Ibid.
201 Gibson v Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 548, (1963) (US).
202 Id. at 570.
203 Id. at 435.
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In Boyd v United States, 204 Justice Bradley reviewed privacy protections in
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. He wrote: “It is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property.”205 The Boyd decision helped to build
the model in which DPSIP is established as a privacy right in the US.
Olmstead was one of the most infamous technology and information privacy
cases in US history. Chief Justice and former President William Howard Taft,
declared that installing a telephone in a house eliminates Fourth Amendment
protections.206 The decision allowed subsequent administrations in the US,
and after World War Two other countries, access to all types of electronic
media without a warrant or any rule of law principle of checks and balances.
While it took forty years, Katz v United States207 overturned part of the
Olmstead decision. Justice Stewart ruled that the Fourth Amendment
protects people - not places. However, the party must take steps to ensure a
subjective expectation of privacy. The expectation must be reasonable by
society standards. This test is still current law in the US.
In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press,208 the Court found that the use of computer technology in
collecting, storing, and sharing private information must be curbed.
Justice Stevens reasoned that the computer age has invalidated traditional
checks and balances of even public records privacy protections. Justice
Stevens also adopted a definition of privacy. The Stevens definition
stressed the need for individuals to control personal information about
204 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, (1886), 630 (US).
205 Ibid.
206 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 S. Ct. 564. 66 ALR 376, 72 L.Ed. 944, (1928), 466
(US).
207 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, (1967), 350-351 (US).
208 U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, (1989), 764 (US).
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themselves.209
In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to liberty under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to private conduct. The
Court determined that “It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm
of personal liberty which the government may not enter”.210 The earliest US
case on point was Wheaton v. Peters,211 wherein the Court ruled that a
"defendant asks nothing - wants nothing, but to be let alone until it can be
shown that he has violated the rights of another."212
Boyd v. United States213 was a landmark decision in the legal recognition of a
right to privacy based on both the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure of the Fourth Amendment and the right to avoid self-incrimination as
provided by the Fifth Amendment. Justice Bradley, writing for the full court,
used over two hundred years of American and English law to find that both
Amendments protect the privacy of individuals from governmental
intervention. The decision applies to criminal and civil actions.
Justice Brandeis argued that, “The makers of our Constitution conferred, as
against the government, the right to be left alone – the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”214 In Oklahoma Press
Publishing Company v. Walling,215 the Court accepted Brandeis’ position on
constitutionally protected privacy rights and sociological jurisprudence.
209 Ibid.
210 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 123 S.Ct 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508, (2003), 564
(US).
211 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055,(1834),1055 (US).
212 Ibid.
213 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, (1886) (US).
214 Id. at 478.
215 Oklahoma Press Publishing Company v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed.
614, (1946) (US).
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The right of privacy was also justified on First Amendment grounds. In
NAACP v. Alabama,216 the Warren Court ruled that “This Court has
recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in
one's associations.”217 “Inviolability of privacy in group association may in
many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”218
The reasoning of Chief Justice Taft in the Olmstead case, in terms of physical
intrusion, was not dead. In Silverman v. United States,219 the Warren Court
ruled that a physical intrusion violated privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment. The case involved placing eavesdropping devices to a private
home’s heating ducts without authorization. The Court determined that the
government unreasonably intruded into the home. Thus, the person’s right to
retreat into his home should be free of unreasonable intrusion. With prophetic
vision and perhaps cowardice, the Court wrote that “[w]e need not here
contemplate the Fourth Amendment implications of ... other frightening
paraphernalia which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon
human society."220
In 1965, the Warren Court finally recognized a constitutionally protected zone
of privacy based upon the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.
The decision in Griswold v. Connecticut221 determined that the Amendments
protect invasions of the “sanctity of a man’s home and privacies of life (and) is
a constitutionally protected zone of privacy.” In this case, Justice Goldberg
wrote a concurring statement on the Ninth Amendment. He wrote that the
“Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental
rights, protected from government infringement, which exist alongside those
216 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, (1958) (US).
217 Id. at §. 3.
218 Ibid.
219 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734, (1961). (US)
220 Id. at 81 (US).
221 Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 1 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, (1965), 485 (US).
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fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional
amendments.”222
A year later, the court clarified the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against self-incrimination, and that it was an essential value. The
Court reasoned that "our respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life" must not be violated.223
The Katz v. United States224 decision finally overturned Olmstead. In the
facts of the Katz case, the government attached a listening and recording
device outside of a phone booth without a warrant. The court ruled that the
governmental action was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment. The Warren Court ruled that the Amendment governs
the seizure of tangible items as well as recording or oral225 statements. The
Court found that a violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy could occur
even without a physical intrusion. The Court wrote, “The Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.”226 The finding was that the “petitioner had
manifested ‘a reasonable expectation of' privacy in his conversation in a
phone booth.” The Katz decision established a two-part inquiry into the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment. The measure was based on two
essential factors: “(1) has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search and (2) is society willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable."227
The Katz ruling also addressed constitutional and legal protections of privacy.
The Court found that “the protection of a person’s general right to privacy –
222 Id. at 486.
223 Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86, S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453, (1966), 486 (US).
224 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, (1967) (US).
225 A case can be made that recording and oral now applies to electronic statements and
communications.
226 Id. at 351.
227 Id. at 388.
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his right to be let alone by other people – is like the protection of his property
and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual states.”228 The
provision allows states to establish increased privacy protections.
The Burger Court found that a state law criminalizing “mere possession of
obscene material was unconstitutional.”229 The decision declared that "It is
now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas regardless of their social value, and to be generally free
from governmental intrusions into one's privacy and control of' one's
thoughts."230
The Court ruled that President Nixon’s “authorization of electronic surveillance
in the domestic security arena without judicial approval”231 was
unconstitutional. The Court balanced the government's duty to protect
domestic security against the right of citizens to be secure in their privacy
against unreasonable government intrusion. The Burger Court found that
"broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy
with electronic surveillance … necessitate the application of a warrant.”232
"By no means of least importance will be the reassurance of the public
generally that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens
cannot occur."233
8.4.2.1 Decisional – Information Cases
The Court also found that decisional privacy was constitutionally protected
when state laws banning distribution of contraceptives were struck down. In
228 Id. at 350-351.
229 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542, (1969), 589 (US).
230 Ibid.
231 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d
752, (1972), 297 (US).
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
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Eisenstadt v. Baird,234 the Burger Court found that the "right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a
child” was protected.
The principles of decisional privacy and zones of privacy were again
sustained in Roe v. Wade.235 The Burger Court ruled that a woman has a
constitutionally protected right to privacy in deciding if she wanted to terminate
a pregnancy.
8.4.2.2 Expectation of Privacy Cases
In United States v. Miller,236 the Burger Court ruled that a bank depositor had
no expectation of privacy when presenting financial data that could be shared
with bank employees. A major factor was the doctrine of the ordinary course
of business practices exemption. However, the Congress did not agree with
the decision; it passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,237 which
established privacy of financial records for bank customers. The Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 voided the decision in United States v. Miller.
The Burger Court was not always consistent. The police required the New
York telephone company to send information to a remote location that
consisted of a pen register that was used as a device to record numbers
dialed. In United States v. New York Telephone Company,238 the Burger
Court found the police order constitutional. The ruling was based on the
argument that the “pen registers disclosed … neither the purpose of the
communication, the identities of the parties communicating, nor whether the
234 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349, (1972), 438 (US).
235 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, (1973) (US).
236 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71, (1976) (US).
237 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401 3422 (1978) (US).
238 United States v. New York Telephone Company, 434 U.S. 159, 98 S.Ct. 364, 54 L.Ed.2d
376, (1977) (US).
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communication was even completed."239 Thus, the Court found that no
legitimate expectation of privacy existed.
Two years later, the Burger Court expanded United States v. New York
Telephone Company240 to include the legal standard that there is no
expectation of privacy when a person dials a telephone number. The Court
ruled that a person "voluntarily conveys those numbers to the telephone
company when he uses the telephone … (A) person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties."241
In United States v. Karo,242 the police attached a beeper to an object that was
taken into a private residence so that they could monitor activity inside the
residence. The Burger Court ruled that this action was unconstitutional
because it violated the Fourth Amendment. The monitoring could have been
done by outside observation. The Court ruled that there was a justifiable
interest in the privacy of the residence.
The Neo-Conservative Rehnquist Court built upon the Karo outside
observation principle. In a case of the police using aircraft to observe illegal
plants growing in a home backyard garden, the Court found that the person
knowingly exposed his private garden to the public. There was no legitimate
expectation of privacy of a garden around a home where it was visible from
above.243
When the police used a navigable airship to photograph a Dow Chemical
plant, the Rehnquist Court found no Fourth Amendment violation. Instead,
the Court found that the airship was available to the public. Although the
239 Id. at 198.
240 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed2d 220, (1979), 799 (US).
241 Ibid.
242 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530, (1984) (US).
243 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, (1986) (US).
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airship enhanced human vision, the approach was constitutional.244 “What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."245 The Rehnquist Court found
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy when one places objects in
the garbage left for collection, when the garbage is publicly accessible.246
In 2001, the Rehnquist Court placed some constraints on the observation of
public spaces. The police used thermal imaging technology on a public street
to monitor heat emanating from a private house. The technology showed
where and what the people in the house were doing. The Court found the
police use of the technology was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court again applied the outside observation principle. “To
withdraw protection of this minimum expectation of privacy, would be to permit
police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.”247
8.4.2.3 Informed Consent Consideration Cases
The issue of informed consent is critical to assessing DPSIP legal
considerations. The first US court case involving reasonable care and
consent was Pratt v. Davis.248 In this case, a patient was subjected to
surgery without any informed consent. The court ruled that “one’s bodily
integrity could not be violated without consent or knowledge.”249 In a similar
case, Justice Cardozo emphasized the need for voluntary consent and ruled
that voluntary consent violations were a form of assault.250 Thus, the concept
of informed consent in the US was established. Similar cases included
244 Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226, (1986),
227 (US).
245 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30, (1988), 35 (US).
246 Ibid.
247 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94, (2001), 27 (US).
248 Pratt v. Davis 118 111. App. 161, (1905), 161. (US).
249 Ibid.
250 Schloendorff v The Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, (1914). (US).
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Theodore v. Ellis;251 Hunter v. Burroughs;252 and Wojciechowski v.
Coryell.253 In Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., University Board of Trustees,254
the court applied a more fully developed informed consent principle that
declared that there is an affirmative duty to disclose. One must offer free
consent based on being fully informed of the risks, benefits, and alternatives.
Plaintiff Salgo was disabled because of a medical procedure. Salgo received
no information about alternatives, benefits, outcomes, or risks. Justice Bray
used the informed consent statement in the brief provided by the American
College of Surgeons255 as the basic structure of the standard. The same
principle of informed consent applies to DPSIP issues.
In Tbornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,256 US
Supreme Court Justice John Stevens addressed the issue of decision-making
based on informed consent and the universal impact of the consent principle.
He wrote "[I]t is far better to permit some individuals to make incorrect
decisions than to deny all individuals the right to make decisions that have a
profound effect upon their destiny."257
The principle of informed consent can be waived. One can waive the
requirement simply by clearly declaring intent to do so. However, one must
still have awareness of the consent principle. The consent cannot be coerced
or be passive. The fundamental principle of autonomy and self-determination
cannot be violated. Legal intervention is needed to protect privacy as self-
regulation and historic standards of care are ineffective.
251 Theodore v. Ellis, 141 La. 709, 75 So. 655, 660, (1917). (US).
252 Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360, 366-368, (1918). (US).
253 Wojciechowski v. Coryell, 217 S.W. 638, 644 (Mo.App, (1920). (US).
254 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, (1957). (US).
255 American College of Surgeons, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant and
Appellant Frank Gerbode (1956). “A duty to disclose any facts which are necessary to
form the basis of an intelligent consent.”
256 Tbornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynaecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 781,
(1986), 781. (US)
257 Ibid. In terms of DPSIP legal principles, the informed consent is an opt-in option.
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Starting in the 1950s, these principles became more standard because of
case law decisions and an increasing pattern of consent violations. In the
twentieth century, research and medical abuses were revealed. Classic
examples include the medical experiments performed by the Nazis during
World War Two. International consent standards were established during the
Nuremberg Trials. The discovery of the state of Alabama Tuskegee syphilis
studies added to the awareness of consent violations.258 In the US, federal
legislation was passed to establish the principle of informed consent and the
need to protect unknowing victims of abuse.259 These standards need to be
applied to DPSIP policies.
Consumers gradually began to become more empowered over the course of
the twentieth century. Issues of negligence on the part of goods and service
providers became more relevant. Information consumerism grew, as well as
the amount of consent violation litigation.260
In 1974, the state legislatures started to move into the area of informed
consent. During the next three years, twenty- four states enacted informed consent
legislation. The pattern continued through 1982 when all but three states had
enacted protective legislation.261
State legislation and associated case law used the concept of enterprise
liability as it is the cheapest cost avoider for no-fault liability. Those who
experience injuries from products or activities placed on the market ought to
be compensated by the related corporations, enterprises, governments,
258 From 1932 through 1972, the Tuskegee Institute and the US Public Health Service
studied the progression of syphilis in a group of poor Black males; some of which had
the disease and some did not. The participants were never informed of their illness
status and no treatment was ever provided. The subjects were given free meals,
questionable medical care, and burial insurance.
259 Ruth Faden & Tom L Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent (Oxford
University Press. 1986).
260 E.S Glass, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 179 Yale Law Journal 8, 1533-1576 (1970).
261 Jessica W. Berg, et al., Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice (Oxford
University Press 2nd ed. 2001).
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institutional caretakers, municipalities, and professionals.262
The movement correlated with Lawrence Friedman’s263 description of the
Total Justice Principle. The principle involves a general expectation of justice
(i.e., fairness, due process in all situations, and a general expectation of
compensation for wrongs known as recompense). The proposed concept of
“protection of the uninformed consumer” was established.264
In 1974, the National Research Act265 was passed. This Act established the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. The Commission established the standard of
Institutional Review Boards, which monitor all human subject research and
related data collection. Protocols must be established, approved, and
followed.266 A similar approach can be used in DPSIP law.
The Act was a codification of the 1948 Nuremberg Code, which established
that voluntary consent is essential and that the benefits of the research must
outweigh the risks involved. The Act further incorporated the 1964
Declaration of Helsinki established by the World Medical Association. The
declaration followed the Nuremberg standard and added that related research
should be monitored by independent committees. In 1979, the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research issued the Belmont Report, which established the
principles of autonomy/respect for persons, beneficence, and justice for
262 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (Yale University Press. 1970). The concept is
that civil and criminal liability is imposed on each sector of the market for defective
and harmful product or service based on market share.
263 Lawrence M. Friedman, Total Justice (Beacon Press. 1985).
264 John B Clutterbuck, Karl Llewellyn and the intellectual foundations of enterprise liability
theory, 97 Yale Law Journal 6, 1114 (1988), at 1114. Examples include the legal
justification of adhesion contracts, consumer protection, contracts, product liability,
respondeat superior, strict liability, workers’ compensation, and all obligations for
health, safety, and security.
265 National Research Act amend. 45 CFR 46 (1974). (US). The current author was part of
the research team that established U.S. Federal Research guidelines including
informed consent.
266 Id. at § 474 (a).
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research dealing with human subject research and data collection.267
8.4.2.4 Opt-in versus Opt-out Cases
One of the most significant DPSIP business, law, and human behavior issues
is the question of whether data collectors should use an opt-in or opt-out268
standard for data collection options. The majority of surveys show that data
subjects prefer the opt-in option.269 Corporations prefer opt-out because it
increases participation by ignoring the participant’s neuropsychological
function. Therefore, corporations take advantage of human physiological
function and dysfunction in decision-making for profit.270
Business proponents of opt-out procedures argue that corporations should be
able to structure consent any way that they want, because doing otherwise
would infringe on the corporations’ right of free speech. On February 13,
2009, the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled for the
2006 Federal Communications Commission opt-in principle.271 The Court
found that "the government has a substantial interest in protecting the privacy
of customer information and that requiring customer approval advances that
267 US Department of Health & Human Services, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research; The National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural
Research. (1979), at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html
(last visited on 21 July 2012).
268 Opt-in means that one has to agree to any data collection. Opt-out means that the data
collector can collect unless one opts-out – says no. The EU Directive (1995) favors
opt-in. The direct marketing associations favor opt-out because of increased profits.
269 Kim Bartel Sheehan, How Public Opinion Polls Define and Circumscribe Online Privacy,
9 First Monday, 7 (2004), http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue9_7/sheehan/ (last
visited on 24 June 2012).
270 See George R. Milne & Andrew J. Rohm, Consumer Privacy and Name Removal Across
Direct Marketing Channels: Exploring Opt-in and Opt-out Alternatives, 19 Journal of
Public Policy and Marketing 2, 238-249 (2000). and Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse,
Opt In Versus Opt Out: A Free-Entry Analysis of Privacy Policies (The Fifth Workshop
on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2006). Robinson College, University
of Cambridge, England 26-28 June 2006). (2006), at
http://weis2006.econinfosec.org/docs/34.pdf (last visited on 24 July 2012).
271 National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Federal Communications
Commission, United States of America, Qwest Communications International Inc. and
Verizon. (2009, February 13), at
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200902/07-1312-1164901.pdf (last
visited on 2 April 2012). (US).
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interest."272 The Court also found that "the carrier's sharing of customer
information with a joint venturer or an independent contractor without the
customer's consent is itself an invasion of the customer's privacy."273
A 2011 study conducted by Stanford University Law School's Center for
Internet and Society found that opt-out procedures are often ignored by
Internet companies. The research studies the practices of sixty-five
companies including AOL, BlueKai, eXelate, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo.
The study found that half of the companies continued to track transactions,
even after data subjects had opted-out. The mechanisms included cookies
and invisible third-party cookies.274 When confronted, the companies claimed
that the opt-out was for marketing, not tracking activities.
8.5 State Constitutional Declarations
A number of states have enacted constitutional protections of privacy. The
following table shows the state provisions, the privacy code, and source.
Table 8.1 State Constitutional Declarations
State of the US Code
State of Alaska
(1956).
Article 1, Section 22: The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed.275
State of Arizona
(1881)
Section 8: No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.276
State of
California (1879)
Article 1, Section 1: All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
272 Id. at 9.
273 Id. at 11.
274 Mike Swift, Stanford Study Shows Opting Out of Web Tracking Not So Easy, Mercury
News. (2011), at http://www.mercurynews.com/rss/ci_18524333?source=rss (last
visited on 25 July 2012).
275 State of Alaska, Constitution. (1956), at http://old-www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-
bin/folioisa.dll/acontxt/query=*/doc/%7Bt25%7D (last visited on 10 July 2012). (US)
276 State of Arizona, Constitution. (1881), at http://www.azleg.state.az.us/const/2/8.htm (last
visited on 10 July 2012). (US)
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are … protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.277
State of Florida
(1968)
Article 1, Section 23: Right of privacy. Every natural
person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person's private life
except as otherwise provided herein.278
State of Hawaii
(1978)
Article 1, Section 6: The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest.279
State of Illinois
(1970)
Article 1, Section 6: Searches, Seizures, Privacy, and
Interceptions: The people shall have the right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and other
possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures,
invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications
by eavesdropping devices or other means.280
State of
Louisiana (1974)
Article 1, Section 5: Every person shall be secure in his
person, property, communications, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or
invasions of privacy...Any person adversely affected by
a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section
shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate
court.281
State of Montana
(1972)
Article 2, Section 10: Right of privacy. The right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free
society and shall not be infringed without the showing of
a compelling state interest.282
State of New
Jersey (1947)
Article 1, Section 7: The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated.283
State of South Article 1, Section 10: The right of the people to be
277 State of California, Constitution. (1879), at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/waisgate?waisdocid=8071921924+0+0+0&waisaction=retrieve (last visited on 10
July 2012). (US)
278 State of Florida, Constitution. (1968), at
http://www.flsenate.gov/Statutes/index.cfm?Mode=Constitution&Submenu=3&Tab=st
atutes#A01S23 (last visited on 10 July 2012). (US)
279 State of Hawaii, Constitution. (1978), at http://www.state.hi.us/lrb/con/conart1.html (last
visited on 10 July 2012). (US)
280 State of Illinois, Constitution. (1970), at http://www.ilga.gov/commission/lrb/con1.htm
(last visited on 10 July 2012). (US)
281 State of Louisiana, Constitution. (1974), at
http://www.senate.legis.state.la.us/Documents/Constitution/Article1.htm#%EF%BF%
BD5.%20Right%20to%20Privacy (last visited on 10 July 2012). (US)
282 State of Montana, Constitution. (1972), at http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/mca/const/II/10.htm
(last visited on 10 July 2012). (US)
283 State of New Jersey, Constitution. (1947), at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/lawsconstitution/constitution.asp (last visited on 10 July
2012). (US)
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Carolina (2006) secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures and
unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be
violated.284
State of Utah
(1895)
Article 1, Section 14: The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated.285
State of
Washington
(1889)
Article 1, Section 7: Invasion of Private Affairs or Home
Prohibited: No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law.286
The number of states that have amended constitutions to include rights to
privacy reveals the importance of the problem and the priority of instituting
DPSIP legal standards. The trend suggests that states in the US may be able
to move more quickly in establishing privacy law protections than the Federal
government.
8.6 US State Legislation
The state of California was the first state in the US to pass massive privacy
legislation; moreover, in 2000, the state of California established a statewide
California Office of Information Security and Privacy Protection.287 The
California Security Breach Information Act established clear rules on
computerized personal information and defined personal information. 288
284 State of South Carolina, Constitution. (2006), at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/scconstitution/a01.htm (last visited on 10 July 2012).
(US)
285 State of Utah, Constitution. (1895), at http://le.utah.gov/~code/const/htm/CO_02015.htm
(last visited on 10 July 2012). (US)
286 State of Washington, Constitution. (1889), at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/education/constitution/index.cfm?fa=education_constitution.
display&displayid=Article-01 (last visited on 10 July 2012). (US)
287 State of California, California Office of Information Security and Privacy Protection.
(2009), at http://www.oispp.ca.gov/ (last visited on 4 September 2012). (US)
288 State of California, The California Security Breach Information Act (SB-1386), Civil Code
§1798.29, §1798.82, & 1798.84 (2002), at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-
02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020926_chaptered.html (last visited on 3
July 2012), §. 2e-f. Personal information includes the individual's first name or first
initial and last name in combination with any one or more of the following data
elements, when either the name or the data elements are not encrypted: Social
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Under the Act, any business, person, or state agency that owns or licenses
the processing of personal information must, with no unreasonable delay,
notify any state residence if the unencrypted information has or may have
been breached or obtained by an unauthorized person(s). The Act also
applies to organizations that hire employees that reside in California or that
outsource services for California employees and organizations doing business
in California. A fine of $2,500 per breach of confidentially incidence, with a
$500,000 per occurrence fine could be awarded.289
Breaches of confidentiality may include a variety of violations, such as
deleting files, hacking, interception, and unauthorized modification. Violations
also include misdirection,290 retention errors, and unauthorized access. The
data may be in files, printed copies, or computer screen views. Breaches can
include auto-forwarding, forwarding, reply, and reply to all actions. Data
viruses can be another source of violations.
The Act addresses a number of vulnerabilities, including the following:
1. Audit Log Tampering: Prevents tampering with audit log files data
by restricting access to allow only authorized users and
applications.
2. Buffer Overflow: Overflow of stored data into adjacent buffers,
executing a code that triggers malicious or unauthorized activity.
3. Physical Theft : The theft of information through extraction from
stolen hardware or storage media.
4. Root Attack: The ability to illegally obtain ‘trusted’ root access
privileges.
Security number; driver's license number or California Identification Card number;
account number, or credit or debit card number, in combination with any required
security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual's
financial account. For purposes of this section, "personal information" does not
include publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general
public from federal, state, or local government records.
289 Id. at § 4.
290 Includes sending data to the wrong e-mail address or person.
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5. Unauthorized Data Viewing: The use of privileges to view
information outside the requirements of a user’s authorized role.
6. Unintended Administrator Privilege: The use of privileges to
access, copy, or tamper with data outside the requirements of a
user’s authorized role.
7. Worms and Trojans: The alternation or insertion of executable
code for the purpose of running an unauthorized application.291
A comprehensive search revealed no published cases under the California
Security Breach Information Act. However, the state and a number of
business organizations had provided extensive training on the provisions.
The Act delineates risks that must be avoided. Several companies and
corporations voluntarily complied with notifying customers of the policy, for
example, CardSystems, ChoicePoint, and Lexus Nexus all responded to the
Act.292 None of these corporations wanted to pay the price or take the risk of
being the first legal test case. States such as Arizona, Georgia, Maryland,
and Rhode Island had passed legislation regarding Social Security Number
identification and other protections.
8.7 US State Case Law
Some state case law has addressed some DPSIP and related issues. One of
the earliest state court rulings that impacted federal law related to privacy was
Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Company.293 The state of Georgia
Supreme Court ruled that privacy "has its foundation in the instincts of nature. It
291 Vormetric Inc., White Paper: California SB 1386 & AB 1950: Implementing Effective
Encryption Protection for Personal Information Privacy. (2005), at
http://www.vormetric.com/downloads/SB_1386_AB_1950.pdf (last visited on 14
August 2012). 5.
292 Robert Vamosi, Security Watch: Congress Loves Identity Thieves. (2005, November 11),
at http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-3513-6381707-1.html (last visited on 14 August
2012).
293 Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company, 122 Ga. 190; 50 S.E. 68; 1905 Ga.
LEXIS 156, (1905), 69-70 (US).
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is recognized intuitively …felt instinctively in its encroachment (and is based on)
natural law."294
Natanson v. Kline295 involved a female plaintiff who had undergone cancer
surgery; her doctor recommended further radiation. The radiation worsened
her condition. The Court determined that the failure to provide an informed
consent constituted negligence. The Court found that patients have a right to
know about possible consequences of treatment decisions, collateral risks
and dangers involved, and the pros and cons of the treatment, as well as
available alternatives. The description of the risks must include reliable
information related to the imminence of harm, the magnitude of the alternative
treatments, and the nature and probability of risks. The Court found that
enterprises and professionals have a positive duty to disclose and obtain an
informed consent. The principle of informed consent must apply to DPSIP
laws.
In Canterbury v. Spence,296 plaintiff Canterbury had back surgery and later
fell from the bed and was paralyzed. The Court found that those under a duty
to care and protect must use reasonable care that considers a personal right
of self-determination. The ruling established that a person need not ask for
information from the holder of the information, prior to the holder informing the
person. The case finding expanded the standard from an issue of
professional practices to a consideration of the information decision-making
on the part of the person. The Court established a standard that considers
the materiality of the information. The Court determined that there is a “right
to consent to what happens to oneself, to self-determination, to make a self -
decision.”297 The legal consent principles in this case should also apply to
DPSIP principles.
294 Ibid.
295 Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d 671 (Kan. 1960). (US).
296 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). (US).
297 Id. at 783-786.
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In Scott v. Bradford,298 the Oklahoma Supreme Court established an
individual – subjective person standard. The Court stated that "the scope of a
physician's communication must be measured by his patient's need to know
enough to enable him to make an intelligent choice. In other words, full
disclosure of all material risks incident to treatment must be made."299
8.8 US Standards and Remedies
In the US, legislative, judicial, and administration of DPSIP standards is much
like a small boat cast on open seas. The enforcement of standards and
remedies are dependent on pendulum shifts from privacy concerns to
governmental and corporate privilege. On a federal level, the general policy
over the past decades has ignored international precedents and focused on
self-regulation. Federal policy has been based on the faulty belief that
markets are self-correcting - rather than self-serving.300
The greatest and most innovative US DPSIP protections appear to be at the
state level. Several states have enacted innovative legislation and regulatory
standards.301 The problem with this approach is that enforcement is limited
to state jurisdictional boundaries and does not cross state lines. In the US,
state law is generally subservient to federal standards. The counter argument
is the full faith and credit principle302 that requires each state to accept all
other states’ attempts to regulate privacy protections. In reality, the US is tied
to the outdated mode of fair information practices.
298 Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, (1979). (US).
299 Id. at 558.
300 The belief is based on a misreading of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.
301 A classic example is the breach notification law passed by the State of California. This
California state law has caused several other states to consider similar breach
notification laws and resulted in an international focus on breach issues.
302 US Constitution, Article IV, Section 1.
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8.8.1 Principles of Fair Information Practices
Various organizations, commissions, and governmental agencies have
proposed and even adopted some Fair Information Practices. A review of a
sample of the practices is warranted; however, legislation and an informed
judiciary are also needed.
The Center for Democracy and Technology303 and the Privacy Rights
Clearing House304 refined the Principles of Fair Information Practices. The
principles are based on the work of the 1973 US Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, the 1980 Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, the 1981 Council of Europe principles, and the 1995 Canadian
Standards Association. The basic principles are noted in the following table:
Table 8.2 Fair Information Practices
Principle Description
Openness “The existence of record-keeping systems and databanks
that contain personal data must be publicly known, along
with a description of the main purpose and uses of the
data.”
Individual
Participation
“Individuals should have a right to view all information that
is collected about them; they must also be able to correct
or remove data that is not timely, accurate relevant, or
complete.”
Collection
Limitation
“There should exist limits to the collection of personal data;
data should be collected by lawful and fair means and
should be collected, where appropriate, with the knowledge
or consent of the subject.”
Data Quality “Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for
which it is collected and used; personal data should be
accurate, complete, and timely.”
Finality “There should be limits to the use and disclosure of
personal data: data should be used only for purposes
specified at the time of collection; data should not be
303 Center for Democracy and Technology, Privacy Basics: Generic Principles of Fair
Information Practices. (2008), at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/guide/basic/generic.html
(last visited on 28 July 2012), 1.
304 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Review of the Fair Information Principles: The
Foundation of Privacy Public Policy (2004), at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fairinfo.htm (last visited on 28 July 2012), 1.
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otherwise disclosed without the consent of the data subject
or other legal authority.”
Security “Personal data should be protected by reasonable security
safeguards against such risks as loss, unauthorized
access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure.”
Accountability “Record keepers should be accountable for complying with
fair information practices.”
Collection
Limitation
“There must be no personal data record keeping systems
whose very existence is secret.”
Disclosure “There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.”
Secondary
Usage
“There must be a way for an individual to prevent
information about him that was obtained for one purpose
from being used or made available for other purposes
without his consent.”
Record
Correction
“There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend
a record of identifiable information about him.”
Security “Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or
disseminating records of identifiable personal data must
assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and
must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.” 305
However, not everyone embraced these fair information practices. John
Poindexter,306 the former director of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Administration’s (DARPA) Total Information Awareness (TIA) project,
strongly advocated for allowing data mining and knowledge discovery in
databases. He proclaimed that data mining is necessary to fight terrorists.
His goal was to have one system that could access all personal information -
everything.307 Poindexter was not new to Republican308 conservative
administrations. Poindexter’s Total Information Awareness program was
stopped in 2002 because of intense publicity but was quietly reinstituted. In
2006, the program was reinstituted under a new name: Disruptive Technology
305 Center for Democracy and Technology, 2008, 1; Privacy Rights Clearing House, 2004, 1.
306 While serving as President Reagan’s advisor of the National Security Council, he
supervised the sale of arms in the Iran–Contra legal violations. He was convicted for
violating federal laws, trading with terrorists, shredding evidence, and lying to
Congress. However, he did not serve any prison time because two far-right judges
overturned the conviction.
307 Everything included every bank card use, book bought or checked out, credit report,
driver’s license, e-mail, employment record, income tax records, license application,
medical report, movie ticket, property record, and travel itinerary in the world.
308 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d
752, (1972), 297 (US).
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Office. The new program has stripped all privacy protections and abuse audit
mechanisms.309
The program ran counter to the First Amendment regarding speech and the
Fourth Amendment protections against searches without probable cause.
The program also violated information privacy law standards. Daniel Solove
placed the threat in a new perspective. He wrote that “Information is not the
key to power in the Information Age—knowledge is. Information consists of
raw facts. Knowledge is information that has been sifted, sorted, and
analyzed.”310 Solove further compared the state of privacy violations in the
US to Kafka’s The Trial. He declared that “existing law protecting information
privacy has not adequately responded to the emergence of digital
dossiers.”311
The September 11, 2001, attack on the New York World Trade Center towers
opened the field for an authoritarian takeover, which was much worse than
Eisenhower’s farewell address warning of the dangers of the military-industrial
complex.312 A new public–private partnership was created to reject
constitutional protections and rule of law principles. For example, the
American-owned JetBlue® airline released five million passenger names and
addresses to the military, simply upon request.313 “Third parties that hold
consumer information often comply with such requests because they want to
309 Shane Harris, TIA Lives On, National Journal. (2006, February 23), at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0223nj1.htm (last visited
on 8 June 2012), ¶ 4.
310 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 Stanford Law Review 6, 1393 (2001), at 1456.
311 Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age
(New York University Press. 2004), at 9.
312 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents,(Government Printing Office ed.
1960). After serving as the Supreme Allied Commander in WWII and two term
President, Eisenhower warned that governmental agencies and large corporations
were dictating governmental policies and ignoring the right of the people to self rule.
The first draft of the speech included the term military-industrial-congressional
complex.
313 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75
Southern California Law Review, 1083 (2002a).
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be helpful to the government or because compliance seems to be the path of
least resistance.”314
Robert O’Harrow315 explained that the law of unintended consequences
applies. He wrote,
It’s a simple fact that private companies can collect information about
people in ways the government cannot. At the same time, they cannot
be held accountable for their behavior or their mistakes the way
government agencies can. Their capabilities have raced far ahead of
the nation’s understanding and laws.316
Neil Richards provided a further legal warning. He showed that, “To the
extent that such private (data) collection is not state action, it allows the
government, in effect, to outsource surveillance beyond the scope of
otherwise applicable statutory and constitutional restrictions.”317
The Bush administration built on the privacy violations of President Nixon and
J. Edgar Hoover’s misuse of massive dataveillance. The dataveillance was
legally like the general warrants issued by the English King George III.318
Such action “threatens both privacy and equality, and diverts government
resources away from more effective responses to terrorism.” 319
314 James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 George
Washington Law Review, 1459, 1476 (2004), at 1476.
315 Robert O'Harrow, No Place to Hide (Free Press. 2006), 8-9.
316 Id.
317 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA Law
Review 4, 1149 (2005), at 1159.
318 Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age
(Random House. 2004), at 23. The King’s agents could enter any house and search
everything.
319 Id. at 23.
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The Bush administration ignored US Supreme court rulings. The Griswold v.
Connecticut320 Court ruled that “The First Amendment has a penumbra where
privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”321 In Whalen v. Roe,322
the Court ruled that information privacy was a liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment from state interference. Stan Karas identified the
security–privacy power imbalance and total control implications. He argued
that the “rationale behind the Griswold line of cases may be characterized as
follows: intruding on private decisions is knowing, knowing is classifying, and
classifying is impermissibly controlling.”323
Paul Schwartz argued that “decisional and information privacy are not
unrelated; the use, transfer, or processing of personal data by public and
private sector organizations will affect the choices that we make.”324 Jeffry
Rosen took the position that “when intimate information is removed from its
original context and revealed to strangers, we are vulnerable to being
misjudged on the basis of our most embarrassing, and therefore most
memorable, tastes and preferences.”325
8.9 United States of America Implementation System
The US DPSIP law is euphemistically termed sectoral. In reality, the system
is a patchwork approach that functions much like rearranging the deck chairs
on the Titanic. The American people consistently report a high interest in
information privacy; however, the government and corporations ignore this
data. Specialized legislation tends to be passed to resolve a current issue
320 Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 1 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, (1965), 483.
(US).
321 Ibid.
322 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, (1977). (US).
323 Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 American University Law Review, 393
(2002), at 424.
324 Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harvard Law Review 7,
2055 (2004), at 2058.
325 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (Random
House. 2000), at 9.
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and is then changed or ignored when the immediate issue is resolved, or
replaced by another television sound bite issue, or shift in political power.
8.9.1 Self-Regulation
Since the Reagan administration, the US federal policy has been one of self-
regulation and privatization. The current information privacy approach in the
US was established by President William Clinton. His administration did not
focus on regulatory control on privacy issues in any substantive way. His
administration’s Framework for Global Electronic Commerce326 favored non-
governmental self-regulation. The Framework’s basic principles included:
1. The private sector should lead.
2. Governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic
commerce.
3. Where governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to
support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple
legal environment for commerce.
4. Governments should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet.
5. Electronic Commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a
global basis.327
Section Five of the Framework document addresses some privacy concerns.
The Framework report reinforces the importance of informational privacy in
US law but also addresses free speech and the free flow of information
dilemma. The position is that “data-gatherers should inform consumers what
information they are collecting, and how they intend to use such data; and
data-gatherers should provide consumers with a meaningful way to limit use
and re-use of personal information.”328
326 White House, Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. (1997), at
http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm (last visited on 5 August
2012).
327 Id. at 2.
328 Id. at §. 5, ¶ 5.
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Three privacy principles were reviewed but left to self-regulation. These
privacy principles included:
First, an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
access to and use of, his or her personal information should be
assured.
Second, personal information should not be improperly altered or
destroyed. And,
third, personal information should be accurate, timely, complete, and
relevant for the purposes for which it is provided and used.329
The Framework report declared that the “Administration considers data
protection critically important. We believe that private efforts of industry
working in cooperation with consumer groups are preferable to government
regulation, but if effective privacy protection cannot be provided in this way,
we will reevaluate this policy.”330 When data showed that the system was not
working well, the Clinton Administration did little to rectify the situation. When
the Federal Trade Commission331 called for comprehensive legislation, still
nothing was done.
Joel Reidenberg332 documented the self-evident truth that self-regulation is a
means by which corporations and industries attempt to avoid governmental
regulations and enforcement powers. Industries tend to advocate self-
regulation when a threat of legal action exists or major public reactions
become evident.333
329 Id. at §. 5, ¶. 7
330 Id. at §. 5, ¶. 21.
331 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace: A Report to Congress. (2000), at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (last visited on 26 July 2012).
332 Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy-- A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights? 44 Federal Communications Law Journal 2, 195 (1992).
333 John W. Maxwell, et al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of
Corporate Environmentalism, 43 Journal of Law and Economics, 583 (2000).
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Regulatory advocates are found on both sides of the issue. The continuum
includes the data in the following table:
Table 8.3 Self-Regulation Arguments
Arguments For Self-regulation Arguments Against Self-regulation
Reduces government and tax payer
costs. 334
The costs are passed on to the
consumers in increased costs and
lowered standards. Enforcement
costs are higher.
Development and administrative
costs are lower.
Standards are lower, less
enforceable, and balanced.
Compliance is not standard or
equitable. Corporations will seek a
competitive advantage by not
following standards.
Industry members bring expertise 335 The expertise can be and has been
used in legal policy making.
The focus is on reasonable
compliance as determined by the
industry.
Compliance is based on the Rule of
Law. Sanctions and expulsion are
limited and have limited effect. There
is no means of legal enforcement.336
Rules are more transparent and meet
industry member needs.337
Legal approaches are more
transparent and meet all
stakeholders’ needs. There is no
recourse for individuals harmed.338
Industry groups have special
knowledge.339
Industry groups should share special
knowledge. The approach raised
antitrust or anti-competitive issues.
Industry can better monitor
compliance and performance.
The standards are self-serving. To
be successful, the benefits must be
high or compliance costs are low.340
334 Margot Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation, 29 Ottawa
Law Review 2, 233 (1997).
335 Id.
336 Deidre K. Mulligan & Janlori Goldman, The Limits and the Necessity of Self-Regulation:
The Case for Both, in Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information Age (U.S.
Department of Commerce eds., Government Printing Office 1997).
337 Douglas C. Michael, Cooperation Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 Yale
Journal on Regulation, 542 (1996).
338 Deidre K. Mulligan & Janlori Goldman, The Limits and the Necessity of Self-Regulation:
The Case for Both, in Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information Age (U.S.
Department of Commerce eds., Government Printing Office 1997).
339 Maria Chiara Malaguti, Private-Law Instruments for Reduction of Risks on International
Financial Markets: Results and Limits of Self-Regulation, 11 Open Economies
Review 1, 247 (2000).
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Self-regulation is more responsive to
environmental changes.341
Independent agencies can effectively
respond to environmental changes
within broad legislative principles.
Self-regulation decreases operating
costs.342
The approach ignores the damage
costs of self-serving standards.
Self-regulation avoids legal standards
including the Constitution and judicial
standards.
Self-regulation can avoid legal
standards including the Constitution
and judicial standards. No checks
and balances are provided.
Enforcement is voluntary. Free-riders
take advantage of the low costs of
non-compliance.343
Some examples of successful self-regulation exist. Bar Associations and
Security Dealer Associations are examples of effective self-regulation. To be
effective, the industry group must be able to deal with the entire field, not just
members. The self-regulation organization must have the power to grant or
withdraw a license or certification to be involved in the field, monitor member
and non-member activities, and punish violators effectively.344
Dale Kunkel and Ursula Goette345 document some major problems with the
self-regulation model. For instance, to compete with television in the 1950s,
motion pictures started adding more sex and violence because the FCC
would not allow such depictions on television. In the 1960s, public concerns
about the increased use of sex and violence in motion pictures started to
mount. The industry self-regulating organization, the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA), did not respond for eight years. Self-
regulation failed. In another example, in 1970, the National Association of
340 Douglas C. Michael, Cooperation Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 Yale
Journal on Regulation, 542 (1996).
341 George Milne & Mary J. Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why
Consumers Read [Or Ddon’t Read] Online Privacy Notices, 18 Journal of Interactive
Marketing 3, 15 (2004).
342 Ibid.
343 John W. Maxwell, et al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of
Corporate Environmentalism, 43 Journal of Law and Economics, 583 (October 2000).
344 See Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and its Reform,(Harvard University Press ed. 1982);
Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation,(Harvard University Press ed. 1993).
345 Dale Kunkel & Ursula Goette, Broadcasters' Response to the Children's Television Act, 2
Communication Law and Policy 3, 289 (1997).
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Broadcasters started negotiating with its members to increase informational
and educational programming for children. However, the issue was not
addressed until the Congress passed legislation twenty years later. In this
instance, self-regulation failed again. When the push for stopping television
cigarette advertising started in the 1960s, the Broadcasters’ association
passed a weak standard which was voluntary and had no regulatory effect.
However, the practice did not stop until 1994, when the Congress passed
regulatory legislation. Self-regulation failed again. In 1973, the National
News Council was formed to help self-regulation of journalists and press
corporations by establishing voluntary ethical standards, fairness, and public
accountability. In 1984, the effort at self-regulation failed due to member non-
compliance. Thus, the self-regulation model does not provide incentives to
comply or control the choices of other players. The urge for profits, power,
and business advantage are render self-regulation ineffective in dealing with
the issues that the law can mandate, enforce, and punish.
Another problem with the US approach is that political appointees can lie
under oath to the Senate with impunity. In May 2001, Timothy J. Muris, the
Bush appointee for the Federal Trade Commission chair, refused to make
public his views on privacy. He stated that he would make sure that the
Commission would maintain involvement on the issue.346 In October of the
same year, after he was appointed, he announced that the Commission was
dropping its prior support for privacy legislation.347
The US model of self-regulation for DPSIP is not working. Under the self-
regulation and financial security model, the Bank of New York Mellon (BNY
Mellon) reported the breach of data on 12.5 million customers’ account details
that included addresses, dates of birth, names, and Social Security
346 Edmund Sanders, FTC Nominee Sails Through Senate Confirmation Hearing, Los
Angeles Times (2001, May 17), at 3.
347 Jonathan Krim, FTC Will Not Seek New Privacy Laws, Washington Post (2001, October
5), at E1.
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numbers.348 In the first seven months of 2008, more expansive data
breaches occurred than in the entire prior year. Four hundred and forty-nine
businesses, governmental agencies, and universities reported the loss or theft
of over 127 million individual records.349
The relative inaction on DPSIP issues of the Clinton Administration
transformed into hostility from the George Walker Bush Administration.
Privacy became a casualty of the “War on Terror,” increasing governmental
powers, a corporate republic, and Neo-Conservative nirvana.
8.9.2 Safe Harbor Agreement
To avoid a trade war with the EU over the Directive on Data Privacy, the
Clinton administration negotiated the 2000 Safe Harbor agreement.350 Prior
to 2000, the EU had rejected the first six privacy proposals.351 Under the
agreement, selected businesses in the US could agree to follow basic data
protection and information privacy standards to reach a level of adequate
protection under the EU Directive.352 Data protection authorities in the EU
would allow data transfers with such firms without challenge.353 US
companies feared that the agreement was too strict, whereas Europeans saw
the agreement as too lenient and unenforceable. US-based businesses did
348 Iain Thomson, Bank of New York Loses 12.5 Million Customer Details, SC Magazine for
IT Security Professionals. (2008, September 1), at
http://www.securecomputing.net.au/News/121357,bank-of-new-york-loses-125-
million-customer-details.aspx (last visited on 1 September 2012).
349 Brian Krebs, Data Breaches Have Surpassed Level For All of '07, Report Finds
Washington Post. (2008, August 26), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/25/AR2008082502496.html (last visited on 27 August
2012), ¶ 2.
350 European Commission, US-EU Safe Harbor Frameworks. (2011), at
http://export.gov/safeharbor/index.asp (last visited on 4 August 2012).
351 Anna Shimanek, Note, Do You Want Milk with Those Cookies?: Complying with the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles, 26 Iowa Journal of Corporate Law 2, 455 (2001).
352 See Chapter 3, § 3.4.3 of this work.
353 European Commission, US-EU Safe Harbor Frameworks. (2011), at
http://export.gov/safeharbor/index.asp (last visited on 4 August 2012).
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not perceive DPSIP protection as a cost of doing business.354 The EU
decided not to try to extend the principles with the US.355
Graham Pearce and Nicholas Platten356 correctly assessed the legal, policy,
and political status of privacy in the US. The authors stated that the powers
that be do not like legislative–legal solutions and international standards. The
work of the Clinton and subsequent Bush administrations presented prima
facie evidence of this statement. As early as 1998, John Mogg, Director
General of the European Commission, told US business and political leaders
that US privacy laws reveal that “Most of what we see is not meaningful ... the
industry codes we have seen have no teeth."357
The Safe Harbor agreement was accomplished to protect corporate profits,
not DPSIP law standards.358 Edmund Andrews reported that the US was
concerned because it had an entire industry that accumulated, analyzed,
collected, and sold personal data. The corporate supported politicians were
concerned that consumers would use privacy standards for nuisance litigation
to protect legitimate privacy concerns.359 The selling point was that the
agreement was consistent with the self-regulation mantra.
The Safe Harbor agreement shows that Europeans have much stronger
privacy protections than those in the US. The agreement is basically
meaningless because violations are referred to the national court. The
principles protect US companies—not citizens. To be covered by the Safe
Harbor agreement, a US company only had to voluntarily sign up and provide
354 Tamara Loomis, A Few Companies Have Complied with EU Law, 228 New York Law
Journal, 1 (2001, August 30), at 5.
355 Ibid.
356 Graham Pearce & Nicholas Platten, Orchestrating Transatlantic Approaches to Personal
Data Protection: A European Perspective, 22 Fordham International Law Journal 5,
2024 (1999), 2048.
357 Ibid.
358 Marie Clear, Comment, Falling into the Gap: The European Union's Data Protection Act
and its Impact on U.S. Law and Commerce, 18 John Marshall Journal of Computer
and Information Law 4, 981 (2000).
359 Edmund L. Andrews, European Law Aims to Protect Privacy of Data, New York Times
(1998, October 25), at A1.
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a self-certifying declaration process.360 Once on the list, the company’s
privacy protection policies are “deemed adequate.” No external review occurs.
Data transfers are uninterrupted and prior approvals are waived or
automatically granted. The company is exempt from any member state data
protection negotiations. A safe harbor company must state that it complies
with EU Standards on data protection. Again, the commitment is based on a
self-declaration with no monitoring or remedies. The topics include choice,
ownership, transfer, access, data integrity, and dispute resolution. The
standard is much less rigid than the standards in the EU.361
In theory, enforcement is based on the business pressures of self-regulation.
Depending on the industry sector, the Department of Commerce (DOC),
Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have enforcement
responsibility.362 The history shows that enforcement is essentially non-
existent.
As part of the original negotiations, nothing would be done from the signing
date of 1 July 2001 through informal agreement in November 2001 as an
informal grace period. The actual data protection principles were ignored
because neither party wanted a trade war. France and Sweden blocked
some data transfers with little impact. US companies have been slow to
register for safe harbor status. The business mindset is that the costs
outweigh the benefits, given that neither the Europeans nor the US
aggressively enforced the agreements. Microsoft reluctantly joined the
agreement only after Spain and Dun & Bradstreet complied. Their
compliance came only after Sweden cut-off data transfers.363 As established
360 European Commission, US-EU Safe Harbor Frameworks. (2012), at
http://export.gov/safeharbor/index.asp (last visited on 4 August 2012).
361 See Chapter 3, § 3.4.3 of this work
362 European Commission, US-EU Safe Harbor Frameworks. (2011), at
http://export.gov/safeharbor/index.asp (last visited on 4 August 2012).
363 Barry J. Hurewitz, US - EU Privacy "Safe Harbor" Greeted with Skepticism, Wilmer Hale.
(2001), at
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in Chapter Two, even if the “powers that be” are willing to establish and follow
sound laws and support the rule of law, data protection and information
privacy laws are meaningless unless the legal principles are enforceable.
Even if the basic safe harbor and self-regulation models were not
fundamentally flawed, privacy legal problems would still persist. The
Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission do not have
the expertise, resources, and statutory power to enforce compliance of DPSIP
standards.364 There is no objective model to show what effective
enforcement would entail.
8.10 United States Sociolegal Concerns
Kim Sheehan365 did a meta-analysis of forty-three established and
respectable public opinion poll studies related to information privacy views in
the US. The data showed a number of population concerns regarding
information privacy. The data provided a contrast to the current legal
constraints on US DPSIP law. The presentation of the data included the
essential question, the number of questions in the forty-three studies
examined, the measurement and the question response range.
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=2367 (last
visited on 22 July 2012).
364 Rachel K. Zimmerman, The Way the "Cookies" Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 4 New York University Journal of Legislation
and Public Policy, 2, 439 (2000).
365 Kim Bartel Sheehan, How Public Opinion Polls Define and Circumscribe Online Privacy,
9 First Monday, 7 (2004), http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue9_7/sheehan/ (last
visited on 24 June 2012).
Chapter Eight: US Legal Standards 505
Table 8.4 Poll Meta Analysis Data
Question
Right of Privacy
Privacy as control
over who gets
information
Privacy as control
over collection of
information
Privacy: information
that can be stolen
Privacy on the
Internet
Financial records
/credit card
information
Social Security
Number (SSN)
Health records
Directory
information
home/phone
Web tracking
Government access
/monitoring
Website sharing
information
Number of
questions
1
6
8
4
9
9
2
3
5
8
7
6
Measurement
Degree to which
is essential
Degree of
importance, risk,
comfort level
Degree of
importance
Level of risk or
worry
Levels of
concern
Level of concern
Level of concern
Level of concern
Level of concern
Level of comfort
/violation
Support or
oppose
Level of concern
/comfort
/invasion of
privacy
Question Response
range
81% say essential
75–84% extremely
important; 50%
uncomfortable over who
gets information; 75%
see as a risk.
69–74% view as
extremely important
43–70% worried /
extremely worried;
69% see as risk
30–50% very concerned;
79–83% concerned
64–84% concerned/very
concerned
75% very concerned
47–65% concerned/very
concerned
51–54% very concerned
95% uncomfortable; 43–
67% agree is violation
65–74% oppose
65–89% consider
violation of privacy; 50–
84% concerned; 92%
uncomfortable
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Government should
pass laws to protect
online privacy
Current laws
protect consumers
Violators should be
disciplined
Opt–in rather than
Opt-out
Websites should
disclose policies
9
6
1
4
1
Level of
agreement
Level of
agreement
Level of
agreement
Support or
oppose
Level of
agreement
38–63% agree
57–87% agree
94% agree
78–88% support
93% agree
The Sheehan mega-data showed that the majority of those polled in the
various studies maintained that the government should pass laws that protect
information privacy. Individuals should have the power to protect their rights
that include private causes of action. The data supported the view that
information privacy was in trouble in the US. The people studied maintained
that there was or should be a right to privacy and that people should have
control over both the collection of their personal information and who gets
information once collected. The subjects were concerned about information
theft and about the lack of Internet privacy. The subjects were also
concerned about financial and credit card information, social security
numbers, health records, home, and phone directory information. The
majority opposed government access and monitoring of personal data. The
majority also maintained that web tracking and website sharing was a privacy
violation. The majority did not think that current laws protected consumers’
privacy, but they did think the government should pass more protective
privacy laws, and that violators ought to receive discipline. The vast majority
supported an opt-in standard, rather than the business preferred opt-out, for
data collection. The vast majority also agreed that websites should disclose
and follow their privacy policies. The Electronic Privacy Information Center
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also tabulated a number of polls that show that privacy concerns and privacy
misinformation were reported by the majority of subjects.366
A study of 7,088 adults, by Ipsos/Queen's University367 found that sixty-three
percent of those in the US were concerned about information privacy
protections. The Angus Reid368 study revealed that seventy percent of the
sample was concerned about their privacy. The use of new technology was a
major factor. Over the last three decades, opinion results supported the belief
that business and government would protect information privacy; however,
belief in real protections had drastically declined. Eighty–four percent of the
population opposed the government placing private information on the Net,
but the government did it anyway.369
A Harris370 poll found eighty-three percent of Americans reported that they
would stop doing business with a company that did not protect personal
information. Ninety percent wanted a transparent privacy policy. Sixty-two
percent wanted an independent monitor on the practices, and ninety-one
percent would do business with such a firm if the practices were audited.
Table 8.5 Harris Poll
Statement 1999
Disagreement
2000
Disagreement
2001
Disagreement
“Most businesses handle
the personal information
they collect about
consumers in a proper and
confidential way”
34% 43% 56%
“Existing laws and
organizational practices
366 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Public Opinion on Privacy (2008),
http://epic.org/privacy/survey/default.html (last visited on 6 April 2012).
367 Ipsos / Queen's University (2006).
368 Angus Reid Global Monitor (2006).
369 Alice Robbin, The Loss of Personal Privacy and Its Consequences for Social Research,
28 Journal of Government Information 5, 493 (2001).
370 Harris Interactive, Privacy On and Off the Internet: What Consumers Want (Study No.
15229) (Author 2002).
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provide a reasonable level
of protection for
consumers today”
38% 47% 62%
Table 8.6 Concerns
Statement Voiced a major
concern
The company will share or sell my information to other
companies with whom I have no relationship.
75%
The transaction will not be secure, and other
companies or individuals may gain access to my
credit card information.
70%
My personal information may be stolen and used by a
hacker or intruder.
69%
I may receive unwanted advertisements for unwanted
products and services (spamming or junk mail).
59%
The company will not follow the promises outlined in
its privacy policy.
56%
The company will use my information outside of the
specific transaction for which it was intended (, to offer
me other products and services).
53%
A 2008 Consumer Report371 poll addressed American privacy concerns. The
organization was highly respected. The data showed:
Table 8.7 Consumer Concerns
Issue Percent
Internet companies should always ask for permission
before using personal information
93%
Worry about credit card data being stolen 82%
Concerned about companies tracking and profiling
behavior
72%
At a minimum want to be able to opt-out 72%
Incorrectly confident that what they do online is private
and not shared without their permission
61%
Incorrectly believe that companies must identify
themselves and indicate why they are collecting data and 57%
371 Consumer Reports, Consumers Alarmed About Online Privacy, 25% Provide Fake ID to
View Sites (2008), http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactive/consumers-alarmed-
about-online-privacy-25-provide-fake-id-to-view-sites-6265/ (last visited on 20 March
2012).
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whether they intend to share it with other organizations
Are uncomfortable with third parties collecting information
about their online behavior
54%
Uncomfortable with Internet companies using their email
content or browsing history to send them ads
53%
Incorrectly believe their consent is required for
companies to use the personal information they collect
from online activities
48%
Incorrectly believe a court order is required to monitor
activities online
43%
Fox and Lewis372 have conducted a number of relevant studies. They found
that seventy percent of Americans supported new laws to protect information
privacy. Fox found that eighty-six percent favored opt-in to data collection
processes. Companies should ask permission prior to using personal data.
Fifty-four percent reported that web site tracking of activities was harmful and
a privacy violation. Ninety-four percent argued for legal punishment for
privacy violators. Eleven percent wanted violating company owners sent to
prison. Twenty-seven percent wanted violating owners fined. Twenty-six
percent wanted any violating web site shut down. Thirty percent wanted a
published list of privacy violating fraudulent web sites.373
In 2006, Consumer Report, a well-respected consumer publication, conducted
a survey on privacy concerns in the US. The survey revealed that seventy-
two percent of the respondents were concerned about the protection of their
person data, including financial data.374
372 Susannah Fox & Oliver Lewis, Fear of Online Crime: Americans Support FBI Interception
of Criminal Suspects’ Email and New Laws to Protect Online Privacy, Pew Internet &
American Life Project (2001),
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2001/PIP_Fear_of_crime.pdf.pdf
(last visited on 24 May 2012).
373 Susannah Fox, et al., Trust and Privacy Online: Why Americans Want to Rewrite the
Rules, Pew Internet & American Life Project (2000),
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2000/PIP_Trust_Privacy_Report.pd
f.pdf (last visited on 7 June 2012).
374 Melissa Campanelli, Privacy, Security Top Consumer Worries Online: Consumer Reports
at FTC Forum (2006, November 7), http://www.dmnews.com/Privacy-security-top-
consumer-worries-online-Consumer-Reports-at-FTC-forum/article/93362/ (last visited
on 1 January 2012), at ¶ 1.
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The Truste’s 2006 survey of 1,025 consumers found that privacy concerns
impacted e-businesses. In the prior six months of the year, seventy-one
percent did not register or buy online because of data protection and
information privacy concerns. Forty-one percent of the respondents provided
inaccurate information when requested for personal information.375
Customers were privacy conscious according to a study by a company named
Javelin Strategy & Research. The data showed that seventy-seven percent of
customers would no longer shop at businesses that did not protect their
private data. Eighty-five percent would spend more on sites that they
perceive as protecting personal data.376 A study by Carnegie Mellon
University also found that customers would pay more for goods on sites that
protect their privacy.377 A study of US online purchasers revealed that sixty-
one percent were concerned about data privacy. The percentage was up
from forty-seven the year before. Prior to the current time, the percentage of
concern had decreased for the last five years.378
Independent research in all of the countries addressed in this study
revealed that citizens and business executives were significantly concerned
about DPSIP issues. Many of the concerns were counter to national
legislation and court decisions. Politicians and jurists can and certainly do
argue and maneuver around DPSIP issues. Businesses and corporations can
375 Cara Wood, Web Users Have False Sense of Security: Truste, TNS. (2006, December
7), http://www.dmnews.com/Web-users-have-false-sense-of-security-Truste-
TNS/article/93762/ (last visited on 26 December 2012), at 4.
376 David Utter, Study: Data Breaches Break Consumer Trust (2007, April 11),
http://www.securitypronews.com/news/securitynews/spn-45-
20070411StudyDataBreachesBreakConsumerTrust.html (last visited on 7 December
2012), at 3-4.
377 Jon Brodkin, Shoppers Willing to Pay Extra for Privacy Confidence, Study Finds (6 June
2007), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/060607-privacy-confidence-
survey.html (last visited on 2 January 2012).
378 Anick Jesdanun, Internet Privacy Concerns Rising, Study Suggests: Findings Come Amid
a Record Number of Data Breaches in 2007, Associated Press (2008, January 16), at
A1.
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and do corrupt the process.379 The above research shows that the majority
of US citizens want strong DPSIP legislation and regulation.
8.11 United States of America Critique
Historically, US law has insisted on checks and balances to protect individuals
and society. Protective mechanisms include court orders, warrants, and
subpoenas.380 Vital balances have been generally maintained. Privacy
concerns were protected in the US through the Earl Warren Supreme Court.
Such protections were diminished starting with the Republican-appointed
Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts courts.
Table 8.8 Expectation of Privacy Supreme Court Cases
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Missteps
US Supreme Court
Generally (although not always)
notice of search should be
contemporaneous.
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385
(1997).
Plain view items need no warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971).
Search incidental to valid arrest – no
warrant.
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S.
800 (1974).
Confidential records held by a third
party under contract - no warrant.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976).
Telecommunication data – no
warrant.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979).
The government can do whatever it
wants with illegally seized data.
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
455 (1975).
379 See: Jeffrey D. Clements, Corporations Are Not People: Why They Have More Rights
Than You and What You Can Do About it (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc ed. 2012).
Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the
Theft of Human Rights (Rodale ed. 2002). Robert G. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money:
The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government,(Alfred A.
Knopf ed. 2009). Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress -
and a Plan to Stop It (Twelve - Hachette Hook Group ed. 2011).
380 Gina Marie Stevens, Privacy: Total Information Awareness Programs and Related
Information Access, Collection, and Protection Laws (RL31730), U.S. Congressional
Research Service. (2003), at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030214crs.pdf
(last visited on 20 July 2012).
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Constitutional protections do not
apply to domestic security where
different policies or approaches may
be needed.
United States v. U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan, 407
U.S. 297 (1972). p. 322
The US approach to DPSIP legal protection is ineffective. Perhaps the best
evidence is found in the declaration that "Congress has granted drug abusers
greater privacy protection than lawful users of the Internet."381
Joel Reidenberg examined the legal history of US privacy laws. The study
found that "the American legal system responds incoherently and incompletely
to the privacy issues raised by existing information processing activities in the
business community."382 The sectoral approach is a byproduct of history,
political conflicts, free market mythologies, lack of historical knowledge, and a
lack of public awareness. The patchwork approach worked for some of the
time in some areas; however, large protection gaps exist.
Daniel Solove declared that the “existing law protecting information privacy
has not adequately responded to the emergence of digital dossiers.”383
Charles Weiss concluded that “American values on privacy were defined in a
previous, less technological era. These values needed to be reexamined and
redefined for a modern era of data mining and knowledge discovery.”384
The US has refused to follow a comprehensive approach in lieu of English
common law, the various cultural standards in the Western World,
ethnocentric social traditions, and partisan politically established statutory law.
The US is at variance with other Western countries and has a recent thirty-
381 Joel R. Reidenberg, E-commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 Houston Law Review
77, 717 (2001), at 726.
382 Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy-- A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights? 44 Federal Communications Law Journal 2, 195 (1992), at 199.
383 Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age
(New York University Press. 2004), at 9.
384 Charles Weiss, The Coming Technology of Knowledge Discovery: A Final Blow to
Privacy Protection, 2004 University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology and Policy
2, 253 (2004), at 271.
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year history of being a privacy rogue nation. Either privacy laws are passed
but ignored or new “privacy” legislation is passed that destroys traditional
privacy rights. Some governmental restrictions exist; however, businesses
can do what the market will bear, while the government circumvents legal
restrictions by allowing and then buying or requesting private corporations to
provide information that was illegal for the government to obtain directly.
The US Government Accountability Office385 issued a privacy report and
testified on the need for the US to pass a new privacy law. The report found
that current US privacy legislation386 is inadequate to meet current needs.
The definition of “system of records” is unclear and not consistently followed.
Public notices are difficult to find and do not specify the real purpose of the
information collection. The enacted fair information standards are not
followed. The Accountability Office recommended “Applying privacy
protections consistently to all federal collection and use of personal
information. Ensuring that use of personally identifiable information is limited
to a stated purpose…Establishing effective mechanisms for informing the
public about privacy protections.”387 The current laws do not protect data
mining processes, and the Government is circumventing the law by buying or
getting information from other sources.
The report concluded with measured recommendations. The evaluation
included “(1) the Privacy Act and E-Government Act do not always provide
protections for federal uses of personal information, (2) laws and guidance
may not effectively limit agency collection and use of personal information to
specific purposes, and (3) the Privacy Act may not include effective
mechanisms for informing the public.”388
385 United States Government Accountability Office, Congress Should Consider Alternatives
for Strengthening Protection of Personally Identifiable Information. (2008, June 18), at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08795t.pdf (last visited on 18 June 2012).
386 See §§ 8.3.6 and 8.3.7 of the Chapter.
387 Id. at 1.
388 Id. at 21.
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The Privacy Act has systemic problems. The Act was shortsighted and
included a number of problematic exceptions. Moreover, the Act applied only
to governmental agencies that had their own system of records. In Henke v.
United States Department of Commerce389 the Court ruled that data retrieval was
not controlled under the act.
Protecting informational privacy has been a transient priority in the legal
tradition of the US. Free speech and information privacy protections are, in
reality, complimentary. The legal principle “allocates rights and
responsibilities” while insuring “fairness and transparency in the collection and
use of personal information.”390 The recent development of a self-regulation
policy is not working, and people in the US are becoming increasingly
concerned. The DPSIP self-regulation movement started in 1996 by
President Clinton and was expanded under Bush W. The Office of
Management and Budget and the Federal Trade Commission “lack the
statutory authority, the resources, and the reporting requirements to operate
effectively on privacy issues. There are too many complaints, too little
adjudication, and too little oversight.”391
While states in the US led the way for breach notification laws, the legislation
has not always been effective.392 Bruce Schneier, Chief Security Technology
Officer at the BT Group, reported that such laws have loopholes, like limited
389 Henke v. United States Department of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(quoting Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403, 1408 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984). (1996). (US)
390 Marc Rotenberg, Privacy in the Commercial World: Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. (2001,
March 1), at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/107/hearings/03012001Hearing43/Rot
enberg68.htm (last visited on 21 August 2012), at 2.
391 Marc Rotenberg, Privacy in the Commercial World: Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. (2001,
March 1), at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/107/hearings/03012001Hearing43/Rot
enberg68.htm (last visited on 21 August 2012), 4.
392 As of 1 October 2011 only Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico and South Dakota had no
breach notification statutes.
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notification standards. As in the UK, penalties are not a significant
deterrent.393
In many cases, security breaches are not reported. “One reason is that the
penalty for failing to disclose a breach under state laws is often minimal—just
a maximum of $10,000—less than a business might spend figuring out which
records were stolen in the breach.”394
The legal and judicial history of DPSIP in the US is a source of cognitive
dissonance and a schizoid approach to problem solving. When it was
revealed that Supreme Court nominee Judge Bork liked to rent pornographic
films from his local video store, his fellow conservative and Republican
legislators cried that such data should be private and passed a special
legislation protecting video rental. The same legislators invalidated the law
after the World Trade Center attack.
The US courts have recently developed a pernicious doctrine to limit
individual privacy rights against business and governmental desires. The
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine395 was used to protect business
and governmental abuses and agendas. The burden of proof is placed on the
victim so that the more powerful are not held accountable.
A classic case in support of this assessment was United States v. Miller.396
In a case of financial privacy violations, the Supreme Court ruled that there
were no constitutionally protected privacy rights for banking records. Making
deposits and writing checks voluntarily places the information available to
another party and to the flow of commerce. The disclosing party thus bears
the risk of whatever actions businesses or the government may take. Courts
followed the new doctrine and denied privacy protections to information to
393 Ben Worthen, Why All The Data Breaches? Businesses Just Don’t Care. (2008,
September 9), at http://blogs.wsj.com/biztech/2008/09/09/why-all-the-data-breaches-
businesses-just-dont-care/ (last visited on 9 September 2012), at 6.
394 Ibid.
395 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, (1967). (US).
396 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, (1976). (US)
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banks, dialed telephone numbers, and trash left in trash bags because the
data was voluntarily placed in commercial flows.397
In United States v. Kennedy,398 the defendant provided information to his
Internet Service Provider to open and maintain an account. The Court
determined that since the defendant had voluntarily provided personal
information for the service, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy
concerning his ISP records because he knowingly revealed the information to
obtain the service.
The legal standard changes when a corporation is involved. Corporations
have the legal right to protect their informational property and relationship
channels.399 There is no test of reasonable expectation of privacy. Why does
such a dual standard exist?
Under current DPSIP legal standards, businesses and the government are not
regulated by any standard of assessment, evaluation, plan, or review. All can
collect, sell, and use personal information freely. International standards are
ignored with no recourse.
After the Watergate scandal, Senator Frank Church established the Select
Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities.400 Church, a Democrat from Idaho, served as Committee Chair.
Congress passed the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
which established special courts of review for national security warrants and
intervention reviews.401 However, the legal lesson was learned for only a
397 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, (1979); U.S.: California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
(1986); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30,
(1988). (US)
398 United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2nd 1103 (D. Kan., 2000). (US)
399 Felsher v. University of Evansville, 755 N.E. 2d 589 (Ind. 2001). (US)
400 Frank Church, Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities, 94th Congress, Final Report on Intelligence Activities and
the Rights of Americans (United State Printing Office. 1976, April 26).
401 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) amend. Public Law 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1811) (1978). (US)
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short period of time. By 2001 and the era of the Bush Administration, the US
Patriot Act was passed; this law changed the FISA processes.402 The entire
process was then suspended in the name of national defense.
The Department of Defense Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee’s
(TAPAC) final report documented that US privacy protection laws and judicial
precedents are disjointed, inadequate, and outdated.403 For example, The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)404 made a clear regulatory
distinction between in storage and in transit, which is no longer
meaningful. The government used such distinctions to violate the spirit
of the law and user’s expectations.405 The Act suffered from poor
development or intentional inconsistencies. For example, the Act
applied to video surveillance only when sound was recorded at the same
time.
The problems of DPSIP law in the US are not as complex as they are
schizoid. There is no independent regulatory function for such concerns. The
federal government does not require reporting or accountability or state
actions. The Executive Branch ignores and violates statutory protections with
immunity. Congress is beholden to special interest lobbies and failed political
philosophies. Congress is either slow to change or jumps on the current call
for action. In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act,406 which
outlawed wiretaps of all types. A complete reversal was done in 1968 with the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.407 Congress passed laws but
did not effectively require any accountability or oversight. Even the Supreme
402 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 amend. Public Law 107-56, § 204, 115 Stat. 272
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B)). (2001). (US)
403 United States Department of Defence Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee,
Safeguarding Privacy in the Fight Against Terrorism (Author. 2004, March), 6.
404 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA Title I) 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2521
(1986). (US)
405 United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001) (US)
406 Communications Act of 1934 amend. ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 605) (1934). (US)
407 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-350, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511-2520) (1968). (US)
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Court was not exempt from a pattern of non-accountability and lack of
consistent oversight. In Olmstead v. United States,408 the Court refused to
apply the Fourth Amendment to wiretaps. Thirty-nine years were required for
the Court to reverse the error in United States v. Katz.409
The US approach to Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) issues is at best,
schizoid. Congress has suggested that the government require PIA
standards for new technology – if practicable. However, the implementation
of the policy has not been swift or uniform. Kenneth Bamberger410 studied
how agencies deal with mixed legislative policies and subvert the process.
A number of United States Supreme Court anti-information privacy decisions
must be overturned or legislatively corrected. The legal fiction of requiring a
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine must be voided. According to the
United States v. Miller411 decision, bank records are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment because there is no confidentiality and the information is
freely given to the bank. The ruling must be over-turned. In Smith v.
Maryland,412 the court found no reasonable expectation of privacy for dialed
phone numbers because the numbers were voluntarily disclosed and
recorded during phone company business activities. This ruling also needs to
be over-turned.
As early as 1987, Spiros Simitis413 showed that in the US, all sectors of the
government - courts, executive, and legislative failed to establish DPSIP
protections. The pursuit of governmental power and business profits trumped
civil liberties-rights, consumer protection-safety, data security, market
408 See Olmstead v. United States (1928). (US)
409 See United States v. Katz (1967). (US)
410 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decision-making, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 Duke Law Journal 2, 377 (2006).
411 See United States v. Miller (1976). (US)
412 See Smith v. Maryland (1979). (US)
413 Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 3, 707 (1987, March).
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fairness, and governmental security protections. In 2002,414 the federal
government established a standard that at lest federal administrative agencies
must conduct a PIA when agencies develop or purchase information
technologies or change current systems when there is a privacy risk. The
standard was not fully implemented and not extended to the private sector.
By 2009, the Office of Management and Budget reported that only fifty-six
percent of federal agencies were in compliance with the 2002 act requiring
PIAs. The data was reported based on agency self-reports.415 The lack of
adoption was based on the lack of public input into the process and neo-
conservatives refusing to appoint the required chief privacy counsel in the
Office of Management and Budget. Neo-conservatives successfully re-
framed privacy issues as a danger to national security concerns.416
Data protection and information privacy law in the United States is essentially
a legal fiction and failure. The good news is that other countries have
established sound protections. Substantive DPSIP laws are needed to limit
access to and misuse of personal data that apply to all governmental,
business, organizational, and personal actors. Procedural DPSIP laws and
rules are needed to support compliance, provide accountability, monitor
failures, insure remedies, and allow private causes of action. Strict liability
standards should apply. An independent regulatory body with full rule
making, enforcement, adjudication powers, and educational powers must be
established. The regulatory agency must have strict rules to protect it from
corporate and governmental interference. The standards of the rule of law
must apply. DPSIP audits should be required for all related programs and
414 E-government Act amend. (Pub.L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 44 U.S.C. § 101, H.R.
2458/S. 803) § (2002) (US).
415 Office of Management and Budget., Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress on
Implementation of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. (2009),
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/FY09_FISMA.pd
f (last visited on 12 March 2012).
416 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, PIA Requirements and Privacy
Decision-Making in US Governmental Agencies, in Privacy Impact Assessment
(David Wright & Paul De Hert ed.^eds., Springer 2012).
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databases, proposed projects or business concerns, intellectual property
protections, and all governmental actions that impact on privacy.
At times, task forces and committees can perform some insightful work;
however, if someone did not want to deal with the issue, he or she referred it
to a committee. A number of taskforces and committees have considered the
issue of security and information privacy in the United States. The blue ribbon
panels included the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the
Information Age,417 McCormick Tribune Foundation’s Cantigny Conference
on Counterterrorism Technology and Privacy,418 US Department of Defense
Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee,419 and the United States
Department of Homeland Security.420 A review of the recommendations of
these committees reveals two general truths. Each report made similar
recommendations, which suggested an acceptance of a standard data
protection perspective similar to the EU approach. Second, the majority of
recommendations were ignored or failed to attend to DPSIP concerns, which
suggested that the powers that be were going to do what they wanted despite
the evidence and the demands of the citizens. The government and business
were not interested in consistent DPSIP laws and reforms.
As noted above, the various states in the US have been advancing DPSIP
issues far more often and effectively than the federal government. Over the
417 Markle Foundation Task Force On National Security In The Information Age, Mobilizing
information to prevent terrorism: Accelerating development information sharing of a
trusted environment (2006, July), at
http://www.markle.org/downloadable_assets/2006_nstf_report3.pdf (last visited on 1
December 2012).
418 McCormick Tribune Foundation’s Cantigny Conference On Counterterrorism Technology
and Privacy, The Cantigny Principles on Technology, Terrorism, and Privacy. 27
National Security Law Report 1, 14 (2005), at
http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/nslr/2005/NSL_Report_2005_02.pdf (last visited on
22 September 2012).
419 United States Department of Defence, Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee,
Safeguarding Privacy in the Fight Against Terrorism. (2004, March), at
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf (last visited on 5 December
2012).
420 United States Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Office - DHS Data Privacy and
Integrity Advisory Committee. (2008), at
http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/committees/editorial_0512.shtm (last visited on 10
December 2012).
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last year, Congress has proposed some information privacy legislation;
however, no real actions have been taken. Some proposals, if passed, will
preempt state legislative efforts. Thus, such a federal DPSIP law will actually
diminish established state protections.
On 23 February 2012, the White House released a consumer privacy bill of
rights.421 The document supports the view that DPSIP issues are a major
concern and have reached historic proportions. Privacy is not outmoded as it
is the heart of a democracy and a necessary consumer protection issue. The
privacy bill of rights includes provisions for individual control of personal
information, transparency of privacy and security practices, and respect of
context related to private commercial organization and data-broker DPSIP
practices. The bill establishes that consumers have a right to data security of
their information. Consumers have a right of accuracy and access.
Consumers also have a right to limits on personal data collection and
retention. Consumers also have an accountability right that organizations
adhere to the bill of rights.422
The Executive would prefer that the federal Legislature pass the Consumer
Data Privacy Bill of Rights as a federal statute. If the Legislature fails to enact
the principles, the Executive argued that the bill of rights provides for a non-
statutory template for DPSIP protections that would increase consumer trust
and innovation.423 The document suggests that enforcement of DPSIP
principles should be assigned to the FTC and States Attorney Generals. The
goal is to create US DPSIP standards that establish and maintain increased
international DPSIP interoperability.
421 The White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy. (2012),
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf (last visited on 23
February 2012).
422 Id. at 1.
423 Id. at 2.
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While the document does not shift the historic US DPSIP self-regulation
model, it does declare that such efforts are preliminary. The document
advocates that strong governmental enforcement powers are also needed
through the FTC.424 The Consumer Data Privacy Bill of Rights proclaimed
rights of individual control, transparency, respect for context, and security.
The rights also include access and accuracy, focused collection, and
accountability.425
The Whitehouse publication of the Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked
World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the
Global Digital Economy426 is a recognition of DPSIP legal and regulatory
issues. The document may be politically acceptable; it actually limits
progressive state actions and ignores international DPSIP legal trends. In
reality, the proposal is understandably, a dollar short and a day late.427 The
document focuses on private organizational practices while ignoring
governmental practices.
8.12 Summary of United States of America Literature and Issues
Reviewed
The intent of this thesis is to conduct a comparative analysis of DPSIP
responses in five different nations. Part of the comparison uses a benchmark
approach of key issues. The issues include legal support of DPSIP
protections, legal support of corporate privacy and data protection standards,
information privacy data protection and security declarations, the use of
regulatory agencies, sectoral legislation, and data controllers. The
benchmark standards also include data processor requirements, data
424 Id. at 29.
425 Id. at 47–48.
426 The Whitehouse, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy. (2012),
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf (last visited on 23
February 2012).
427 An idiom for an action that is too little and historically too late – ignorant of the evolution
of international DPSIP standards.
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subjects, data security destruction, cross-border data flow, exemptions and
exceptions, and the current stage of the approach based on evolutionary
stages. The following table presents the summary based on the benchmark
model.
Table 8.9 Comparative Model of US Legal Support of DPSIP Models
ISSUE DESCRIPTION US CURRENT RESPONSE
CM.1: Legal Support of DPSIP
Protections
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with International Human
Rights Standards
(See Appendix A.)
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with EU DPSIP
Standards
No
Signatory, Adheres, and/or
Complies with APEC DPSIP
Standards
Yes
Federal Constitutional Law Examples are given but the term is not
directly used.
Federal Legislative Efforts Contradictory
Federal Common Law Limited
Province /State Constitutional Law Some (e.g., California)
Province / State Legislative Efforts Some
Province /State Common Law Some
CM.2: Legal Support of
Corporate Privacy and Data
Property Protection Issues
US CURRENT RESPONSE
Copyright Protections Yes
Database Protection Yes
Patient Protections Yes
Service Mark Protections Yes
Trade Mark Protections Yes
Trade Secret Protections Yes
Privacy Impact Audit Required
Before Use
No
Privacy Impact Audit Required
Before Government Protections
Granted
No
Checks and Balances on
Corporate Collection, Use, and
No
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Transfer of Individual DPSIP Data
CM.3: Information Privacy: Data
Protection and Security
Declarations
US CURRENT RESPONSE
Definitions Provided Some; self-regulatory guidelines.
Personal and Sensitive Data
Defined
Guidelines
Definitions Effectively Address
Advanced Data Mining
Technologies
No
All Holders and Users Held
Accountable
No
CM.4: Regulatory Agency US CURRENT RESPONSE
Independent of Legislative and
Executive Branches
None to Limited
Administrative Power None to Limited
Investigative Power None to Limited
Regulatory Powers None to Limited
Education Function None to Limited
Enforcement Powers None to Limited
Structure None to Limited
Responsibilities Defined None to Limited
Accountability None to Limited
Governmental Chief Privacy Officer/
Commissioner Required
None to Limited
Governmental Privacy Audits
Required as Part of Legislation
Passage
No
Business Chief Privacy Officer/
Commissioner Required
None to Limited. Health exception.
Employees are Personally Liable for
Violations
None to Limited
Business Privacy Audits Required None to Limited
Agency Educational Function Limited
CM.5: Sectoral DPSIP
Legislation
US CURRENT RESPONSE
Credit Reporting Agencies Some
Criminal Justice Record
Restrictions
Some
Health Information Yes
Health Information Exceptions Limited
Electronic Medical/Health Record
Controls
Limited
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CM.6: Data Controllers US CURRENT RESPONSE
Notice Required Limited
Opt-in Limited
Opt-out Some
Must Be Lawful and Fair In theory
System Access Controls In theory
Data Quality And Integrity In theory
Accurate In theory
Complete In theory
Up to Date In theory
Limited to Needed Data In theory
Relevant In theory
Not Misleading In theory
Data Retention Limitation In theory
Data Transfer Controls In theory
Openness on Information Held In theory
Breach Disclosures Required Some
Breach Penalties Limited
CM.7: Data Processor
Requirements
US CURRENT RESPONSE
Informed Consent Required In theory
Rationale is Provided In theory
Fair Processing In theory
Legal Processing In theory
General Data In theory
Sensitive Data In theory
Accuracy In theory
Timely In theory
Duration of Record Keeping
Controls
Limited
CM.8: Data Subjects US CURRENT RESPONSE
Ownership by the Subject No
Control Over Access In theory
Alter, Amend, Correct, and Delete
Errors
In theory
Notification Requirement In theory
CM.9: Data Security and
Destruction
US CURRENT RESPONSE
Security Must Be State of the Art Limited
Technology Use – Cost of
Implementation Not a Defense
No
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Tracking No
Safeguards Required In theory
Protects from Alteration In theory
Protects Against Disclosure In theory
Protects Misuse In theory
Protects Against Unauthorized
Internal and External Access
In theory
Unauthorized Access Penalties In theory
Timely Notice of Breaches In theory
Strong Remedies Provided No
CM.10: Cross-Border Data Flow US CURRENT RESPONSE
Individual Informed Consent
Required
Limited
Transfer Source Is Accountable No
Outsource Service Controls No
CM.11: Exemptions and
Exceptions
US CURRENT RESPONSE
Only Permitted With Compelling
Justification
In theory
Checks and Balances – Court
Order Required
No
Government Agencies No
Intelligence and Defense Yes
Police Actions Yes
Small Business Exemption No
CM.12 DPSIP Evolutional Stages US CURRENT RESPONSE
DPSIP.0 Limited DPSIP
legal Issues
Yes
DPSIP.1.0 Establishes PII;
does not fully address
security issues; focus on
limited legal consent and
notice.
Yes
DPISP.2.0 Accepts PII
standards; does not fully
address security issues;
focus on a legally based
harm based analysis.
In theory
DPSIP.3.0 PII and non-PII
data fused; privacy, data
protection and security
issues are interrelated; legal
audits, checks, and balances
needed for all personal
No
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information stakeholders.
New technologies are
required to pass privacy
audits (e.g., RFID, Internet of
Things) and require use of
privacy enhancing
technologies in all new IP
approvals.
Sameer Hinduja428 reported research data on privacy and public views. A
total of 71.5 percent of a sample of 1,482 subjects reported that Internet
privacy laws should be developed and implemented. A total of 77.5 percent
of the sample chose privacy over convenience. His work concluded,
The collection of data and its exploitation for commercial gain, its
unauthorized distribution to third parties, and the archiving and storage
of that data for interminable periods of time weakens the civil
protections of freedom of association and privacy. Self-regulation is
ineffective, and legislation appears to be the only way to best serve the
citizenry of the United States, and to prevent American companies from
taking advantage of the online consumer.429
Consumer Policy Solutions conducted a study of 1,035 adults and 260 pairs
of parents and teens. The data showed that 97 percent reported that privacy
protections were somewhat or very important while 95 percent said that the
safety of the Internet was somewhat to very important.430 However, the US
government executive, legislative, and judicial branches have done little to
meet the threats. The public policy in the US does not meet the basic
regulatory standards of AU, CA, the UK, and the EU. However, some state
governments have advanced innovations like breach notification.
428 Sameer Hinduja, Theory and Policy in Online Privacy, 17 Knowledge, Technology, &
Policy 1, 38 (2004), at 55.
429 Ibid.
430 K. C. Jones, Online Safety, Privacy Tops Parents' Concerns, Information Week. (2008,
July 22), at
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/client/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=209
400624 (last visited on 22 July 2012), at 3.
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Chapter Nine compares and contrasts DPSIP standards in AU, CA, SA, the
UK, and the US. The chapter reviews what can be learned from the historic
experiences, strengths, trends, and weaknesses of each approach. The
chapter shows that SA should431 consider establishing sound, modern, and
effective DPSIP laws and regulation.
431 Should, ought to but not necessarily will.
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CHAPTER NINE: DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW:
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION
The current study is a comparative analysis of data protection
and security legal standards in five countries. The purpose is to
present to SA suggestions on the next strategic step in DPSIP
legal protections. This interdisciplinary study integrates
comparative, positive, and sociolegal approaches.
Rather than applying an isolated legal perspective, the author
integrates a behavioral, business, jurisprudence, legal,
philosophical, and psychosocial perspective because the law
does not function in isolation from the human condition
9.0 Overview of the Chapter
This chapter provides a summary of the research findings proposed in
Chapter One. The chapter will show that, from an academic perspective,
bifurcation of information privacy, data protection, and data security is in some
people’s self interest; however, from a legal perspective, bifurcation of
information privacy, data protection, and data security is not justified. The
comparative positive law analysis of the subject countries will involve
independent socio-legal data that will be presented. A meta-analysis of the
subject countries’ analysis of legal and policy approaches will be examined.
The legal justifications for DPSIP will be explored. The chapter will present a
textual analysis of international and specific national DPSIP statutes to aide in
the understanding of current issues and future developments of DPSIP law in
SA and the international community.
9.1 Summary of Research Question Findings
The basic questions and objectives investigated in this thesis were based on
Sir Edward William Cooke’s legal interpretation standards set in Heydon’s
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Case.1 The issues were addressed as they relate to the legal challenges of
DPSIP legal concerns. The summary includes the general and specific
research questions posed, and the author’s responses based on the research
findings.
1. What was the common law before the advent of personal
information becoming a commodity and means of social control?
Before the evolution to the information age and advances in
information technology, each country and geographical area addressed
DPSIP legal issues based on local cultural and legal standards.
Minimal threats to privacy existed because of the time and effort
needed to compile massive amounts of information.2
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did
not provide? The common law focused on past principles and was ill
prepared for massive accelerated information change. Specifically, the
common law principle of stare decisis3 was ill prepared for massive
business, economic, political, social, and technological shifts. The
common law standard was reactive rather than proactive, and it was ill
prepared for new threats that were based on greed and social control
by business and government policies. Governments claimed that the
end justified the means; businesses claimed the divine rights of kings
and queens to harvest profits.4
3. What comparative legal principles and procedures formed the
“cure for the diseases” of the invasions of DPSIP? The current
study has explored the legal justifications for DPSIP legislation and
regulation based on the best practices of the countries studied.
International and social legal data supports the solution.
1 Heydon’s Case 76 Eng. Rep. 637, (1584). (UK)
2 See § 1.1 and 2.4.1 of this study.
3 Stare decisis means to stand by things decided.
4 For a chronology from 1791 to 2011, see Robert Gellman & Pam Dixon, Online Privacy,
(Contemporary World Issues, ABC-CLIO ed. 2011) at 107-126.
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4. How can SA best respond to the DPSIP law principles? The
current chapter proposes specific recommendations that SA should
and must consider to meet and extend international DPSIP standards.
SA can ignore international DPSIP standards, follow the trend, or
advance DPSIP protections.
The general research questions were as follows:
1. Could the law effectively respond to the fundamental DPSIP legal
principles raised by computer technology and the information
economy violations? In some of the countries and areas analyzed in
this study, international-specific and country-specific DPSIP laws do
respond to DPSIP issues effectively. Even effective DPSIP legal
approaches must be periodically re-evaluated to meet current deviant
practices.
2. What were the national and international legal standards related to
DPSIP legal principles before the advent of computer technology
and the information economy violations? Some countries (e.g., the
US) developed privacy-related tort violations. Other countries (e.g., the
UK and SA) resisted such an approach. Early responses to the
technology threat were generally advisory guidelines.5
3. What DPSIP flaws and defects did the computer technology and the
information economy create that the existing law did not
adequately protect? Justice Michael D. Kirby summarizes the AU
view of DPSIP issues. He argues that historically information privacy
has been protected by costs, inconvenience, impermanency, and
indexing problems. The privacy concerns that began with the modern
computer era in the 1980s have increased due to technical
developments that have raised the accessibility, power, storage
5 For a historical and legal analysis see Gini Graham Scott, The Death of Privacy: The Battle
for Personal Privacy in the Courts, The Media, and Society, (Changemakers
Publishing and Writing ed. 2011). See Chapter 3 of this study.
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capacity, and speed of computer processing. Justice Kirby argues that
the right to confidentiality of communications, honor, privacy, and
reputation must be protected.6
4. What DPSIP legal principles and procedures should form the
“cure of the diseases” of the new information economy
violations? SA has the option of passing legislation that brings it into
the general EU DPSIP 2.0 standards or moving to address the more
current DPSIP 3.0 standards.7 The data from the current study argues
that all of the countries in the study must move towards adopting
DPSIP 3.0 legal standards.
5. How can the law best respond to computer technology and the
information economy challenges of fundamental principles of
DPSIP law? SA has the option of passing legislation that brings it into
the general EU DPSIP 2.0 standards; otherwise, it can move to
address the more current DPSIP 3.0 standards.8 The data from the
current study supports the argument that all of the countries in the
study must move to adopting DPSIP 3.0 legal standards.
Specific research questions were as follows:
1. Can DPSIP be protected from computer technology and the
information economy violations? Appropriate laws, regulations,
incentives, and structures can require that business and government
organizations comply with DPSIP 3.0 standards.9 The basis of the
approach must be interdisciplinary, comparative, progressive, and
based on the rule of law.
6 The Hon Justice Michael D. Kirby, Privacy in Cyberspace, 21 University of New South Wales
Law Journal 2, 323 (1998), at 323. See also §§ 1.2 and 2.3 of this study.
7 See § 9.6 of this chapter.
8 See § 9.6 of this chapter.
9 Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth,
and Happiness, (Yale University Press ed. 2008).
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2. What were the appropriate DPSIP laws, and what were they based
on? The current study has addressed this essential question. The
author argues10 that the basis of an effective DPSIP legal approach
must be interdisciplinary, comparative, progressive, and based on the
rule of law as noted above.
3. How are DPSIP legal principles violated? Businesses and
governments violate DPSIP legal principles because of greed,
negligence, and weakened technology standards. Legislative
corruption and judicial recalcitrance have delayed, weakened, and
violated basic rule of law principles. Some political leaders in the
countries studied seek a democracy that protects civil and human
rights; whereas, others seek a corporate republic that serves corporate
interests and a fascist state.
4. Should DPSIP legal principles ever be violated? No. However,
when legal justification exists, with court approval and established
checks and balances, certain reasonable and unambiguous
established exemptions must be allowed.
5. Does a proposal exist on how to best establish DPSIP law
protections? Respectfully, the current study and recommendations in
this chapter present a proposal on how SA and the other countries in
the study can best establish effective DPSIP legal protections. The
basic recommendation conflicts with some business and political
interest groups’ positions as has been seen in the opposition to the SA
proposed DPSIP law. The charge of the study is that the issues must
be periodically re-evaluated. To be effective, DPSIP laws and
regulations must become proactive rather than reactive. The only way
to meet this challenge is to establish an independent authority to
monitor developments in the field that has the power and authority to
regulate and adjudicate DPSIP issues.
10 See Chapters 3 through 9 of this study for the author’s rationale.
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The current study replicates and validates the findings of previous
independent studies on international DPSIP efforts.11 Countries like SA12 have
yet to fully establish DPSIP legal principles. The US has failed because of a
policy and legal commitment to self-regulation. The self-regulation policy has
allowed corporations and government agencies to use personal information
data as they see fit. As noted in previous chapters, the data protection
response of the EU, AU, CA, and the UK have resulted in some legal and
policy failures.
In all of the countries in this study, DPSIP protections remain a concern.
Many of the national laws explored in this study have not adapted to
technological advancements. Significant protection gaps exist because of
inadequate enforcement and monitoring. Those countries that have stronger
DPSIP laws exempt police services from any DPSIP responsibilities or even
warrants. Countries like the US and AU exempt many businesses.13
Companies in all of the countries ignore DPSIP policies and claim ownership
of and use data for marketing purposes.14
Organizations in the countries studied in this work are constantly collecting
and retaining more information regarding more people. Such collection
continues even when a person has opted out. The data is used for purposes
that are not transparent, and the information is often shared with other
businesses and government organizations. Few DPSIP laws provide an
individual right of action, and even when an individual right exists, the
11 See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey
of Privacy Laws and Practice. (2008), at http://www.gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html
(last visited on 16 July 2012) and Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal
Privacy in an Information Society. (1977), at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/ (last visited on 29 July 2012).
12 As of 20 August 2013, SA has passed the POIP Act. At the time of this writing, the bill has
not been signed.
13 See Chapters 4 and 8 in this study.
14 Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of
Privacy Laws and Practice. (2008), at http://www.gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html
(last visited on 16 July 2012)
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standards for damages are unrealistic. Technology developers do not insure
that protections are protected by design.15
9.1.1 Is the Bifurcation of Information Privacy, Data Protection, and Data
Security Justified?
Jack M. Balkin16 recognizes the existence of surveillance states. The
essential question is whether governments will protect the people and
require that both public and private surveillance conform to the rule of
law. DPSIP laws and regulations that apply to private and public
information gathering and use are critical to maintaining the rule of law.
Information privacy is the term used in the US; data protection is the
term used in most of the world. Data security refers to information
technology practices and standards to make data and systems secure.
For some time, the two fields were considered to be different.
Information privacy and data protection were considered to be topics of
legal concern. Data security was considered to be an area of interest in
information technology and risk management.17
Such a bifurcation may be academically viable; however, the two areas
are interconnected.18 One cannot have data protection without data
security. The reverse is also true. DPSIP legislation and regulation
must address issues related to both protection and security.
15 Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society. (1977),
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/ (last visited on 29 July 2012).
16 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 Minnesota Law
Review 1, 1 (2008), at 3-4. See also Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National
Surveillance State, in The Constitution in 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
Oxford University Press 2009) at 198.
17 See Susan Landau, Surveillance or Security? The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping
Technologies, (The MIT Press ed. 2010).
18 See § 3.3.7 of this study.
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9.2 Legal Analysis
The focus of this study included a sociolegal analysis of DPSIP issues. The
study included a comparative law - business practices, analysis. A positive
law analysis was also conducted. The focus addressed DPSIP issues
internationally and in five different countries.
9.2.1 Sociolegal Analysis
The analysis included a review of fundamental principles of the rule of law and
sources of law. The relevant areas of the law were presented. The study
explored data on special interest corruption issues. The problems of
willingness to enforce DPSIP standards were explored.
Relevant sources of DPSIP laws were examined. Related areas of the law
were addressed. The study concludes with a review of DPSIP 3.0 best
practices. The following figure graphically presents the mind map19 used to
analyze related connections.
19 A mind map is a visual diagram used to examine and present complex information in a
rational model. The map starts with a central node or core concept. Lesser nodes
represent the major categories of the central concept. The map shows the
subcategories of the lesser categories. For centuries, mind maps have be used to
assist brainstorming, problem solving, and visual thinking by educators, engineers,
philosophers, and psychologists. Mind maps are used to generate ideas, make
decisions, and solve problems. Mind maps helps to direct the study and organization
of information.
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Figure 9.0 Sociolegal Analysis
9.2.2 Comparative Law - Business Practices
As a part of the comparative law analysis of the countries in the current study,
a number of related international studies were reviewed and the data re-
analyzed following a meta-analysis model. Relevant data was extracted from
the World Economic Forum global information technology report and the
privacy international study of major corporations. This analysis places the
DPSIP issues in a relevant objective perspective.20
The World Economic Forum21 publishes a global information technology
report. The report studies data from 138 countries that account for ninety-
eight percent of the world’s gross domestic product. Countries are ranked
from the best (lower scores) to worst (higher scores). A number of DPSIP
related issues are addressed in the report. The rankings on usage data and
regulatory data factors for the five countries in this study are reported in the
following table. The country related to this study with the highest score in
each category is noted in bold.
20 See Chapters 4 – 8 of the current study.
21 Soumitra Dutta & Irene Mia, The Global Information Technology Report 2010–2011:
Transformations 2.0 (World Economic Forum. 2011).
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Table 9.0 Comparative Technology and Regulatory Data
Issue AU CA SA UK US
Usage Data
Networked readiness22 17 8 61 15 5
Internet users23 20 11 107 7 15
Use of virtual social networks24 9 6 88 3 12
Extent of business Internet use25 20 8 52 6 7
Usage data weighted average 16.5 8.25 77 7.75 9.75
Regulatory Data
Freedom of the press26 16 9 20 18 38
Effectiveness of law-making
bodies27
4 11 29 12 45
Laws relating to information and
communication technologies28
9 10 32 15 16
Judicial independence29 9 11 43 8 34
Efficiency of legal framework in
settling disputes30
12 14 19 8 33
Efficiency of legal framework in
challenging regulations31
13 18 20 16 35
Protection of asset and property 14 10 29 17 40
22 Id. at xix.
23 Id. at 372.
24 Id. at 374.
25 Id. at 380.
26 Id. at 317.
27 Id. at 320.
28 Id. at 312.
29 Id. at 322.
30 Id. at 323.
31 Id. at 324.
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rights32
Intellectual property protection33 14 13 27 17 24
Regulatory data weighted
average
11.38 12 27.38 13.88 33.13
The usage data scale34 reports the international rankings on networked
readiness, number of Internet users, virtual social network users, and
business Internet usage. Of the countries in the current study the UK earned
the highest ranking followed by CA, the US, and AU. SA ranked a little lower
than the international mean. However, the score is an indication of a number
of opportunity factors not necessarily related to usage data. SA is above the
international mean for business Internet usage and networked readiness.
The regulatory data scale35 addresses several important issues that can
impact current and future DPSIP regulatory issues. Freedom of the press is a
measure of press control by government and corporate sources. The
measure is often not supportive of DPSIP regulatory efforts. Effectiveness of
law-making bodies indicates how successful law makers may be at legislating
DPSIP standards. A further measure is the level of laws relating to
information and communication technologies. Judicial independence is a
measure of how effective the courts may be in developing and enforcing
DPSIP standards. Ineffective or non-existent DPSIP regulations require an
effective legal framework to challenge erroneous regulations or gaps in
regulations. DPSIP legislation requires the legal framework to be effective in
settling disputes. The level of intellectual property protection has a potential
for strong DPSIP legal standards; however, it can also show a strong anti-
DPSIP preference for businesses over the interests of people. A similar
dynamic can be found in measures of protection of asset and property rights.
AU, CA, and the UK have the highest scales of the countries studied. The
32 Id. at 325.
33 Id. at 326.
34 The scale was developed using the raw data reported in the World Economic Forum’s
original study.
35 Ibid.
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difference between AU and CA is statistically small. Prior chapters have
shown that CA has much stronger DPSIP legislative and regulatory programs.
The SA data suggest possible reasons why the country has been slow to
develop strong DPSIP legislation. The US data provides insight into the
ineffectiveness of the historic sectoral approach, self-regulation, and a refusal
to adopt modern DPSIP legal standards.
The data from the current study provides some insights into the DPSIP laws
and approaches of the subject countries. Not all factors are a zero-sum
game; instead, SA can view the issues on a continuum of polar opposites.
Are DPSIP legal issues one of corporate liberty that includes the view of
“buyer beware,” or is it aimed at the protection of dignity and of the individual
and of community interests? Is the justification one of economic rights of the
corporate republic, or the political rights and interests of the people and
society? Should the approach be sectoral or comprehensive? Should the
oversight of DPSIP laws and practices be ruled by market and political forces
or a truly independent government office? Should the DPSIP legal standards
be fragmented or comprehensive? When a balance is required, should the
law favor the capitalistic interests of businesses, corporations, and the super
rich, or should it favor maintaining cultural and legal standards of the rule of
law, human rights, and the social contract? Given the reality of judicial
biases, such standards must be included in the legislative mandate.
An independent international study that included the countries in the current
study addressed DPSIP and surveillance issues.36 The findings are consistent
with the data in the current study. The US and UK ranked as endemic
surveillance societies—the lowest rating. AU and SA ranked as having a
systemic failure to uphold safeguards. CA ranked as having some safeguards
but weakened protections; however, it did not make the list of countries with
the worst DPSIP records. AU made the worst records list for not having
DPSIP constitutional protections. SA ranked in the list of countries with the
36 Privacy International, Leading Surveillance Societies in the EU and the World 2007. (2007,
December 28), at http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-
559597 (last visited on 2 January 2008).
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worst record because of its communication data and retention policies, poor
privacy enforcement; and lack of statutory protections. The UK made the
worst DPSIP list because of its border and transborder issues, communication
data retention policies, communications interception practices, lack of
constitutional DPSIP protections, data-sharing practices, use of identity cards
and biometrics, as well as surveillance of medical, financial, and movement
practices, and visual surveillance. The US made the list for border and
transborder issues; communications interception practices; use of identity
cards and biometrics; lack of privacy enforcement; lack of privacy leadership;
lack of statutory protections; surveillance of medical, financial and movement
practices; visual surveillance; and workplace monitoring.
Privacy International37 examined twenty-three “consumer-facing” companies.
The population included firms noted on lists of different top fifty to top 500
firms. The selection measures included market share, number of users,
services offered, and site traffic. Rankings were based on corporate
administrative details, corporate leadership on DPSIP issues, customer and
user controls, data collection and processing standards, and data retention
policies. The companies were also evaluated on their ethical compass, fair
gateways and authentication processes, openness and transparency, use of
privacy-enhancing innovations and privacy invasive innovations, and
responsiveness.
The corporations that were “generally privacy-aware but in need of
improvement”38 included the BBC, eBay, Last.fm, LiveJournal, and Wikipedia.
The companies that were “generally aware of privacy rights, but demonstrate
some notable lapses”39 included Amazon, Bebo, Friendster, LinkedIn,
Myspace, and Skype. The organizations that showed “serious lapses in
37 Privacy International, A Race to the Bottom - Privacy Ranking of Internet Service
Companies. (2007), at https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/race-bottom-
privacy-ranking-internet-service-companies (last visited on 2 June 2012). Privacy
International is a global organization whose mission is “to defend the right to privacy
across the world, and to fight surveillance and other intrusions into private life by
governments and corporations.”
38 Id. at 1.
39 Id. at 1.
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privacy practices”40 included Microsoft, Orkut, Xanga, and YouTube. The
corporations that showed “substantial and serious privacy threats”41 included
AOL, Apple, Facebook, Hi5, Reunion.com, Windows Live Space, and Yahoo!
Google was the one organization that was rated as having a “comprehensive
consumer surveillance and entrenched hostility to privacy.”42 The data reveals
that DPSIP legal issues relate to governments and businesses.
9.2.3 Comparative DPSIP Positive Law Analysis
Relevant sources of DPSIP laws were examined. Related areas of the law
were addressed. An analysis of each of the DPSIP standards established by
the countries in the study standards was assessed.
9.2.3.1 Legal Support of DPSIP Protections
All of the countries in the study are signatories of various International Human
Rights agreements. Only CA and the UK are approved under the EU DPSIP
standards. AU has attempted to meet the EU standards; however it has not
been granted approved status. The US has negotiated a Safe Harbor
agreement with the EU. SA is still attempting to establish compliance
standards. AU and the US have been involved in the establishment of APEC
DPSIP standards, which offer fewer data protections than the EU standards.43
Of the countries studied, only SA has a clear Constitutional privacy protection
clause. The US Supreme Court has found a penumbra in the Bill of Rights for
privacy protections. While SA is currently working on a national DPSIP law,
the other countries in the study already have DPSIP laws. The US approach
tends to be contradictory based on the industry sector. Limited or mixed
DPSIP related common law is found in the countries studied.44
40 Id. at 1.
41 Id. at 1.
42 Id. at 1.
43 See tables 4.1, 5.3, 6.2, 7.2, and 8.9 of the current work.
44 Ibid.
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With the exception of some states in the US, the countries studied do not
have provincial or state DPSIP constitutional declarations. Provincial or state
DPSIP legislative efforts have been found in AU, CA, the UK, and the US.
DPSIP related common law has also been established in these countries on
the provincial or state level.45
9.2.3.2 Support of Corporate Privacy and Data Property Protection
Issues
All of the countries studied provide for protections of copyright, data base,
patent, trade mark, service mark, and for trade secret protections on the basis
of a property right.46
None of the countries in the study require a privacy impact audit prior to any
use. Only AU requires a limited privacy impact audit before government
protections are granted. CA and the UK have provided for checks and
balances on corporate collection, use, and transfer of individual DPSIP data.
AU has limited checks and balance protection on such practices.47
9.2.3.3 DPSIP Declarations
Of the four countries that have passed DPSIP legislation, all have provided
key definitions for personal and sensitive information. Unfortunately, the
definitions are all technologically outdated. None of the current definitions
effectively address advanced data mining technologies or make all data
holders and users accountable to DPSIP standards.48
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
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9.2.3.4 Regulatory Agency Powers
Of the countries studied, only the US has some independent regulatory
agencies that do not directly report to the executive or legislative branches.
All of the regulatory agencies in the study have administrative powers,
investigative powers, and an educational function. All of the agencies have
defined responsibilities, accountability standards, and require the appointment
of a governmental chief privacy officer or commissioner. None of the
countries require businesses to do privacy audits.49
The AU DPSIP agency does not have strong enforcement or regulatory
powers. CA and the US do not mandate that governmental privacy audits be
required as part of legislation passage. AU does not require a business chief privacy
officer or commissioner. CA does not hold employees personally liable for DPSIP
violations.50
9.2.3.5 Sectoral DPSIP Legislation
All of the countries in the study provide some DPSIP protections for industry
sectors. All restrict credit reporting agencies. AU has the strongest credit
reporting agency restrictions and provides a model for all. All of the countries
protect individual health information, with some exceptions. All of the
countries are attempting to confront the DPSIP risks related to electronic
health or medical records. CA and the UK do not provide for criminal justice
record restrictions. The US has limited restrictions on criminal justice records.
AU has the strongest restrictions on criminal justice records and provides a
model for all.51
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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9.2.3.6 DPSIP Data Controller Standards
All of the countries in the study establish some standards for data controllers.
With the exception of the latest SA Bill, all of the countries in the study require
a notification requirement and allow Opt-Out provisions. Only the UK does
not provide for any Opt-In provisions. All of the countries in the study require
that collected data be accurate, complete, and limited to needed data; be
lawful and fair, not misleading; and be relevant, and up to date. Each
provides standards for data quality and integrity, data retention limitations,
openness on the information held, and system access controls. Only some
states in the US require breach notification standards and breach penalties.52
9.2.3.7 DPSIP Data Processor Requirements
All of the countries that have passed DPSIP legislation require some form of
informed consent for data processing. A rationale for the processing should
be provided, and the processing must be fair and legal. The processing must
also be accurate, timely, and protect sensitive information. The standards for
the duration of record keeping are limited. AU, CA, and UK standards allow
for limited data ownership by the subject. SA and the US do not accept the
ownership of data by the subject. AU and CA do not provide data subjects
the right to have control over access. All of the countries studied allow data
subjects to have the limited power to alter, amend, correct, or delete data
errors. Each provides for a limited notification requirement for data subjects.53
9.2.3.8 DPSIP Data Security Standards
Generally, the countries in the study require that data security standards and
technology be state-of-the-art. Tracking of the security processes is not
required once data has been merged. The US has no such standard at all for
merged data. Adequate safeguards are mandated by the other countries.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
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The standard is only adequate encryption. The security process must protect
from unauthorized alteration, disclosure, misuse, and internal and external
unauthorized access. AU provides for civil and criminal penalties for
unauthorized access. CA, the UK, and the US provide for access penalties
based on the cause of action. AU and CA do not allow a technology cost of
implementation defense. None of the countries in the study provide for strong
remedies for data security inadequacies.54
The data shows a wide variance in the DPSIP responses between the
countries in the study. Such a situation sends mixed messages and
inconsistent standards to businesses, governments, and the people.
9.3 DPSIP Legal Justification
Robert Gellman and Pam Dixon recently summarized the legal justification for
DPSIP concerns. In addressing issues of information privacy, Gellman and
Dixon wrote that “privacy is a right, a human right, a legal right, a moral right,
a property right, a positive right, a negative right, a value, and an economic
interest, a personal interest, a societal interest, and other things.”55 DPSIP
standards focus on legal principles and the security of individuals, business,
and government data. The issues include asset protection, contract law,
information control, intellectual property law, property law, tort law, and
privacy law conflicts.
The DPSIP protection model suggests that data protection and information
privacy is an individual right; more importantly, it is a societal protection from
misuse of power. The model empowers the individual to access and control
information privacy data and increases the need for state-of-the-art data
protection security for those who hold the data.56
54 Ibid.
55 Robert Gellman & Pam Dixon, Online Privacy: A Reference Handbook, (ABC-CLIO, LLC
ed. 2011), at 1.
56 See § 2.7.1 of this work.
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Informed consent, confidentiality, due process, and privacy legal principles
must apply to all data protection and information privacy recordkeeping
systems. These principles must be considered whenever an information
privacy contract is formed. Collection and use of personal information
requires a contract clearly affirmed through standard contacting principles. A
valid offer, acceptance, consideration, intent to be bound, specific terms, and
performance should be required.57
DPSIP law is justified under the principles of information and knowledge
control law.58 Pricilla Regan defined privacy as a collective value, not just an
individual value, based on the economic view of collective and public goods.
One can not benefit from a collective good without others benefiting.59 Free
riders, government or business, should not use information without legally
obtaining consent and paying for it.60 Alan Westin advocated the need for
individuals to have control over their personal information. He argued that
free societies recognize a personal information privacy right. Only
extraordinary exceptions should trump this right.61
Whether by intent, design, or regulatory ignorance, intellectual property law
has become a major force negating some DPSIP legal issues.62 Granting
anti-privacy intellectual property protections gives owners considerable legal
power and protection. The intellectual property codes do not require any type
of environmental or information technology impact study prior to granting a
patent or copyright. Because of this failure, legal protections as applied to
technology or software that violate privacy rights must be re-considered to
stay current with regulatory standards in other fields. Two major problems
have arisen: first, software patents started, despite a long history against
awarding protections to mathematical formulations and business practices.
57 See § 2.7.2 of this work.
58 See § 2.7.3 of this study.
59 Pricilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy
(University of North Carolina Press 1995), at 227.
60 Id. at 228.
61Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom, at 42 (Atheneum 1967).
62 See Chapter 5.
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Second, cookies received legal protection without being subject to a sound
legal review.63
The economic value of information in the current era cannot be denied. Large
corporations and even some courts claim that information is a financial
property asset; however, little attention is given to the original owners and
creators. Personal information can be bought and sold, has high value, and is
measurable. Moreover, license rights can be assigned and transferred.
Individuals whose private information is collected in data bases have property
rights to that information or data. The information, similar to a copyright, is
owned by the author, the data subject.64 Adam Moore65 further argues that
information privacy is an intangible property right. Personal information is
owned by the subject of the information; the person must be able to restrict
the use as privacy property right. Frank H. Esterbrook66 argues that intangible
intellectual property is “no less the fruit of one’s labor than is physical
property”.67
Vine Deloria Jr. and David Wilins68 advance the position that property relates
to individuality, personal freedom, and sovereignty contrasted to material
objects. The existence of intellectual property protections supports this view.
Personal information and traditional views of property are like matter and
energy: each is inseparable – neither is dominating. The law must recognize
each issue as equal. The legal principles afforded to one must be applied to
the other. The Deloria and Wilins position is built upon the classic work of
63 See § 2.7.4 of this study.
64 Brian Gongol, Privacy as a Property Right (2006), at
http://www.gongol.com/research/economics/privacypropertyright/ (last visited on
2012, November 1).
65 Adam D. Moore, Intangible Property: Privacy, Power, and Information Control, in
Information Ethics: Privacy, Property, and Power (Adam D. Moore ed., University of
Washington Press 2005).
66 Frank H. Esterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, in Information Ethics: Privacy,
Property, and Power (Adam D. Moore ed., University of Washington Press 2005) at
117. See also § 2.75 of this study.
67 See § 2.7.5 of this study.
68 Vine Deloria Jr. & David E. Wilkins, The Legal Universe: Observations on the Foundation of
American Law ( Fulcrum Publishing ed. 2011).
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Charles A. Reich.69 Reich argued that property was not a tangible product;
however, it was a relationship that produced income and value. Governments
establish occupational and professional licenses based on individual behavior
which is considered a property right. Data subject information is a form of
wealth and property owned by the subject.70 The function of such property is
to protect the dignity, independence, and pluralism over which the majority or
other forces have to yield to the individual. In this sense, property is not
tangible but a set of behaviors and relationships that produce value created
by the data subject, thus forming a circle of legal protection. Businesses,
governments, and organizations must compensate, explain, and justify any
interference with or taking of such property.
Edward Bloustein argued that "privacy began its modern history as a tort."71
Privacy tort law began with the publication of an article by Warren and
Brandeis. In the work, the authors advocated protections against unwanted
publication of personal information while protecting the "products and
processes of the mind"72 and protecting one’s "inviolate personality."73 The
authors argued that "political, social and economic changes entail
recognition of new rights, and the common law ... grows to meet the demands
of society."74 Warren and Brandeis argued that privacy rights required
“protection, without the interposition of the legislature"75
In January 2012, the Ontario Court of Appeals of CA76 first recognized an
intrusion upon seclusion tort.77 The Court found that DPSIP issues are
essential to the individual’s well being, and are a fundamental democratic
value worthy of protection under the law.
69 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 The Yale Law Journal 5, 733 (1964).
70 Even if only as the owner of raw materials.
71 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 New York University Law Review 962 (1964), at 963.
72 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review 5,
193 (1890), at 194.
73 Id. at 192.
74 Id. at 193.
75 Id. at 195. See § 2.7.6 of this study.
76 The highest Court in the Providence
77 Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, (18 January 2012). (CA)
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9.4 Comparative Legal and Policy Research Findings
A linguistic textual analysis was conducted on the DPSIP international
documents presented in this study.78 This qualitative research method
determines common related concepts, as well as identifies key legal issues
and regulatory responses.79 The analysis shows that there are generally
accepted legal and regulatory recommendations and standards. The
consensus is that the law must provide for an independent regulatory body
with considerable power, and that it must require a DPSIP authority at the
government and business organization level. This analysis forms the basis of
DPSIP 3.0 recommendations.
DPSIP law and regulations must provide for inspection activities to evaluate
information business activities including an analysis of competition practices.
Inspection activities extend to all processes related to individual data and
information and to the quality of that data and information. Inspection of
individual or group objections to the practices of an organization holding such
data is required.
The regulatory body must have the authority to insure legal compliance,
establish regulatory guidelines, and adjudicate disputes. This authority
includes the right to inspect organizational DPSIP-related practices. The
authority of the regulatory body must extend to business and government
organizations’ data and information practices. The regulatory body must also
have the authority to insure compliance with DPSIP principles, processing
standards, and security protections. In addition, the regulatory body must
have the authority to monitor competitive standards across economic sectors,
insure acceptable confirmation standards (including state-of-the-art
technology), and mediate objections.
78 See Chapter 3 International Legal Standards & Guidelines.
79 See Chapter § 1.12 Data Processing and Analysis.
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The regulatory body must insure organizational compliance with DPSIP laws
and regulations including collection and use of data, individual rights, and
DPSIP principles. A legal compliance balance is needed to limit deviate
behaviors and acceptable legal standards. Specific areas of concern include
collection practices, insuring an informed consent, and data processing
practices. Organizations have an obligation to protect personal civil rights
around DPSIP issues and to implement consumer protection standards on the
range of use of data issues.
The regulatory body must also perform an educational function. The public
and organizations must be educated on current data practice standards and
changes in DPSIP legal principles.
The regulatory body must also have the power to monitor and set standards
for data collection practices. The standards include any policy changes,
individual access to records, and consumer protections and human rights.
The regulatory body must issue confirmation reports related to business and
government compliance, inspections, and information practices. The
confirmation reports include practices related to data protection and security
compliance, adherence to data protection principles, as well as individual civil
and human rights.
The regulatory body must insure that an informed consent is provided by data
subjects for the collection and use of personal information. The data subjects
must be asked and provide informed consent for every collection, processing,
and data transfer function.
The regulatory body must insure that contract law principles are enforced in
all DPSIP functions; specifically, there must be a means to balance the
contracting power differences, collection and processing consents. Data
processing and systems that do not identify personal-related data directly or
indirectly must have a competent informed consent.
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The body must insure that data controllers abide by individual identification
principles as well as by DPSIP legal and regulatory principles including
confirmation of compliance with contract law provisions as they apply to data
collection and processing. The regulatory body must insure that those
functions that are generally exempted from standard DPSIP regulations still
comply with checks and balances. Such organizations must still follow the
spirit of DPSIP and rule of law principles.
Finally, the regulatory body must have the power and obligation to monitor the
processing and use of all personal data processes and insure that legal
protections are provided. State-of-the-art data security principles and
practices must be applied in all DPSIP situations. The following graph80
shows the textual analysis of the interconnections discussed above.
80 Textual analysis results are presented numerically and in a graphic presentation. The
graphic presentation includes a data legend. The shared responses are presented by
connection lines of various widths and darkness. The wider and darker lines
represent a higher number of shared responses. The number of data points as noted
by the respondents is represented by circles at the connection nodes. The size of the
circle represents the range of respondents. Larger circles represent key concepts
and issues.
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Figure 9.1 International DPSIP Textual Analysis
Graph 9.1 shows the interconnections noted in the proceeding paragraphs.
The graph reveals the need for a comprehensive DPSIP approach. DPSIP
issues are a systemic problem that requires a system level resolution.
9.5 Comparative Textual Research Findings
This data reveals that current DPSIP legal and regulatory update efforts and
the SA approach can benefit from a linguistic analysis. Prior to the
advancements in technology and the development of advanced data mining
technology practices, the concept of regulating personally identifiable
information (PII) was sufficient. Discrete PII identification currently provides
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little protection. The interrelated categories of terms must be considered in
modern DPSIP legislation and regulatory efforts.
9.5.1 Definition: Data Protection
The following graph reveals the inter-relationship of key terms related to data
protection legislation based on standard qualitative textual analysis methods.
The database included information drawn from AU, CA, EU, SA, UK, and the
US. Each term refers to personally identifiable information and data security.
The analysis shows some common use of terms. The findings are noted in
the following figure:
Figure 9.2 Data Protection Terms
An effective DPSIP approach must address the interconnections of privacy,
data protection, and data security. The connections must address technical
and policy protections. Users need to be aware of the risks and safeguards.
The relationship of key terms related to DPSIP legislation in AU, CA, the EU,
SA, UK, and the US were analyzed using standard qualitative textual analysis
methods. The finding is noted in the following figure:
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Figure 9.3 Term Relationships
The common themes of the selected data protection legislation reveal that
such legislation involves the regulation of technical devices and access to
information about individuals. These legislative acts provide limited
safeguards to protect privacy concerns.
Access includes either accessing or obtaining access to data. Belief
embraces personal and religious beliefs. Clients consist of actual clients and
client files. Data incorporates access to data from data bases, electronic data
files, personal data, security of data, sensitive personal data, test data, and
use of data. Individual refers to living individual human beings. Information
comprises accountability for information, confidential information,
heterogeneous information systems, information, and sensitive stored
information.
9.5.2 Textual Definitions: Information Privacy
Data protection is the term most often used in the EU and its member nations
for personally identifiable information. Information privacy is the term most
often used in CA and the US. Although the two terms are similar, it is
important to further define information privacy and examine legislative
exceptions.
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The following graph shows the information privacy law definitions of privacy
based on standard qualitative textual analysis methods. The data is based on
legislative acts and the legal literature.
Figure 9.4 Privacy Definitions
The individual category includes identifiable human individuals or persons.
The information category comprises personal correspondence, papers, and
personally identifiable data. The term people encompasses family, home,
houses, leading one’s own life, likeness, and reputation. Privacy consists of
invasions, false light, and property rights. Private affairs include
communications, life, organizations, and related personal affairs. Publicity
incorporates release of embarrassing information that can detract from one’s
reputation and false light publicity. Right includes the right to have one’s data
and private information free from unwanted uses, protected, and secure.
Unlawful interference covers appropriation, arbitrary, interference, misuse, not
duly authorized, not reasonable, seizures, unlawful, and wrong.
The following graph reveals a range of operational definitions based on
standard qualitative textual analysis methods. The data is based on
progressive legislative acts.
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Figure 9.5 Operational Definitions
This analysis of data protection and information privacy legislation reveals
considerable overlap in the listing of sensitive data. While some are more
complete than others, there are essentially eight data classifications: biometric
data, data, financial, government ID, information, Internet, name, and
personal information.
Biometric data includes unique fingerprint, iris image, retina image, voiceprint,
or other unique physical representation. Data comprises unencrypted data
elements. Financial data consists of access codes, access to personal
financial data, account numbers, balances, credit card numbers, credit cards,
debit cards, debit card numbers, financial account data, financial resources,
and tax information. Government ID encompasses driver’s license numbers,
government ID cards and numbers, motor vehicle license numbers and data,
non-driver ID card data, social security numbers, and data.
Information data contains membership information, personal ID information,
phone number, photo ID card data, and residence data. Internet includes
electronic access codes, codes, identification numbers, Internet accounts,
passwords, and security codes. Name covers an individual’s first initial, first
name, last name, middle initial, middle name, surname, and user name. The
name is usually tied to one or more other categories of data and information
privacy. Personal information includes date of birth, electronic signature,
employer, and mother’s maiden name. Personal information also
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incorporates sensitive personal data. Such data consists of association or
union membership, criminal charges or record, ethnic origin, mental condition
or health, physical condition or health, political opinions, racial identification,
religious beliefs, and sexual life.
With the exception of the listings in the categories for biometric data and
information data, the majority of all of the data categories are noted in the
legislative acts. Biometric data is related to the date of the Act and use of
such technologies. The information category is also related to older Acts and
court decisions on directory data ownership.
An essential part of any information privacy law definition includes those
factors excluded from legal regulation. The findings regarding the categories
of such exclusions are based on standard qualitative textual analysis methods
and shown in the following graph.
Figure 9.6 Exclusions
Available comprises information that is publicly available including distributed
directories. Distributed focuses on available information distributed through
the full range of media resources. Information incorporates available
published data. Local government records include available local or state
information, directories, or media releases. Media covers the full range of
information media resources. Media comprises bona fide advertising
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statements, association publications, charitable publications, fraternal
nonprofit corporations, broadcasts over radio or television, directories,
journals, magazines, news, news bureaus, newspapers, reporters, or any
other type of media activity entity or item. The list includes Internet posts,
blogs, and social media. The exclusions found in this analysis are
problematic. For example, if the government or a business wants to bypass
the letter and spirit of DPSIP principles, all it has to do is leak a story to the
press to make the data legally available for use for whatever purpose.
Of the legislation examined, only two pieces of legislation did not require data
protection and information privacy exemptions to be lawful. These two
jurisdictions allow for stolen information that is publicly released to be in the
public domain. That standard is a source of cognitive dissonance. The
majority of legislation requires that the collection, use, and distribution of the
data must be lawful. Data in federal, state, or local government files are
exempt; however, whether to release the data is a government decision. If
the government releases the information to the public, then privacy
constraints are ineffective.
If one seeks information under freedom of information acts, then the data is
again controlled by the government. One of the most troublesome features of
the exemption lists typically in place is a clause that allows widely distributed
media release of information privacy data that is otherwise protected. Under
these provisions, it was lawful for the George W. Bush administration to
release private and secret information identifying Valerie Plame Wilson81 as a
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operative. The Bush administration secretly
released the data to widely distributed media. The release of the data was
declared lawful because the data was released by the government; however,
the release was illegal under other national security laws.
81 Valerie Plame Wilson, Fair Game: My Life as a Spy, My Betrayal by the White House,
(Simon & Schuster ed. 2007).
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9.6 Summary
This chapter provided a summary of the research findings to the questions
proposed in Chapter One. This chapter showed that, from an academic
perspective, bifurcation of information privacy, data protection, and data
security is in some people’s self interest; however, from a legal perspective,
bifurcation of information privacy, data protection, and data security was not
justified. The comparative positive law analysis of the subject countries
involved independent socio-legal data. A meta-analysis of the subject
countries’ analysis of legal and policy approaches was examined. The legal
justifications for DPSIP laws and regulations ware explored. The chapter
presented a textual analysis of international and specific national DPSIP
statutes to aide in the understanding of current issues and future
developments of DPSIP law in SA and the international community.
Chapter ten will propose new Gold Standards of DPSIP protections. The
proposals are based on the comparative analysis of the current study and
reflect recent legal changes in DPSIP standards in the countries studied and
the EU reconsiderations of legal approaches. The proposals provide a means
for SA to take a lead in DPSIP protections.
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CHAPTER TEN: DATA PROTECTION AND SECURITY LAW:
GOLD STANDARD PROPOSAL
There are three major reasons for the movement towards
comprehensive privacy and data protection laws. Many
countries are adopting these laws comprehensive privacy and
data protection laws for one or more of three major reasons. :
To remedy past injustices. … To promote electronic commerce.
… To ensure laws are consistent with Pan-European laws.1
10.0 Overview of the Chapter
This chapter concludes the author’s research.2 The findings and
recommendations presented in this chapter are solely the author’s own; they
do not represent the legal or policy views of the faculty, research supervisor,
or the School of Law of the University of South Africa. The focus of the work
is to stimulate discussion and perhaps debate on what the author considers to
be key issues related to the development of DPSIP law internationally and
specifically in SA. The author maintains that SA faces a strategic choice:
follow historic Pan-European approaches or take the lead in national and
international DPSIP standards. Respectfully, SA can certainly make its own
decision. However, this chapter discusses the factors that legislators in SA
should consider when making their decision and proposes a DPSIP 3.0 gold
standard based on a comparative study of major international parties.
The chapter addresses the need for DPSIP legislation and regulation. The
approach to effective regulation must address the connection with data
1 Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of
Privacy Laws and Practice. (2008), at http://www.gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html
(last visited on 16 July 2012).
2 The views and recommendations in this chapter are based on the author’s interdisciplinary
research, education, training, and experience. The proposals do not necessarily
reflect the views of the law faculty at UNISA or the university. The proposals do not
necessarily reflect the views of any affiliation the author may have with organizations
or employers of the author. The purpose of this chapter is to stimulate academic and
professional dialogue and legal – policy development.
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security, protection, and privacy. Key DPSIP issues that must be addressed
are presented alphabetically to make the data easier to access. The issue
recommendations are based on the research conducted internationally and
from the countries included in the study. The chapter addresses the issue of
providing exemptions to DPSIP law and regulations. Alternative legal
considerations, limitations of the current study, and future research
recommendations are addressed. The chapter concludes with the need for
DPSIP vigilance.
10.1 Comparative Gold Standard of DPSIP Principles—DPSIP 3.0
From an international perspective, as noted in Chapter One, DPSIP laws and
policies have gone through four evolutional stages at this time:
 DPSIP 0 in which few DPSIP legal protections exist.
 DPSIP 1.0 which established some legal standards focused on limited
legal consent and notice.
 DPISP 2.0 which accepts personal information standards but does not
fully address security issues centered around a harm based legal
analysis, and
 DPSIP 3.0 in which sensitive and non-sensitive personal data is fused;
information privacy, data protection, and security issues are
interrelated; legal audits and checks and balances are needed for all
personal information stakeholders; new technologies are required to
pass privacy audits (e.g. RFID) and to employ the use of privacy
enhancing technologies in all new IP approvals.
The countries in the present study fall at various points along the continuum
between DPSIP 2.0 and DPISP 3.0. Justice Kirby of AU argues for enhanced
privacy rights, including a right not to be indexed. The positive principles
include the following rights: access to data, effective encryption of personal
communications, fair treatment, human checking of adverse decisions,
protection of personal information privacy, and understanding automated
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decisions.3 The CA standard is that information privacy is essential to the
democracy and the individual person. All personal information is owned by
the person who has the legal right to control the exchange of the information.4
The DPSIP law enacted in the CA province of Alberta clearly defines personal
information, breach notification, and transfer of information outside of CA
notification.5 DPSIP 3.0 legal and regulatory standards build on international
data protection and security standards6 rather than replacing them.
DPSIP 3.0 legal and regulatory standards must address all DPSIP players—
government, juristic, business and corporate, organizational, and natural
persons. The standards of data security and information privacy and data
protection standards must apply to all these persons. Establishing and
maintaining DPSIP legal checks and balances is essential. Legal and
regulatory DPSIP standards must be applicable to all or there is no rule of
law. DPSIP 3.0 protections require specific and unified principles. Dedicated
and powerful change agents are required for innovative implementation.7
10.2 Data Security
Historically, the fields of data security and data protection developed
independently. As the technology and applications evolved, it is evident that
there is no information privacy or data protection without computer and data
security protections. All DPSIP 3.0 legal standards must apply to private and
government data collectors, processors, and transfer of data processes. A
strict liability standard must be applied to the range of data security issues.
3 The Hon Justice Michael D. Kirby, Privacy in Cyberspace, 21 University of New South
Wales Law Journal 2, 323 (1998), at 323.
4 See R. v. Dyment, 2 S.C.R. 417 at 427-428, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 503, 66 C.R. (3d) 348, (1988),
427. (CA) and Information Canada, Privacy and Computers (A Report of a Task
Force Established Jointly by Department of Communications/Department of Justice)
(Author. 1972), 13.
5 See § 5.6.1 of this work.
6 See §§ 3.37, 3.5, 3.7 of this work.
7 See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will
Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (An Eamon Bolan Book/Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt ed. 2013); Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet
Freedom (PublicAffairs ed. 2011); and Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything, Click
Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism (PublicAffairs ed. 2013).
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The issues include controlling tracking tools like cookies by any name,
encryption options, filtering, identification authentication, phishing, and spam.
Intellectual property law standards must address associated data security
issues. On a more technological level, data security issues include
protections from malicious and mobile code; mathematical computer security
models; physical and web-based vulnerabilities; Trojan Horse attacks; and
virus protections. Mandating periodic vulnerability assessments and security
awareness programs is critical.8
Data processes, as defined above, must meet strict liability requirements to
establish standards for detecting, responding, remediating, and managing
data security issues. Managers and employees should be held to state-of-
the-art application controls. Data organizations must monitor and control
systems. Such organizations must conduct security audits, carry out system
and data inspections, and maintain high quality data security standards.9 Data
security standards require that intellectual property protections can not be
provided for technologies and practices that do not meet DPSIP design
requirements.
Bruce Schneier made a cogent argument that national security and individual
privacy are not opposites. The legal issue is not a zero-sum game.10 Police
states provide security, but there are no major immigration trends into those
states.11 Schneier further explained that information privacy and data security
must work together.12 Anti-privacy security tactics alone do not significantly
improve security and often do more harm than good. Government security
8 Seymour Bosworth, et al., Computer Security Handbook § 1 (John Wiley & Sons 5th ed.
2009a). See also Tim Mather, et al., Cloud Security and Privacy: An Enterprise
Perspective on Risks and Compliance, (O'Reilly Media, Inc. ed. 2009).
9 Seymour Bosworth, et al., Computer Security Handbook § 2 (John Wiley & Sons 5th ed.
2009b).
10 In game theory, a zero-sum game exists whenever the rules require that when one party
wins, the other party must lose
11 Bruce Schneier, What Our Top Spy Doesn't Get: Security and Privacy Aren't Opposites
(2008, January 24),
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/01/securitym
atters_0124?currentPage=all (last visited on 24 January 2008), at 4.
12 Id. at ¶ 6.
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claims that restrict DPSIP issues are often wrong or address fake cases.13
The security versus privacy issue is a false dichotomy and is based on
generating fear. The reality is that “There is no security without privacy. And
liberty requires both security and privacy.”14 All data mining efforts must be
transparent and must have strong legal and regulatory controls.
DPSIP 3.0 laws and regulations must follow the CA approach of focusing on
privacy-enhancing technology, privacy by design, and privacy by re-design.15
The approach must require privacy audits and controls related to information
technology, physical design and networked infrastructure, and must be
accountable for all business and government personal information practices.
DPSIP 3.0 standards must be designed and operated on the basis of an
embedded default standard. The approach must be proactive and
preventative. Information life cycles must be established and followed. The
design must provide respect for users, be transparent, and be visible.16
DPSIP 3.0 standards require that all organizations that collect, hold, process,
or transfer data must have an identifiable data controller. This controller must
register data-processing activities with the DPSIP authorities.17 This standard
was established in the UK and provides that negligence or deliberate loss of
data is a criminal offense subject to a punishment of at least two years in jail.
Lord Erroll stated that “Data controllers need to wake up to the importance of
personal data, whether in the public or the private sector.”18
Data controllers must insure that data security procedures are constantly used
to meet or exceed legal operational standards. Administrative and
technological security procedures must guarantee that adequate prevention
13 Id. at ¶ 8.
14 Id. at ¶ 12.
15 Ann Cavoukian, What is Privacy by Design?, Information & Privacy Commissioner Ontario.
(2010), at http://www.privacybydesign.ca/ (last visited on 6 July 2010).
16 Ann Cavoukian & Claudiu Popa, Privacy by ReDesign: A Practical Framework for
Implementation, (Information & Privacy Commissioner Ontario ed. 2011).
17 See Part 3 §§17-26.
18 Tom Young, Lose Data and You Go To Jail. (2008, May 8), at
http://www.computing.co.uk/computing/news/2216073/lose-jail-3989942 (last visited
on 10 May 2008), ¶ 4.
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procedures exist and there is no unauthorized or malfeasant access, copying,
disclosure, erasure, modification, reading, or removal of personal data.
10.3 Data Protection and Information Privacy
The findings of the current study reveal that comprehensive DPSIP 3.0
legislation is a necessity. Such laws and the regulatory agencies the laws
establish must have significant enforcement power.19 The legal standards
must apply to anyone who collects and rents/sells personal information. Such
persons must always inform the user, and all uses of data should be
processed on an opt-in only consent.”20 The proposed DPSIP standard is not
voluntary nor is it a data protection directive. The standard is regulatory and
applies to all parties that are involved in the personal information sector. The
following issues are a significant part of DPSIP 3.0 standards; however, the
list is not exhaustive. New technology will develop that has DPSIP
implications, so the standards must be technology neutral. The key
application factor must always consider the spirit of the law and technological
advancements. For ease of presentation and access, the following DPSIP 3.0
principles are presented in alphabetic order similar to a statutory definition of
terms.
10.3.1 Administration
All government departments, agencies, and coordinating bodies must appoint
a Chief Privacy Officer (CPO)21 to oversee the processing of DPSIP data and
insure compliance22 to DPSIP laws and regulations. All such activities may be
19 Terence Craig & Mary E. Ludloff, Privacy and Big Data, (O'Reilly Media, Inc ed. 2011) at
89.
20 Ibid. See also Susannah Fox & Oliver Lewis, Fear of Online Crime: Americans Support FBI
Interception of Criminal Suspects’ Email and New Laws to Protect Online Privacy,
Pew Internet & American Life Project. (2001), at
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2001/PIP_Fear_of_crime.pdf.pdf
(last visited on 24 May 2008). See § 4.11 of this study.
21 Such a practice has been successful under the US HIPAA law and regulation.
22 Compliance requires knowledge, concerted efforts, and useful guidelines, and checklists.
See examples in Lothar Determan, Determann's Field Guide to International Data
Privacy Law Compliance (Edward Elgar ed. 2012); Nancy Flynn, The Social Media
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audited and investigated by the state [province] and federal DPSIP office.
Private businesses and organizations that are involved in DPSIP issues shall
also be required to appoint a CPO to serve the same function and apply the
accountability standards of government agencies internally. The CPO is
responsible for full compliance with DPSIP laws and regulations, conducting
and verifying privacy impact assessments prior to implementation as well as
throughout operations, managing privacy by design standards and subject
access standards, dealing with complaints, keeping pace with technological
enhancements, supervising all trans-company and transnational data
transfers, and maintaining current best DPSIP practices.
The operations of the CPO must be independent. Independence requires that
the office must have economic and political freedom, its own infrastructure,
separate premises, sufficient financial and staffing support, and use of state-
of-the-art technology. The CPO and related staff must constantly fulfill the
highest levels of professional integrity, comply with the law, be free of conflicts
of interest, and must not be beholden to business or government
representatives. CPO functions must be transparent. After government
agency CPO officials leave office, they may not establish a DPSIP consulting
role or work in related employment in the private sector for a period of five
years.
The office shall have the power to investigate and hear complaints. The
government CPO shall have the power to order compliance with the law,
regulations, and office findings. The office shall have the option of seeking
judicial enforcement relief or, when appropriate, means of redress under
international arbitration and alternative dispute resolution standards and
treaties.23 The government CPO shall have the power to issue administrative
Handbook: Policies and Best Practices to Effectively Manage your Organization's
Social Media Presence, Posts, and Potential Risks (Pfeiffer ed. 2012); and John J.
Trinckes Jr, The Definitive Guide to Complying with the HIPAA/HITECH Privacy and
Security Rules (CRC Press ed. 2013).
23 See United Nations, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. (1958), at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-
conv/XXII_1_e.pdf (last visited on 20 August 2012).
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fines and penalties that have the force of law when DPSIP laws and
regulations are violated. The office may petition the courts to issue criminal
penalties when warranted.
10.3.2 Applicability Scope
DPSIP 3.0 standards apply to government agencies, private organizations,
data controllers, data processors, those who maintain mailing lists, and
marketing organizations. The DPSIP 3.0 standards apply to all personal data
processing: manual, electronic, or any form of technology. The focus includes
data mining and data surveillance practices that currently include variations of
cookies, RFID, spyware, and surveillance.24 These behavior-tracking
processes must be connected to an identified or identifiable person.25
The 3.0 standards apply to all Near Field Communications (NFC), which
includes now-ubiquitous mobile devices including RFID, mobile devices, and
smart phones. Such technologies provide new benefits and conveniences to
users. NFC also provides some privacy and security benefits. However,
some risks exist that must be considered.26 The privacy and security risks
include ascertaining the identity of an anonymous user, data being leaked
(transferred) without consent, improperly redirecting the device to an unknown
website, initiating a (pay-per-use) service without the knowledge of the device
user, interception or eavesdropping on wireless communications, lack of
24 See Kenneth K. Dort, Recent Trends in Cyberspace Law: Data Security and Privacy, in
Understanding Developments in Cyberspace Law: Leading Lawyers on Analyzing
Recent Trends, Case Law, and Legal Strategies Affecting the Internet Landscape
(Thomas Reuters Aspatore ed., Thomas Reuters / Aspatore 2012).
25 See Amann v. Switzerland, ECHR 27798/95, (2000),¶ 65. (EU) The purpose is “to secure in
the territory of each Party for every individual ... respect for his rights and
fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic
processing of personal data relating to him” (Article 1), such personal data being
defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual” (Article
2).
26 See Michael A. Tomasulo & Scott N. Godes, Helping Clients Evaluate Their Cyber Risks,
in Understanding Developments in Cyberspace Law: Leading Lawyers on Analyzing
Recent Trends, Case Law, and Legal Strategies Affecting the Internet Landscape
(Thomas Reuters Aspatore ed., Thomas Reuters / Aspatore 2012).
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adequate notice and transparency of operations, receiving unwanted or
malicious content, and secret tracking of a device user’s location.27
10.3.3 Breaches
Breaches of DPSIP data violate the law. Legal responsibility shall rest with
those causing the breach whether intentional, unintentional, or by negligence.
Legal responsibility shall also rest with the holder and processor of the data.
Breaches have become a major DPSIP problem. In the US alone, since
2005, there have been over 543 million reported breaches. While any given
data breach is a problem in itself, breached data can also lead to four times
more cases of identity theft in the next year.28
The following types of conduct will all be considered as breaches: hacking,
malware, spyware, insider actions, payment card fraud, physical loss, potable
losses, stationary devices, and unintended disclosure. Breaches shall also
include data collection without an opt-in informed consent including data
collection by means of cookies and related electronic tracking. Should a
contractor or employee intentionally breach information, it will be considered
as insider breaching. Payment card fraud shall include the use of skimming
devices at point-of-service terminals to obtain data that enables fraudulent
use of credit and debit cards. Physical loss shall include loss where data is
discarded, lost, or stolen including loss of non-electronic records such as
paper documents. Portable device breaches refer to discarded, lost, or stolen
devices that have DPSIP data and are not adequately protected. Such
portable devices include CDs, data tapes, hard drives, e-books or readers,
laptop computers, PDAs, portable memory devices, smart phones, and other
potentially related devices. Stationary devices refer to electronic devices not
27 Ann Cavoukian, Mobile Near Field Communications (NFC) “Tap ‘n Go” Keep it Secure &
Private, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. (2011), at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/mobile-nfc.pdf (last visited on 12 December
2012).
28 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Data Breaches: A Year in Review. The Top Half Dozen
Most Significant Data Breaches in 2011 (2011), at https://www.privacyrights.org/top-
data-breach-list-2011 (last visited on 16 December 2012).
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designed for mobility, including computers or servers that are discarded, lost,
or stolen whilst storing DPSIP data. Unintended disclosure includes sensitive
DPSIP information published on a website and data that is mishandled or sent
by e-mail, fax, or mail to the wrong party.29 All breaches must result in
notification to the parties affected or those who might be affected, as well as
notification to the regulatory agency within 24 hours.
10.3.4 Breach Notification
The first legal requirement for a breach notification standard started in the
State of California in the US.30 The DPSIP law enacted in the CA province of
Alberta further establishes a breach notification standard.31 AU law
establishes the same principle.32
DPSIP 3.0 adopts the breach notification legal standard. Data controllers
must notify affected data subjects and the DPSIP legal authorities of a data
breach within 24 hours thereof. The notification must explain the nature of the
breach and provide means for affected data subjects to protect themselves
from further harm at no expense to the data subject.
10.3.5 Compatibility Declarations
The body politic is based on the principle of the social contract. All
government officials swear an allegiance to a constitution or to a ruling king or
queen. All of the countries included in this study are committed to a rule of
law standard. Behaviorally, juristic and natural persons swear an allegiance
to be subject to the rule of law, if only for legal protections.
29 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, How to Use the Chronology of Data Breaches. (2011), at
https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach-how-to (last visited on 17 December 2012).
30 State of California, The California Security Breach Information Act (SB-1386), Civil Code
§1798.29, §1798.82, & 1798.84 (2002), at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-
02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020926_chaptered.html (last visited on 3
July 2009). (US)
31 See § 5.6.1 of this work.
32 See § 4.11 of this work.
88 See § 4.6.6 of this work.
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DPSIP 3.0 adopts the AU compatibility standard.33 When making DPSIP
decisions and/or policy-related standards, all bureaucrats, courts, executives,
and parliamentarians must sign compatibility statements with DPSIP
decisions and policies. The compatibility declaration is signed under penalty
of perjury with strict civil and criminal penalties applied. The DPSIP 3.0
compatibility standard is also applicable to all executives and officials in the
private sector. Violation of the signed compatibility standard is subject to civil
and criminal action subject to a DPSIP commission or personal right of action.
10.3.6 Data
DPSIP 3.0 expands the historic definitions of personally identifiable
information (PII). References to personal data and data subjects include any
direct or indirect identifier or given name or number. Facial recognition
software, GPS, on-line activities, and behavioral targeting data are included.
Data also includes biometric, cultural, economic, genetic, medical, mental,
physical, physiological, and social identifiers.
10.3.7 Data Mining
One of the major advantages of modern information technology is the ability
to search, sort, and mine data. Data mining activities must be transparent34
and must meet the spirit and letter of DPSIP 3.0 legal standards.
34 See Bill Bonner, The Problem of the "Problem" of Privacy, in Privacy: Management, Legal
Issues and Security Aspects (Tobias K. Buckner & Betram L. Knowles ed., Nova
Publishers 2012).
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10.3.8 Data Ownership
Information privacy related data must be owned by the natural person or data
subject. With a clear informed consent, the data may be shared for limited
purposes. Sharing such data does not transfer the ownership right. The
natural person or data subject has a moral right as found in intellectual
property law, especially copyright law.
The DPSIP 3.0 data ownership principle is based on Section 20 of the SA
Copyright Act that sets forth some fundamental principles.35 The data subject
“shall be deemed to be the owner of the copyright in question.”36 The natural
person data subject “shall have a right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of it, where such
action is or would be prejudicial to the honor or reputation of the author.”37
The intellectual property laws in all of the countries studied in the current work
provide government enforced information privacy and ownership property
rights to juristic and selected natural persons. The protections include breach
of confidence, copyright, design rights, exclusive rights, infringement, moral
rights, passing off,38 patentable inventions, patents, secrecy, service marks,
trademarks, and trade secrets.
The DPSIP protections afforded to juristic persons must also be applied to
natural persons. John Rawls39 argues that two basic principles of justice
apply. The principles include the following:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of
liberties of others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be
35 Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (1978). (SA) See section 6.3 of Chapter six of this work.
36 Id. at § 20(2).
37 Id. at § 20(1).
38 Falsely presenting one’s work or product as though it was another’s.
39 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press rev. ed.
1999) at 53.
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arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to
everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to
all.40
Granted, some juristic persons (i.e., companies and corporations) create
value by combining or altering natural resources. When such an economic
value-added product is created, the natural resources are purchased for a fee.
Such is not the case in DPSIP situation. The DPSIP 3.0 alternative is to
purchase the natural resource with consent and a fee.
When a corporation is declared bankrupt, DPSIP records must be disposed.
The data may be destroyed. When an existing competitor in the exact same
industry sector desires the data, it can negotiate with the bankruptcy court for
control over the data. If the court approves the transfer, the new holder must
contact each data subject and request an opt-in to the transfer. The only data
that can be used is when data subjects have opted-in. All other data must be
destroyed.
10.3.9 Data Retention Limits
Data controllers and ISPs may only retain personal data for as long as
necessary and to the limits covered in the informed consent. Data shall be
kept for at least six months and no longer than two years.41
10.3.10 Independence of Office
DPSIP 3.0 legislation should establish an independent Privacy Data
Commissioner Model.42 A registration and licensing system should be
40 Id.
41 European Union Directives, Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in
Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications
Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive
2002/58/EC. (2006), at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF
(last visited on 4 September 2008), at Article 6.
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established for the purpose of regulatory control, which would also provide an
income stream and increase enforcement powers.43 The Privacy
Commissioner must have the authority to address issues that arise in both
government and private organizations. Both government agencies and
private organizations must appoint a chief privacy officer who is mandated to
comply with the DPSIP law and regulations.44
The CA province of British Columbia privacy office maintains independence
from the government and government’s powers.45 In CA, the provinces that
have enacted DPSIP legislation place enforcement of such acts, including
freedom of information laws, under that same agency.46 Commissioner
findings may be subject to judicial review. A similar independence is found
with the FTC in the US.47 The functions of the independent privacy
commission are noted in AU law.48
A functional independent regulatory agency has an increased ability to
address current and evolving technology issues. Legislatures and the
executive branches must address a full range of issues while delivering on
commitments to past supporters and future financial funders. The judiciary
tends to be very conservative in response to technological change; in the
countries studied, the judiciary is tied to continuing a common law approach.
With few exceptions, governments have allowed or advanced the interests of
corporations over the will of the people. Companies have created or found
gaps, and taken possession. When people have objected, such organizations
claimed foul. Once one company gets away with an end run play,49 others
join the game. One only has to examine the historic behavior of direct
42 Industry Canada, Privacy and the Information Highway Regulatory Options for Canada
(Author. 1996). See also § 4.1 of this work.
43 See §§ 4.1 and 5.8 of this work.
44 See § 5.8 of this work.
45 See § 5.62 of this work.
46 See § 5.6.5.1 of this work.
47 See § 8.4.1 of this work.
48 See § 4.6.1.1 of this work.
49 A strategy in which legal constraints or restrictions are bypassed by deceit or trickery.
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marketers, monopolies, and companies like Google, Facebook, and Wal-Mart
to see such evidence.
Given the rapid technological change related to DPSIP issues, only an
independent regulatory agency has the power to ask relevant questions,
investigate problem areas, and intervene effectively. Such an agency can
evolve and keep pace with technological change in a way that legislative and
judicial case law can not. Following the AU standard, the agency can proceed
even when specific damages are not required.50
10.3.11 Information Privacy Rights
Information privacy rights are a collective, not just an individual value. The value is
based on the economic view of collective and public goods. One cannot benefit
from a collective good without others benefiting.51 Free riders, government or
business, should not use information without legally obtaining consent and paying
for it.52 DPSIP 3.0 extends the information privacy right beyond PII to include
practices related to behavioral marketing, data mining, and information
surveillance.53 The principle also includes identifiers like cookies, ISP addresses,
and genetic data. The new approach adopts the AU standard of credit reports being
limited to credit worthiness.54 DPSIP 3.0 also adopts the AU standards on spent
convictions related to criminal records.55
50 See Australian Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Issues Paper: A
Commonwealth Statutory Cause of Action for Serious Invasion of Privacy;
Submission to the Attorney-General’s Department, Author. (2011), at
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/%289A5D88DBA63D32A661E636
9859739356%29%7E14B+-+Office+of+the+Australian+Information+Commissioner+-
+Word.pdf/$file/14B+-+Office+of+the+Australian+Information+Commissioner+-
+Word.pdf (last visited on 12 December 2012).
51 Pricilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy
(University of North Carolina Press 1995), at 227.
52 Id., at 228.
53 See also § 8.6 of this work.
54 See § 4.1 of this work.
55 See § 4.6.12 of this work.
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10.3.12 Informed Consent and Confidentiality
Prior to collecting, storing, using, distributing, or selling personal information
data, the data subject of the information should give an affirmative, freely
given, explicit, and informed consent. The informed consent should meet the
legal requirements for any lawful written informed consent and be verified by
an opt-in process. If a default option is present it should be opt-out or left
blank.56 Silence does not indicate consent.
In AU, consent cannot be a condition to receive products, services, or
supplies.57 CA law also requires an informed consent for data collection and
processing.58 DPSIP 3.0 consents must be explicit, must be subject to simple
removal, may not be bundled, apply to any personal profiling, and must be
required for all direct marketing activities.
10.3.13 Liability
DPSIP 3.0 legislation and regulations must establish a liability standard for
violations. On balance, the most effective standard is strict—an absolute
liability standard as noted in AU.59 The Office of the Australian Information
Commissioner and the Australian Law Reform Commission has established
recommendations similar to DPSIP 3.0 liability standards. A DPSIP cause of
action should be established without proof of damages. As a human right,
invasion of privacy should not be subject to proving damages. Such an action
56 See § 2.5.1 of this study. See Charles J. Sykes, The End of Privacy: Personal Rights in the
Surveillance Society, at 246 (St. Martin's Press 1999).
57 Ibid. at (¶ 4.3.3), 35.
58 Canadian Federal Government, Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document
Act. (2000), at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/P-8.6 (last visited on 1
November 2012).
59 See Parliament of New South Wales, Legislation Review Committee: Strict and Absolute
Liability. (2006), at
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/88212f7a0a84b436
ca2571870022bc55/$FILE/Strict%20and%20Absolute%20Liability%20Discussion%2
0Paper.pdf (last visited on 6 December 2012).
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should apply only to natural persons. The AU view is that juristic or non-
human entities do not qualify for a human right.60
Liability extends to the breach of confidentiality obligations, breach of privacy
obligations, breach of security obligations, damage to tangible property, data
loss, illegal acts or omissions, intellectual property infringement, loss caused
by service interruption, loss of tangible property, misuse of data, and personal
injury (including sickness and death). Liability extends to psychological and
psychosocial injury, as well as unlawful acts or omissions.
When a chief privacy officer commits an act of negligence or malpractice
related to DPSIP 3.0 standards, the officer and the agency or organization are
jointly civilly and criminally responsible. The parties are jointly and severally
liable. The liability extends to third-party providers.
The legal analysis principles of accomplice, alternative, derivative, enterprise,
market-share, stockholders, and vicarious liability apply. Liability attaches
when an individual has been subjected to an act that involves an unauthorized
surveillance of the person, or one’s home or family life has been subjected to
interference—directly or indirectly. Liability attaches when a person’s
electronic, oral, or written correspondence is disclosed, interfered with,
misused, or used without prior informed consent. Liability also attaches when
sensitive facts of an individual’s private life have been disclosed.
Furthermore, liability attaches to government and business employees who
access personal data for private purposes or gain. Sensitive facts include
more than PII and sensitive information.61
60 Australian Government Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Issues Paper: A
Commonwealth Statutory Cause of Action for Serious Invasion of Privacy; Submission
to the Attorney-General’s Department, Author. (2011), at
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/%289A5D88DBA63D32A661E6369
859739356%29%7E14B+-+Office+of+the+Australian+Information+Commissioner+-
+Word.pdf/$file/14B+-+Office+of+the+Australian+Information+Commissioner+-
+Word.pdf (last visited on 12 December 2012).
61 Id.
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The standard legal analysis of damages can be used in DPSIP cases to
determine penalties. Such standards include accumulative, benefit-of-the-
bargain, consequential, continuing, discretionary, enhanced, excess,
foreseeable, future, hedonic, intervening, irreparable, punitive, putative,
reliance, restitution, treble, uncertain, and unliquidated damages.
Legal causes of actions may include either individual or class action litigation
parties. Damages, including punitive damages, fines, and penalties shall be
awarded to the litigants.62 Following the AU standard, “no maximum award of
damages” (e.g., financial judgments) for noneconomic should be considered.63
The civil and criminal penalties for a DPSIP violation shall be no less than the
maximum penalties for intellectual property violations sought by business
organizations and juristic persons. The same principle applies to government
agencies. The non-inclusive list shall include standards for copyright, moral
rights, patent rights, publicity rights, service mark, trademarks, trade-secrets,
and unfair competition protections.
10.3.14 Licensure
All organizations that collect or process DPSIP data must be licensed by the
government. Significant DPSIP 3.0 violations can be punished by a
revocation of the DPSIP license and criminal sanctions. Such processors
must also file an annual audit notification filing similar to the practice in the
UK.64 Chief Privacy Officers must also be licensed and face similar penalties
for DPSIP violations. This approach is similar to laws that regulate
professionals whose practices involve consumer protection.65 Failure to
62 The DPSIP damages pattern in the US has been to award penalty payments to not-for-
profit privacy advocacy groups.
63 Australian Government, Issues Paper: A Commonwealth Statutory Cause of Action for
Serious Invasion of Privacy, (Australian Government ed. 2011 September).
64 United Kingdom Government, The UK Data Protection Act of 1998. ch. 29. Part III § 16
(1998), at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1984/1984035.htm (last visited on 17
May 2009).
65 Examples include attorneys, mental health professionals, and physicians. The list also
includes barbers, contractors, and even realtors.
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maintain a license or register is a criminal offense and can include significant
monetary fines.
10.3.15 Opt-in
DPSIP 3.0 laws and regulations must require an opt-in approach standard
similar to the AU standard.66 The UK All Party Parliamentary Communications
Group has also recommended an opt-in approach.67
The German Privacy Agency68 has approved an opt-in approach in some
situations. The agency has worked with Google for an opt-in in its Find my
Face program option. Facebook has yet to comply.69
10.3.16 Privacy by Design—Privacy by Default
Privacy by default and privacy by design standards apply to device
manufacturers, application developers, and designers. The standards also
apply to service providers like Cloud computing and ISPs. At a minimum, the
principles include products and services that are “proactive not reactive;
preventative not remedial approaches; privacy as the default setting; privacy
embedded into design; full functionality—positive-sum, not a zero-sum
strategy; end-to-end security—full lifecycle protection; visibility and
transparency—keep it open; and respect for user privacy—keep it user-
centric.”70
66 See § 4.11 of this work.
67 All Party Parliamentary Communications Group, Can we keep our hands off the net?
Report of an Inquiry by the All Party Parliamentary Communications Group. (2009), at
http://www.apcomms.org.uk/uploads/apComms_Final_Report.pdf (last visited on 19
October 2009). The group is an open and independent organization of MPs and Lords
from all political parties. The group encourages stakeholders to present evidence and
testimony on communication issues. The stakeholders include the Government,
Parliamentarians, industry, and consumer groups.
68 Known as the Der Hamburgishche Beauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit.
69 Kevin Shalvey, Germany Privacy Agency OK With Google Facial Recognition Click. (2011),
at http://blogs.investors.com/click/index.php/home/60-tech/4045-germany-privacy-
agency-ok-at-least-now-with-google-facial- (last visited on 21 December 2012).
70 Ann Cavoukian, Mobile Near Field Communications (NFC) “Tap ‘n Go” Keep it Secure &
Private, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. (2011), at
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By design and default, privacy protections must be included in all programs,
practices, and technologies. The default must limit processing options to only
those activities that the data subject has approved. Such data shall not be
made available to an indefinite number of parties or other organizations.
10.3.17 Private Right of Action
DPSIP 3.0 establishes business organization and government agency CPOs
and government agencies to monitor and regulate DPSIP legal standards.
The gravity of the issues also requires that private partes must have a private
right of action. Such a private right also includes the availability of class
action litigations.71
10.3.18 Privacy Impact Assessment
Prior to using any DPSIP-related business or government methods or the
government granting any intellectual property protection, the requesting party
must conduct and gain approval of the proposal through a privacy impact
study and approval.72 A privacy impact study and approval must be
conducted prior to any legislative or regulatory actions. The courts must
consider, subject to review, the privacy impact on relevant cases.
AU and CA have established some impact assessment guidelines. The basic
principles are sound and must be integrated into DPSIP 3.0 legislation and
regulations.
The AU73 guidelines address a project description, which included mapping
the information flows and privacy framework, privacy impact analysis, and
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/mobile-nfc.pdf (last visited on 12 December
2012).
71 See § 8.3.7 of this work.
72 See §§ 2.5.2 and 2.6 of this study.
73 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Privacy Impact Assessment Guide
(Revised May 2010). (2010), at
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privacy management practices. The final stage is a full report that included
recommendations for future action.
The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat issued a useful set of Privacy
Impact Assessment Guidelines.74 They establish a gold standard for partial
compliance; unfortunately, they donot apply to business organizations. A
further problem is that the CA Court ruled that the standards are not binding;
however, standards do help interpret the legislation.75 The CA Information
Commissioner Office produced a stronger Privacy Impact Assessment
document.76 Under DPSIP 3.0 guidelines, the principles must apply to both
business and government.
Privacy impact assessments relate to government agencies that address
DPSIP issues, including the administration or executive branch, legislators or
parliamentarians, and the court or judicial branches. In the private sector,
privacy impact assessments are required by all personal data controllers and
processors.
Natural living person risk data factors must be identified in the assessment to
identify clear, effective, and valid protections that will be afforded. While
following the established PII items, the impact assessment must also
incorporate the biological risk factors including but not limited to: biometric
data, genetic data, health care utilization, health status, infectious diseases,
http://www.oaic.gov.au/publications/guidelines/Privacy_Impact_Assessment_Guide.ht
ml (last visited on 20 June 2012).
74 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Privacy Impact Assessment Guidelines: A
Framework to Manage Privacy Risks. (2002), at http://www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/ciopubs/pia-pefr/paipg-pefrld2-eng.asp (last visited on 20 July
2010).
75 Canada Post Corp. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works) (1995), [1995] F.C.J. No. 241, 60
C.P.R. (3d) 441, 91 F.T.R. 320 (note), (sub nom. Societe canadienne des postes v.
Canada) [1995] 2 F.C. 110, 179 N.R. 350, 30 Admin. L.R. (2d) 242, 1995 CarswellNat
688, 1995 CarswellNat 652 (Fed. C.A.), (10 February 1995). (CA) See also Canada
(Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2002
CarswellNat 1476, 2002 FCA 270, 291 N.R. 236, 228 F.T.R. 319 (note), [2003] 1 F.C.
219, 21 C.P.R. (4th) 30, 1 Admin. L.R. (4th) 270, (21 June 2002). (CA)
76 Information Commissioner Office, Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook. (2009), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pia_handbook_html_v2/html/0-advice.html
(last visited on 6 October 2012).
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and mental disorders. Psychosocial risk factors shall include but not be
limited to: creditworthiness, economic situation, legal activities, location,
personal behavior, personal preferences, personal reliability, and work
performance.
DPSIP 3.0 legal standards require that all government and business
organizations perform a privacy impact assessment on all DPSIP-related
policies, practices, and technologies prior to adoption and use. The
assessment must include factors of compliance, information security
procedures, and stakeholder management. The focus is on avoiding
inadequate solutions, avoiding loss of recognition and trust, avoiding
unnecessary costs, identifying and managing risks, informing communication
strategies, and meeting and exceeding DPSIP legal requirements. If DPSIP
risks exist, the assessment must provide an identification of less privacy-
invasive alternatives, means to avoid negative impacts, and ways to eliminate
the negative impact on privacy rights. The privacy right extends to personal
information, the privacy of the person, one’s personal behavior, and personal
communications. The assessment must clearly establish privacy protections,
means to avoid breaches, function creep,77 and misuse. The assessment
process is continual. Submission of the assessment includes an
acknowledgement and acceptance of risks, impacts, as well as legal
liabilities.78
The DPSIP 3.0 assessment must address all of the issues advocated by
Salvatore Colletti, Divonne Smoyer, and Bernard Nash.79 The assessment
must address all existing and potentially new federal and state DPSIP laws
and regulations. The task includes international laws and the impact of
77 The subtle use of technology or systems to invade information privacy rights beyond the
original intent of the data collection.
78 See Information Commissioner Office of The UK, Privacy Impact Assessment, Version 2,
Author. (2009), at
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pia_handbook_html_v2/files/PIAhandbookV
2.pdf (last visited on 3 March 2012).
79 Salvatore Colletti, et al., Top Ten Recommendations for Improving Your Company’s Data
Security Compliance, Acc: Association of Corporate Counsel. (2009), at
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/top-ten-recommendations-for-
improving-your-company.cfm (last visited on 2 February 2012).
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transferring data between countries and safe harbors. The assessment must
include monitoring computer systems to detect any intrusions, vulnerabilities,
and weaknesses (both personal and technological). The process must
assess and reassess the data security policies and the sufficiency of the
standards. The organization must be held responsible to the standard that all
employees are trained and monitored on DPSIP policies and practices. The
process must verify that the organization limits the amount of personal
information that is collected, stored, and transferred. The organization must
establish quality mechanisms for the timely disposal of personal information.
The assessment must ensure that the data security practices of third-party
contractors are adequate, both legally and technologically. The PIA must
establish a sound incident response plan for preventing the loss of personal
information and for reacting to any losses of personal data that occur. The
assessment must document that it encrypts all private information. The PIA
must document that the policies and practices apply to technological data and
even paper records.
10.3.19 Reports
DPSIP 3.0 commissioners must issue periodic reports based on the CA
practices. The office of the commissioner must also provide public education
on the law, regulations, and acceptable practices.80
10.3.20 Right to be Forgotten
DPSIP 3.0 recognizes the right of data subjects to be forgotten.81 A subject
can object to a controller’s processing of the subject’s data and show that the
data is no longer needed or warranted. The subject may withdraw any prior
consent. In such situations, the data controller must permanently erase any
such personal data.
80 See § 5.9.2 of this work.
81 See Chapter 3 section 3.4.3.2; Chapter 5. section 5.9.2; Chapter 6 section 6.5,
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The principle of a right to be forgotten is relatively new based on CA’s and
proposed EU standards. A common charge is that the law is slow to respond
to technology and business advances. The reality is that legal scholars often
sound a beacon call for attention; however, legislatures and the judiciary are
slow to heed the call. Each has its own self-serving set of assumptions and
beliefs to justify inaction. During this assumption of belief error, business and
government organizations take aggressive claim to rights while ignoring the
law of unintended consequences. When confronted with their invasion of
personal and property rights, governments and entrepreneurial business
sources claim foul. The charge of foul ignores the existing spirit of previously
established legal principles.
International corporations like Google, Facebook, and Linkedin will vigorously
fight legal constraints to their theft, without consent, of DPSIP data. Such
organizations may claim that the data subject freely participates in the
activities; these organizations ignore the fact that the data subject has
provided no written informed consent. Such organizations have a legal
obligation make the data subject right – with appropriate redress.
Data subjects have the legal right to delete information posted online, even if
one has given consent or release to make the data public. The data subject
shall have the right to obtain erasure of any public Internet link to personal
data. The right shall apply to any copy of or replication of personal data that
is contained in any publicly available communication service.
10.3.21 Right to Data Portability
A data subject has the legal right to transfer personal data from one
automated processing system to another. A data controller may not interfere
with the subject’s right by policy or technology. The controller may not charge
a fee for any portability request.
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10.3.22 Subject Rights
Similar to the UK standard, DPSIP 3.0 standards provide that a data subject
must have a legal right of data corrections, prevention of processing, failure
compensation, and rectification.82 Individuals must have a legal right to
access personal data that is held about them. Individuals must be able to
legally block, erase, and rectify inaccurate data. Individuals must also have a
legal right to block the processing of data not covered by the written informed
consent.
10.3.23 Technology-Based Surveillance
Governments have an obligation to protect their citizens from criminal
activities within strict parameters with legally justified checks and balances.
The principle of the rule of law applies. At the same time, the government
must also protect the innocent from unwarranted interference and even
unwarranted surveillance.83 The government has the right to develop
technology that can aid its legitimate functions like facial recognition
technology. However, the government does not have the right to allow
development of or sale of such technology for private gain. Nor can the
government circumvent its constraints by purchasing such technology or data
from private sources. The government can restrictively license and monitor
the development of DPSIP technology similar to activities restricted to certain
medical research and weapons that could destroy the nature of civilization.
Private businesses and corporations—even powerful multinational
corporations—do not have the same legal right or lawful justification.
Arguments of providing wanted services or promoting sales do not justify the
use of spying technologies. Without government constraints, far too many
business organizations are more than willing to pillage and rape the DPSIP
rights of the people.
82 See Part 2 §§ 7-15.
83 This basic legal principle has been forgotten in the UK and is being ignored in the US under
the guise of fighting the so called war on terror.
Chapter Ten: Gold Standard Proposal 586
Some business organizations have already started to use facial recognition
technologies in a number of products and services with no legal constraints.
Examples include digital billboards, mobile apps, and even social networks.
Some companies want to automatically tag photographs of even strangers.84
There is no informed consent or opt-in option. Such technology can be used
by private individuals to take pictures of strangers anywhere to identify them
and discover everything about them—including a full range of DPSIP data—
without the person’s awareness or consent. The data can be used for identity
theft or even worse. The recent research conducted by Alessandro Acquisti
at Carnegie Mellon University showed that the potential threat is not paranoia
or science fiction.85
AU police claim that many businesses use biometric facial recognition
technology without any public notice. Westfield, the international shopping
mall corporation, has noted that it will use such technology in its malls for
tracking all customer activities—without notice or consent.86 Large
international corporations like Wal-Mart are requiring their suppliers to provide
RFID tags to products to track item movement.87 The use of RFID and even
smart meters can serve a useful purpose as long as the data is not linked to
an individual consumer’s DPSIP data.
84 In the US the FTC is starting to investigate such practices. See Alysa Zeltzer Hutnik &
Sharon Kim Schiavetti, The FTC Offers Framework for Facial Recognition Technology,
Acc: Association of Corporate Counsel (2011), at
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a93a9908-880c-48cf-b5c6-
77b0002cb618 (last visited on 12 December 2012).
85 Alessandro Acquisti & Richard Power, New Study Co-Authored by CyLab Researcher:
Face Recognition Software and Social Media Result in Increased Privacy Risks,
Cylab News: Carnegie Mellon University (2011), at
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/news_events/news/2011/acquisti-study-finds-face-
recognition-software-social-media-increase-privacy-risks.html (last visited on 1
August 2012).
86 Saffron Howden, No Place For Crooks to Hide, Sydney Morning Herald. (2009), at
http://innovya.com/2009/12/10/no-place-for-crooks-to-hide/ (last visited on 9
December 2009).
87 Katherine Albrecht & Liz Mcintyre, Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government
Plan to Track Your Every Move with RFID, (Nelson Current ed. 2005).
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DPSIP 3.0 standards require that invasive technologies similar to facial
recognition software or hardware, NFC devices, RFID, and smart meters
should not be sold to or used by private parties and business organizations
because of the innate DPSIP, fraud, identify theft, and stalking issues.
Possession and use of such technology is subject to civil and criminal
sanctions for the manufacturer, distributor, seller, purchaser, and user,
including corporations and executives. Sanctions shall include civil and
criminal remedies. Intellectual protections shall not be afforded to such
technologies, unless a successful privacy impact assessment is created and
audited and the technology follows the quality standards of privacy by design.
10.3.24 Violations
Violations of DPSIP 3.0 laws and regulations must give rise to civil penalties
[using a strict absolute liability principle], criminal penalties, and/or loss of the
information processing license and registration. The cost of violation must be
strong enough to function as a deterrent to deviant behavior.
10.4 Exemptions
DPSIP 3.0 acknowledges the rightful need for limited exemptions to the legal
standard. When properly monitored and when warrants are obtained, the
government’s police powers must be an exemption. The function may include
the investigation, indictment, and prosecution of crimes. Government
agencies are allowed to investigate and prosecute ethical breaches of
regulated professions. The state’s power of taxation or duty collection may be
exempted.
Traditional exemptions of artistic, historic, journalistic, literary, and research
purposes are not to be presumed or seen as universal. Any such exemption
must be within a strict standard of fulfilling the people’s need to know and is
subject to approval by the organization’s CPO, government CPO office, or the
courts. Prior consultation and authorization is recommended. Publication or
use of DPSIP data without an acceptable privacy impact assessment shall be
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considered ipso facto88 proof of a material breach of the DPSIP law and
regulations.
Some jurists have created and perpetuated the legal fiction of a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” as it relates to informational DPSIP issues. When a
person walks through a shopping center, one could expect that he or she will
be seen by another person. However, people may not expect that facial
recognition software and GPS technology may trace their every step, collect
total personal data on every purchase, and even track purchased goods after
purchase. Credit card data on purchased items must be limited to credit
purchase data only. In such situations a reasonable expectation of privacy
standard must apply.
A common exception in DPSIP legislation is national security. The rule allows
governments to ignore DPSIP laws with a simple and even unsubstantiated
claim. Historically, national security claims have been made to suspend civil
and human rights. Claims of national security are not an automatic
exemption; however, such issues can be processed using the checks and
balances of the state’s police powers. Perhaps Dr. Samuel Johnson
addressed the issue best when he said that “patriotism is the last refuge of a
scoundrel.”89 A few decades later, Ambrose Bierce offered a friendly
amendment that “patriotism is the first refuge of a scoundrel.”90
10.5 Alternative Legal Considerations
The adoption of DPSIP 3.0 legal standards will limit some assumed laisez-
faire personal information business practices. Violations of basic civil and
human rights, consumer protections, and international treaties justify
regulatory constraints. Legal protections afforded to government agencies
and business organizations must also be extended to DPSIP legal issues.
88 Res ipso facto means “by the fact itself.”
89 James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., at 615 (Henry Baldwin for Charles Dilly
ed. 1791).
90 Ambrose Bierce, The Collected Writings of Ambrose Bierce, at 323. (The Citadel Press ed.
1946).
Chapter Ten: Gold Standard Proposal 589
In response to the new DPSIP legal standards, business organizations that
deal with personal data may seek insurance coverage to respond to the risk.
Such a practice is standard in the business world. Business organizations
may seek to establish international DPSIP 3.0 compliance standards and
certification similar to International Standards for Business, Government, and
Society.91
DPSIP issues will continue to exist. At the time of this writing, many states
and countries have passed a range of approaches. In some regional groups
like the EU and APEC, staffers are working on evolving regional standards.
DPSIP 4.0 may include an international treaty based approach. Efforts at an
international DPSIP treaty must begin now. A sound basis is the DPSIP 3.0
standards.
10.6 Limitations of the Current Study and Future Research
Recommendations
The current study is an interdisciplinary analysis of modern DPSIP legal and
regulatory issues. The focus has included perspectives from the history and
current positions of the law, legal theory, human rights, business and
government practices, information technology, psychosocial concerns, and
psychological research. The study is a comparative law analysis using
sociolegal and positive law principles. The study examines international legal
91 See International Standards for Business Government and Society, Information
Technology. (2011), at
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_ics/catalogue_ics_browse.htm?ICS1=
35 (last visited on 26 December 2012). See also standards 17799, 22307, ISO
27000 Standards Series.
Chapter Ten: Gold Standard Proposal 590
standards and guidelines with a major focus on the AU, CA, SA, UK, and US
legal standards and approaches.
The approach reports the legal research and writings of distinguished legal
authorities in each of the countries studied. Examples include Professors J.
Neethling and Anneliese Roos in SA; Professor Ian Lloyd in the UK; Professor
Lawrence Lessig in the US; Professor Michael Geist in CA; and the Honorable
Justice Michael Kirby in AU.
The strengths of the study also reveal weaknesses in research. The study
focuses on historic and current issues and practices. As the field develops,
additional research will be needed to keep pace and even advance further
prescriptive legal approaches.
The design of the current study is limited to five generally English-speaking
countries. Future research could add to the list or focus on different countries.
During the course of this study interesting developments have evolved in
other countries like Mexico and India. Following the lead of the work of
Anneliese Roos,92 future work may focus on some European countries like
France and Germany.
With the exception of the work of revisionist historians, the history of the law
rarely changes. Historic insights can be revisited. As the technology and law
advance, some of the current data may be changed or become footnotes.
This is the nature of legal research.
10.7 The Need for DPSIP 3.0 Vigilance
DPSIP intrusions, surveillance, and violations are not victimless crimes or a
civil law nuisance. DPSIP breaches damage and harm the body politic.
Whether done by governments, business organizations, not-for-profit
92 Anneliese Roos, The Law of Data (Privacy) Protection: A Comparative and Theoretical
Study (LL.D. thesis, UNISA ed. 2003).
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organizations, or even individuals, DPSIP violations damage basic legal and
government principles.
Elaine Scarry writes that such violations repeal guarantees of privacy and
political freedom. Such behaviors reverse the fundamental constitutional
“requirement that people’s lives be private and the work of government
officials be public; instead it crafts a set of conditions in which our inner lives
become transparent, and the workings of the government [or business]
become opaque.”93
The first parade-of-horribles94 harm is that the countries in the study follow the
UK lead in establishing a surveillance society, where all traditionally private
behavior is monitored by faceless and non-accountable government
bureaucrats. Few checks or balances on big brother exist, and the legal
principle of obtaining a legal warrant is often ignored. Those who sanction
such violations of basic legal rights attempt to justify the violations in the name
of security. Violations of such principles are constitutional violations.
The second parade-of-horribles harm is that juristic organizations95 violate
DPSIP standards in the name of making profits. The theft of personal
information is often framed as providing better services while it is in fact
making profits that violate basic principles of distributive justice. A corollary is
found when governments obtain, even pay for, and use little brother to obtain
data, which is ordinarily illegal to possess.
The third parade-of-horribles harm claim is not popular with neo-conservative
advocates: a claim of damages can be made on an individual and class action
based on a behavioral basis.
From a psychological and psychosocial perspective, information privacy is an
93 Elaine Scarry, Rule of Law, Misrule of Men, (A Boston Review Book, The MIT Press ed.
2010) at 9-10.
94 Also known as the slippery slope principle or the parade-of-horrors objection.
95 Known as Little Brother.
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imperative. Information privacy has powerful consequential and meaningful
impacts on personal and societal wellbeing.96 "Privacy plays a central role in
human affairs. Without some degree of privacy, civilized life would not be
possible."97 Research in anthropology, architecture, design professions, law,
political science, psychology, and sociology supports the thesis.98 "Respect
for another's privacy is a legitimate expectation in all social relationships. As
a value, privacy does not exist in isolation, but is part and parcel of the system
and values that regulates action in society."99
Data protection and information privacy is more than a legal debate. The
concepts, principles, and laws are based on legal standards and
psychological–psychosocial realities. Information privacy laws recognize
relevant psychological and psychosocial research findings.
When procedures inhibit one's ability to control personal information, one
may be forced to alter the image that one portrays to others. That is, one
may be unintentionally forced to reveal information that he or she would
like to keep private, as part of his or her personal identity. In a similar
manner, the public self that one wishes to reveal may be threatened
when privacy is impinged. Privacy ensures control of self-other
boundaries.100
Data protection and information privacy are the focus of concern and study
from a range of disciplines. Ideally, the law should culminate the theory,
research, and data from legal history, business practices, political science,
philosophy, psychology, and sociology. Eric Fromm, a famous psychoanalyst,
96 See Charles T. Melton, The significance of law in the everyday lives of children and
families, 22 Georgia Law Review, 851 (1988). James Rachels, Why Privacy is
Important, 4 Philosophical and Public Affairs 4, 323 (1975). Charles R. Tremper &
Mark A. Small, Privacy Regulation of Computer-Assisted Testing and Instruction, 63
Washington Law Review 3, 841 (1988).
97 Louis W. Hodges, The Journalist and Privacy, 9 Journal of Mass Media Ethics 4, 97 (1994)
at 200.
98 Irwin Altman, Privacy: A Conceptual Analysis, 8 Environment and Behavior 1, 7 (1976) at 7.
99 Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is Not An Isolated Freedom, in Privacy (Nomos, XIII) (J. Ronald
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., Atherton Press 1971) at 71.
100 Bradley J. Alge, Effects of Computer Surveillance on Perceptions of Privacy and
Procedural Justice, 86 Journal of Applied Psychology 4, 798 (2001) at 798.
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wrote about issues of freedom and liberty. He offered a challenge to those
concerned about both and information privacy. He declared as follows:
We forget that, although each of the liberties which have been won
must be defended with utmost vigor, the problem of freedom is not only
a quantitative one, but a qualitative one; that we not only have to
preserve and increase the traditional freedom, but we have to gain a
new kind of freedom, one which enables us to realize our own
individual self, to have faith in this self and in life.101
The research supports the position of Oscar Ruebhausen and O. G. Brim.102
The authors maintained the following:
The essence of privacy is no more, and certainly no less, than the
freedom of the individual to pick and choose for himself the time and
circumstances under which, and most importantly, the extent to
which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior, and opinions are to be
shared with or withheld from others. The right to privacy is, therefore,
a positive claim to a status of personal dignity—a claim for freedom, if
you will, but freedom of a very special kind.103
Perhaps the best description of the psychological and psychosocial
principle supporting information privacy was argued by Immanuel Kant. He
explained that “Man is inclined to be reserved. ... We do not press our friends
to come into our water-closet, although they know that we have one just like
themselves. ... Everyone has a right to prevent others from watching and
scrutinizing his actions."104
Writing from a legal perspective, Charles Fried expanded the Kantian view.
101 Eric Fromm, Escape from Freedom,(Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc ed. 1941) at 126.
102 Oscar M. Ruebhausen & O. G. Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 Columbia Law
Review, 1184 (1965).
103 Id. at 1211.
104 Kant, I. (1930). Ethical duties toward others: Truthfulness (L. Infield, Trans.). (Indianapolis,
IN: Hackett Publishing Company) at 225.
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He maintained as follows:
Privacy is not just one possible means among others to insure some
other value, but it is necessarily related to ends and relations of the
most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust. Privacy is
not merely a good technique for furthering these fundamental relations;
rather without privacy they are simply inconceivable.105
Information privacy represents and performs a vital psychological and
social function. Individuals are more than social and political entities.
Individuals are discrete human beings with rights. Information privacy
is a vital psychological aspect and an integral part of functional
autonomy and self-development.
Abraham Maslow106 wrote about human needs. The basic need, the one
on which all other psychological needs are based, is security.
Information privacy is an element of security. Julie Inness107 wrote that
privacy infringements result in a sense of "violation, harm, and loss of
agency." Privacy allows people "to conduct ourselves... in a way that
serves purely individual demands.”108 The "interpersonal spheres of privacy
protected from the public gaze are essential for human emotional … life.”109
An essential issue is "What we can tolerate having out in the open between us
depends on what we think we can handle jointly without crippling our
relations for other purposes.”110
105 Charles Fried, Privacy (A Moral Analysis) in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An
Anthology (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., Cambridge University Press 1984) at
205.
106 Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, (John Wiley & Sons 3rd ed. 1999).
107 Julie C. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation, (Oxford University Press ed. 1992) at 3.
108 Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, 3 (1998)
at 17.
109 Id. at 20.
110 Id. at 16.
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“Men and animals share several basic mechanisms for claiming privacy
among their own fellows.”111 Robert Ardrey112 established The Territorial
Imperative as an accepted biological basis for different types of privacy. Louis
Hodges argued that "Privacy plays a central role in human affairs. Without
some degree of privacy, civilized life would not be possible."113
Charles Fried supported the psychological need for information privacy
in social relations. Fried wrote about the “sharing of information about
one's actions, beliefs, or emotions which one does not share with all, and
which one has the right not to share with anyone. By conferring this right,
privacy creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love.”114
Ruth Gavison takes the need for information privacy a step further.
Information privacy allows for the "promotion of liberty, autonomy, human
relations, and furthering the existence of a free society."115
The importance of and correlation of information privacy and psychological well-
being has been the subject of scientific studies. The two principles and dynamics
are connected. Judee Burgoon established the psychological and psychosocial
significance of "the degree of control that the individual can exercise, not only over
the initial release of the information but also over its subsequent distribution and
use."116 Irwin Altman clearly documented the need for information privacy as a
psychological imperative for psychosocial well-being and functioning. Privacy
involves a “selective control of access to the self or to one’s group.”117
Sandra Petronio showed the psychological importance of having control over one’s
personal information. She found the following:
111 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, (Atheneum ed. 1967) at 8.
112 Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative, (Atheneum ed. 1966).
113 Louis W. Hodges, The Journalist and Privacy, 9 Journal of Mass Media Ethics 4, 97 (1994)
at 200.
114 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale Law Journal, 475 (1968) at 492.
115 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale Law Journal 3, 421 (1980) at 423.
116 Judee K. Burgoon, Privacy and Communication, in Communication Yearbook 6 (Michael
Burgoon & Noel E. Doran eds., Sage Publications 1982) at 230.
117 Irwin Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory,
Crowding, (Brooks/Cole Publishing Company ed. 1975) at 18.
Chapter Ten: Gold Standard Proposal 596
Revealing private information is risky because there is a potential vulnerability
when revealing aspects of the self. Receiving private information from
another may also result in the need for protecting oneself. In order to manage
both disclosing and receiving private information, individuals erect a metaphoric
boundary to reduce the possibility of losing face and as a means of protection.
Also, people use a set of rules or criteria to control the boundary and regulate
the flow of private information to and from others.118
Sandra Petronio argued that privacy management is a demand–response between at
least two people.119 When given the right, disclosing people use five factors in
deciding when to release data: “(1) need to tell, (2) predicted outcome(s), (3) riskiness
of revealing the specific information, (4) privacy level of the specific information, and
(5) degree of emotional self-control.”120
Valerian Derlega and Alan Chaiken define privacy from a psychological and
psychosocial perspective. The essential feature of information privacy is control over
all aspects of self-disclosure. Control over "what one person tells another about
himself/herself'121 is a psychological imperative. The authors concluded as follows:
Privacy represents control over the amount of interaction we choose to
maintain with others. If one can choose how much or how little to divulge
about oneself to another voluntarily, privacy is maintained. If another person
can influence how much information we divulge about ourselves or how much
information input we let in about others, a lower level of privacy exists.122
Regulating access to the self in terms of self-disclosure outputs and inputs
affects one's own vulnerability to control by others as well as one's ability to
118 Sandra Petronio, Communication Boundary Management: A Theoretical Model of
Managing Disclosure of Private Information Between Marital Couples, 1
Communication Theory 4, 311 (1991) at 311.
119 Id. at 314.
120 Id. at 316.
121 Valerian J. Derlega & Alan L. Chaiken, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social
Relationships, 33 Journal of Social Issues 3, 102 (1977) at 103.
122 Id. at 102.
Chapter Ten: Gold Standard Proposal 597
influence other's outcomes (or to exercise power).123
Alan Westin summarized the importance of information privacy. He wrote:
Psychologists and sociologists have linked the development and
maintenance of this sense of individuality to the human need for
autonomy—the desire to avoid being manipulated or dominated wholly
by others. … The most serious threat to the individual’s autonomy is
the possibility that someone may penetrate the inner zone.124
Westin also noted cases where information privacy violations caused
damages.
The numerous instances of suicides and nervous breakdowns resulting
from such exposures by government investigation, press stories, and
even published research constantly remind a free society that only
grave social need can ever justify destruction of the privacy which
guards the individual's ultimate autonomy.125
Robert Laufer and Maxine Wolfe126 maintain that information privacy involves
information and interaction management. In the study, researchers found that
individuals whose private data was violated reported significant levels of loss of
control—not only of the information but in inter-action boundaries.
Ferdinand Schoeman127 summarized the psychological and psychosocial research
related to information privacy. He found:
What makes information private or intimate for a person is not just a function
123 Id. at 109.
124 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, (Atheneum ed. 1967) at 33.
125 Id. at 33-34.
126 Robert S. Laufer & Maxine Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue: A
Multidimensional Developmental Theory, 33 Journal of Social Issues 3, 22 (1977).
127 Ferdinand D. Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in Philosophical Dimensions of
Privacy: An Anthology (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., Cambridge University Press
1984).
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of the content of the information; it is also a function of the role the information
plays for the person... their importance to our conceptions of ourselves and to
our relationships with others. To entrust another with intimate information is
not primarily to provide the other with an arsenal that could prove detrimental
to ourselves if revealed to the world. Typically, this involves a trust that the
other will not regard the information as inconsequential.128
In his 4 March 1837 Presidential Farewell Address, Andrew Jackson
addressed one of the key issues of his time. DPSIP issues are the key
legal, political, cultural, and psychosocial issues of this day. President
Jackson’s words apply to the issues of this study. He said:
But you must remember, my fellow-citizens, that eternal vigilance by the
people is the price of liberty, and that you must pay the price if you wish
to secure the blessing. It behooves you, therefore, to be watchful in your
States as well as in the Federal Government.129
Since the middle ages, advancements in civil and human rights have
involved a struggle against those who hold power and authority however
gained, even against those who want to maintain their power at all costs.
Advancement in DPSIP protections is no different. Those who want to
assert their economic and political powers of social control will not give up
their advantage easily.
Strong DPSIP protections are justified by:
1. Research in the selected countries that shows that the majority of
the people want DPSIP protections and the numbers are increasing
over the years.
128 Ferdinand D. Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in Philosophical Dimensions of
Privacy: An Anthology (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., Cambridge University Press
1984) at 405-406.
129 Andrew Jackson, Presidential Farewell Address. (1837 March 4), at ¶ 27 at
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/jackson/farewelladdress.html
(last visited on 29 December 2012).
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2. Basic psychological and psychosocial research
3. Enlightenment political theory
4. Historic legal theory and agreements
5. Basic modern legal checks and balances and consumer protections
6. Basic principles of corporate social responsibility.
SA has some options. SA can:
1. Ignore or reject the DPSIP advances of the international community
and its trading partners.
2. Catch up to the standards of its various trading partners and the
Western world.
3. Follow its Constitutional mandate and advance DPSIP standards for
itself and the world.
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Appendix A
International Treaties and Conventions
Declaration AU CA SA UK US
International
International
Convention on the
Protection of the Rights
of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their
Families
D D D D D
International Covenant
on Civil and Political
Rights
P P P P P
The Convention on the
Rights of the Child
R R R R S
The Universal
Declaration of Human
Rights
P P Abstained P P
UN Guidelines for the
Regulation of
Computerized Personal
Data Files
Adopted by General
Assembly resolution
45/95 on 14 December
1990 – no vote
recorded [NV]
NV NV NV NV NV
Regional - Africa
African Charter on
Human and People’s
Rights
N/A N/A R N/A N/A
Declaration of
Principles on Freedom
of Expression in Africa
N/A N/A R N/A N/A
Regional – Asia
Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Privacy
Charter
S S N/A N/A S
Regional – European
European Convention
of Human Rights and
Fundamental
N/A N/A N/A P N/A
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Freedoms
European Union
Declaration
Seek Seek N/A P Seek
OECD Privacy
Standards
R R N/A P R
Regional – Western
Hemisphere
American Declaration
of the Rights and
Duties of Man
N/A S N/A N/A S
Guidelines Concerning
Personal Data Files
N/A S N/A N/A S
A – Accession
D – Did not support
N/A – Not Applicable
NV - No Vote Recorded [NV]
P - Party
R – Ratified
S - Signatory
Seek – Seeking compliance
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